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ABSTRACT
AT THE HANDS OF FATE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ISLAMIC INSURANCE IN INDONESIA,
MALAYSIA, AND PAKISTAN, C. 1980 TO THE PRESENT
Muhammad S. Rahman
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Dr. Francis Adams
Why have Islamic insurance systems developed well in some countries, but not in others?
Malaysia is considered as Islamic insurance elite due to its relatively large number of operators it
houses as well as the sustained growth of Islamic insurance sales within the country, while
Indonesia and Pakistan are still in early stages of development. Analyzing the political and social
history of Islamization of insurance systems in these three Muslim majority countries in Asia since
1980s, this dissertation demonstrates the development gap between these countries on Islamic
insurance results from; firstly, complex bargains made between various groups within each
country polity, and those bargains are structured by the country’s fundamental political
institutions. Secondly, the gap is also an outcome of different societal transformations during the
Islamization that ‘produce Islam(s)’ in these countries. The revival of Islamic principles in these
countries does not only create Sharia-compliant financial products but produces Islamic norms,
identities, ethics, and practices enacted in their risk management.
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GLOSSARY

Alim (pl. ulama): religious scholar in Islamic disciplines, gives opinions or issues rulings (fatwa)
on religious questions
Bancatakaful: combination of Islamic banking with Islamic insurance
dawah: propagation of the Islamic faith
faqih (pl. fuqaha): a legal expert, jurist in Islamic law
fatwa (pl. fatawat): authoritative religious injunction without legal binding
fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence based upon the Quran and Sunnah
halal: that which is lawful, permitted, good, and praiseworthy in Islam
Hanafi school: one of the four religious Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence. It is named after
the scholar Abu Hanifa an Nu’man ibn Thabit (d.767).
haram: actions that are unlawful and forbidden in Islam
hijab: clothing for the purposes of modesty and dignity according to Islamic dress code
ijtihad: independent reasoning. It is recognized as one of the legal methods of reasoning in
Islamic law (Sharia), which is completely independent of any school (madhhab) of jurisprudence
(fiqh).
madhhab (pl. madhahib): school of legal thought or jurisprudence that interpret the Quran and
hadith for followers. There are four main madhahib; Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali.
mudharabah: the commercial profit-sharing contract according to Islamic law
qadi: judge in the Islamic court system
pesantren: madrasah/traditional Islamic boarding school within Southeast Asian context
Shafii: one of the four religious Sunni schools of Islamic law. It was named after Imam al-Shafii
who lived in the early 9th century.
Sharia: Islamic law

vii
Sukuk: Islamic bonds
tajdid: renewal. In Islamic context, tajdid refers to the revival of Islam in order to purify and
reform society.
Takaful: mutual guarantee. In the modern context, this term is used to name Islamic alternative
for conventional insurance
riba: usury
ushr: specific type of religious tax implemented on agricultural products
wakalah: a principle in Islamic commercial law, which is based on the idea that the operator,
acting as an agent of the participants, can charge its management expenses on the Islamic
insurance contributions or premium paid.
zakat: religious tax, or obligatory distribution to the needy
zameen: Pakistani term for land, which along with family (zan) and wealth (zar) are the most
important things to be protected according to the tribal law
zan: family
zar: wealth
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Since the establishment of the first modern commercial Islamic bank, Dubai Islamic Bank
(DIB) in 1975,1 Islamic financial instruments (IFIs) have been largely promoted as a panacea for
many national economic problems, particularly throughout the Islamdom.2 This initiative
happened together with a growing common presumption that the economic development at that
time was a secular project that needed a thorough reexamination. Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, and
Sudan led the way for a national program of establishing Islamic economy.
Furthermore, the Islamic finance market is a dynamic and rapidly expanding sector. IFIs
are primarily comprised of Islamic Banking, Sukuk (Islamic Bonds), Takaful (Islamic insurance),
and Islamic Mutual Funds.3 Some scholars even argue these instruments help to maintain the
stability of the financial system as a whole by the simple fact that it provides an alternative to the
existing financial services. S. Nazim Ali and Shariq Nisar suggest, “The liberalization and
globalization of the financial systems have led to a homogenized financial system with the same
set of incentives and motivation, which led to global instability. Therefore, diversity in the
structure is considered a stabilizing factor.”4 Scott Schmith, an international trade specialist at

1

Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).
A historian Marshall G.S. Hodgson introduced the term Islamdom and it refers to the society in which the
Muslims and their faith are recognized as prevalent and socially dominant. He prefers not using the term Islamic
world because this term implies there are many separate and mutually exclusive worlds. See detail discussion in
Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam Conscience and History in a World Civilization (Chicago: Chicago :
University of Chicago Press, 1974). Page 58. For this dissertation, I will use term Islamdom to emphasize the
transnational dimension and uniformity of Muslims beyond their local and national identity, and I will use ‘Islamic
societies’ or Muslim societies talking about their diversity or particularities. Islamic societies and Muslim societies
are used by another historian, Ira Lapidus, in his magisterial work Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd
ed.. ed. (Cambridge New York : Cambridge University Press, 2002); ibid.
3
The word insurance or banking when prefixed by “Islamic‟ means that all theories and practices are examined
from the perspective of Islamic laws and values as enshrined in the Quran (holy book) and Hadith (sayings of
prophet Muhammad). See S. U Farooq et al., “An Analytical Study of the Potential of Takaful Companies,”
European Journal of Economics Finance and Administrative Sciences 20 (n.d.): 55–75.
4
Finance Harvard University Forum on Islamic, Takaful and Islamic Cooperative Finance : Challenges and
Opportunities / Edited by S. Nazim Ali, Shariq Nisar, Studies in Islamic Finance, Accounting and Governance.
(Cheltenham, Glos ; Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016).
2

2
the International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, USA, indicates other positive
effects of Islamic finance. He shows in his report that the growth of Islamic finance has helped to
diversify markets and institutional structures, particularly in oil-rich Muslim countries, and in
countries with significant Muslim minorities.5
Furthermore, several studies confirm the role of Islamic-based economies in dealing with
global financial crises. Studies conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that
co-operative banks-including local credit unions- and Islamic banks are among those financial
institutions that survived the 2007-2008 economic crisis. They were relatively distant from
‘speculative’ financial market that made them more resilient to any financial shocks. Both
institutions are different from commercial banks because they share some risk with the
depositors.6 During financial panics, Islamic banks especially were less prone to deposit
withdrawals, but even so, their lending is consistently less sensitive to change in deposits.
Therefore, during the recent crisis, these banks were able to provide more loans compared to
commercial banks.7
Besides banking, another financial instrument that has gained prominence recently is
Takaful or Islamic insurance. Takaful is a term for ‘mutual guarantee’ utilized by modern Muslim
societies in times of economic insecurity- illness, unemployment, widowhood, old age, etc.
Currently, Islamic insurance companies provide various Islamic insurance products such as life
and family (i.e., education fund), medical, marine and aviation, property and accident, and auto
insurances. Also, Islamic insurance has been used to unlock the potential for insurance
penetration in the Islamdom. Insurance markets in this area are largely at nascent or growth
stage of development with a very low insurance density, even in the most developed Muslimmajority countries.8
5

Scott Schmith, Islamic Banking Experiencing Rapid Growth (International Trade Administration, 2005),
https://www.trade.gov/MAS/pdf/Islamic_Banking.pdf.
6
Saeed Al-Muharrami and Daniel C Hardy, "Cooperative and Islamic Banks : What Can They Learn from Each
Other?," Working Paper No. 13/184 (2013),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Cooperative-and-Islamic-Banks-What-can-theyLearn-from-Each-Other-40888. Accessed September 20, 2016.
7
Moazzam Farooq and Sajjad Zaheer, "Are Islamic Banks More Resilient During Financial Panics?" IMF Working
Paper Research Department and Strategy, Policy, and Review Department (2015),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1541.pdf (accessed September 20, 2016).
8
Swiss Re sigma (2011), World Insurance (2010).
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Islamic insurance has experienced substantial growth globally; however, there has been
an uneven development of Islamic insurance between countries throughout the Islamdom. Some
countries, such as Iran, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia are Islamic insurance elites due to their
relatively large number of Islamic insurance operators their houses as well as the sustained
growth of Islamic insurance sales within their countries, while others including Indonesia,
Pakistan and Sudan are having limited development. This dissertation seeks to understand the
factors that influence the different developments of Islamic insurance of the three most
significant Islamic insurance markets in Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan.
Islamic insurance: fate, faith, and good faith
The idea of insurance itself is a profoundly religious insight. We live in a world of
uncertainty. We look around and still see potential disaster or risk at every turn. Illness, fire,
earthquakes, economic slowdowns, global warming, terrorist threat shows that our ability to
control our lives is not total. Religious scholars would say that in those big things, we are at the
hands of fate or luck or God's will. We can be discipline exercising at the gym, eat healthy food
and do not smoke to maintain our health. However, we have no control over healthcare cost.
Insurance was designed with this awareness. It protects us from the powers beyond our control.9
Insurance works by enabling us to ‘spread and transfer risk’. We pay a small amount of
money regularly so-called premium to an insurance company to get protection when our time of
need comes. Takaful or Islamic insurance goes beyond that. According to its proponents, Islamic
insurance follows the principles of religious injunctions strictly. It is a risk-sharing arrangement
based on Islamic law with a purpose to address the moral issues of speculation, interest-based
practices, and financial exclusion of conventional insurance.
Takaful comes from an Arabic term kafala meaning ‘cooperative’ or mutual indemnity. It
refers to the mutual assistance between members of society, be it a person, a society, an
institution or a government. It came from a pre-Islamic Arab tribe’s practice of giving blood
money. It is argued by many Islamic scholars that Prophet Muhammad embraced and validated
9

Steven Waldman, "Is the Health Insurance Industry Immoral?," the Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2009, accessed
13 October 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124950683016308929.
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it as part of the Islamic faith within the early Muslim society afterward.10 Later, the Muslims used
the concept of mutual assistance when they extended their trade by sea to the Far East. The
merchants put aside a sum of money as a collective fund to compensate for any loss incurred by
any of them during the trading journey.11
In the context of contemporary Islamic insurance, the initial official forum that discusses
the legitimacy of insurance in the Islamic world was the Congress of Islamic Research in Cairo
back in 1965. Afterward, at the first international conference on Islamic economics in 1976 in
Mecca, Saudi Arabia, Islamic scholars from various countries met and reached a consensus that
conventional insurance for profit was deemed as contradicting Islamic law.12 In the early 1980s,
Muslim scholars together with Muslim financial practitioners started to develop this concept as
modern private-based insurance services where primarily a group of participants donating funds
into a pool managed by a company that members could use in the event of personal or business
contingencies.
The first Islamic insurance company -the Islamic Insurance Company of Sudan- was
founded in Sudan in the year 1979. Another declaration was proclaimed in the Second
Conference of International Council of Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) in Jeddah in 1985, which declared all forms commercial insurance is prohibited.
13

Also, this council recommended cooperative insurance as the preferred alternative.14 Several

countries followed it up by issuing specific Islamic insurance regulations, rules, and guidelines.

10

There were three kinds of mutual financial protection created by traditional Arab merchant: hilf, daman khatr
al-tarid and Aqila. Hilf is mutual risk fund to assist victims of natural disasters or hazards of trade journeys. Daman
khatr al-tariq (a kind of surety) was placed to recover the losses caused by bandits or pirates. Aqila was practiced
preventing bloodshed among tribal members by extending compensation to ransom captives or to settle a claim
from an accidental killing. For more detail, see: Abdullaah Jalil et al., The Concept of Social Security in Islamic
Economy, Islamic Economic System Conference 2015 (iECONS 2015) (Krabi, Thailand: 2015).
11
Syed Othman Alhabshi Shaikh Hamzah Shaikh Abdul Razak, "Takaful: Concept, History, Development, and Future
Challenges of Its Industry," Islam and Civilisational Renewal 1, no. 2 (December 2009).
https://www.icrjournal.org/icr/index.php/icr/article/view/268
12
Muammar Dahnoun and Basil Alqudwa, "Islamic Insurance: An Alternative to Conventional Insurance," American
Journal of Humanities & Islamic Studies 1, no. 1 (2018).
13
The term ‘commercial’ was used before the establishment of Islamic bank and Islamic insurance. After the
establishment, it is more common to use term ‘conventional’ Vis a vis ‘Islamic’ to differentiate the new method of
Islamic commercial bank and Islamic commercial insurance and the common ways of banking and insurance.
14
The Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Council of the Islamic Fiqh
Academy 1985-2000 (2012).
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For example, after experimentation for more than a decade, Sudan promulgated a
comprehensive Islamic insurance regulation in 1992, Pakistan replaced its old Insurance Act with
the Insurance Ordinance in 2000, and Saudi Arabia enacted the new Supervision on Cooperative
Insurance Act of 2003 and so on.15 Before these regulations, Islamic insurance companies in those
countries operated under conventional insurance or cooperative laws. Except for Malaysia,
Islamic insurance companies in Malaysia started to run only after the promulgation of the Takaful
Act of 1984.
Currently, there are two types of service provided by an Islamic insurance company:
General Takaful and Family Takaful. General Takaful is usually a short-term policy where Islamic
insurance participants pay contributions and operators undertake to manage risk. General
Takaful gives protection to the participant for losses arising from perils such as accident, fire,
flood, liability, and burglary. Family Takaful provides protection and long-term savings where
participants or their beneficiary will be presented with financial benefits if they suffer a tragedy.
At the same time, they will enjoy long-term personal savings because part of their contribution
will be deposited in an account for savings. Participants will be able to enjoy investment returns
from the savings portion based on a pre-agreed ratio.16
Nonetheless, there is no religious requirement for joining Islamic insurance. Not only
Muslim but also everyone can use this service. Islamic insurance does not require the buyer to
adhere to other Sharia principles within the religion of Islam or becomes a Muslim, but it only
needs the buyer to comply with the Sharia or Islamic law principles of the conduct of business.
Like conventional insurance the issues of "insurable interest" and uberrimae fidei (of the fullest
confidence) are equally valid in Islamic insurance contract also. Islamic law emphasizes the
principle of uberrimae fidei in any form of contractual agreement. According the Islamic jurists,
the contract is void unless there is honesty, full disclosure, truthfulness, and utmost good faith

15

Ajmal Bhatty and Shariq Nisar, "Takaful Journey: The Past, Present and Future," in Takaful and Islamic
Cooperative Finance: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. S. Nazim Ali and Shariq Nisar (Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2016).
16
Dahnoun and Alqudwa.
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among the parties. Non-compliance of these makes the contract unenforceable, and it applies
fully to any Islamic insurance contract. 17
Islamic scholars mention that the primary purpose of Islamic insurance is to deal with the
prohibited or haram practices of modern finance: the payment of prohibited interest (riba), the
existence of uncertainty in a transaction of inordinate risk and insufficient transparency (gharar),
gambling (maysir), and investing in prohibited activities such as alcoholic beverage production,
gambling, drugs and tobacco. It places great importance on the moral consequences of financial
transactions. Besides that, Islamic insurance is different from other conventional finance in
respect of risk mitigation. It uniquely emphasizes risk sharing rather than trading and shifting of
risk. According to these scholars, Islamic insurance alters the practices of modern financial
transactions in two ways: enforcing Sharia-compliant contracts and creating a mutual
organizational framework.18
Sharia prohibits the use of the interest-based instrument and certain types of equities
companies. According to Muslims’ understanding, the use of interest creates possibilities of
exploitation of the one who needs money by the one who has plenty. The basic premise of Islamic
finance is the parties involved must mutually share risk and reward. The uncertainty of
conventional insurance lays on lack of transparency as to what premium is for management
expenses, how much portion is for claim payments, and what portion is for policyholders or
shareholders a return.19
Moreover, many Muslim scholars consider the joint-stock insurance model speculative.
In the joint-stock insurance model, participants seek to profit from the risk of an indeterminate
event will occur.20 This model comprises an undertaking by an insurer in exchange for
consideration to make a payment to the insured if a specified event occurs. This commutative

17

Uberrimae fidei contracts or contracts of utmost good faith refer to a class of contracts where certain material
facts to the contract are within the exclusive knowledge of one party and hence, the other party depends upon the
good faith of the party with knowledge to disclose it. See Haemala Thanasegaran and Mohammed Shaiban,
"Harmonisation of Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Regulation- a Realistic Goal or Improbable Ideal?," Singapore Journal
of Legal Studies (2014).
18
Ajmal Bhatty, The Growing Importance of Takaful Insurance, Asia Regional Seminar (Kuala Lumpur: 2017).
19
Bhatty and Nisar, in Takaful and Islamic Cooperative Finance: Challenges and Opportunities.
20
Serap Oguz Gonulal, ProQuest, and C. S. A. ProQuest, Takaful and Mutual Insurance [E-Book] Alternative
Approaches to Managing Risks (Washington, D.C.: Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2012).
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contract of the mainstream conventional insurance is specifically objectionable by Sharia. This
type of contract unduly limits uncertainty and ambiguity in human lives. Muslims can take steps
to minimize the impact of events; however, they believe that what happens is predetermined by
God’s will. Furthermore, Muslim scholars consider conventional insurance is prohibited because
the insurers pay for a loss of human life which is priceless, and they aim to generate profit for
their stakeholders not whom there are insuring. This conceptual paradigm is the essential
differences between mainstream conventional insurance and Islamic insurance.21
Nonetheless, Islamic insurance is not a health care sharing ministry as developed by many
faith-based communities in the United States, such as Samaritan Healthcare ministry, Medishare, Liberty HealthShare, etc. Islamic insurance operator is a for-profit company and regulated
by the government as an insurance service. Meanwhile, these faith-based communities
established health care sharing ministry as non-profit entities and with the purpose of promoting
certain religious values.22 The Affordable Care Act or Obamacare gives exemption to the
members of health care sharing ministry plans due to this religious reason (which will end after
2018). They are exempt from the mandate to purchase insurance or face financial penalties.
These health-sharing plans necessitate the religious devotion of the members. The
members need to obey specific behavior rules; for instance, they are not allowed to smoke, to
use illegal drugs, to drink heavily, and to abuse prescription medications. These plans also are not
covering medical expenses that are incurred from behavior that is deemed immoral, such as outof-wedlock births or drunken-driving accidents, or medical procedures that conservative
Christians oppose, such as abortion and gender-reassignment surgery, or even birth control, as
required under Obamacare. The members must sign documents agreeing to obey those rules
including going to church regularly and being faithful in their marriage. Their pastor had to affirm
that they were active in their faith community. Liberty HealthShare, based in Canton, Ohio, for
example, requires its members to follow God’s commandments in their daily lives. The provider

21

Hussein A Abdou, Ali Khurshid, and Roger J. Lister, “A Comparative Study of Takaful and Conventional Insurance:
Empirical Evidence from the Malaysian Market,”
Insurance Markets and Companies: Analyses and Actuarial Computations 5, no. 1 (2014): 22–34.
22
Serap Oguz Gonulal, Takaful and Mutual Insurance [e-Book] Alternative Approaches to Managing Risks,
Directions in Development (Washington, D.C.). Finance (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2012).
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is also constantly reminding them that the purpose of the plan is not to save money and gain
profit but to honor the biblical teaching to “share one another’s burdens”.23
However, there is no unanimous agreement among all Muslims concerning the lawfulness
of insurance transaction mentioned above. Muslim scholars from different legal schools of
thought have different opinions on each detail of financial transactions, particularly on Islamic
insurance. Some scholars even argue that conventional insurance is lawful under Sharia due to
its benefits for individuals and society. Shaikh Abd al-Rahman Isa and Shaikh Muhammad al-Bahi,
Professors of Al-Azhar University; Shaikh Muhammad Yusuf and Shaikh Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf
from University of Cairo; Bahjah Hilmi, advisor of high court of Egypt; Muhammad Dasuki and
Shaikh Muhammad Najatullah Shiddiqi from King Abdul Aziz University; Shaikh Muhammad
Ahmad, economist of Pakistan; Shaikh Muhammad al-Madhani and Shaikh Mustafa Ahmad al–
Zarqa from University of Syria, are example of Islamic scholars who do not prohibit conventional
insurance services.24 According to them, insurance is a cooperative; therefore, there is no usury
applied in this type of transaction.
This disagreement is beyond the scope of this dissertation, although it may have some
effects on the level of public acceptance toward insurance services. This dissertation focuses on
Islamic insurance as a global social phenomenon, which was introduced, regulated and
implemented widely by Muslim societies to replace conventional insurance.
Why is this important?
Islamic insurance’s geographical penetration is overgrowing. Islamic insurance is
regionally significant in Gulf Cooperation Countries/GCC mainly in Saudi Arabia (KSA), Iran where
the government prohibits conventional insurance and South and Southeast Asia with Malaysia at
its core development. Islamic insurance’s growth has primarily outpaced the insurance sector
growth in these regions. The demand has grown particularly within the GCC, as there is a shift

23

Paul Demko and Renuka Rayasam, "Why Desperate Families Are Getting Religion on Health Coverage," Politico,
last modified February 4, 2018.https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/02/04/obamacare-religion-healthcare-216933
24
Syakir Sula, Asuransi Syariah, Konsep dan Sistem Operasional, page 71–76, as cited in Muhammad Maksum, "The
Growth of Islamic Insurance in the World and Indonesia," Al-Iqtishad III, no. 1 (2011).
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toward ethical, innovative and Sharia-compliant financial solutions. This growing need has also
resulted in the launching of new Islamic insurance products, and these services are not only
provided by Islamic countries, but also by American, European and Asian companies.25 Islamic
insurance is growing fast and reaching new places where conventional insurance has not been
able to succeed, especially in life insurance.26 In other words, the future development of global
insurance cannot be separated from the development of Islamic insurance.
Despite its growing importance within the global financial system and in the daily lives of
individuals, Islamic insurance is the least understood compared to the other Islamic Financial
Instruments (IFIs). Islamic insurance’s gross contribution (gross premiums) is estimated at
around $14.9 billion in 2015.27 After four decades, Islamic insurance’s total contribution has
grown from $750 million in the year 2000, to $2.5 billion (2006), and then $12.4 (up to 23.9 billion
including Iran in 2012). With an annual growth rate of 20%, growth Islamic insurance contribution
is expected to be around $52.5 billion in 2020. Islamic insurance has also brought many players
in the business. It started by a handful of operators in 1980s, increased by 58 operators in 2003,
and then 241 operators in 39 countries in 2012 with total global employees are estimated 70,010
(2013).28 After 37 years (2016), there is a total of 308 Islamic insurance companies globally with
mainly delivering insurance services in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Even American
International Group, Inc., or AIG has also been offering Sharia-compliant home-owners insurance
in the US through its subsidiary, Lexington Insurance Company. This company provides customtailored Sharia-compliant insurance solutions to consumers across the United States by working
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together with a New Jersey-based insurance brokerage firm, Zayan Takaful.29 Despite this
auspicious development, scholarly articles on the industry are sparse, particularly compared to
the study on Islamic banking.
If the industry is less understood, it is more so than the politics involving the Islamic
insurance industry. Although insurance, in general, is one of the largest state-regulated
industries, scholarly literature on insurance has ignored the political economy aspects of
insurance regulation. Most of the studies on insurance stress on the economic structure of the
insurance industry and the economic theory of regulation. The economic theory of regulation
contends that regulation is sought by the industry and designed for its own benefit. “The
argument is because insurance issues are generally complex and rarely salient; the insurance
industry should have a great advantage over consumer groups, bureaucrats, and political
elites.”30 This theory sees insurance as a ‘non-political’ issue. Arguably, the same reason has
made political scientists reluctant to discussing the Islamic insurance industry.
Furthermore, political scientists prefer to focus on social insurance, which is provided by
the government rather than the one that is promoted by the private sector such as Islamic
insurance. Governments spent much money through social insurance, which produced a
substantial level of public expenditure in many developed economies. This scheme was the
manifestation of what John G. Ruggie once called ‘embedded liberalism’: a global order made up
of free-market societies with a compromise that allowed compensation for those who lost out
from trade liberalization.31 Protecting the population against economic insecurity is a way of
ensuring the dynamism of the economy to be politically sustainable and morally defensible.
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However, the acceleration of automation and globalization limit the ability of the national
government in protecting its domestic workers. There has been a transfer of risk from previously
managed by the state or employer to the individual. Everyone must decide by him or herself how
to handle his or her pension plan, investment, and saving.32 As a result, insurance companies
have become the dominant service provider for individuals and organizations to plan their future
and protect them from losses. Rather than seeing this process as natural, we need to examine
the homogenizing trend of the current neoliberalism. Perhaps, the growing importance of
private-based Islamic insurance is as an instance of “The Retreat of the State” in the Islamdom.33
Furthermore, even though the development of Islamic insurance is a clear manifestation
of Islamic revival,34 political scientists have rarely put attention to this development compared to
the issue of political Islam, radicalization, or even terrorism. It is surprising, especially when we
understand that Islamic finance instruments including Islamic insurance are Muslims’ responses
to capitalism as a social and economic phenomenon.35 One of prominent contemporary Islamic
scholars in the West, Shaikh Hamza Yusuf, suggests that the single most important aspect of the
Sharia after personal law of marriage are the commercial laws. Also, he adds that most Islamic
books on Islamic law deal with issues on commerce.36
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Islamic insurance shows how modern Muslims adapt their traditions to engage with
today's world particularly the growing economic insecurity. It is an example of strategies that
have enabled Muslims to remain true to their faith while engaging effectively with a world, not
of their own making.37 This dissertation wants to present the transformation of Muslim societies,
particularly about the interaction between what Muslims believe (religion) and what, as a
consequence, they do in politics and economics.
Furthermore, this research intends to give a scientific contribution toward the existing
literature on Islamic insurance and International Political Economy (IPE) in several ways. Firstly,
most research on Islamic insurance up to now has been survey driven and quantitative. This
dissertation argues for qualitative research as a means of adding breadth and depth to existing
studies of insurance implementation. Secondly, it intends to fill the gap within the studies of
Islamic insurance development from its political determinants. The purpose is to understand how
fate: potential harm, risk, crisis, economic insecurity, are manufactured and controlled in cultural
and politico-economic context. Thirdly, it broadens the discussion of comparative IPE by including
the social dimension of its analysis. It concerns how meaning ascribed to insurance changes over
time, which is the behavior, the habit, and action of the consumers and providers within the
system. The following paragraphs provide these expected contributions in further details.
Aside from rational calculation, historical circumstances are also essential to understand
the context of an economic institution such as Islamic insurance. The defining characteristic of
the historical view is its emphasis on `path dependence': ways in which the cumulative past,
including the history of shocks and their effects, change the structure of the economy. Most
studies on Islamic insurance have an underlining assumption that Islamic insurance will
eventually be accepted by Muslim societies universally. As they become more modern and
religious, they become more acceptable toward modern financial schemes such as Islamic
banking and Islamic insurance.
On the contrary, the study of its historical context might push us to review this modernist
view. A country with under-developed Islamic insurance may show a different path of response
against economic insecurity. Probably, the private-sector-led Islamic insurance just does not fit
37
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for that country. Some Muslim majority countries may pursue other ways of providing economic
protection to their citizens such as through state or community-based assistance. The
development gap in Islamic insurance and the various adjustments help us to identify different
patterns of national response. This political process may depend not on the influence of doctrinal
forms of Islam, but on historically, sociologically, and ideologically determined pattern of political
agency.38 In line with that, it may refute a simple notion of homogenization of global Islamic
finance.
On the other hand, we cannot easily ignore the force of globalization of finance. It creates
institutions and standards across different national boundaries. Thus, studying Islamic insurance
can help us to examine the patterns of change within the Muslim societies especially in its
relation to the economy. The consensus among historians suggests in the pre-modern Muslim
societies economically defined social classes were relatively less significant as the famous Islamic
historian, Ira Lapidus had claimed. 39The remaining puzzle would be whether this claim is still valid
within the current context of economic globalization.
In conclusion, this study is expected to broaden the theoretical discussion on comparative
IPE. The works of such notables as Lindblom along with economists Robert Heilbroner and Lester
Thurow argue that states and markets do not exist in a vacuum.40 There are usually many
different social groups within a state who share identities, norms, associations based on tribal
ties, ethnicity, religion, or gender. Examining the societal aspect helps us to understand the
context where political economy institutions exist. Studying a value-laden financial service such
as Islamic insurance helps us understand the relationship between political economy and cultural
differences. Economic activity is not merely a process of producing, accumulating and distributing
wealth, but it is also a cultural process where people construct meaning. Therefore, removing
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cultural particularities in political economy analysis means dismissing context where our
institutions exist.
Finally, yet importantly, studying the context of institutions has practical consequences.
Unless we learn to link cultural, local, domestic to the economic, international, and global, we
will not be able to identify predictions and policies that work better.
Case studies: three countries, three trajectories
This study investigates the causes of Islamic insurance development gap between three
Muslim majority countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. Malaysia has shown a significant
growth rate in Islamic insurance demand and outpacing conventional insurance, while other
countries including Indonesia and Pakistan, the home for 225 million and 200.3 million or 12.7%
and 11% of the world’s Muslims,41 are still standing far behind Malaysia. Not only different in
growth, but these three countries also seem to have different strategies in developing their
Islamic insurance industries.
Since the 1980s, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan have experienced globalization in two
folds: Islamization and economic liberalization. The 1979 revolution in Iran had an enormous
global effect. It was for the first time Islamists gained power in a modern state. This event
coincided with, and some have argued spurred, a broader resurgence of Islam around the world,
including in these three countries.42
Abbot and Gregorios-Pippas define Islamization as ‘the intensification of Islamic influence
on social, cultural, economic and political relations.’43 There was an increasing religious
commitment toward Islam among the middle classes in these countries. For instance, many
Muslim women started using the veil in public. In many urban areas, Madrasahs or Islamic
schools were established. The number of Muslim middle classes were increasing; consequently,
it also led to an increase in their political demand and economic influences. They demanded the
expansion of Sharia law in the judicial system. Some scholars prefer to use the term ‘Islamic
41
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revival’ instead of Islamization to label specifically the phenomenon that happened in the post1970s and to underline the growing universalistic Islamic identity, which transcends national and
ethnic customs.44 In this dissertation, both terms are used interchangeably.
At the same time, the economic stagflation of the 1970s encouraged many countries to
look for a new economic system. Starting with Chile in 1975, various governments adopted and
implemented liberal economic policies. Adding to that, the collapse of the Communist bloc at the
end of the late 1980s generated political opposition to state interventionism in favor of
unregulated market policies.
Beginning in the early 1980s, Indonesia embarked on the most comprehensive trade
liberalization program in its history under President Soeharto. The long-term goal of the reform
program was to replace Indonesia's industrial development strategy of import-substitution
industrialization with one of export-oriented industrial growth. In Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad was inaugurated as the Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981 with main agendas to boost
Malaysia’s economy and to respond to the growing political threat from the Malaysian Islamist
political party of PAS. Meanwhile, the government of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was ousted
in a coup d'état led by a former Army general, Zia-ul-Haq. He then became the sixth President of
Pakistan with two cornerstones economic policy, including liberalization and Islamization of the
economy. Islamic finance emerged within this context, in which the waves of Islamization and
economic liberalization were sweeping the globe.
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan were the pioneers of Islamic finance, not only in the
region but also in the world. Currently, these countries are the three most significant Islamic
insurance markets in Asia. They are similar in many important dimensions. Islam has a prominent
role in the social and political lives of the countries. Their population is majority Muslims. Pakistan
declares itself as an Islamic state, while Malaysia gives special status for Islam as the religion of
the Federation. Indonesia is not an Islamic state nor gives higher status to Islam, but Islam is the
most adhered to religion in Indonesia, with around 87.2% of the population are Muslims. The
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majority of Indonesian and Malaysian Muslims follow the Shafii School of law (madhhab).45
Meanwhile, most Pakistanis are Hanafis with an also significant number of Shafii followers.46 The
government of Indonesia provides legal protection and financial support for not only Islam but
also other five other religions. The Constitution of Indonesia also states that Indonesia is not a
secular but a religious country.
The political economy situation of these three countries before the year of 2000 was also
similar. They had authoritarian governments who controlled their social and cultural institutions.
These countries had elements of democracy, such as general election and mass media, but the
governments had enormous power and resources to ensure that these democratic elements did
not work against them. There was widespread government favoritism in the distribution of fiscal
expenditures and extensive political influence in the allocation of credit. On the other hand, the
governments did not provide vast social security benefits for their general populations. These
governments had been looking to several approaches of reducing the burden on their fiscal
budgets arising from benefits being paid out to their growing population, particularly since the
1980s.
Moreover, there was no compulsory insurance introduced in these countries (except for
Indonesia after 2014 with a universal healthcare system of JKN). The leaders had preference over
liberal economic policies but wanted to maintain their political control at the same time. The
ability to distribute economic resources among their supporters was the key to their political
successes. Leaders in each country were avowed nationalists and maintained extensive personal
control over the formation of economic policy.
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan are multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries. There
are over 300 ethnic groups live in an archipelago of 17,508 islands of Indonesia with Javanese
constitutes the largest group. There is also diversity in the religious affiliation among Indonesians.
The government only recognizes six official religions, but there are more than 245 non-official
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religions in Indonesia, according to the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP).47
Malaysia society consists of three major ethnic groups: Malays, Chinese-Malaysian, and IndianMalaysia. In the eastern part of Malaysia, there is also a small number population of indigenous
Bornean. Islam is the official religion, but Malaysia acknowledges the freedom of religion. As of
the 2010 Population and Housing Census, 61.3 percent of the population practices Islam; 19.8
percent Buddhism; 9.2 percent Christianity; 6.3 percent Hinduism; and 3.4 percent traditional
Chinese religions. The remainder is other faiths, including Animism, Folk religion, Sikhism, Baha'i
Faith, and other belief systems.48
Meanwhile, Islam is the state religion of Pakistan, and around 98% of Pakistanis are
Muslims. The majority are Sunni, and 6% of them are Shia.49 Other data shows that Shia-Pakistani
population reaches 10-15% of the total Muslim population of Pakistan.50 Pakistan consists of
diverse ethnic communities. The major ethnic groups in Pakistan in numerical size include
Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Siddis, Saraikis, Muhajirs, Baloch, Hindkowans, Chitralis, Gujarati and
other smaller groups.51
Indonesia and Malaysia are two neighboring countries located in Southeast Asia region
and share many similarities beyond the similarity in religion. These include standard frames of
reference in history and culture. Furthermore, Indonesia and Malaysia are also working closely
together regionally and internationally. They are the founding members of ASEAN and APEC, and
members of the Non-aligned Movement and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
Despite sharing so many similarities, they achieve different levels of Islamic insurance
development and Islamic finance in general. Malaysia has become the hub of Islamic finance of
Southeast Asia and the world, while Indonesia still has a vast untapped market. Not only in Islamic
insurance but Indonesia life insurance penetration was also 0.99% in 2015, lower than
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neighboring Malaysia with 3.33%.52 It is partly due to the differences in the compulsory insurance
regulations. The mandatory portion of insurance in both countries are small. However, Malaysia
has a higher requirement than Indonesia. For instance, Indonesia requires only a basic life and
accident insurance for a driver of an automobile, which includes in the vehicle registration and
driver license fee. Although the tariff is standardized, Malaysia requires third-party protection in
vehicle insurance.
Furthermore, Malaysia has been officially developing Islamic finance since 1983 (Islamic
insurance in 1984) with high government commitment and top-down approach comprehensively
and pragmatically. On the other hand, the Government of Indonesia only started to support the
development of Islamic finance in 1992 and Islamic insurance in 1994. There are less government
support and more community initiative from below in Indonesia’s Islamic finance development.
In 2016, total premiums and contributions of Malaysia’s insurance sector increased by
4.4% to RM 61.3 billion or USD 14 billion (2015: +4% to RM 58.7 billion), while combined
insurance and Islamic insurance assets expanded by 5% to RM 277 billion or USD 64 billion (2015:
+5.7% to RM 263.8 billion). There were also 55 insurers and Islamic insurance operators, including
reinsurers and Islamic re-insurance operators, in the industry as at end-2016.53 Altogether,
Malaysia has been contributing by 70% of the total regional market of Southeast Asia and 13% of
the global market of Islamic insurance, respectively.
Meanwhile, Indonesia Islamic insurance sector has been showing significant growth too
by having the contribution of 19% of the total regional market. In 2016, Islamic insurance in
Indonesia accounted for 6.2 percent of the overall Indonesia insurance market with asset more
than 42 trillion IDR (3.1 million USD).54 Islamic insurance was introduced to Indonesian society
through the establishment of PT Syarikat Takaful Indonesia (Takaful Indonesia) on 24 February
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1994. It was the first Sharia-compliant insurance company in Indonesia, which was endorsed by
ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) and promoted through Islamic informal and
formal organizations. Since then, Indonesia’s Islamic insurance has now developed into 20 Family
Takaful companies, which consist of 3 Family Takaful companies and 17 units of Family Takaful,
and 25 General Takaful composed of 2 fully-fledged Takaful companies and 23 units, and three
Islamic re-insurance windows.55 In 2015, the Islamic Insurance Association of Indonesia (AASI)
had 61 Islamic insurance companies listed as its members.56 The introduction of the new
insurance law of 2014 was partly responsible for this positive development.
Moreover, microtakaful or micro-Islamic insurance has been utilized to help poor
especially in rural Indonesia. Through this micro Islamic insurance program, poor people only
need to buy monthly premium of 5,000 IDR (50 cents) to receive proper health care against
dengue fever. Micro Islamic insurance in Indonesia is an instance of the bottom-up approach of
Indonesia’s Islamic finance strategy. It is based on Indonesia’s communitarian tradition, which
has provided a strong foundation for the national economy. On the other hand, micro-Islamic
insurance is lacking in Malaysia. Malaysia’s Islamic insurance companies focus more on the
middle class and affluent Malay Muslims. Instead of providing social insurance, the state
governments rely on the religious charity of zakat to assist their poor population.
In sum, Malaysia’s Islamic insurance industry has higher growth compared to Indonesia.
Moreover, there is not the only gap in the level of development, but also differences in strategies.
These two neighboring nations have different priorities related to the development of their
Islamic insurance structure.57
Pakistan shows another different story on its Islamic insurance development. In 2016,
Pakistan was the third largest Takaful market in Asia along with Malaysia and Indonesia.58
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Pakistan is an Islamic state. The creation of Pakistan was to establish land for Muslims.
Demographically, Pakistan is more like Indonesia. Almost 95% of 180 million Pakistanis are
Muslim.
The government of Pakistan has been very involved in promoting various programs to
bring Pakistan law in line with the principle of Sharia law. For instance, approximately 7,000
interest-free counters were opened at all the nationalized commercial banks in January 1980,
making Pakistan the first country in the Muslim world with the largest number of Islamic banking.
In 2012, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, through notification S.R.O
877(I)/2012 dated July 16, 2012, issued the Takaful rules 2012, allowing conventional insurers to
operate Islamic insurance windows alongside their existing conventional insurance business, and
conduct Islamic insurance business.
Nevertheless, Pakistan has a very small Islamic insurance market (both total Islamic
insurance penetration and density) compared to Malaysia, and even to Indonesia. There was no
Islamic insurance company in Pakistan before 2006, and then only five companies operated in
2012. In 2010, the gross premium of Islamic insurance in Pakistan was just US$ 25.92 million,
which is quite small compared to Malaysia with US$ 1.5 billion within the same year.59 Pakistan
started the Islamization of its economy since the 1980s, but it is not clear why Pakistan delayed
the development of Islamic insurance until 2012. Pakistan preferred to focus on the
implementation of Zakat (poor-due) to provide economic assistance for most of its poor
population.
Indeed, there are some differences in their economic characteristics, such as the level of
poverty and globalization that influence the growth and the direction of countries’ Islamic
insurance development. Pakistan has a higher level of poverty and a lesser connection to the
global economy compares to Indonesia and Malaysia. However, this economic factor alone does
not drive outcomes. Moreover, if this is more about religion as many insurance scholars
suggested, what influence the acceptance toward Islamic insurance among the three countries’
population who profess the same religion of Islam? The variation between countries is still
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puzzling. Consideration of the political and social aspects of Islamic insurance development in
these countries is needed to complete the story. This dissertation project investigates various
socio-political factors contributing to this gap and their different trajectories.
‘Political life’ and ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance
My theory on the development of Islamic insurance rests on the analysis of Islamic
insurance as a product of political decision and social practice. It focuses on how the decision of
political actors to embrace and regulate Islamic insurance as a state’s policy and the acceptance
of public of Islamic insurance in their daily lives influence the development gap of Islamic
insurance between the three countries. This dissertation aims to understand the whole picture
of Islamic insurance development; therefore, it concerns less on how an increase or decrease in
a unit of independent variables influences changes in the unit of dependent variables.
The literature on Islamic insurance suggests most demographic and economic factors for
conventional insurance demand are also responsible for the development of Islamic insurance in
the countries. Although Islamic insurance was designed as an alternative to conventional
insurance, it needs similar conditions to grow. The factors such as inflation, income, education,
urbanization, and dependency ratio are affecting the country’s Islamic insurance development.
These factors are essential; however, they cannot fully explain the reason why the government
and its people supporting or rejecting Islamic insurance as an accepted and normative practice
within society. Those findings are beneficial only when we disregard the historical context and
socio-political particularities of the countries. For instance, the increase in income does not
necessarily affect Islamic insurance development if the government outlaws its practice in the
first place.
Moreover, those variables also cannot depict the reasons why Islamic insurance is
organized and structured in a certain way; for instance, the way dispute should be solved. The
law in Malaysia gives that authority to civilian court, while in Indonesia dispute settlement is
managed under Islamic court jurisdiction. So, why they introduce it in the first place? Why the
government regulates it? These are political and cultural related questions, which cannot be
answered without understanding the historical context of Islamic insurance in the country.
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As mentioned before, most research on insurance to date has been survey-driven and
quantitative. This dissertation makes a case for qualitative research on the ‘political life’ and the
‘social life’ of Islamic insurance in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan as a means of adding breadth
and depth to existing studies of insurance implementation.
The term ‘political life of Islamic insurance’ is developed based on the argument that
Islamic insurance arrangements are not a passive response to some efficiency criterion but rather
the product of political deals within country’s polity that determine which laws are passed.60 The
payment, involving all the details of how providers are paid, incentives, and so on; and
organization, the structure of Islamic insurance system, risk pooling and the division of labor of
institutions within it are an outcome of political decisions. The political life of Islamic insurance
in these three countries is examined through the analysis of political coalitions behind the
institutionalization of Islamic insurance and Islamic finance in general since the 1980s.
The usage of the term ‘social life of Islamic insurance’ refers to a framework for
understanding Islamic insurance as a commodity whose worth lies both within and beyond its
exchange value.61 It calls attention to how insurance moves between registers of value among
different stakeholders and at various scales of analysis. It also encompasses how meaning
ascribed to insurance changes over time. It is the behavior, the habit, and action of the consumers
and providers within the system. Based on Ami Dao’s ideas on the social life of health insurance,
we can analyze the social life of Islamic insurance through the interaction of various factors,
including the sociocultural, economic, political, historical, and “global-local” that contribute to
the “careers” of Islamic insurance plans in these countries.62
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Figure 1-1: Theoretical Framework
Variables
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The diagram above summarizes the arguments of political life and social life of Islamic
insurance. Chapter II, literature review, presents the reasoning behind this theoretical framework
in further detail. However, the purpose of this dissertation is not to test hypotheses nor to make
a generalization. The theoretical framework shown above is a descriptive tool and it should not
be treated as a universal model. This dissertation is case studies that observe, explore the cause
and effect relationships between variables over time and across scales, and trace processes of
Islamic insurance development of these countries. The intention is to trace the political coalition
processes behind the development of Islamic insurance, examine the influence of political and
economic actors and institutions, look at the effect of ‘path dependence’ on each country, and
to show in detail the ebb and flow of religious devotion, ideologies and self-definition of Muslims
interacting with modernity and capitalism.
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Data and methods
This dissertation draws on secondary works in several other disciplines: not just political
science and history, but also anthropology, economics, sociology and religious studies. The design
of this study mostly follows a qualitative research methodology specifically case study and
combines a range of primarily qualitative approaches. It analyzes political parties and coalition
platforms, organizations’ charters, and press releases to trace contemporary and prior political
norms, priorities, and strategies. Ethnographic and historical studies, documents, and secondary
sources help to understand the social and cultural circumstances. Quantitative resources such as
survey data and statistics are used when possible.
This dissertation focuses on the period between the initiations of Islamic insurance
regulation in each country until the present time. However, the major part of this research will
be dedicated to examining the socio-political process surrounding the enactment of those
regulations. The different starting date of Islamic insurance development is in itself a puzzle as
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan started the whole project of Islamization of economy relatively
at the same time in the early 1980s. Therefore, the development of Islamic insurance cannot be
separated from the development of other Islamic financial institutions such as Islamic bank and
the implementation of religious tax of Zakat, and the role of Islam in these countries in general.
Moreover, it is necessary to discuss the historical background as far as since these countries
became independent nations.
Data on national Islamic insurance growth of each country are available from many
sources. However, Malaysia has an abundance of quantitative data on Islamic insurance;
meanwhile, reliable quantitative data from Indonesia and Pakistan are scarce. In Malaysia, Bank
Negara Malaysia provides both data on conventional insurance and Islamic insurance along with
other economic indicators. The Central Bank of Indonesia does not regulate Islamic insurance
and other insurance products. Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK) is the one who
regulates, monitors, and provides up to date data on insurance including Islamic insurance. Data
on Islamic insurance in Pakistan is still limited. The State Bank and Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan offer insurance data in one package; therefore, data on insurance
premium from Islamic insurance companies and other private agencies are more reliable to be
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used. Auditing and consulting firms provide annual growth data, market research and normativejuridical reports on insurance and Islamic insurance of many countries.
The primary goal of this research is to understand the Islamic insurance phenomenon by
focusing on the total picture rather than breaking it down into variables. It is to see a holistic
picture and depth of understanding of Islamic insurance development.63 Therefore, this
dissertation uses a method suggested by Calomiris and Faber in their study of the political origins
of Banking Crises.
Different from other economists, Calomiris and Faber write ‘narrative history’ of six case
studies to draw some general lessons on the banking system. They argue that considering the
historical context to understand the factors that shape complex systems such as the banking
system are important. Without that, we omitted the most important dimension that is time,
which can lead to misinterpretation of the deeper meaning of the correlations between variables.
They said:
Researchers who do not take history seriously wind up reducing the study of complex
banking systems to an analysis of correlations among various influences… This approach
often fails to find the connections because the influences being modeled are considered
without taking context into account. And when such a modeling approach does find
empirical correlations, the meaning can be misinterpreted because the correlations
identified by the researcher reflect deeper, omitted influences on all the variables being
measured. 64
Similarly, with its emphasis on the context-bound and holistic approach of theory
generation, this dissertation seeks to understand Islamic insurance development by identifying
and categorizing vital elements of the phenomenon that emerge from data, rather than to verify
theory or to describe data. This method helps us to understand the complexity of the problem of
Islamic insurance development in these three countries.
Lastly, Islamic insurance is part of a bigger Islamic finance regulatory structure. Some
countries regulate it separately and in a very detail manner. Malaysia, for instance, has a very
63
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sophisticated Islamic insurance program. In this case, we can expect more information and
specific data on the political processes of Islamic insurance. Meanwhile, other countries regulate
it together with other Islamic finance instruments. Therefore, there are not many specific data
available except the data within the general discussion of the political processes of Islamic
finance.
Dissertation organization
The dissertation consists of six chapters. As shown above, the Introduction Chapter
provides an argument for the significance of the problem, contextualizes the study, and
introduces the fundamental component of this dissertation. Islamic insurance has been rapidly
growing in the Islamdom since the 1980s. However, there has been a development gap between
countries. This dissertation is an effort to explain that gap in selected countries.
Chapter 2 is a literature review of this study. This chapter places the dissertation in the
context of the previous research and scholarly material on Islamic insurance, insurance in general
and International Political Economy (IPE). It addresses a gap in the literature on the lack of study
on the political and social determinants of Islamic insurance development. This chapter provides
a strong theoretical basis for the dissertation for analyzing the ‘political life’ and the ‘social life’
of Islamic insurance within Muslim societies.
The next three chapters are the empirical chapters of this dissertation. These chapters
organize and report the study’s main findings, identifying what is significant, and making sense
of large amounts of data concerning the Islamic insurance development of the three countries.
These chapters are organized similarly, and each country is fully discussed in one complete
chapter. All chapters start with a brief introduction of the country, particularly the role of Islam
in the country’s political economy ecosystem. Then the chapters continue by elaboration of data,
including quantitative and qualitative (narrative data), on the development of Islamic insurance
in each country. The discussion on coalitional politics and social aspects of Islamic insurance are
provided afterwards. These chapters synthesize and discuss the results considering the study’s
research questions, literature review, and conceptual framework. The three empirical chapters
start with Chapter 3 on Malaysia, then Chapter 4 on Indonesia, and ends with Chapter 5 on
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Pakistan. These chapters are the foundation for the reflections, conclusions, and
recommendations that will appear in the next chapter.
The last chapter, Chapter 6, provides the conclusion of this research project and
recommendation for further research. Moreover, this chapter offers a thorough reflection on the
study’s findings, and the practical and theoretical implication thereof. The goal is to discover what
meaning we can make of them by comparing the findings both within and across country case
studies, and with those of other studies. This chapter ends with the identification of relevant
future research areas in the disciplines.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review chapter discusses the factors of Islamic insurance development
provided by the current research on Islamic insurance. It is also a detail elaboration of the
theoretical framework presented previously in the introduction chapter. In general, the literature
show most demographic and economic factors for conventional insurance demand are also
responsible for the development of Islamic insurance in the countries. Although Islamic insurance
was designed as an alternative to conventional insurance, it needs similar conditions to grow.
The factors such as inflation, income, education, urbanization, and dependency ratio are
affecting the country’s Islamic insurance development. These factors are essential; however, they
cannot fully explain for variations among the three countries of our case studies: Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Pakistan. Therefore, it is essential to understand the correlations between those
factors by considering the political and social institutions within which Islamic insurance systems
are constructed.
This chapter starts by providing a general overview of the importance of insurance in
international political economy (IPE) discourse. Then, it continues by reviewing the common
explanations offered by conventional economists on Islamic insurance development. Almost all
studies provide a static comparison by presenting Islamic insurance as a universal product that
necessitates similar determinants to grow, regardless of countries’ particularities. Next, this
literature review elaborates alternative explanations consisting of two categories: political and
social explanations. Lastly, this chapter provides a comprehensive synthesis of the literature
review, arguing the importance of socio-political factors to understand Islamic insurance
development in these three countries.
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Insurance: an institutional history
Insurance is an institution created by humanity to handle the risk of economic loss. It
provides constraints that structure how we manage economic risk.65 The practice dates back to
the Hammurabi Code, which offered basic insurance in that a debtor did not have to pay back his
loans if some personal catastrophe made it impossible (disability, death, flooding, etc.).66 Then,
it developed into a sophisticated actuarial science when in 1654, Blaise Pascal and Pierre de
Fermat discovered a way to understand the level of risk, thereby, actuaries can calculate the
insurance rates. Using the probabilistic method, they counted the amount of capital needed to
overcome future losses. Since then, insurance shifted the focus from preventing to compensating
possible losses. This innovation makes insurance as an important part of the development of the
market economy. It has enabled capital accumulation, especially for risky business ventures.67
In general, contemporary insurance can be categorized into two mechanisms: spreading
risk among large numbers of people and/or moving risk to entities that can handle it. The
collective insurance fund of the guild system during the Middle Ages was an example of spreading
risk among group members (cooperative), while the practice of underwriting during voyages to
the New World was an example of moving risk- the origin of joint-stock enterprises. Both are the
core practices of contemporary insurance.68
Every civilization has been dealing with economic insecurity for so long. However, the
concept of risk is quite modern. Risk is a concept to transform the unpredictable into something
that calculable. The traditional society emphasizes on anticipation of the actual prevalence of
life-threatening dangers, which lead to economic insecurity. God or Nature is the source of this
unpredictable insecurity. Anthony Giddens argues that there has been a substantial historical
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transformation of the nature of risk -and security.69 People in the modern age are relatively more
secure than they were in previous ages. They have longer life expectation and freedom from
serious disease.
Nonetheless, the physical security of modern people is balanced by new risks: war,
nuclear threat, motor accident, environmental degradation, etc. These risks are not generated
by natural causes, but as results of modern social organization or so-called abstract system.70
Furthermore, these new risks affect everyone or at least very large numbers of people on the
planet.71 The new risks are considered as manufactured risks, which resulted from the human
activity. Therefore, instead of merely anticipation from the impact of natural causes as happened
during the traditional society, control of risk is the essential feature of responding toward
manufactured risks of modern society.
Modern Insurance is a modus operandi for modern society to control economic risk. It
has been developed through the role of the state and the market, which are the two most
important parts of four dimension of modernity discussed by Giddens.72 State and market
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become crucial actors because the traditional institutions and culture can no longer provide the
necessary protection for modern people. Giddens argues:
The security 'threat' which individuals face is, at base, the threat to their very identity
from the ways in which abstract systems instead of Nature operate. The challenge to
individuals is to construct and reconstruct their own identity, which is no longer given for
them by traditional institutions and cultures but are constantly at risk. 73
Adding to that, the informal mechanisms have become obsolete also because of the
‘actuarial technique’ itself. There is no need for ‘community’ or ‘social capital’ for modern
insurance to work. In his work of The Emergence of Risk Society: Insurance, Law, and the State,
Jonathan Simon asserts that the modern way of managing risk reconstructs individual and social
phenomena as risk object rather than a moral agent and member of society. It focuses on one’s
risk profile rather than biographical individuals. Individual identity is a combination of variables
associated with different categories and level of risk.
Furthermore, insurance provides a sense of security not by disciplining individuals and
prevent harm through moral tools (e.g. rituals, punishment, and excommunication) but by
calculating the aggregate cost in order to compensate for the harm. Using the example of auto
insurance, Simon argues that the actuarial technique creates a new social fact. A traffic accident
is no longer considered as a deviance act to be eliminated but as just a part of the consequences
of living in society and has a significant probability of happening.74 Statistics has replaced taboos
and traditions in structuring the way we deal with economic risk.
Insurance managers offer us comfort for this economic insecurity through a promise to
pay compensation for the losses. They convert our liability to risk into a liability to themselves to
pay the cost of compensating us. Later on, this type of personal risk is multiplied by the increase
in economic transactions. In a planned economy such as the former Soviet Union, State was the
universal insurer. The government decided whose risks should be translated into costs, and it
was the state that decided who should bear the cost. Mostly, the cost was imposed on the citizens
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in forms of taxes, inflation, in shortages, and poor public services. Usually, some resource
transfers as in progressive taxation are used in this state-scheme mechanism.
On the contrary, the power to decide about risks is more mixed in the market economy.
The main responsibility for insuring against risks of economic insecurity is left by the State to the
individual that empower players in the market to decide. This means the individuals as potential
buyer of insurance service and the seller are free to negotiate and take the decision on access,
price, and availability of benefits. For that reason, Susan Strange argues insurance practices entail
power relations. It lies on who is translating risks into a cost.75
Moreover, insurance as a global practice was indispensable for the development of the
market economy. Strange considers insurance business as an instance of diffusion of power in
the world economy. It is one of Strange’s empirical proof of diffusion of power in the world
economy: “that power has shifted “sideways” from states to market and other non-state actors
who derive power from their market shares.” The power relations are also reflected in whose
favor it operates. As in the case insurance within the market economy, Strange states:
When the insurance business is left to the market, the result is usually the rich,
individually or collectively, can choose whether to translate, through insurance
premiums, some element of risk into a cost. Insurance gives them the option. The poor,
unable or unwilling, or both to pay the premiums are left with the risk.76
Competition does not necessarily eliminate the opportunity of monopoly by big
companies. As the service becomes more global, the big global companies have a comparative
advantage, especially compares to the developing countries, which act as state insurer.
Therefore, developing countries tend to be more protective in term of their insurance businesses.
Allowing saving to be converted into foreign currency -in the form of insurance premiums- out of
national currency is considered as a threat to the well-being of their economy. According to
Strange, therefore Brazil and India, among others, opposed the American proposal of extending

75

Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), page 49.

76

Ibid.

33
the liberalization of goods into services including insurance in the mid-1980s during the GATT’s
Uruguay round.77
Many scholars argue that the institutionalization processes are in the direction toward a
more economically efficient, complex, global and impersonal institution or market. It seems there
is no place for the informal institution of insurance within the modern and globalized economy.
It is far from it. Rather than disappearing, the personal and social alternatives of insurance are
gaining importance in many places.78 People turn again to the informal when ‘the state is
retreating’ and at the same time, the market is operating against their favor. As some researchers
have documented, poor farm-households are less keen to adopt high risk/high return
technologies than rich households are. The consequence, there has been a very low insurance
penetration among the poor. However, introducing formal insurance to the poor is not an easy
task. It often generates a moral hazard among this community.79
Regarding Islamic insurance, Atiquzzafar Khan argues the Muslims first became aware of
the practice of insurance because of trade contacts between Europe and the Ottoman Empire.80
However, the Muslims did not develop insurance until the 21st century. In addition, in 1914, there
were around 170 insurance companies offering insurance services: life, transport, and life
insurance, in Istanbul, the capital of the Ottoman Empire. All of them were European companies
with roughly one-thirds of these were German-speaking companies.81The possible reason is that
cooperative practices in both personal and business life substantially reduce the need for
insurance – a society is expected to take care of those in need. Insurance was not needed in the
original Islamic Empire, despite the existence of an extensive global trade network.82
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Furthermore, the central question related to insurance within Muslim societies is always
about its permissibility. When questioned about the permissibility of insurance, scholars of
Islamic law have generally given negative answers. While they recognized the utility of the
practice, they found that it conflicts with Islamic law on several grounds of the uncertainty about
the product received, the element of usury, and gambling as discussed before in the introduction
of this dissertation.
Given the nearly unanimous verdict on the prohibition of insurance, the next question is
what alternatives might be possible. Many of the Islamic scholars reject the approach of
modifying existing institutions to conform to Islamic law and suggests that Muslims should
develop Islamic alternatives to clarify the radical differences between Islamic and capitalist forms
of insurance. They call this alternative insurance with unique name, Takaful. The scholars
examine the purpose of various types of insurance contract, assesses the conformity between
their purpose and Islamic law and historical precedence in the Islamic tradition, and suggests
different methods to achieve the same purpose that are within the domain of Islamic law.83
Takaful or Islamic insurance has been promoted as an Islamic alternative for the
immorality of conventional insurance. According to its supporters, Islamic insurance is not simply
a compromised form of Western risk management. It is argued that the motivation of Islamic
insurance is different from how the Victorian recasting of Christian duty to provide the family’s
future. Islamic insurance is claimed to be a tool not only for the benefit of individual and family,
but also to reduce unequal wealth distribution in the society, which resulted from the interestbased economy.84
According to the Sharia, government-sponsored plans are generally acceptable. The
reason is because Sharia provides ruling that governments are responsible for taking care of their
citizens. Meanwhile, private sector insurance schemes are acceptable but with some conditions.
The general principles on which private scheme of Islamic insurance are based are different from
conventional insurance contracts. According to the Sharia, the foundation of assurance can be
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based only on cooperation, mutual sympathy, brotherhood, and mutual guarantee. The system,
which the real and basic aim is business, profit-making, and money is hoarding cannot be
adopted. Islamic law permits only mutual insurance, where a group collectively safeguards the
interests of its members and acts to support them in the case of damage.85
What we know about its determinants
Like conventional insurance, the country’s Islamic insurance development is commonly
measured by insurance penetration and density. Insurance penetration is expressed as a ratio of
premium to another financial measure like Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while Insurance
density refers to a product's number of customers by geographic area (country, state etc.). It is
usually expressed a ratio of premium to a population. Both indicators comprise the insurance
demand of the country.
In the literature of economics and finances, determinants of insurance demand in
national level are divided into two broad categories of macroeconomic and demographic factors.
A comprehensive study by Feyen, Lester, Rocha86 concludes that life and non-life insurance
sectors premiums ‘are driven by per capita income, population size and density, demographic
structures, income distribution, the size of the public pension system, state ownership of
insurance companies, the availability of private credit, and religion’. Income is considered as the
best predictor of insurance demand as it leads to more affordability and ultimate higher demand
for an insurance product. Other studies regarding the demand for life insurance in the Muslim
majority countries are also confirming this conclusion. Baharul-Ulum and Yaakob found that the
GDP of the country plays a vital role in reshaping insurance demand in Malaysia.87 In addition,
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Zerriaa and Noubbigh findings show the positive impact of GDP per capita income toward
insurance demand across the MENA region.88
Demographic factors also play an important role. Expansion of cities and towns due to
industrialization and urbanization provides opportunities for the insurance sector to grow
especially in developing economies. Hwang and Gao found a positive impact of urbanization on
saving propensity of urban people in China. They argue that insurance can play a vital role in
providing protection and financial security to small families living in China’s new urban centers.
Not only China, life insurance products and urbanization are found positively related in other
Asian countries too. 89 However, some studies have found an insignificant impact of urbanization
on life insurance in Central and East European countries.90 However, there is contradictory
findings related to non-life insurance demand. Park and Lemaire found positive relationship of
urbanization to non-life insurance demand while Treerattanapun found it insignificant.91Also,
Simona Laura Dragos’s comparative research founds a positive and significant impact on non-life
insurance for both Asian and Central and East European countries (CEE). However, regarding life
insurance, Dragos founds urbanization only has positive and significant impact in Asian region
only. 92
Financial sector development plays a vital role in economic growth through strengthening
the financial institutions and building investors’ confidence. Cash flows and financial assets
securitization create a close link between financial sector developments and insurance demand.
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On the other hand, after the global financial crisis, financial sectors (especially banking
developments) more focused on insurance backed investments to minimize the unexpected
losses. Financial sector development encourages investors to obtain ownership of financial assets
to secure their future income and to expand their operations. Therefore, it generates the need
to secure these assets through insurance products results in their increasing demand.93
Interestingly, Islam as religion is considered by many researchers as an obstacle to
insurance development. According to their findings, most Muslim majority countries have a very
low insurance demand. It is thought that the reason is that prohibition of usury and speculative
economic activities. Researchers consider this prohibition makes Muslim population reluctance
in buying conventional insurance premium. Presumably, this prohibition encourages the
development of Takaful or Islamic insurance as alternative insurance.
Inflation is also an important factor, which has an ambiguous correlation with insurance
development. Customers are sensitive to the change in inflation realized or anticipated, and this
might result in reducing the consumption of insurance products.94 It results in a decline of
insurance demand. On the other hand, Hwang and Gao found that insurance demand, in the case
of China, was not adversely affected by higher inflation. It is because the higher inflation period
happens when there is also higher economic growth. In summary, people using these products
were less responsive towards change in their demand for insurance products.95
Another significant demographic factor is education. Education is used as a proxy for the
level of risk aversion and awareness. Most the studies indicate a positive relationship between
general insurance and education illustrating that education enhances knowledge regarding
financial stability threats, insurance benefits and awareness of risk mitigation.96
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Adding to education, the ratio of average family member’s young and old dependent for
support within the family is also an essential factor. It is defined as dependency ratio. Providing
protection from financial hardships to their dependent family members is the basic driving force
for the demand and consumption of these insurance products. Some studies have documented
a positive relationship between dependency ratio and insurance demand.97
Several studies on Islamic insurance confirm similar findings. For example, a survey by
Rahman, Rosylin, and Faizah98 founds a positive relationship of GDP per capita and Islamic
insurance demand in Malaysia. Both conventional insurance and Islamic insurance tend to
develop well in the country with high GDP per capita. As the people are getting wealthier, they
can spend some of their income for insurance, regardless the type of the insurance. Other
economic aspect that relevant to Islamic insurance is inflation. Redzuan et al. depicted a negative
but insignificant relationship of inflation with Family Takaful demand. They asserted that inflation
depresses the value of financial assets, life insurance and Family Takaful products.99
Studies on factors of education have shown consistent relationship with conventional
insurance, but it show mixed evidence in relation to Islamic insurance.100 Hawariyuni in her study
indicated that education is not a significant variable affecting Islamic insurance demand, as it is
not necessary that highly educated people buy these Islamic insurance products.
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and Family Takaful. 103 Redzuan, in his study analyzing Malaysian life insurance and Family Takaful
from period 1970–2008 using ARDL approach, found a significantly positive and long run impact
of education level on life insurance and Family Takaful demand. 104 Islamic insurance is even more
limited in highly educated people according to Akhter & Hussain. 105 Altogether, education might
not be considered a true measure and proxy for awareness of Islamic insurance.
Likewise, Akhter, Khan and El-Gammal conduct a parallel study between conventional
insurance and Islamic insurance by using similar determinants. They also compile all existing
literature of Islamic insurance. They observe 33 countries worldwide where both Islamic
insurance and conventional insurance operators exist. They conclude:
For conventional insurance demand, income, urbanization, financial sector
developments, inflation and education are the significant factors, while for Islamic
insurance demand, inflation, income, education, urbanization and dependency ratio are
significant factors affecting their relative demand. For the ASEAN region, income,
urbanization, and financial sector developments have significant positive impact for both
insurance and Islamic insurance demand but dependency ratio shows negative impact.
Inflation shows positive impact for Islamic insurance demand while negative impact on
insurance. In case of Middle East region, income, inflation and urbanization shows
positive impact on both products demand while dependency reveals negative impact.
Education shows positive triggering insurance demand while affecting negatively to
Islamic insurance demand due to due to lack of its awareness. 106
From that observation, it can be inferred that the very similar domestic factors influencing
for conventional insurance demand are also responsible for the development of Islamic
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insurance. A possible explanation for this similarity is because Islamic insurance, despite its initial
intention of being alternative insurance, still needs similar conditions to grow.
Altogether, previous studies on insurance and Islamic insurance have provided various
useful explanations for the national demand of Islamic insurance. However, almost all of them
consider these financial services develop in an institutional, historical, and cultural-absent space.
Those factors are unable to fully account for variation in Islamic insurance development among
the three countries included in this study. In addition, these countries have many commonalities
in these factors. Moreover, Akhter, Khan and El Gammal suggest that literature on Islamic
insurance are lack of discussion on its institutional and political factors. According to them,
‘future studies could be conducted using insurance and Islamic insurance product lines (life or
nonlife insurance with family or general Takaful) considering the global financial crisis,
institutional and political factors impact on their demand’. Without dismissing these findings,
there is an urgent need to understand Islamic insurance development in a more comprehensive
manner. Islamic insurance is designed as a private-based mechanism, but its development has
been shaped by political, legal, institutional, and cultural limitations of the country.
The figure below shows the current state of study on Islamic insurance. Most of the study
are focusing on the economic determinants of Islamic insurance. Meanwhile, the discussion on
its politics and social aspects of Islamic insurance is quite scarce.

Figure 2-1: Summary of the Current Scholarship on Islamic Insurance
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Islamic insurance as a political product
The existence of the global financial crisis is part of an international environment that can
be influential in the development of Islamic insurance. According to Ercanbrack, the process of
producing Islamic finance law, products and services illustrate complex fields of action driven by
power dynamics, neoliberal paradigms and the institutional momentum of the global
economy.107 The timing of Islamic insurance establishment in a country can be decisive for its
development. As a global service, insurance needs global linkage in order to grow. This is the
environment where the company can re-invest and gain capital. Some of the Islamic insurance
companies have managed to develop sophisticated Islamic re-insurance portfolios that sustain
their development.108 This statement shows that political institutions are a vital element in the
development of Islamic insurance.
Political coalition formation
In Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises & Scarce Credit, Charles
Calomiris and Stephen Haber argue that the modern Banking arrangements are ‘not a passive
response to some efficiency criterion but rather the product of political deals that determine
which laws are passed’. 109 They provide a rich history of banking over the last couple of centuries
to convince us that banking instability has its roots, not in any fragility inherent to commercial
banking, but in deals struck between governments and various interest groups. The book
discusses the question of why banking systems are unstable in so many countries, but not in the
others. For instance, the United States has had twelve banking crises since 1840, while Canada
has had none. Economists have been developing models to explain those crises. Banking
performance is shown in two indicators: credit abundance and the propensity of crises. They
understand that the monopolization of banking will tend to result in reduced supply credit, which
leads to low banking performance and decreases prosperity. Nonetheless, the models cannot
explain why such a system of monopolized banking would arise in some countries.
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According to them, the banking performance of a country is related to the bargaining
process within the banking system or so-called the Game of Bank Bargains. It is a strategic
interaction between the government and private sectors. The game operates according to the
logic of politics, not the logic of efficiency. The game governs entry and competition, the pricing
of credit and its terms, and the allocation of losses when banks fail. Who is in the partnership
varies across countries and within countries over time--because who else is in the partnership
depends on who is politically crucial?
Three political realities shape this bargaining game. There is active encouragement of the
government, the political coalition in charge of banking policy, and regulatory framework.
Successful banking cannot develop without government support. For instance, if the government
is lacking the desire to allow a competitive environment to flourish due to fiscal needs, the
banking system will be repressed. On the contrary, as in England before 1820s, the government
permitted a competitive bank system to develop thus, created a stable system with an
abundance of credit available for private sectors. Bank crises can happen in autocracies and
populist democracies. It is not the political system per se, but what kind of political coalition
designs the country’s banking system. Crises occur in the countries with political coalition ‘that is
willing to tolerate instability as the price for obtaining the benefits that it extracts from
controlling banking regulations.’110
Moreover, the discussion on regulations should focus on the outcome of the regulations.
It should not focus on whether the institution needs more or fewer rules or regulations. Some
countries create more regulations but facilitate better market outcome, while others initiate
deregulation that ends up at market failure.
The domestic institutional arrangement especially the insurance regulation is crucial for
Islamic insurance development. Meier suggests insurance regulation is similar to other forms of
regulation, that it is inherently a political process whereby political actors seek to allocate the
powers of the state for their benefit. Furthermore, he identifies four major political actors (or
sets of actors) in the literature: the regulatory agency (i.e., the insurance commission), the
regulated industry (in this case the insurance industries), non-industry interests (primarily though
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not exclusively in this case consumer interest groups), and political elites (legislators, chief
executives, federal officials, et. al.) 111
The political elites are particularly crucial within Muslim societies throughout history.
Nonetheless, the support from the political elites or government does not always give a positive
impact on Islamic insurance development. Calomiris and Haber have shown in the case of the
banking system that the issue is on how and what support the government provides.112
However, a single political actor cannot determine the development of Islamic insurance
in a country. Islamic insurance development is a result of the interaction of different political
actors. Therefore, Islamic insurance flourishes when there are institutional support and
regulatory framework as a product of the coalition among the political actors involved.
The scholars of State-Society relations elaborate on the interactions between the state
institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public authority is exercised and study how
people can influence it. They consider states and societies are both mutually dependent and
mutually constitutive.113 The following paragraphs explain the relevance of state-society
scholarship with Islamic insurance.
Islamic insurance developed within a broader popular demand for Islamization or Islamic
revivalism. The 1979 revolution in Iran had an enormous global effect. It was for the first time
Islamists gained power in a modern state. This event coincided with, and some have argued
spurred, a broader resurgence of Islam around the world, including in these three countries.114
Abbot defines Islamization as ‘the intensification of Islamic influence on social, cultural, economic
and political relations.’115 There was an increasing commitment toward Islam among the middle
classes in these countries. The state has a range of options from to co-opt, to accommodate, and
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to repress those demands. Furthermore, this state-society relations framework provides us with
a deeper understanding of how incentive is generated, and legitimacy is acquired by the state.
The nature of the political settlement can greatly affect upon state-society relations. In
many fragile and conflict-affected states, relations are based on patronage and lack of
accountability. The prominence of informal institutions and relationships and unofficial processes
result in divergences between formal systems and rules and actual practice. As we will see in the
case study of Pakistan, the Pakistani political elites, who benefit from patronage and income from
natural resource rents and criminal activities, often have little incentive to engage with citizens
and to build effective public authority. The concentration of power in a few elites also limits the
participation of citizens from public life. In some situations, citizens may be excluded from public
life through state repression and violence. This results in a legacy of negative and weak statesociety relations. Efforts to promote an inclusive political settlement can re-shape relations and
contribute to political and social transformation. Moreover, to understand the reason for the
elites to support or reject Islamic insurance, we need to put greater attention to questions of
power and altering elite incentives.116
The country’s fundamental political institutions structure the complex bargains made
between various groups within each country polity. This understanding leads us to the concept
of path dependence. Path dependence is the idea that decisions we are faced with depending on
past knowledge trajectory and decisions made and are thus limited by the current competence
base. In other words, history matters for current decision-making situations and has a strong
influence on strategic planning.

Institutional economics
Institutional economics would argue that the emergence of Islamic insurance or any
contemporary economic models could be explained from the institutional evolutionary process
within certain society in the past. Specifically, on insurance, the transformation of uncertainty
into risk marked the final shift of primitive/traditional exchange into a modern system.
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Accordingly, the process is influenced by the interaction of the intensity and extensity of
economic activity (capital), innovations, and the role of a political institution or the state.
Institutional economists develop analytical frameworks specifically to explain the
influence of institutions on economic performance through long periods of time. According to
them, the current forms of political, economic, and even military organization are derived from
the opportunity set provided by the institutional structure that evolved incrementally. This idea
is often called path dependence. Moreover, institutions are the key to understand how people
make choices under conditions of (economic) uncertainty and ambiguity. Therefore, by using that
approach, this section elaborates variables derived by this school of thought that shape
institutional structure of risk.
Their works started by questioning the rationality postulate of the neoclassical model.
They argue people do not determine their choices directly through an elaborate rational process.
Rationality cannot sufficiently answer why people make the choices they do. Admittedly, that
model explains clearly the options and tradeoffs people have, but at the same time people are
also facing difficulties in deciphering their complex circumstances. There are constraints
preventing people from choosing the best response. Indeed, they need ways to reduce
uncertainty and to create order in human interaction.
Likewise, a simple cost-benefit analysis cannot satisfactorily explain the way people
choose the strategy against economic insecurity.117 As mentioned above, an ideology such as the
religious prohibition of commercial insurance is partly responsible for the low insurance
penetration in Muslim majority countries and the emergence of Islamic insurance. In other
words, it gives constraint for people to choose specific strategy. Therefore, we need an analytical
framework which incorporates an understanding of how ideologies and ideas determine the
choices people made in responding to an economic situation.
Thorstein Veblen, a Norwegian-American economist and sociologist, laid the foundation
for the development of American institutional economics through his criticism on the traditional
static economic theory. Influenced by Darwinism, he added historical and evolutionary processes
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to economic analysis. According to him, the economy is embedded in social institutions,
therefore it should not be treated as an autonomous and static entity. Evolutionary process and
institutions have significant roles in shaping economic behavior. This perspective enables
economists to explore economic problem as part of broader socio-cultural development and to
consider the economy as an evolving entity of bounded rationality.
Veblen defines institutions as both units of evolutionary selection and repositories of
knowledge. But rather than being the determinant factor of the individual action, institutions
develop in the process of coevolution with the other. In other words, the economy can be
considered as the locus for dynamic interaction between the individual as agency and institutions
as social structure.
In 1904, he published The Theory of Business Enterprise, where he utilized evolutionary
principles to explain the development of new industrial processes in America at the time. He saw
them because of the growth of industrial processes in the context of small business firms that
had evolved earlier to organize craft production. Veblen's institutionalism was a central element
of American economics during the interwar period post-1919, but then it never managed to take
hold due to mostly the emergence of positivism within social sciences and also due to the
misused of principles of biological evolution to justify racist, sexist and imperialistic practices,
such as the Nazis. 118
Since the 1960s, several scholars have been tried to refine the institutionalist approach in
the understanding the economy. Rather than merely criticizing neoclassical economy, it builds
on, modifies and extends it. This approach, so called New Institutional Economics, incorporates
a theory of institutions into economics. What it means is the approach retains and builds on the
fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence competition - the basis of the choice theoretic
approach that underlies microeconomic.119 One of the influential scholars in this school is the
1993 Nobel laureate, Douglass North.
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In his 1991 journal article Institutions, he describes how innovations in systems of
exchange, long-distance trade in early modern Europe from the 11th to the 16th centuries
enabled Europeans to transform the tribal system of exchange into a sequentially more complex
organization that eventually led to the rise of the Western World. Those innovations include
techniques and methods to evade usury laws and actuarial science that are crucial for
transforming society into the modern capitalistic economy.120
The institution evolution started within tribal or village community in which people relied
heavily on a dense social network. People have an intimate understanding of each other;
therefore, they were able to create, for instance, pool resources out of mutual trust and the
threat of collective violence (punishment) for preserving order. Although the societal cost in this
tribal or village is very high, it will not create additional transaction cost. As of the economic
interaction is expanding beyond village or tribal community and become a regional exchange, the
dense social network is replaced by more infrequent clientization of the players. Typically, there
is no central political authority governing this regional network. Instead of a unified political
structure or formal rules, religious precepts-imposed standards for players’ behavior. The
religious precept of “thou shalt not defect” acts as a paternalistic divine command that enables
people from diverse geographical backgrounds but embracing the same religion cooperate. The
next stage shows economic exchange becoming more complex, therefore impersonal and kinship
ties, a voluntaristic constraint such as the religious rulings, and other informal mechanisms are
no longer effective. Coercive political order and judicial organizations are needed in an age of
capital markets and manufacturing firms.121 Arguably, the increase in the volume of trade is partly
responsible for this evolution process. It necessitates the society to find ways to lower the
transaction cost to achieve what so called economies of scale.
The term ‘partly’ above means that volume of trade cannot be the only cause. In fact,
many societies have developed differently. After centuries, certain society relies more on formal
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mechanisms while others still maintain the use of informal ways. Douglass North examines the
differences between Suq (Bazaar economies engaged in regional trade) which has existed for
thousand years and still exists nowadays in North Africa, the Middle East, and the modern market
of Western World in order to illustrate different paths of development. The question is; what
factors make the difference?
Suq is characterized by widespread, relatively impersonal but clientized exchange, and
relatively high costs of transacting. It is widespread because it consists of a multiplicity of smallscale enterprises, low fixed cost, and an enormous number of small transactions. It is not based
on kinship ties, but nonetheless, it is still based on face-to-face contacts where trading involves
a continual search for specific partners (clientization). There is no institution specifically for
distributing market information and at the same time, there is a minimal and decentralized
governmental control. The transaction is performed by raising the costs of transacting to another
party to exchange. People are seeking gains at the expense of others. In this context, one makes
a profit by relying more on having better information and bargaining skills than one’s
adversary.122
Information asymmetries make regional trade of Suq inefficient. Based on the previous
generic model, it is expected that there would be an evolution of voluntary organizations. The
organizations then would be able to reduce uncertainties and mitigate any upcoming hazards
due to the asymmetries. On the contrary, these voluntary organizations are missing in the Suq
system due to the lack of innovations in legal institutions and juridical enforcement, which make
the organizations viable and profitable. As a result, there is no incentive to alter the system.123
North argues that the modern market of the Western World was created not only because
of the expansion and because of the enormous number of trade transactions. Some innovations
enabled them to lower transaction cost.
These innovations occurred at three cost margins:(I) those that increased the mobility of
capital, (2) those that lowered information costs, (3) those that spread risk. For instance,
European created innovations in the form of techniques and methods to evade usury laws
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that later enhanced the mobility of capital. From 11th to the 16th centuries, European
created innovations that enhanced the mobility of capital were the techniques and
methods evolved to evade usury laws. The variety of ingenious ways by which interest
was disguised in loan contracts ranged from "penalties for late payment," to exchange
rate manipulation, to the early form of the mortgage; but all increased the costs of
contracting. The costliness of usury laws was not only that they made the writing of
contracts to disguise interests complex and cumbersome, but also that enforceability of
such contracts became more problematic. As the demand for capital increased and
evasion became more general, usury laws gradually broke down and rates of interest
were permitted. In consequence, the costs of writing contracts and the costs of enforcing
them declined.124
Another innovation to increase the mobility of capital was the development of techniques
and instruments of discounting methods125 along with development of the centers that could
specialize in that-such as the Champagne fairs, then banks, and finally financial houses. This
method enabled people to develop credit by which increased the mobility of capital. Moreover,
the standardized system of accounting is also important for maintaining control of agents
involved in long-distance trade. Previously, people relied more on kinship and family ties to do
that. Accounting system and notarial records provides an evidence-based mechanism to monitor
trade transaction. It is different to the tribal/traditional mechanism which relies more on agency
or witness. Adding to that, information cost was lowered through printing of prices of various
commodities as well as the materials containing information on weights, customs, brokerage
fees, postal system, and exchange rates.126
The transformation of uncertainty into risk marked the final transformation of the
primitive/traditional exchange into a modern system as previously discussed in the section of
‘insurance: and institutional history’. Actuarial science enables people to convert uncertainty into
risk and thereby reducing the costs of the transaction through the provision of a hedge against
variability.127 As the economy grew, there was a need to pool huge capital in financing risky
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business activities. Besides the development of actuarial science, the commenda was developed
as an institution that permitted a large number of investors to engage in a new venture. 128 The
commenda itself was originated from Jewish, Byzantine, and Muslim traditions that later
developed by Italian merchants to English regulated company. It was promulgated by The Marine
Insurance Act 1743 and became the first commercial insurance of the modern economy.
In the later development, transfer risk mechanism of insurance is not only used for risky
activities but almost on all economy. The market can transfer risk to institution or people who
can handle risk effectively. For instance, the cost of rebuilding house due to environmental
disaster is beyond individual’s capacity, but by buying insurance premium the individual can let
insurance company with many properties and shareholders, to manage that loss efficiently.
It is also crucial to mention the innovation in the form of legislation to ‘distinguish’
speculation and gambling. One of the major issues was the close relationship between insurance
business, future trading and gambling. Even an economist, John Kay argues that the whole of
capitalism is based on gambling. A speculative investment that led to several contemporary
economic crises is not something that is unusual. Speculation is the main feature of the modern
economy.129 Following the enactment of the Marine Insurance, Sir John Barnard’s Act of 1743
states that the ‘evil practice of compounding or making up differences to the great
discouragement of industry, and to the manifest detriment of trade and commerce.130 Of course,
the controversy of gambling and speculative investment was not over. It is part of the
contemporary debate. Nevertheless, the legislation had enabled capital markets to grow. People
had no hesitation to put their money in investments despite how speculative they are because
they were convinced that it was not gambling.
As a side note, it is important to put aside our normative judgment in discussing these
two types of institutions. Exchange in Suq or even in tribal or village communities is not simple
and always inferior compares to the modern market. It is inefficient, but arguably, that is the best
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way considering the local circumstances. It happens because there is an incentive or disincentive
for the society to develop certain mechanisms.
The innovations on contract monitoring and enforcement such as accounting method,
notarial records, and merchant organizations would not be sufficient to create an efficient capital
markets without enforcement by the state. The state was the major player because there was
continuous link between the fiscal needs of the state and its relationship with merchants and
general citizen. North uses the comparison between the state that encourage innovations during
the evolution of the modern market such as the Netherlands and England, and the empires in
decline Spain and Portugal. The main difference was the declining empire set up a centralized
system that generated rent-seeking behavior while the Netherland and England created a more
decentralized system that encouraged check and balance. For instance, the establishment of
Bank of England and a fiscal system in which expenditures were tied to tax revenue in England
had laid the ground for both a healthy financial basis for government and the development of
private markets. Acemoglu and Robinson use terms of extractive and inclusive institutions. The
extractive institutions hamper or block economic growth while inclusive are the ones do not. For
them, how a political institution is designed is the key to the success or failure of the nation. 131
Altogether, the ability of the state to restrain itself for not confiscate assets or using its coercive
power to increase uncertainty in the economy made it possible for evolution of the modern
market.132
Deriving from North’s explanation on these several institutional structures, we can
identify that there are three variables involved in the evolution of institution. An institution is
evolved primarily from “interplay between two fundamental economic forces: the economies of
scale associated with a growing volume of trade, and the development of improved mechanisms
to enforce contracts at lower costs. The causation runs both ways. The increasing volume of longdistance trade raised the rate of return to merchants of devising effective mechanisms for
enforcing contracts. In turn, the development of such mechanisms lowered the costs of
contracting and made trade more profitable, thereby increasing its volume.” Nevertheless, it is
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not the whole story. The state is crucial in ensuring this process runs without experiencing
disruption, either due to external factors or more importantly from the state itself.133
As mentioned before, the prevalent cooperative practices in both personal and business
life of the Muslim societies substantially reduce the need for insurance – a society is expected to
take care of those in need. This may be why insurance was not introduced in the original Islamic
Empire, despite the existence of an extensive global trade network.134Besides that, the decline
of trade and ‘the absence of state’ within the Islamdom during the European colonization
probably had a role in it too.
It seems there was no incentive for Muslim societies to develop institutionalization of risk
beyond kinship based common pool resources. The information on individual moral characters
and skills seem more important than generating data to calculate risk. Actuarial science did not
develop and shape the way the Muslims deal with economic insecurity within this society. The
development of probabilistic thinking as the essence of the innovation of actuarial science
possibly the most important key to understanding the difference. The development of
probabilistic thinking depended on the Enlightenment’s rejection of argument from authority
and the diminished influence of religious doctrine.135 It is expected that probabilistic thinking in
the modern sense would not develop in a society where religious authority or tradition is still
intact. Therefore, it is interesting how contemporary Muslim societies integrate it into the
construction of Islamic insurance.
Overall, institutional economics’ approach suggests that the emergence of Islamic
insurance or alternative insurance, in general, should be explained not only from its
contemporary development but also more importantly how the past specifically its historical
evolution influences its current emergence. Arguably, those variables compose a path
dependence, which provides constraints for people choosing the best response against their
economic insecurity.
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Islamic insurance as a social practice
How do people respond to economic insecurity- illness, unemployment, ‘widowhood’,
and old age? Moreover, if commercial insurance, the 300 years old industry with the gross
contribution (gross premiums) of $4.6 trillion (2014),136 can be considered as the most efficient
way to do that, what makes people choose other strategy over this? In a traditional society, they
relied mostly on family support and social networks in coping with these unforeseen events. For
instance, peasants created collective rice barn as a type of insurance at the time of crop failure
or natural disasters. Afterward, modern society considered this informal mechanism insufficient.
It is because the nature of modern insecurity or so-called risk is different from the previous one.
There are some theories inform people attitude toward insurance.
Social action
One theory is theory on social action. The social action theory by Max Weber explains that
human actions are meaningful and that certain reasons push people into various kinds of actions.
To Weber, there are three kinds of action: traditional (based on customs and habits); affective
(based on the emotional state of the individual at a particular time); and rational (based on a
clear awareness of a goal).137 This also implies that certain factors tend to influence one’s
behavior toward insurance. People might choose to prefer insurance due to intuitive or cultural
underpinnings. On the other hand, people can rationally decide to have an insurance policy for
clearly economic reasons.
The social action theory also suggests that there is a societal factor for the development
of Islamic insurance services. Islamic insurance is a private-based service and not a social
insurance because the state is not the one who provides the services. Therefore, an Islamic
insurance company needs to be able to convince the consumers to buy it.

136

Insurance Information Institute, World Insurance Factbook 2015"World Overview," (2016),
http://www.iii.org/publications/international-insurance-fact-book-2016/world-overview., accessed January 22,
2017, and Middle East Global Advisors (MEGA), World Takaful Report (2016),
http://www.takaful.coop/images/stories/WTR%202008.pdf accessed January 22, 2017.
137
Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1924).

54
Support from the Muslim population in the societal level is also important for its
development, along together with its political dynamic in the state level. Moreover, it is not only
the support toward the product but also the support toward the agency, which provides it. As
private sector or market138 has become the dominant agency of Islamic finance recently, a
positive attitude toward the private sector from the population will be crucial for Islamic
insurance to flourish in the country. In addition, the middle class has always been essential for
the acceptance of any type of reform, either in the form of radicalism of Islamic state or
modernism such as Islamic insurance.
According to Charles Tripp, the reliance on the private sector has been one of the
dilemmas in the Islamization of the economy in general. Islamic insurance was intended as an
alternative of conventional insurance, but then it could not escape from the existing paradigm of
market capitalism.139 Consequently, Islamic insurance tends to be more developed in capitalistic
countries where there is high support for the private sector and market mechanism.
Also, economic modernization and globalization have created a new global Islamic
identity, which defines an individual’s preference on using Islamic insurance. The more global a
Muslim is, the more likely this individual to embrace Islamic financial services.140 Timur Kuran
argues the real purpose of Islamic economics has not been economic improvement but
cultivation of a distinct Islamic identity to resist cultural globalization. Based on his literature
survey, Islamic banking differs from conventional banking mainly in symbolism and terminology.
141

The Islamic sub-economies that have sprung up across the Islamic world are commonly viewed

as manifestations of Islamic economics. In reality, Kuran demonstrates, they emerged to meet
the economic aspirations of socially marginalized groups. The bottom-up process of Islamic
economics in Indonesia is an instance of this phenomenon. The Islamic enterprises that form
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these sub economies provide advancement opportunities to the disadvantaged. By enhancing
interpersonal trust, they also facilitate intragroup transactions.142
Furthermore, several ethnographic studies on Islamic business networks documented by
Timur Kuran show various non-economic motivations for members joining the networks. The first
is that network membership is akin to belonging to a club. Members receive support from other
members in return for contributions to the group and, sometimes, to the wider society as well.
For instance, the members of the global Hizmet network led by Fethullah Gülen, Syria’s
Damascus-based Jama‘at Zayd, the Bilal Muslim Mission of sub-Saharan Africa, or Eastern
Indonesia’s Hadhrami network coordinated by the Islamic organization Al-Khairaat, give each
other business, and they support one another financially in times of need. In return for these
advantages, they help to finance the group’s activities and participate in its recruitment
campaigns. Their economic interactions are embedded in deeper social and cultural relations.
They also provide charity, both on their own and jointly with the group. Thus, the members of
Jama‘at Zayd finance mosques, schools, and hospitals affiliated with the group. They also fund
poverty alleviation programs, provide care for orphans, and help impoverished youths get
married.143 Spending some of their profits for helping others bring them many benefits. This
generous gesture is considered as an integral part of their economic activities. Through its
members’ donations, the Hizmet movement has established schools in 130 countries, along with
thousands of mostly volunteer-staffed outreach centers.144
Secondly, Islamic networks benefit from alliances with politicians who give them access
to rents. In providing social services, the Gülen network has also pursued political power in its
homeland, Turkey. During the first decade of Islamist rule in Turkey under the Justice and
Development Party (AKP), Gülen’s network shared in the privileges of power, including
preferential treatment in government hiring and contracts. 145 These mixed motivations exist and
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compete against each other as part of popular support over the development of Islamic
insurance.
In line with arguments above, the scholars of insurance have pointed out the significant
of religion and culture in consumer’s decision of buying insurance. Treerattanapun shows
empirical results of how consumers may respond to insurance solicitations according to their
cultural belief, not only economic rationality.146 For example, the prohibition of conventional
insurance by Islamic law is often used as the explanation for the low insurance demand in the
Islamdom. Insurance markets even in the most developed Muslim-majority countries are largely
at nascent or growth stage of development. Studying several Muslim majority countries,
Rahmane (2009) and Yazid et al. (2012) find that the determinants of Islamic life insurance are
like those of conventional life insurance on all points except religion. According to them, religion
plays significant role in encouraging Muslim population to take Islamic life insurance because this
type of insurance is considered consistent with Islam.147
Furthermore, by using a regression analysis in 1980 and 1987, Browne and Kim investigate
the factors that lead to variations in the demand for life insurance across countries. They report
a negative correlation between the demand for life insurance and Muslim countries.148 Also,
based on a study of 45 developing countries, Outreville finds that personal income, inflation, and
the development of the country’s financial sector have the most important impact on the
demand for life insurance. In line with Browne and Kim’s study, the author reports that in Muslim
countries, the demand for life insurance and Muslim religion are negatively correlated.149
However, other researchers emphasize on the characters and attitude of the religion or
culture, rather than on the religious doctrine of the religion itself. Chui and Kwok (2009) using
Hofstede's cultural dimensions, and data from 1976–2001 across 41 countries. They argue that
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culture with strong individualism indeed has a significant, positive effect on life insurance
consumption. People with a culture with emphasis on independence and autonomy tend to
rely more on market life insurance and less on social network security (financial help offered
by fellow kinsmen to one's dependents upon one's death) than people with culture of
interdependence or collectivism. 150
Other scholars do not consider religion or culture as a socio-demographic characteristic
at the country level, but at the personal/individual level (i.e. at the consumer level). Muslims
might have different interests in Islam (as a faith/religion) or attribute a different importance to
it in their lives. Thus, they may expect that Muslims vary in terms of their Islamic beliefs, and that
their behaviors and attitudes will depend accordingly. For example, Souiden and Jabeur argue
that the higher (lower) the Islamic beliefs of individuals, the less (more) favorable their attitude
will be toward conventional life insurance and the more (less) favorable their attitude will be
toward Islamic life insurance.151
In addition, Stasavage and Scheve provide an interesting study on religiosity and social
insurance. They argue individuals who are religious will prefer lower levels of social insurance
than will individuals who are secular. To the extent policy outcomes reflect individual
preferences, then countries with higher levels of religiosity will have lower levels of welfare state
spending.152
Informal economy
Besides a theory on the growth of Islamic insurance, we also need theory on the lack of
its development. The literature on informal economy suggest that market failures responsible for
the existence of economic activities outside the formal economy. Market failures in the form of
regulation constraint, tax evasion, state’s weaknesses, economic crises or conflict have made
people take alternatives. It is not because of the path dependence as suggested by institutional
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economics, but more of the current events that disrupt the efficiency of the market. It means
even a highly modern society can roll back to informal in certain circumstances.
Islamic insurance has been presented as an alternative to conventional insurance.
However, Islamic insurance is built on a similar platform, which is a formal and private-based
scheme of insurance. After almost four decades of the introduction of Islamic insurance, the
demand for Islamic insurance is still considered very low. The literature on informal economy
might help us to understand why many Muslims are still reluctance in using the modern scheme
of Islamic insurance and maintaining their informal ways to deal with economic hardships.
During the 1950s and 1960s, many economists believed that low-income, traditional,
subsistence, and informal economies of developing countries could be transformed into dynamic
modern, capitalist, wage-employment, formal economies through a combination of correct
economic policies and enough resources: capital, plentiful labor, and technology. As the countries
gaining more economic growth or industrial development, the labor forces from the informal
economy will be absorbed by the modern sector, which offers higher wages.
Many models including the dual-sector or the Lewis model, which was invented by an
economist W. Arthur Lewis in 1954, describe this process. The model assumes that the
developing country has a surplus of unproductive labor especially from agricultural sector. This
assumption is based on the classical economy’s argument such as Adam Smith who argued before
that unlimited supply of labor was available at subsistence wage. Later, these workers become
attracted to the manufacturing sector where higher wages are offered. At the beginning, due to
the ‘unlimited’ supply of labor, the capitalist of the manufacturing sector can expand without
necessarily increase. As a result, the capitalists can charge a price above the fixed wage rate, and
then reinvest the profit into fixed capital and enables this sector to expand more. At the final
stage, the country will eventually shift from traditional economy into modern economy. This
universal model combines an analysis of the historical experience of Japan and Western
European countries with the central ideas of the classical economists to explain development
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process. Moreover, this model emphasizes income per capita as the measurement of economic
success.153
Other common models during those years, whether it was Raul Prebisch’s ‘center vs.
periphery’ (1949) or Harvey Leibenstein’s ‘big push’ (1957) or W. W. Rostow’s ‘stages of
economic growth’ (1960), had also suggested a linear and gradual model of social change. Those
models argued that the informal and subsistence economy of all developing countries would be
transformed into a modern economy regardless of their differences in size, history, culture,
endowment, etc.154
Contrary to this optimism, many research projects conducted in the 1970s had shown the
persistence of the informal sector especially within rural areas. British anthropologist, Keith Hart
stated that despite the external pressure from the capitalist economy, most of rural migrant
workers in Accra, Ghana were still engaged in informal activities.155 This pioneering study was
confirmed later on by similar study by ILO World Employment Commission, which was conducted
in Kenya in 1972. Moreover, this study concluded that the informal sector was not only persisted
but it was expanded to include profitable and efficient enterprises as well as marginal
activities.156 It means that rather than simply a low-income and backward economic activity, the
informal sector is considered by these studies as creative, efficient and resilient activities.
Therefore, some experts found that the term ‘informal’ is misleading. Robert Neuwirth prefers
to use the term of System D, which comes from French word débrouillard. This word literally
means resourceful and ingenious. System D is used to define the inventive, self-reliance, and the
do-it-yourself economy that exist by not being regulated by the government, and for most part,
without paying taxes. Not only that, this sector is also growing around the world including within
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developed economies. According to Neuwirth, "Estimates are that the informal economy around
the world is [worth] about $10 trillion a year and if it is combined into a one country, it would be
the second-largest economy on Earth, rivaling the United States economy.”157
ILO defines informal sector as “a sector may be broadly characterized as consisting of
units engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating
employment and incomes to the persons concerned. These units typically operate at a low level
of organization, with little or no division between labor and capital as factors of production and
on a small scale. Labor relations - where they exist - are based mostly on casual employment,
kinship or personal and social relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal
guarantees.”158 Furthermore, informal sector activities are largely ignored, rarely supported,
often regulated and sometimes actively discouraged by the Government.
That definition suggests that informal does not indicate a location of the activities such as
rural or the periphery of the cities. It also does not limit the meaning to certain economic jobs or
economic activities. Informal is the way of doing things, characterized by:
(a) ease of entry;
(b) reliance on indigenous resources;
(c) family ownership of enterprises;
(d) small scale of operation;
(e) labor-intensive and adapted technology;
(f) skills acquired outside the formal school system; and
(g) unregulated and competitive markets.159
There are many debates related to the emergence of the informal economy. One is
questioning its impact whether this sector brings benefit to the system as a whole. Some see it
as a pathology that need to be cured, but others regard it as an alternative that makes the
economy continues to grow and stabilize. The first group considers informal economy represents
unprotected workers, excessive regulation, low productivity, and unfair competition, evasion of
the rule of law, underpayment or nonpayment of taxes, and work “underground” or in the
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shadows. Many believe that informal enterprises should be brought under the formal regulatory
environment to increase the country’s tax base and reduce the unfair competition to formal
businesses. The second group considers diversification as a good thing. It helps individuals and
society becoming more resilient toward shocks.
There are also scholars who are focusing on the issue of its relationship with the formal
economy. The Dualist as presented by the Lewis model argues that both sectors operate
separately or with a very few linkages. In this situation, the informal sector comprises the less
advantage sector. Contrary to the Dualist, many experts argue on the interconnectedness of
these two sectors. The Structuralists see the informal and formal are intrinsically linked where
Capitalists subordinate workers from both sectors in order to keep the price of goods and services
low.160 These questions are important in defining the direction of the current research on the
informal economy.
In 2007, the Latin America Division of the World Bank published Informality: Exit and
Exclusion, a book co-authored by Guillermo Perry, William F. Maloney, Omar Arias, Pablo
Fajnzylber, and Jaime Saavedra. The co-authors proposed a holistic model of the composition
and causes of the emergence of the informal economy or informality. Regarding the causes or
drives informality, they specified three different forms of both Exit (voluntary informality) and
three different forms of Exclusion (involuntary informality). The term ‘exit’ is appropriate for the
individuals or enterprises that used to be in the formal sector then move to informal, while
‘exclusion’ is for the ones who never been formal. The scholars believe there is no single factor
that is able to explain it comprehensively, and most of the cases are considered as result of a mix
interaction between voluntary and involuntary informality.161
The three forms of Exit are opportunistic evasion, defensive evasion, passive evasion or
state irrelevance. Opportunistic evasion is informality that is caused by motives of evading tax
and labor codes or law and conducting illegal activities. The informality is considered as defensive
evasion when the informal workers and entrepreneurs move to informal activity in response to
burdensome, captured, and weak state. For instance, the conflict in Iraq had weakened the state
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in providing the livelihood for Iraqis. Governmental job had been the main sources for Iraqis to
get income for the past years, thus when the Government collapsed, they turned to the informal
economy to earn a living.162 Other instance is how global economic crises makes people in
Johannesburg to work informally by selling at the city street.163 Lastly, the passive evasion is a
voluntary informality, which is caused more by the prevailing pre-modern institutions such as
Bazaar economy or a non-state institution such as traditions within the localities.
Different from the previous ones, the informality happens involuntarily mostly due to
structural reasons. For instance, worker cannot get formal jobs due to labor market
segmentation. A study on informal childcare work concludes that migrant workers stay in
informality because when it is formalized, it will become too expensive. There is no incentive for
the family (or the mother) to use the informal childcare services because it cost more than they
earn.164 The economic activities inside refugee camps are also kept informal due to the nature of
the legality of the camp itself. Informal economy has become the lifeblood of the camp, but at
the same time, it also has made the non-permanent settlement ‘permanent’.165 Another reason
for Exclusion is burdensome in entry regulations or excessive taxing which prevents firms from
formalizing. Many informal health care practices such as herbal medicine or faith healers are
maintaining their activities within informal framework because of the regulations. Many of these
practices are still exist in many parts of the world.166
Informality also exists in insurance. A study from the World Bank notices the persistence
of informal insurance in many households in low-income countries. The examples include
drawing down savings, engaging in a reciprocal gift exchange, selling physical assets, and
diversifying income-generating activities. Those are not arranged through a legally binding
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contract or state bureaucracy. The mutual help is ensured through the existence of social norms
and trust. Everybody helps with the expectation to receive similar help in the future. This
arrangement is often very effective in the right circumstances, but it is hardly able to cope with
large-scale economic shock or huge natural disasters.167
Altogether, these theories of informality help us to understand the reasons why people
in majority Muslim countries maintain their traditional risk management (as we will see in the
case of Pakistan), instead of using the modern, formal, Sharia-compliant of Islamic insurance.
Furthermore, the sophisticated approaches on informality of the recent literature enable us to
consider traditional risk management not as pathology or backwardness, but a sign of
resourcefulness and ingenuity.
Social capital
This next group of literature on social capital proposes a parallel explanation of the
phenomenon of the lack of Islamic insurance development. It comes naturally on the list after
the discussion on the informal economy. It suggests that a society with rich social capital will have
more capability to develop alternative mechanisms. The informal insurance services use social
capital as the basis of their activities. Even for the formal one such as mutual or cooperative
insurance, it still depends also on the existence of trust between its members. As most individuals
could not deal with an economic loss only by themselves, the solution would be to develop a
mechanism of risk sharing through mutual insurance. This effectiveness of this mechanism
depends on the extent of the availability of social capital within the community.
Social capital has been an essential part of Sociology for a long time. Emile Durkheim did
not use the term on his discussion on Suicide (1897), but he referred it conceptually when he
talked about how individual’s connection to society can protect the individual from anomie and
self-destruction. Durkheim explores the differing suicide rates among Protestants and Catholics,
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arguing that stronger social control among Catholics results in lower suicide rates.168 The other
French writer, Alexis de Tocqueville, also highlighted the importance of social participation within
the American society as he observed during his visit there in the early 19th century. According to
him, Americans were prone to discuss public matters collectively. The social participation of the
people along with a high level of transparency were the reasons for American democracy to
work.169
The next scholar on social capital would be Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu can be considered
as the pioneer for the recent study of social capital. He identified the value of social capital, which
he defined as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group
by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual
acquaintance and recognition.” 170As a neo-Marxist, he examined the role of different types of
capital including social capital in the reproduction of power relations within society.
Furthermore, James Coleman developed Bourdieu differentiation of capitals and
provided a clearer theoretical framework on social capital. According to him, social capital has a
similar function as other capitals: physical, financial, and human capital, which provides structure
for facilitation human actions. Social capital can take three forms; firstly, obligations and
expectations which depend on the trustworthiness of the social environment, secondly the
capacity of information to flow through the social structure in order to provide a basis for action
and thirdly the presence of norms accompanied by effective sanctions. In his discussion on
obligations and expectations, he describes the situation of doing favors for someone as "credit
slips." Should an individual need a favor, he is essentially giving someone else a credit slip, which
signifies that he will be paid back for his goods and/or services. He mentioned how the strong
ties among members of the Orthodox Jewish community in Brooklyn enable them to trust each
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other then make trade transaction easier.

171

The existence of social capital can be measured

from the level of trustworthiness, which enables that process to happen.
Robert Putnam completed the conceptualization of social capital. His works have
expanded the discussion of social capital beyond academic circle to a wider public, but more
importantly, he strengthened the conceptualization of social capital as an attribute of
communities rather than individual. Putnam started his research on social capital by studying the
local governments in Italy. In Making Democracy Work: Traditions in Modern Italy, Putnam wrote
that northern Italy's history of community, guilds, clubs, and choral societies led to greater civic
involvement and greater economic prosperity. Similar with Tocqueville’s finding on the American
society, the ‘networks and norms of civic engagement’ allows to build trust. Therefore, trade and
democracy flourish in this locality. Meanwhile, the agrarian society of Southern Italy is less
prosperous economically and democratically because of less social capital.172
Similarly, Francis Fukuyama compared the relative economic performance of different
nations and cultures based on differing levels of trust. He underlines the interconnectedness of
economy to the cultural life of society. He believes that nation cultures contain underlying
principles that foster social and economic prosperity. It is a certain set of informal values or norms
shared among the members of a group, which permit cooperation among them. In his book,
Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity, he concluded that society with high level
of social trust will be able to create the flexible, large-scale business organizations that are
needed to compete in the new global economy.173 Coleman, Putnam, and Fukuyama agreed that
trust as the main feature of social capital.
At later development, social capital had started to gain attention in the economics
discourse too. This importance of social capital in economic development has captured the
attention of many international development agencies such as the World Bank and OECD. Not
only focusing on technical assistance, these organizations has been adjusting its strategy to
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include the development of the social fabric of the society: the institutions, relationships, and
norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions.174 Regarding
insurance, many of these agencies have tried to find alternative ways to provide healthcare to
low income communities. Many of these new alternatives or unknown policy for instance
Community-Based Health Care need to be supported by a cohesive community. They believe that
a community with a high level of social capital will be more inclined to go through change.175
Beyond the component of trust, Putnam provides a more comprehensive definition on
social capital by adding other crucial components. He defines social capital as ‘trust, norms, and
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’.176 This
definition involves three aspects of social capital: trustworthiness (how people anticipate that
others will behave in the future), norms (the informal laws that govern exchanges and daily life),
networks (the connections between individuals). According to Putnam, these three aspects can
be observed through the level of increase/decrease level of membership of professional,
political, or religious organizations and informal socializing.
The recent scholars have enriched Putnam’s basic definition resulting a more
sophisticated understanding on social capital. Some of them have tried to improve Putnam’s
methodological approach by focusing on the changing pattern of membership rather than simply
its number. Others are focusing more on the term ‘social’ rather capital meaning that they
approach the concept not as properties of individual or collective that can be identified
independently but more social properties that can only be accessed through ties in the network.
Putnam focuses on ‘wires’ where information and resources run, hence the network and
relationship are its core component, but others focus more on ‘electricity’ or information and
resources that running through the wires.177
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The recent scholarship on social capital acknowledges that social capital is not panacea
for social problem. Social capital is not necessarily to be societal goods. The reason is social capital
works in certain circle or social connection. For instance, Fukuyama asserts that trust does not
work equally across society. He refers to a “radius of trust” which means a circle of people among
whom cooperative norms operate. In some societies, a narrow radius of trust produces a twotier moral system, with good behavior reserved for family and personal friends, and a lower
standard of behavior in the public sphere. This explains the practice of nepotism and corruption
in many countries.178
This differences on how it works has led to a further study on the differentiation of social
capital. As networks, social capital can be categorized into three types of connections: bonding,
bridging, and linking. Bonding (exclusive) social capital refers to relations amongst relatively
homogenous groups such as family members and close friends and is similar to the notion of
strong ties. Putnam mentions the examples of bonding social capital as being ethnic fraternal
organizations and church-based women's reading group. This form of network centers on
horizontal ties between individuals who are quite similar to each other and may live the same
area. This type of network can produce negative externalities as documented by Daniel Aldrich
in his study on post-disaster recovery. He acknowledges that social capital has more role
compares to financial assistance in the recovery process, but it also has a downside.
Aldrich provides a thorough empirical study of how a strong bonding hampered the
recovery process for instance in the case of Hurricane Katrina, 2005. FEMA had trouble to locate
temporary housing/trailers in the area with strong political participation. The local citizens
successfully opposed the existence of FEMA trailers in their area. Moreover, strong sense of
belonging to a group can create indifference or even hostility to non-members.179 Bridging
(inclusive) social capital refers to relations with distant friends, associates and colleagues. It refers
to the horizontal network to extra local, crossing ethnic, racial, and religious cleavage, for
instance civil rights movements and ecumenical religious organizations. Linking social capital
refers to vertical relations between individuals and groups in different social strata in a hierarchy
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where different groups access power, social status and wealth. This to include the capacity to
leverage resources, ideas and information from formal institutions beyond the community.
Understanding how the networks work can help us to understand informal insurance.
Aldrich notes that in disaster recovery, social ties can serve as informal insurance, by providing
information, financial help, and physical assistance as alternative of market-based insurance.180
Some scholars even argued, “Being embedded in a network of higher kin composition, greater
density, larger size, and lower diversity increased the probability that a respondent received
recovery support”.181 In other words, the higher the bonding is, the most likely that people rely
more on informal and community based insurance mechanisms.
Overall, this section shows the significance of social capital, understood as trust, norms
and networks in examining the emergence of alternative insurance. Furthermore, the literature
on social capital pushes us to ask the question of economic security beyond framework of
economy. The argument for modern insurance company is the need to have a financially capable
entity to handle economic insecurity. The risks are simply too difficult and too expensive to be
handled by a single individual. To the contrary, social capital provides us with a different approach
on the problem. As many studies on post-disaster recovery show that, the financial capability has
less role in community recovery. The difference between resilience and disrepair lies in the depth
of communities’ social capital. Likewise, those communities rely more on alternative risk
managements due to the existence of robust social networks which help them in providing better
economic security.
Summary: from static comparisons to a dynamic conception of the ‘political life’ and the ‘social
life’ of Islamic insurance
In considering the central question of why Islamic insurance systems develop well in some
countries, but not in others, this chapter provides various possible theories to answer it. The
literature on Islamic insurance up to this date have provided us with a wealth of insight and
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information. However, almost all of them treat Islamic insurance as an autonomous and static
entity. In fact, Islamic insurance is part of a complex economy that is embedded in the country’s
particular social institutions. Moreover, evolutionary process and institutions in each country
have significant roles in shaping their population economic behavior, which is mostly neglected
in many studies of Islamic insurance. This dissertation offers a new as a means of adding breadth
and depth to existing studies of Islamic insurance implementation.
By using the various theories mentioned previously in this chapter, this dissertation offers
a qualitative research on the ‘political life’ and the ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Pakistan. The development gap between these countries on Islamic insurance rests
on the analysis of Islamic insurance as a product of political decision and social practice. It
explores Islamic insurance development gap as part of a broader socio-cultural development and
to consider economy as an evolving entity of bounded rationality. In other words, our theory
focuses on how the decision of political actors to embrace and regulate Islamic insurance as a
state’s policy and the acceptance of public of Islamic insurance in their daily lives influence the
development of Islamic insurance in these countries.
The term ‘political life of Islamic insurance’ is developed based on the argument that
Islamic insurance arrangements are not a passive response to some efficiency criterion but rather
the product of political deals within country’s polity that determine which laws are passed.182 The
payment, involving all the details of how providers are paid, incentives, and so on; and
organization, the structure of Islamic insurance system, risk pooling and the division of labor of
institutions within it are an outcome of political decisions. The constitution, political pattern, and
institutional arrangement provide a ‘path dependence’ for each country in operationalizing the
Islamic reform. In the upcoming chapters, the political life of Islamic insurance in these three
countries is examined as a result of complex bargains made between various groups within each
country polity, and those bargains are structured by the country’s fundamental political
institutions.
The usage of the term ‘social life of Islamic insurance’ refers to a framework for
understanding Islamic insurance as a commodity whose worth lies both within and beyond its
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exchange value.183 It calls attention to how insurance moves between registers of value among
different stakeholders and at various scales of analysis. It also encompasses how meaning
ascribed to insurance changes over time. It is the behavior, the habit, and action of the consumers
and providers within the system. The concepts of risk, risk sharing, distributive justice,
generalized reciprocity, and hedging against financial catastrophe are understood and addressed
in relation to the values, social capital, and culture in local worlds. In fact, different stakeholders
have presented insurance as both a concept and an institution to the public in various ways.
Public perceptions of and demand for insurance are not static. They are sensitive to changing
policy, practice, experience, and flows of information.184 According to Amy Dao and Mark Nichter,
we can analyze the social life of Islamic insurance through the interaction of various sociocultural,
economic, political, historical, and global and local that contribute to the “careers” of Islamic
insurance plans in these countries.185
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CHAPTER III
MALAYSIA

Since the enactment of the Takaful Act 1984, Malaysia’s Islamic insurance industry
continues to demonstrate a positive growth rate. It becomes a significant contributor to
Malaysia’s overall Islamic financial system. In 2015, Malaysia had the largest Islamic insurance
market in South East Asia with a 62% market share and the largest Family Takaful market globally.
There were eight composite companies (i.e., selling both Family and General Takaful business)
and three pure Family Takaful operators in Malaysia. In the same year, the market share of the
Islamic insurance industry in Malaysia was 12% of the total conventional insurance. Malaysia is
also considered as the leader in Islamic insurance regulations. Malaysia is the first country in the
world to implement a risk-based capital (RBC) framework for Islamic insurance. This novel
framework requires Islamic insurance companies to be more transparent by disclosing its agency
fees in its sales.186
Islamic insurance of Malaysia develops within a dual banking and financial system. The
Islamic financial system coexists with the conventional financial system. The Islamization in
Malaysia was not presented as an aspiration of replacing the existing political economy structure
of the country. The Islamic financial system is regarded as a supplement to the existing system.
Malaysia is considered as the first country to implement this dual system. Many Muslim majority
countries recognize Malaysia’s Islamic finance as the model to emulate.
This chapter discusses the development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. It begins with a
brief introduction of Malaysia as a multi-ethnic Islamist state. This section stresses the status and
role of Islam in the state building, the ethnic-based politics, the economic structure, and the
political actors of Islamic politics of Malaysia. Also, this introduction explains the structural and
cultural environments of Malaysia where Islamic insurance develops. After this brief
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introduction, this dissertation continues with a section on Islamic insurance development in
Malaysia. It provides detail information on the fact and figures of Islamic insurance in Malaysia,
and more importantly the characteristics of Islamic insurance as a political product and social
practice within Malaysian polity and society. We can consider this section as the dependent
variable of this dissertation. The next two sections explain this development through the
independent variables of ‘political life’ and ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. The first
independent variable explores the catalysts and the political coalitions behind Islamic insurance
during the Mahathir (1981-2003) and the post-Mahathir regimes. The second independent
variable relates to Malay’s social transformation, which is responsible for the development of the
‘modern’ redefinitions of Islamic economic beliefs that have shaped the Malay understanding of
entrepreneurship, human agency, Islamic duty, and financial obligation.187 This modern
understanding of ‘Islam’ is influential in how Islamic insurance has been presented to the public.
The structure of a multi-ethnic Islamist State
Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy consists of thirteen states and three federal
territories. Although Islam is the official religion of the country, Malaysia is not a state where the
law is ultimately derived from Islam. Ethnicity is important in Malaysia’s politics. A coalition
government dominated by Malay Muslims has ruled Malaysia since its independence in 1957.
Malaysia can also be described as an illiberal democracy. The country has procedures and
institutions characteristic of democracy, such as regular elections, minority rights and free press.
However, the government maintains control and intervenes in most aspect of social life of its
citizens.188
The British colonialism had a prominent role in shaping the political and economic
structures of Malaysia. This prominent role includes influencing the religious life and the
relationship between Malay states and Muslim communities. The British consolidated the
apparatus of centralized government and Malaya’s capitalist economy for almost 100 years of
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colonial rule in the Malay Peninsula and the Northern Borneo. After a brief period of Japanese
occupation during World War II, the British Military Administration returned to Malaya and
proposed the formation of a newly independent country. The decision of giving independence
was due to the lack of financial resources and popular support to maintain the British’ colonies
in the post WW II. However, the proposal clearly showed British’s intention in ensuring their
economic interests would be safeguarded after independence.189 Therefore, rather than
breaking up with the colonial past, the formation of independent Malaysia in 1957 was designed
to inherit the colonial political, legal, and economic system.
Later, the Islamic dimension was added in the overall system since the 1980s. The
inauguration of Mahathir Mohamad as Malaysia’s Prime Minister in 1981 set Malaysia gradually
‘as the fruit of a happy union between strict Islam and modern capitalism’.190 That concept shows
Malaysia’s ambition to be the Islamic financial hub of the Southeast Asian region and the world,
but at the same time, it wants to maintain the religious conservatism in the social life. The
following discussion provides a brief introduction of Malaysia as a state, particularly in its relation
to the role of Islam in state building, its multi-ethnic/religious circumstances, its capitalistic
economy structure, and its essential political actors.
Malay nationalism
Historically, Malaysia has its origins in the Malay Kingdoms present in the area, which,
from the 18th century, became subject to the British Empire. Based on the latest United Nations
estimation, the population of Malaysia in 2019 is around 32 million or equivalent to 0.42% of the
total world population.191 The territory of this federal constitutional monarchy is separated by
the South China Sea into two similarly sized size regions, Peninsular Malaysia and Malaysian
Borneo. The Peninsular Malaysia also known as Malaya or West Malaysia, which contains the
capital city of Kuala Lumpur, accounts for the majority (roughly 92%) of Malaysia’s population
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and economy. Malaysian Borneo or East Malaysia is less populated and overall less developed in
its settlements than its West. However, East Malaysia’s land mass is larger, and it has more of
many natural resources including oil and gas reserves.
As mentioned earlier, the independent Malaysia was not a result of a nationalist
opposition against the British rule, but it was a formation of an independent Malay state
governed by its traditional elites with a full support from the former ruler of the colony. In 1946,
upon the return of the British to Peninsula Malaya after Japanese occupation, the British Military
Administration proposed for the creation of the Malayan Union, which consists of the federated
and un-federated Malay states, Singapore, Malacca, and Penang. According to this proposal,
there would be a central government for the whole region where Malay, immigrant Chinese and
Indian communities have equal access to political power.
This initial proposal was in fact bypassing the traditional authority of the Sultanates. The
Malay nationalists strongly opposed this proposal and successfully pressured the British to
replace the Malayan Union with the Federation of Malaya in 1948. The modified proposal of the
Federation of Malaya preserved the separate existence of the several Malay states and
guaranteed the supremacy of Malay interests.192 The Malayan Communist Party, which primarily
supported by Chinese workers, was the only one who opposed the formation of the Federation.
The Malayan Communist Party, who had organized anti-Japanese resistance in the 1940s,
condemned the Federation as a reunion of “British imperialism and Malay feudalism”. 193
At the same time, the Malay elite knew that the British would not grant independence
unless the Malays could convincingly demonstrate that they could work with the immigrant
Chinese and Indian communities. In order to convince the British, the Malay elite initiated the
formation of an inter-ethnic political coalition called the Alliance in 1954 comprising the United
Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan
Indian Congress (MIC). The Malay elite gained more confidence after their landslide victory in the
first elections for the legislature in 1955. This victory showed that the Malay elite could lead a
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culturally and religiously diverse nation. Moreover, the coalition and its electoral triumph had
shown the overwhelming political support among the masses upon the idea of power-sharing
governance of this new federation.
In 1957, an independent Malayan state was officially formed with the support of Malay
officials, Chinese merchants, and Indian intellectuals under the leadership of Tunku Abdul
Rahman. Under the new constitution, the dominance of Malays or Bumiputera in education, job,
the state bureaucracy, and reservation of land and of non-Malays in the economy were
established. The Federal Constitution declares Islam as the official religion of Malaya, but it also
guaranteed freedom of worship for other religious communities. Article 52 of the Constitution
stated that Malay language (Bahasa Melayu) as the official language of the Federation. Bahasa
Melayu would soon replace English, Chinese, and Tamil in state schools. In 1993 the Federation
of Malaya was reorganized to include North Borneo and Singapore (though Singapore withdrew
in 1965), and the extended federation was officially renamed Malaysia.
Ethnicity is the backbone of Malaysian politics. Malaysia’s population is just over 50
percent ethnic Malay, with Chinese Malaysians composing 22.7 percent, Indian Malaysian
making almost 7 percent, and non-Malay Bumiputera and other Indigenous groups another 11.8
percent.194 The law defines Bumiputera as consists of Malays and non-Malays indigenous
communities. It includes Malays, Thais, Eurasian, hill peoples in the Malay Peninsula (known as
orang asli), and indigenous Borneans (i.e. Dayak, Kadazandusun, and many others) but excludes
Malaysian of Chinese and Indian descent. Article 160 of the Constitution only states the criteria
for a person to be considered a Malay; which is to profess the religion of Islam, habitually speak
Malay language, conform to Malay custom and be born to a Malaysian parent.195
In the mid-year of 2017, the Department of Statistics Malaysia estimated the country’s
population as slightly over 32 million citizens and non-citizens. The 28.7 million citizens consisted
of the Malays and non-Malay indigenous groups that reside in Malaysian Borneo (Bumiputera)
at 19.78 million and the Chinese at 6.66 million and Indians just below 2 million. Chinese
194

World Atlas, "Ethnic Groups of Malaysia," Society (accessed 16 January 2018,
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-of-malaysia.html.
195
malaymail.com, “Bumiputera: Are You One? Or Can You ‘Become’ One in Malaysia?,” July 26, 2017,
https://www.malaymail.com/s/1429005/bumiputera-are-you-one-or-can-you-become-one-inmalaysia#Hj6u5yUBytSWCDwQ.99.

76
Malaysians include both long-settled Peranakan or Chinese descents and the larger group of
immigrants that arrived in the 1800s and early 1900s, which can be divided still further among
different provincial or dialect groups. The Indian community, though mostly Tamil, contains
significant numbers of Telugu and Malayalam speakers in addition to Punjabi, Sikh, and Indian
Muslim minorities.196
The non-Malay communities have been vital for the economy of the country. Chinese and
Indian labor skill was crucial to the tin mining and rubber industries, respectively, which were the
two principal revenue earners for the country during the colonial era. The vital significance of
these communities was one of the reasons why the British colonial regime included them as
citizens in the British’s initial proposals of the formation of the Federation. Chinese and Indian
labor skill was important for maintaining the British’ economic interest in the post-colonial era of
Malaysia. Moreover, both the British and the Malay elite did not want the immigrant Chinese to
support the Communist cause to break the colonial economic structure of the country.
The Federal Constitution does not necessarily exclude the non-Malay from the political
domain. There have been some of the prominent non-Malay legislators at both federal and state
levels. Non-Malay can achieve senior public service positions, such as ambassadors and
counselors in mission abroad. The Malaysian judicial service boasts of an array of non-Malay
judges. However, there is political power imbalance between the Malay and non-Malay
communities. Non-Malay has no reasonable representation in the federal cabinet, the
parliament, the various state executive councils, and state assembly.197 The prime minister and
deputy prime minister have always been Malays, though there is no constitutional provision
restricting others. The Malay also dominates the civil service and the armed forces. As agreed,
since independence, the political system of having a Malay core is preserved to maintain the
historical character of Malaysian society. This dominance has continuously supported by
government policies that usually give preference to Malay Bumiputera over other groups.
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Malaysia was relatively successful in operating a system of consociational democracy
based on multi-ethnic elite bargaining until the breakdown of the Alliance due to the ethnic riot
of May 1969. Since 1971, Malaysian political system cannot be considered as consociational.
Malaysia under the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad of the UMNO has been transformed into a
Malay authoritarian government where the Malaysian regime has promoted institutions and
policies that favor more Malays (who are also Muslim) at the expense of non-Malays (Chinese
Malaysian, India-Malaysian). There were regular elections and a parliament, but these
democratic institutions did not make government turnover possible, instead of lending the
regime legitimacy and encouraging some political responsive.198 However, the UMNO under
Mahathir was more responsive toward constituent interests than Indonesia’s Golkar Party was
under Soeharto. Soeharto’s New Order regime was far more repressive than Mahathir’s
Malaysia.
The Malaysian regime since the early 1970s has relied on two groups, each of which
receives benefits from the regime in exchange for political support. The regime relies on the
explicit system of Malay favoritism targeting ordinary Malays and rewarding wealthy Malay
cronies. The favoritism was actualized through the implementation of the New Economic Policy
(NEP), an affirmative government policy to improve the economic wellbeing of the Malays. In
fact, the wealthy Malay elites were the result of this affirmative policy. In sum, the actual
Malaysian political system under Mahathir rests on an explicit cross-class alliance between the
Malay masses and a group of wealthy Malay elites with extensive involvement in both the
corporate world and politics.199
The Chinese Malaysian minority is economically dominant but have mostly been left out
of the ruling coalition. Moreover, the Chinese Malaysia had not been able to create a strong
communal-wide organization. The new wealthy Malays and Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurs
are the corporate business sector in Malaysia. Both favor a more liberal legal regime that
facilitates business activities. The difference is that the wealthy Malays have the capital
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investment that is fixed in Malaysia, while Chinese Malaysian have mobile capital. According to
Pepinsky, this is the reason Mahathir relied on policies of capital controls and an exchange rate
peg in dealing with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Malaysia implementation of these policies
reflects the Mahathir regime’s dependence on an alliance between Malay fixed capital and Malay
labor.200
Islamic supremacy
Islamic matters were under the control of the state level administrators, and not the
federal government. The British set out a special place for Islam in their administration of the
Federated Malay States, granting the sultans, or the traditional rulers, authority and status, but
only in limited matters concerning religious practice, ritual, and the laws of Muslim personhood,
family life, and marriage (munakahat). Sharia courts adjudicate matters concerning Sharia
matters in the individual state-based jurisdictions. The single exception to that legacy is
muamalat, the regulation of Islamic finance, which, since its inception in Malaysia in 1983, has
been governed by federal law.201
Despite its centralized politico-administrative system, Malaysia is an agro-urban society
with a differentiated social formation. Malaysia has an institutional configuration that recognizes
the division between state and religious spheres.202 The Federal government represents the state
sphere and the Sultan and State level religious institutions represent the religious sphere.
Throughout the Malay Peninsula, administration of religious affairs and the creation of chief
qadies, councils, and Sharia committee brought Islamic legal, educational, ritual, and financial
affairs under the control of the Sultan, assisted by state level religious agencies, the Majilis
Agama Islam (Council of Islamic Religion and Religious Council) and the Department of Religions
Affairs (or Religious Department).
200

Ibid.
Ahmad Abdul Hamid, The Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Malaysia : Prospects and Problems
(2009).
202
Riaz Hassan, “Power and Piety: Religion, State and Society in Muslim Countries” (the 15th Annual International
Conference on Islamic Studies on ‘Harmony in Diversity: Promoting Moderation and Preventing Conflicts in SocioReligious Life,’ Manado, Indonesia, 2015), https://www.unisa.edu.au/Documents/EASS/MnM/workingpapers/Riaz%20Hassan%20Power%20and%20Piety%20Religion,%20State%20and%20Society%20in%20Muslim%20
Countries%202015%20paper.pdf.
201

79
There has been a constant federal-state tension over religious authority in Malaysia.203
However, the role of state-level religious agencies has diminished since the Islamization project
of the 1980s. The federal government, under the leadership of JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam,
or Islamic Development Department), the central religious authority, managed to minimize a
‘separatist’ tendency apparent in individual state level religious authorities. According to
Hamayotsu, this has prevented them from building an entirely separate religious-legal regime
based on their own localized interpretation in each State.204 This strategy proved to be an
essential part of the success in Islamic finance project discussed in this dissertation.
Malaysia is neither an Islamic state where the law is ultimately derived from Islam nor a
secular state. It is the Federal Constitution and not Islamic Law that becomes the ultimate source
of legal and constitutional authority. The relationship between the Federal Constitution and
Islamic law is entirely different from the Pakistan-type model of Islamic State. Nonetheless, Islam
does have constitutional status in Malaysia. The Constitution (specifically, Article 3) establishes
Islam at the state religion of Malaysia.205 Therefore, Tom Pepinsky defines Malaysia as an Islamist
state rather than an Islamic state.206
The place of Islam within the state system differentiates Malaysia with another country,
for instance, Indonesia, which rejects the supremacy of Islam over other religions. Under
Indonesian law, the state through the Ministry of Religion is responsible for all manner of norms,
standards, and procedures for the organization and functioning of other officially recognized
faiths. In Malaysia, Islam and Islamic organization receive preferential treatment from the
government.
Sharia courts exist for Muslims in parallel operation of civil courts. However, Islamic law
is enacted only for Muslims and has no relevance for non-Muslims whatsoever. The
institutionalization of Sharia court, interestingly, has come with ‘modernization’ of the Sharia
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mechanism. This modernization process is not a novel thing. It is a continuation of the
modernization process previously conducted under the British colonial regime. This type of
modernization resulted in a selective approach of Islamic law where the ‘draconian’ elements of
the Sharia, such as traditional capital punishment, were removed and rejected.207
The role of Islam in the nation and state building has always become contestation among
Malaysian Muslims. The expansion of modern state institutions is highly political. On the one
hand, there is no evidence to suggest that an Islamic vision of state motivated the founding
fathers of independent Malaysia. The Muslim politicians -Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Abdul Razak,
and Tun Dr. Ismail- who played a significant role at that time approached the complexity of multiethnic Malaya as liberal and English-educated Malays. On the other hand, a small segment of the
Malay community represented by the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) who consistently argue for
an Islamic state. Their argument is the political power in Malaysia must be in the hands of the
Muslims. According to their understanding of Sharia, non-Muslims can perform various
administrative and bureaucratic roles, but under the direction of Muslim power holders. Contrary
to the liberal-minded of Malaysia’s founding fathers, PAS leaders readily use the idiom of religion
to engage with the process of state building. 208
Malaysian capitalism
The British Colonialism introduced capitalism to Malaya through the establishment of
plantation and mining economy. Initially, the British maintained the ‘non-intervention’ trade
relations with Malay states. However, as Britain’s need for raw materials supply, particularly tin,
had increased the British went for further incursion in Malay states’ domestic affairs in order to
safeguard trade monopoly. Furthermore, there was an opportunity presented by invitation from
Raja (Prince) Abdullah of Perak to aid him in his conflict against another prince for the throne in
1873. In his book, Azlan Tajuddin explains the transformation of Malaysian economy in detail. 209
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Based on this invitation, the British made some treaties with the ruler of the Malayan
state in the form of residential system. The residential system gave Malaya prince assistance and
support in their conflict with other states (protectorate), and at the same time gave the British
monopoly in the tin trade. The residential system was vital in the transformation of Malay
political economy structure. It strengthened the prestige and position of the Sultan, and
effectively marginalized the powers of the various local or village leaders.210 The residential
system also created salaried positions for the multiple members of the aristocrats, thereby
effectively taking away their traditional prerogatives in controlling local trade.211 The old Malay
government machinery soon gave way to modem western style bureaucratic administration with
a centralized structure under the Resident. These transformations, along with the enforcement
of standardized British-type laws, helped shield the processes of tin extraction and transportation
in the Malay States from any civil disruptions.212
Furthermore, the residential system created a supportive land lease and labor tax laws in
response to the demands for agriculture and mining. The British declared that all lands were
vested in the ruler. According to Tajuddin:
In the decade between 1879 and 1889, General Land Regulations based on standardized
leaseholds were introduced in Perak, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan. Malays in rural areas
were now required to register the lease of their lands from the new government for 999
years in return for quit rent. Lands not actually cultivated or occupied were to become
'state land’. In effect, the land was transformed into private property with prescribed
rights and obligations, which greatly enhanced production processes and the
management of revenues in British hands. It facilitated the growth of the tin trade as well
as provided the impetus for greater agricultural mass production, particularly pepper,
gambier, tobacco, sugar, tea, coffee, and later, rubber and palm oil. For the Malays, the
new land laws enabled the precipitation of sale and losses of their lands to Chinese and
Indian moneylenders, since many had placed their lands as collateral for loans, as well as
to plantations and land agents, who regarded lands as a commodity. 213
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Furthermore, various types of labor legislation were introduced organizing wage labor
and revenue collection for the state. This legislation had profound impact in establishing the
dominant role of the Chinese Malaysian in the economy. Under this system, Chinese towkays
(headmen or ‘advancers’) were responsible for the recruitment and maintenance of their
workers into the Malay states. They were also the ones who provided these workers with
expensive supplies, in which loans were usually made at double the market rates as ‘payments’
for their boarding and transport. Although the British controlled the overall tin production
process, such a profitable enterprise allowed Chinese firms to dominate the tin industry in the
early years of British colonial administration.214
Since tin provided the mainstay of the new capitalist economy, lands in which potential
tin deposits could be found were strictly dealt with in terms of clear and uniformed laws. The
commodification of land and labor in the Malay States was a process that was highly integrated
with the use of monetary funds to inject mercantile investments in trade and production. Largescale tin mining also fueled other activities of the modem capitalist economy into the Malay
States such as retail, consumer durables, and supplies. It became largely responsible for the
urbanization process in this region, which contributed to the growth of Singapore and the cities
on the western coast of the Malay Peninsula.215
Tin production serviced the needs of a growing industrial manufacturing base in the west,
in which case, capital-friendly land and labor laws became important antecedents to the
consolidation of British economic interests in the Malay states. This system also consolidated the
labor structure of the colony. Drabble noted that the trading system in the Malay States,
Singapore, and northern Borneo throughout the nineteenth century was characterized by a
three-tier participatory structure. At the top is a group of largescale entrepreneurs dealing in
imports and exports, consisting mainly of Europeans and later in the case of Singapore, some
Chinese. This group, backed by huge capital, dealt mainly in the vast bulk of wholesale items. The
second group is made up of medium scale bazaar-type traders, situated usually in the ports in
the form of small import-export firms. Chinese merchant houses, and to some extent limited
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Indian companies, performed many of these groups’ activities goods collection and distribution
and retailing. The third group consists mainly of on-the-ground, small peddlers and market
traders. This group, which comprises mostly of Malay and other indigenous peoples, operated
throughout the Malay world in the ports as well as in the hinterlands of deep forests and jungles.
Goods are usually primary products to be exchanged for small quantities of imports.
Interdependence of the system is reflected in the finance and credit networks that filtered down
from the top through banks and manufacturers.216 This structure also explains the persistence of
ethnic tension in the post-colonial era.
Capitalist incorporation of the Malay States and the northern Borneo regions was a result
of two kinds of social process under the residential system. One was the redefinition of land in
terms of capital in order to generate revenues for both individual entrepreneurs and the state
and the other one was the establishment of a wage system. Under Residential system, laws were
formulated to enable the efficient transfer of landed property into the hands of individual
capitalists. Not only was land now legally owned as individual property, the state also managed
its transactions through laws that secured its expropriation of minerals and resources. A wage
system organized labor forces for purposes of extracting surplus value to facilitate the newly
emerging capitalist production in the Malay states. The shortage of labor compelled the British
to recruit labor from overseas, which later on influence the ethnic relations in Malaysia. The
relation between ethnics in Malaysia is dominated by the socio-economic structure of Malaysian
capitalism.
Both processes were significant landmarks in Malay political economic history since they
became the crucial transitory factors that ushered the feudal Malay world into the world
capitalist economy. They also became the turning points of active Malay involvement in the
regional economy.217 Moreover, the social transformation of Malay society was a result of
colonial encroachments. The transformation was not a process resulting from internal dynamic
forces but rather from coercively external, top-down factors. In the late nineteenth century,
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further consolidation of British capitalist interests was realized through the unification of some
of the more affluent Malay states into a formal and autocratic colonial state.218
The introduction of a capitalist economy led to profound social change. Malay states had
become an important source of agricultural and forest commodities for export, and a market for
textiles, hardware, and other foreign goods. These developments led to extensive
commercialization of the economy, which continued after the formation of independent
Malaysia. The first decade of Malaysian independence was a period in which the elite classes
solidified their positions and utilized the state apparatus to advance their political economic
interests with the support from Chinese entrepreneurs and foreign investment.219
In the 1970s, Malaysia replicated the developmental state of Japan and South Korea in
which the government heavily involved in trade and industrial policies. In this ‘Look East’ policy,
the government of Malaysia chose strategic industries to be supported through generous
allocated credit. State-owned enterprises and government-linked companies mostly ran these
industries. However, Malaysia’s version of the developmental state was more open to foreign
investment by multinational enterprises. Moreover, the state also encouraged the development
of public equity markets, which provided domestic firms with and alternative source of capital.220
Starting 1980s, Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional coalition under Mahathir Mohamad had
relied more on an alliance between the Malay masses and a class of the new Malay
entrepreneurs. Chinese entrepreneurs were still important, but the government had
continuously tried to limit their political role. The ruling Malay government understood that the
creation of an indigenous Malay entrepreneur class was essential to sustain its regime. However,
the government preferred to take an instant method rather than nurtured genuine
entrepreneurs. Many of these Malay entrepreneurs were not professional managers. They were
senior civil servants who were appointed to senior positions in the Malaysian business group.
This strategy gave enormous benefit to Mahathir. Besides fulfilling the shortage of qualified
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manager, the usage of bureaucrats enabled the Prime Minister to have personal control over the
businesses. 221
Favoritism in economic and social policy ensures support from ordinary Malays;
favoritism in corporate and financial policy ties the new wealthy Malays to the regime.222 At the
same time, Mahathir had started the privatization process of Malaysia’s economy. In overall, the
capitalist system of modern Malaysia can be described as a combination of developmental state
and liberal market economies infused with personalized patron-client relationships. This patronclient relationship, particularly during the Mahathir regime, was very significant for the
development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. The following sections discuss this correlation in
further details.
Political actors in Islamic politics
The following paragraphs provide a brief map of the actors of Islamic politics in Malaysia
particularly on their position on to the institutionalization of Islamic insurance. According to
Meredith Weiss, Islamization in Malaysia, in general, created a fragmentation of political society
into three blocks, ‘as the debate over the role of religion inevitably had an impact upon the
possibilities for democratization and market-led modernization.’223 Weiss mentions the three
block consists of those who desired Malaysia to become a secular state represented by the
Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP), those who imagine Malaysia as a democratic
state imbued with Islamic values, but retaining secular laws and institutions, coalesced around
the communally organized UMNO and its partners in the ruling BN coalition, and those who called
for establishing an Islamic state with full implementation of Sharia of the Parti Islam SeMalaysia
(PAS, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party). Regarding Islamic insurance, three important actors need to
be added beside these three political groups; the civil society groups (ABIM and Islamic NGOs),
epistemic community and the insurance industry.
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The governing Barisan Nasional coalition (BN, National Front) comprises about a dozen
parties. Incorporated in 1974, this coalition is an expansion of a tripartite union called the Alliance
that contained three race-based parties, UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and
the Malaysian Indian Association (MIC). The Alliance was handed power by the British colonial
government when Independence was declared in 1957. The BN is headed by the United Malays
National Organization (UMNO), with Mahathir Mohamad (1981-October 2003) and then
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (November 2003) as prime minister. UMNO is secular nationalist,
though with increasing attention to Islamization since the 1970s; it is the linchpin of BN, and the
head of UMNO has always been head of government. UMNO had historically catered to
Malaysian Chinese, Malaysian-Indian, and foreign business interests.224
Bridging the gap between the heightened religiosity of the society and electoral politics
have been Islamic NGOs. Most prominent among these in terms of both size and political impact
has been Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement). The Islam
Malaysia (ABIM, Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement). The organization's ventures include a
network of Islamic schools that annually educate 20,000 students, a corporate arm (Koperasi
Belia Islam), and substantial property holdings. ABIM's nationwide complex of state and district
branches stretches down to the grassroots, with a 1,000 strong staff and around 60,000
members.
Most members are university graduates, often brought into the dakwah (Islamic
proselytization) movement. Most have been beneficiaries of federal affirmative-action policies
that benefit Bumiputera, or Malays and other indigenous peoples, in university admissions,
career advancement, and other areas. ABIM has produced leaders of PAS, UMNO, and the more
recently formed Parti Keadilan Nasional (Keadilan, or National Justice Party; multiracial but
Malay-dominated; centered around former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim and headed by
his wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail). Among them is Anwar Ibrahim helped found ABIM in 1971,
then led the organization from 1972 until he resigned to join UMNO; past PAS president (until his
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death in 2002) Fadzil Noor; his deputy and successor Abdul Hadi Awang; and Keadilan supreme
council member Ghazali Basri.225
The Malay opposition parties (DAP & PAS), by contrast, has evolved toward two divergent
positions on the issue of Islamic statehood and democracy. While the PAS has only about 15%
electoral support, it has managed to push the UMNO to implement elements of its nationalistreligious agenda. Islamic revivalism has brought heightened emphasis on Islamic rituals,
implementation of Islamic legal codes, and strengthening of Islamic praxis in all areas of social,
political, and economic life. For example, in the two states PAS governs, the party has required
that Muslim women cover their heads, restricted gambling and the sale of alcohol, and tried to
implement hudud/criminal law (though barred from doing so by the Malaysian constitution).
Meanwhile, the DAP is claimed to be multi-racial and center-left Malaysian political party
advocating for social democracy and secularism. The DAP usually draws much of their support
from secular and liberal voters with a stable electorate from voters of big cities, coastal regions,
professional middle-class, and working class. The party's strongholds are primarily in the urban
and semi-urban areas of Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Johor and the Federal
Territory of Kuala Lumpur. In the 2018 Malaysian general election, DAP contested in 47 federal
constituencies and won 42 seats and 101 out of 104 state seats contested, most under the ticket
of its ally People's Justice Party (PKR), representing a win rate of 95%, the highest among the
major political parties contesting.226
Foreign players dominate Malaysia insurance industry. Although they are economically
dominant, they do not have direct political influence on the development of Malaysia insurance
structure. On the contrary, the government through its central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia
(BNM) has strictly regulated this sector. Access to the Malaysian insurance market is very
restricted, BNM issues a limited number of insurer licenses. No direct conventional insurance
license has been issued since the 1970s. New reinsurance, Islamic insurance and Islamic reinsurance licenses have been issued from time to time since 1995 to meet specific objectives to
enhance domestic reinsurance capacity and further develop the Islamic insurance industry. Seven
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reinsurance licenses (one life reinsurance license and six general reinsurance licenses) were
issued between 1995 and 2007 and twelve Islamic insurance and Islamic insurance licenses were
issued between 2005 and 2010. Not included is the special license for the government backed
financial guarantee insurer established in 2009.
Foreign ownership of Malaysian insurers is restricted. The foreign equity limit for insurers
is 70 percent. A foreign equity limit above 70 percent will be considered on a case-by-case basis,
particularly for players that can facilitate consolidation and rationalization of the general
insurance industry. The foreign equity limit for reinsurers is 70 percent. Reinsurers are also
allowed to be established as branches. The foreign equity limit for Takaful operators is 70
percent. There is no foreign equity limit for Islamic re-insurance operators. There is a clear trend
towards consolidation of insurance industry players in the Malaysian market, led by the general
insurance sector.227
In Malaysia, the insurance industry has been regulated by Bank Negara Malaysia since 1
May 1988. Prior to that, the Ministry of Finance regulated the industry as per the Insurance Act
196343, which outlines the main set of rules and regulations governing operations of insurance
business in the country. The Insurance Act 1996 subsequently replaced this Act. The regulation
of the insurance industry by the Central Bank also involves policy development, administration
and enforcement of the Insurance Act 1996 governing the insurance industry, carrying out the
actuarial function, supervision of insurance licensees, consumer education and complaints
handling. The close supervision of solvency and market conduct along with a strengthened
regulatory framework enforced in the 1990s helped to enhance the professional standards in the
insurance industry and consumer confidence.228
There are currently 47 licensed insurance companies operating in Malaysia – general, life,
composite and Takaful license holders, out of which close to 70% of the units contain stakes held
by foreign shareholdings. Domestic banks either have their own insurance operators, JV with a
foreign partner or banc-assurance agreement to offer complete range of general and life
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products. 15 Takaful companies set up Malaysia Takaful Association (MTA) in 2008. This
organization is dedicated in promoting the interest of its members and to supervise the exercise
of self-regulation within the Takaful industry. Moreover, they signed inter-Takaful operator
agreement to set a common standard among all operators to regulate on and control matters
related to pre-contract examination for agents, agency registration system and code of ethics,
and compliance of the general Takaful tariff for motor and fire businesses.229
Most of the study on finance focus the roles of investors, lenders, analysts, advisors,
actuaries, and other skilled financial professionals informing and reproducing financial and other
markets. The unique aspect of Islamic finance is in the prominent role of epistemic community,
which consist of Sharia professionals, jurists, and adviser in the law-making process. Together
with practitioners, they formulate rules and regulation on Islamic finance. They are not the
traditional village religious authority, but they are an urban class of Sharia professional and
government bureaucrat who are increasingly armed with educational credentials from local and
foreign universities, they are promoting a more rational scientific approach to Islam and treating
rural Islam as mystical and ritualistic. The establishment of International Islamic University of
Malaysia (IIUM) has been very central in this process. IIUM and the International Center for
Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) has produced a skilled pool of graduates available for
expanding the Sharia bureaucracy particularly at the federal level.230
Being amongst the Islamic insurance elites
The development of the Islamic insurance industry in Malaysia in the early 1980s was
inspired by the prevailing needs of the Muslim public for a Sharia-compliant alternative to
conventional insurance, as well as to complement the operation of the Islamic bank that was
established in 1983.231 Islamic insurance becomes a new venue for both individual and company
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for investment, joint ventures, and alternative insurance sector with Islamic characteristics.232 As
an individual, a Muslim has the opportunity to invest in their family’s future and at the same time,
he or she receives financial protection. Meanwhile, an experienced international insurance
company can access insurance market in Malaysia by joining with the domestic Islamic insurance
company to provide Islamic insurance services. All processes have been carefully planned and
directed by the state.
History and development
In June 1972, the National Fatwa Committee declared that the concept of conventional
insurance contravened the rules of Sharia.233 Insurance transaction contains elements of interest,
gambling, and speculation, which are prohibited in Islam. In 1982, the Task Force to Study the
Establishment of an Islamic Insurance Company in Malaysia was formed by the order from Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad. This Task Force has a task to investigate the possibility of launching
Islamic insurance as a complement to Islamic banking. Datuk Mohd Fadzli Yusof, the current chief
executive officer of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. was one of the members of this task force.
Later, when Takaful Malaysia first started operation in 1984, Fadzli was made the chief executive
officer, a position he has held until today. He is known as the first Takaful man in Malaysia due
to his prominent role in initiating Islamic insurance.234 Following the recommendations of the
Task Force, the Malaysian Parliament enacted the Takaful Act 1984, thus giving birth to the
Takaful Scheme in Malaysia.235
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Malaysia has developed Islamic insurance gradually within three phases since that
moment. The first phase (1984-1992) started by the enactment of the Takaful Act 1984, the
establishment of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. (the first and the sole Islamic insurance
operator in the country) and placement of the basic infrastructure for the industry. In this phase,
the government focused its effort on setting the foundation for Islamic insurance by providing
basic regulation. The main investors/shareholders of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. during
this phase were an Islamic bank and state religious councils and foundations, and the customers
were mainly Muslims. The products offered were quite limited consisted of motor, fire and
mortgage Islamic insurance. Similarly, the investment avenues were confined to Islamic deposits
and government Islamic securities.236
The second phase (1993-2000) marked the introduction of competition, with MNI-Takaful
Sdn. Bhd. (now known as Takaful National Sdn. Bhd.) entering the scene as Islamic insurance
operators. In 1993, MNI Takaful was licensed and has since been operating in Malaysia. This latter
insurer currently focuses on enhancing customer services technology and developing new
marketing channels, e.g., policyholders' services through post offices. Malaysia National
Insurance Company, the largest local insurance company, currently owns about 80 percent of the
shares of MNI Takaful. This phase also witnessed greater regional cooperation amongst Islamic
insurance operators, with the establishment of the ASEAN Takaful Group in 1995 and ASEAN
Retakaful International (L) Ltd. in 1997 to facilitate Islamic re-insurance arrangements in the
region.237 They have a wider range of investment instruments issued by the Government and the
private sectors. There was a broad range of products features with more than 71% share of Family
Takaful products of the dominated market.
Next, the third phase (2001-2010) then began in tandem with the introduction of the
Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) by the Central Bank, which has as its objectives the
enhancement of the capacity of Islamic insurance operators and the strengthening of the legal,
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Sharia and regulatory frameworks. The Malaysian Takaful Association (MTA) in 2002 was
established during this phase. The association was formed as an association for Islamic insurance
operators to improve industry self-regulation through uniformity in market practice and to
promote a higher level of cooperation amongst the operators in developing the industry. As at
February 2008, there were eight registered Islamic insurance operators in the country, namely
Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad, CIMB Aviva Takaful Bhd., Hong Leong Tokio Marine Takaful
Bhd., MAA Takaful Berhad, Takaful Ikhlas Sdn. Bhd., Prudential BSN Takaful Bhd., HSBC Amanah
Takaful (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., and Etiqa Takaful Bhd.

In addition to this, the Central Bank in

September 2006 approved the licenses of 2 additional Islamic re-insurance companies, namely
Munich Re and MNRB Holding Bhd. The policy was intended to strengthen the institutional
infrastructure of the Malaysian Islamic insurance industry as well as synergize the overall financial
sector. Also, particularly since 2004, this phase witnessed the increasing interest from the nonMuslim costumers with different expectations, experiences, and demands toward Islamic
insurance.238
Furthermore, the Financial Sector Master Plan (a 10-year plan to be implemented in 3
phases) was launched by the Central Bank on 1 March 2001 and provided the blueprint for the
development of the financial sector (of which Islamic insurance is a part). At its core are
recommendations aimed at developing a competitive and dynamic financial system resilient to a
more challenging and globalized environment ahead.239
Malaysia has been developing Islamic Insurance of Takaful since 1984 with high
government commitment and top-down approach comprehensively and pragmatically. With
support from the business sector and universities particularly IIUM (International Islamic
University of Malaysia), the Central Bank has managed to gradually develop Islamic insurance
industry in Malaysia. In 2016, total premiums and contributions of Takaful sector increased of
Takaful by 4.4% to RM 61.3 billion or USD 14 billion (2015: +4% to RM 58.7 billion), while
combined insurance and Takaful assets expanded by 5% to RM 277 billion or USD 64 billion (2015:
+5.7% to RM 263.8 billion). There were also 55 insurers and Islamic insurance operators, including
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reinsurers and Islamic re-insurance operators, in the industry as at end-2016.240 Altogether,
Malaysia has been contributing by 70% of the total regional market of Southeast Asia and 13% of
the global market of Takaful respectively.

Figure 3-1: List of Islamic Insurance Operator in Malaysia
Name of company
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad
Takaful Ikhlas Sdn. Bhd
CIMB Aviva Takaful Berhad
Prudential BSN Takaful Berhad
HSBC Amanah Takaful (Malaysia) Sdn.Bhd
Hong Leong MSIG Takaful Berhad
MAA Takaful Berhad
Etiqa Takaful Berhad
AmFamily Takaful Berhad
Great Eastern Takaful Berhad
AIA AFG Takaful Bhd.
AIA Public Takaful Bhd
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, October 2018

Year

Ownership

1984
2003
2005
2006
2006
2006
2006
2007
2010
2010
2010
2010

Foreign (F)
Local (L)
L
L
L
L
L
L
L
F
L
L

Figure 3-2: List of Islamic Re-Insurance Operator in Malaysia
Name of company
1
2
3

ACR Retakaful Berhad
MNRB Retakaful Berhad
Munchener RuckversicherungsGesellschaft (Munich Re Retakaful)
4 Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd. (Swiss
Re Retakaful)
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, October 2018
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Regulatory framework
Those successes cannot be separated from the constant effort by the Malaysia
government to institutionalize its Islamic insurance industry through Public-Private Partnership
scheme. Mark Smith who assessed the contemporary state of Islamic finance in Malaysia said,
“Malaysians have seen consistent high-level government support of the industry within the
country and internationally, are exposed to large marketing campaigns, and have seen Islamic
banks on the main street for a generation. In such an environment the level of wholesale
suspicion of something new has largely been erased, though increased customer education about
the products remains a challenge.”241
Malaysia is the first country who created specific and separate Islamic insurance
regulation from conventional insurance, the Takaful Act 1984. The role of Islamic insurance
within the Malaysian secular common law system is clearly delineated by the Malaysian Federal
Constitution.242 In Malaysia, Islamic insurance is considered to be a part of mainstream
mercantile law, and hence a part of civil law and subject to the civil court structure of the country.
Therefore, the Federal Parliament has jurisdiction to legislate over it (as it has done via the
Takaful Act 1984), as opposed to being regulated by Sharia law and the Sharia courts. At this
moment, only Saudi Arabia and Sudan (and Iran) take the conservative approach of treating
Takaful as being a part of Sharia.243
The Takaful Act 1984 states that Bank Negara (the central bank of Malaysia) was
appointed to regulate Takaful insurance operations and to monitor the compliance of Takaful
insurers with the Sharia. Section 54 of the act entrusts the Central Bank with the responsibility of
administering the Act, whereby the Governor of the Bank is also the Director General of
Takaful.244 Moreover, this is apparent from the combined effect of Articles 73, 74, 75, 121(1),
121(1A), and the 9th Schedule of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia and is in line with Malaysia
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being a moderate Islamic country, with Sharia being confined to personal and inheritance
matters.245
However, Sharia still plays important part of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. The operation
of Islamic insurance in Malaysia must conform to Sharia or Islamic rulings on the commercial
transaction. Unlike health care sharing ministries or other non-profit schemes, Islamic insurance
is confined in the commercial or private sector. As a result, its operation is regulated based on
the Islamic commercial profit-sharing principle of Al-mudharabah. Al-mudharabah is recognized
as the commercial profit-sharing contract between the providers of funds for a business venture
(participants) and the entrepreneur who actually conducts the business. The principle of the Almudharabah contract has been successfully modified and developed into the Malaysian model,
where the participant of an Islamic insurance product is entitled under the contract to enjoy a
return on the contribution or premium paid in consideration for participating in the product. This
contrasts with the Al-wakalah principle, which is based on the idea that the operator, acting as
an agent of the participants, can charge its management expenses on the Islamic insurance
contributions or premium paid. 246
Islamic insurance is defined in section 2 of the Act as a scheme based on brotherhood,
solidarity and mutual assistance whereby the participants mutually agree to contribute to
providing for mutual financial aid and assistance in case of need. The Act also classifies Islamic
insurance business into the family solidarity business, which is defined as Islamic insurance for
the benefit of the individual and his family, and general business, which is defined as all Islamic
insurance business that is not family solidarity business. In the terminology of conventional
insurance, family solidarity business refers to life insurance while general business is equivalent
to general insurance.247
Family Takaful is like an endowment policy. A participant decides on the maturity period,
the amount of annual contribution (provided it is above the minimum amount set by the
company), and the frequency of contributions. The money goes into two different accounts,
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namely the Participants’ Account (PA) (a savings and investment account) and the Participants’
Special Account (PSA) (which is for contributions made for the purpose of Tabarru or donation),
whereby the participants agree upon to relinquish as donation a certain portion of their Islamic
insurance installments as contribution to a common pool out of which is paid the compensation
as agreed upon in the contract of Islamic insurance. In this way is realized the goal of assisting
and helping the participant who may suffer some loss. Money from both accounts is invested in
accordance with Islamic principles. The General Takaful protects participants against losses from
personal accidents and loss or destruction of property. The contract specifies the amount of
contribution that the participant must make. All contributions are paid into the General Takaful
fund.
Part of the fund is used to cover the expenses while the rest of the fund is invested like in
family Takaful. Profits in the fund are then shared between the company and the participants.
The registration of Islamic insurance operators is covered in section 8 of the Takaful Act 1984.
Section 8(5) states that the applicant must satisfy the Director General of Takaful that the aims
and operations of the Islamic insurance business will be in accordance with Sharia, and that the
Articles of Association provides for the setting up of a Sharia Supervisory Council.
According to Thanasegaran, the concern shown in the Islamic insurance contract to
specify every detail is not only Islamic but also a definite improvement on the existing nature of
conventional insurance contract. However, despite every effort to spell out details of the Islamic
insurance contract, there may still be some uncertainties. For example, how much the Islamic
insurance company must pay to settle a claim under a third-party motor policy may only be
known after actual happening. Such uncertainties are inherent in the contract of insurance and
are condoned under the doctrines of necessity and public interest.248
Like conventional insurance, the issues of "insurable interest" and uberrimae fidei (of the
fullest confidence) are essential in the Islamic insurance. Thanasegaran further explain, “The
nature of family Takaful is such that the issue of insurable interest is automatically taken care of;
the participant himself is both the insured and the policy-holder. In case of the General Takaful
(fire, accident, motor, etc.), although the Takaful Act 1984 is silent on insurable interest, yet the
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general provisions of the Contract Act 1950 against wagering contracts may be applied to these
contracts requiring the participant to show enough interest in the subject-matter, both at the
inception and the time of loss.”249
The principle of uberrimae fidei is emphasized equally under the Islamic law of contract
and its rules regarding honesty, full disclosure, truthfulness and utmost good faith. Noncompliance of these makes the contract un-enforceable and it applies fully to any Islamic
insurance contract. As the Takaful Act 1984 does not state the whole of the law governing an
Islamic insurance contract, it is presumed that section 5 of the Civil LAW Act 1956 applies. This
section says inter alia that "in all questions or issues with respect to life, and fire insurance, and
with respect to mercantile law generally, the law to be administered shall be the same as in
England."250
The Malaysian government has however taken steps over the years to enhance the
industry in terms of its infrastructure and education. In 2003, it launched a 10-year Consumer
Education Program to educate consumers of their rights and responsibilities arising under
insurance and Islamic insurance contracts. This policy was followed by the amalgamation of the
Insurance and Banking Mediation Bureaus into the highly effective Financial Mediation Bureau
in 2005 which handles most of the insurance and Takaful complaints to date. The Law
Harmonization Committee was in turn established in 2010 to facilitate a more conducive legal
system to achieve certainty and enforceability of Malaysian Islamic finance laws. This law was
followed in 2011 by the Central Bank’s Sharia Governance Framework for Islamic Financial.251
The Malaysia government undertook several regulatory reforms to enhance the role of
the critical organs responsible for executing Sharia compliance. In 2013, the government issued
the Financial Services Act 2013 (Malaysia) and the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013. Both these
statutes came into effect on 30 June 2013 following a much-awaited repeal of their predecessors,
the Insurance Act 1996 (Malaysia) and the Takaful Act 1984 (Malaysia).
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Special features and challenges
Malaysia is well known for its clear guidelines for halal (permitted) investment, as Bank
Negara issues directives regularly on such investment. As a result, the participants of Islamic
insurance as well as other Islamic investors, in Malaysia and abroad, can now invest in
approximately 480 securities from the companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
Besides, Malaysian Islamic insurance participants have identified, with help from the
government, other similar investments. For example, those insureds that have a life insurance
policy with Syarikat Takaful Malaysia can invest the fund in their individual account to Bank Islam
Malaysia for a period ranging from one month to over 60 months. This bank also helps this insurer
lend its funds for special accounts to large corporations and individuals.252
Furthermore, the Malaysian government currently gives a tax relief of up to RM 5,000 for
residents for their Takaful insurance premiums plus additional tax relief of RM 2, 000 specifically
for such premiums for medical and educational purposes. As a result, 41,170 new life Takaful
policies were issued in 1996 for coverage totaling RM 1.92 billion253. The total assets for life and
non-life Takaful insurers in 1997 were approximately RM 300 million and RM 170 million,
respectively.254 During the same period, life Takaful insurance generated profits amounting to
about RM 60 million and non-life Takaful gained about RM 40 million from the investment.
Malaysia Islamic insurance growth to soar beyond the expected growth rate is its
competitive market structure of Islamic insurance industry. The rapid liberalization of Malaysia's
Islamic financial industry has encouraged foreign institutions' participation in Malaysia, thus
creating a diverse and growing community of domestic and international Islamic insurance
operators. There are currently eight Islamic insurance operators and two Islamic re-insurance
operators, with five foreign participations from the UK, Bahrain, Germany and Japan. This
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diversity of Islamic insurance operators helps in the reduction in the cost of doing insurance
business.255
Moreover, Malaysian companies are considered to have higher re-insurance capacity
even though they are less capitalized in relation to the amount of business managed by them.
They use a smart investment strategy by giving priority to the liquidity of shareholders’ fund
investment portfolio, where the investment accounts represented almost 48% of total Malaysian
shareholders’ fund investment portfolio. Most investment accounts both in the GCC and in
Malaysia are invested on a short-term basis. This is because the Islamic insurance operating
companies perceive the investment accounts as the safest, easiest, and most liquid asset class
available in the market. Although Sukuk (Islamic bonds) is a good alternative, the Takaful
operating companies are reluctant to use this asset class to manage their liquidity due mainly to
illiquidity of the Sukuk market. Globalization contributes to the development of vibrant Islamic
insurance structure in Malaysia.
Despite its success, there are some lack of Islamic insurance development in some
geographical areas and key market segment. The eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak have a
very low Takaful penetration along. The study conducted in 2012 by Malaysia Takaful Association
on Protection Gap showed that the low income, high cost, and challenges in product distribution
contributed to the low Takaful and insurance penetration, in which made larger protection gap
in these states.
Islamic insurance and other insurances in general are considered as not attractive among
younger working population of age 30 and below. They are prioritizing their expenses on their
immediate needs rather than long-term objective such as insurance or investment. It is noted
that the key market segment with a large protection gap is attributed to those below age 30 years
old who are largely single and are in the lower income group given that they would have only
recently entered the workforce and would receive entry-level pay. This is consistent with the
observations highlighted by the head of distribution channels of various Takaful operators
interviewed in this study, whereby the younger generation are often reluctant and would delay
purchasing insurance or Takaful protection cover. Furthermore, there has been low participation
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also from senior age population (50 and above). This is because the limitation on maximum age
of entry and underwriting requirement.

256

The demand from low-income population has not

been met with the suitable Islamic insurance product. Micro Islamic insurance products were
identified as lacking in Malaysia. At this moment, the lack of product variety is also considered as
one of the challenges for Islamic insurance development in Malaysia.
Altogether, the usage of very specific Islamic terms and contracts in Islamic insurance
does not necessarily mean that there is new method invented in Malaysia. The method used is
combination of several practices of Islamic financial contracts which is adapted to the existing
conventional insurance regulatory framework in Malaysia. Companies have freedom to choose
any method if the model does not breach Sharia principles. Their main goal of creating different
methods of the application of Islamic insurance is to make the Islamic insurance business ‘a
profit-seeking commercial venture’. As a result, Malaysia has been contributing by 70% of the
total regional market of Southeast Asia and 13% of the global market of Islamic insurance
respectively.
Moreover, Malaysia has been developing Islamic insurance as a complete and diverse
Islamic insurance service that is linked to other Islamic and non-Islamic financial services. These
achievements are a result of a comprehensive institutionalization through public-private
partnership scheme and sophisticated regulatory frameworks, with the government takes the
major role in its development. Islamic insurance operation is regulated separately from the
conventional insurance but still under mainstream mercantile law of civil court structure. It
means Islamic insurance in Malaysia is not regulated under the Sharia court. Unlike other faithbased insurance schemes, The Takaful Act 1984 confined the operation of Islamic insurance
within commercial or private sector. For this reason, Malaysia has become a model for many
other countries to follow suit.
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Making Islamic insurance ‘national’
The 1979 revolution in Iran had an enormous global effect. It was for the first time the
Islamist group gained power in a modern state. This event coincided with, and some have argued
spurred, a wider resurgence of Islam around the world, including Malaysia.257 There was an
increasing demand for Islamization in Malaysia. There was growing popularity of the Islamist
opposition political party Partai Al-Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), dakwah (Islamic missionary) activities
in Malaysia’s schools and campuses, and demand for wider implementation for Sharia law.
Islamization process in Malaysia took various expressions; from a formulation that like a
type of religious intolerance to the one that acceptable by different groups outside Muslim.
Recently, the Arabic word for God, Allah, widely used by Arab and Indonesian Christians, is now
reserved for Muslim use only.258 On the other hand, Islamic finance is a kind of Islamization that
is accepted by the public. One record shows almost half of the clients of Islamic finance are nonMuslim Malaysian. This section elaborates the coalition building behind Malaysia’s Islamic
insurance successes.
Also, the examination on Islamic insurance includes the assessment of Islamic finance
infrastructure as a whole. As the Malaysian example shows the strength of Bancatakaful
(combination of Islamic banking with Islamic insurance) has made Malaysia the second largest
Islamic insurance market globally. There has been growth in Bancatakaful, and half of Family
Takaful contributions come through this channel in Malaysia.
A window of opportunity
Shortly after Mahathir Mohamad was inaugurated as Prime Minister of Malaysia on July
16, 1981. He ordered the formation of a national steering committee to explore the possibility of
opening an Islamic bank and Islamic insurance in Malaysia. There were three catalysts for this
initiative. The first was the establishment of Lembaga Tabung Haji or Hajj pilgrim fund board by
the government of Malaysia in 1963. Performing Hajj or pilgrimage to the Holy City of Mecca,
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Saudi Arabia is one of the pillars of Islam. Every Muslim supposed to do Hajj at least once in a
lifetime. This ritual necessitates Muslims to devote enough financial resource to cover the
expenses. Not all Muslims have enough financial means to do it immediately; therefore, most of
them save some of their earnings until it is enough to cover the cost. Before Tabung Haji existed,
Malaysian Muslims saved their money in conventional Banks.
Since the 1960s there had been a growing concern among Muslims in Malaysia related
the use of conventional bank for saving their Hajj fund. The issue was on the use of interest by
the banks and the un-Islamic way of banks’ investment activities. Muslims of Malaysia demanded
a financial institution that can facilitate their need to deposit their money for hajj and at the same
time, avoiding the practice of interest which was considered as usury. Lembaga Tabung Haji was
established to solve that problem. Currently, it is the only institution in Malaysia managing more
than RM73billion of deposits (2017).259 The success of Tabung Haji gave incentive for Mahathir’s
regime to expand the practice of Islamic finance in Malaysia. This institution was considered as
the embryo of the Islamic bank in Malaysia. Until now, Tabung Haji has become the main source
of investment for various Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia.
The second catalyst for the Islamization of finance is the development of Islamic bank in
international level. The bank, so-called the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was initiated by the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) with the purpose to generate financial cooperation
among Muslim countries. IDB is working to improve the lives of those we serve by promoting
social and economic development in Muslim countries and communities worldwide, delivering
impact at scale.260Initially, OIC was established as a respond of an arson attack at Al-Aqsa mosque
of Palestine. Global Islamic resurgence began in the 1970s with the Arab–Israeli war which
triggered the global Oil Crisis in 1973. Events in the Middle East caused Muslims throughout the
world to identify with the various plights of their co-religionists, particularly in the Palestinian
issue. However, the member countries have tried to develop other meaningful cooperation
beyond international politics. OIC is 2nd largest inter-governmental organization after the United
Nation. It is "the collective voice of the Muslim world" and works to "safeguard and protect the
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interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony".261
IDB was established to serve these purposes through the vehicle of Islamic finance. Malaysia was
one of the countries who was playing s prominent role in the establishment of OIC including ADB.
Furthermore, the establishment of IDB provided an incentive for the creation of Islamic bank in
national level including Malaysia. Tunku Abdul Rahman who was the Prime Minister of Malaysia
before Mahathir was the committee chair of the establishment of IDB.
The third catalyst was the investment demand for the Petro dollar, mainly from Saudi
Arabia. After the Oil boom in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia wanted to recycle their wealth and to assert
its international influence by investing their Petro dollar to other Muslim majority countries. In
order to capture this opportunity, Mahathir contemplated the possibility of Malaysia having a
financial institution that capture this opportunity. They need an Islamic bank. In fact, it was Prince
Mohamed Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia was the one who convinced Mahathir to open Malaysia
market to an international Islamic bank. Due to legality issue, it was hard to establish an
international Islamic bank in Malaysia at that time. Nevertheless, Malaysia already saw its
importance and later, this has set the motion for Malaysia of building its Islamic banking system.
Beyond these three catalysts, the dynamics of national politics of under the secular
regime of Mahathir was considered as the primary driver of Islamization of economy in Malaysia.
Prior to Mahathir’s accession to the premiership in 1982, UMNO had done little to co-opt Islam
and Islamists into the umbrella of the Barisan Nasional (BN). According to Shamsul (1997), BN at
the time was too busy dealing with internal political squabbles for such efforts to take
precedence. Mahathir’s prescription to meet the challenge of ABIM and PAS was to effectively
redefine the debate between the two parties by embarking on a state-led, UMNO-led program
of Islamization. Islamization was a representation of the religious conscience of the Malays.
Although the global Islamic resurgence did serve to affect the religious conscience of the Muslim
population in Malaysia, there are ‘unique aspects to the resurgence of Islam in Malaysia that
cannot be traced to the wider global dynamics’.262 Unlike many Muslim countries, the promotion
of Islamization in Malaysia was not an expression of growing disenchantment over the repressive
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secular nationalism dictatorship and western domination of the relative underdevelopment of
Muslim societies that led to the promotion of the possibilities of a better life under the auspices
of an Islamic state. Under Barisan Nasional leadership, Malaysia was experiencing rapid economic
development, coupled with the redistribution of wealth under the New Economic Policy (NEP),
and meant that Malays were not in the same economic position as their Muslim brethren in the
Middle East. Therefore, the domestic factors of Malaysia Islamic politics are more relevant in
explaining the development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia.
In the 1980s, the common presumption that economic development was a secular project
underwent a thorough reexamination in Malaysia. As a result, it created a demand to initiate a
viable financial system: Islamic banking and Islamic insurance grounded in Islamic prescriptions.
Indeed, there was a keen interest in Islamic finance across the Islamdom like Iran, Pakistan, and
Sudan also sought to develop Islamic banking systems in the early 1980s.263 At the same time,
Malaysia had been facing high unemployment since the 1970s: the unemployment rate in the
1970 was 7.5%.
Nonetheless, Mahathir had been consistently voiced his rejection toward “western
capitalist blueprints” for modernization. Therefore, he came up with plans—in part in response
to Islamist political critiques—to design techniques for the provision of capital commensurable
with both Islam and capitalism, but also guarantee autonomy against globalization as the ability
of UMNO to distribute economic resources (as patronage) is the key to maintain its power. 264
The creation of a dual financial system and harmonization of Islamization with economic
liberalization enabled Mahathir to build a political coalition to support the establishment of
Islamic insurance in Malaysia. The first strategy has generated support from non-Malays to the
project, and the second has produced continues approval and participation from the Malays
population. Both policies are pursued as part of the adoption of the managerial role in the Islamic
economy. As the manager, Malaysian state can incubate a new service economy in which private
individuals and institutions (not the state) are the primary agents of economic growth.
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State as the manager of Islamic insurance
In June 1972, the National Fatwa Committee declared that the concept of conventional
insurance contravened the rules of Sharia. Unlike those Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan, which sought
the wholesale transformation of their banking systems into full-fledged Islamic systems, Malaysia
“initiated Islamic banking in parallel with conventional banking on a trial basis”.265In 1982, the
Task Force to Study the Establishment of an Islamic Insurance Company in Malaysia was formed
to look into the possibility of launching Islamic insurance as a complement to Islamic banking.
Following the recommendations of the Task Force, the Malaysian Parliament enacted the Takaful
Act 1984, thus giving birth to the Islamic insurance scheme in Malaysia that was entirely
government driven and received full governmental support. Mahathir explains why it took that
path, revealing that the systematic development of Malaysia’s Islamic finance industry mirrors
the administrative system the country was built on.
According to Mahathir: “When Malaysia became independent, we adopted the
administrative system of the West. We adopted that, and we became familiar with having rules
for everything. If you want to do something, you must have a law for it. Therefore, we had to
provide a law for Islamic banking. Of course, the law was passed by parliament and not passed
by some Islamic authority.”266 Creating the most comprehensive Islamic financial system in the
world and this system operates parallel to the conventional interest-based system through a
parliamentary framework gave national legitimacy for this initiative.
This systematic but pragmatic strategy created a much more conducive environment
within a vulnerable inter-race relation of Malaysia. On the issue of multiracial Malaysia and
Islamic finance, Mahathir says, “We have to be pragmatic. The world is not peopled by Muslims
alone. Even in Malaysia, we have non-Muslims, and they have their rights too. We respect their
rights. I told the non-Muslims that this [Islamic finance] is the Muslim way. They don’t reject it.
They even accept it.”267 The government set the goal of attaining a developed country status
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before the year 2020. To this end, establishing a cordial partnership between Muslims and nonMuslims was essential in minimizing the political and socio-economic costs and risks inherent in
unstable ethnic relationships.268
We can confirm this statement with the fact that there was no opposition on Islamic
finance among the non-Malays including from DAP which was on the outside of Barisan Nasional
coalition government. Lim Kit Siang, the DAP parliamentary leader, and Gelang Patah MP, once
quoted the former ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, to make a point that the ChineseMalaysian population have no problem with Islamization. He said,” Surin said right up to the 80s,
Islamization used to be a good word, where people integrated Islamic values and norms into
every aspect of their life, including in education, work, and economic development. Furthermore,
he said that DAP party supports Islamization based on the Malaysian Constitution, which
promotes a nation-building process based on tolerance and mutual respect in a plural society
and not one which engenders bigotry, hatred, and extremism.269 DAP even agreed to cooperate
with PAS particularly in 2008 when PAS was pursuing open, tolerant and inclusive policies under
the leadership of Nik Aziz Nik Mat, Fadzil Noor and Yusof Rawa.
The affirmation of non-Malays group on Mahathir’s Islamization partly also because they
were not able to form a strong opposition against BN. There has been a low level of non-Muslim
(Chinese in particular) in this arena. It is generally assumed that the Chinese in Malaysia were not
particularly concerned about Sharia-related issues, unless their interests were directly
affected.270 The non-Malays were too diverse to form a political coalition. For instance, the
majority of Chinese and Indians were already co-opted under Barisan Nasional. The one outside
the government such as DAP were left with two options of Islamization: the moderate and procapitalist version of Mahathir’s Islamization or PAS’ version of Islamic State. Although, once they
cooperated with PAS against UMNO, in general, DAP preferred Islamization that carried by the
government.
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Based on its center-left platform, DAP prefers to have more government involvement in
health care and public service. Nonetheless, DAP stresses the need for government to run
efficiently. In the issue of 1Care, a reform plan that would give universal healthcare for Malaysia
in 2012, DAP showed criticism in term of how this program could be supported financially. Lim
Kit Siang stated,” Healthcare is a human right and each and every government of this world is
obliged to provide to its citizens the best of healthcare in the form that is most efficient, cost
effective and acceptable to its citizens.”271 In summary, the development of Islamic insurance
through a dual system has not been considered as a threat for the well-being of the Malaysian
minority, particularly compared to the previous economic program of NEP which certainly bias
toward Malays. They also accept Islamic insurance if it is developed as private-based insurance
that does not give a financial burden to the state and does not disrupt the existing business
environment.
From the perspective of UMNO leadership itself, support from the Chinese in Malaysia
particularly the Chinese corporate figures are important. The recession in the later 1980s exposed
the fundamental weakness of Bumiputera entrepreneurs. Mahathir found that vibrant Chinese
capital, together with the energetic Chinese workforce, was a vital asset to the Malaysian
economy. This fact became an incentive for Mahathir to ensure Islamic finance project that
entertains Chinese interest and demands. The UMNO government could not afford to have the
Chinese community in general, and Chinese capital in particular, lose confidence in its leadership.
The dual system did not pose a serious threat to Chinese and corporate business in general. The
Islamic finance law was introduced without replacing paralleling laws on the civil side and the
administration of these laws remained under the jurisdiction of civil courts. Therefore, they
welcomed this system and supported UMNO political agenda if Malaysia’s liberal business
practices were kept untouched.
Furthermore, there are many non-Muslim Malaysians participants in Islamic finance,
particularly Islamic insurance. A study by Swartz and Coetzer mentions that Islamic insurance
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products have attracted even non-Muslim communities.272Although no hard numbers are
available, the industry has trumpeted the non-Muslim take-up rate for Islamic banking products
over the years. It is well-known in the financial sector that most customers of the country's fullyfledged Islamic banks-such as Bank Islam Malaysia and Bank Muamalat-as well as the Islamic
banking "windows" of conventional banks, including Maybank, Public Bank, HSBC, Citibank and
Standard Chartered-are, in fact, non-Muslim. A report released by PricewaterhouseCoopers in
2008 claimed that more than 50 percent of Islamic banking customers are non-Muslim.273
Although it was designed as an alternative political and economic framework using
specific Islamic terms and contracts, Islamic insurance and Islamic finance, in general, are very
inclusive for various players. In 1993, the central bank introduced the Interest-Free Banking
Scheme.274 This program offered tax breaks for conventional banks that opened Islamic
“windows” to offer Islamic financial products, such as home mortgages or savings accounts.
Similarly, conventional banks could use their existing institutions and infrastructure to expand
into Islamic banking and Islamic insurance on a gradual basis and offer conventional and Islamic
financing options under the same umbrella. According to some observers, the Islamic window
scheme offered the most cost-effective and efficient way to “disseminate Islamic banking on a
nation-wide basis, with as many players as possible, so as to be able to reach all Malaysians”275,
and which allowed Malaysia to quickly grow its Islamic financial sector. Furthermore, by
increasing the number of firms in the sector, the state spurred the innovation of instruments and
products.
To further facilitate the growth of Islamic insurance, the Malaysian government had
increasingly built a network of Islamic financial institutions rather than relying on a single statesupported Islamic insurance company. Foreign insurance companies have been active in
acquiring stakes in local insurers through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) since 2010. Between
2010 and 2016, the Malaysian insurance industry saw the conclusion of around 20 M&A deals
valued at about RM16bn, notably in the more fragmented general insurance segment. The
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industry’s consolidation and the entry of global players resulted in larger and stronger insurers,
as well as greater sophistication for the domestic industry through product innovation, pricing
and risk-management expertise as well as multi-channel, including digital, distribution.
At this moment, AIA and Great Eastern are dominant players in the domestic life
insurance segment landscape, cumulatively commanding close to 50% of market share by net
premium contribution. AIA, Great Eastern and Zurich have Islamic product offerings. While AIA
and Great Eastern each has a local partner for the Takaful JV (Public Bank and Koperasi Angkatan
Tentera respectively), Zurich’s operations are wholly owned. In 2006, Hong Leong Bank - the
sixth-largest local bank entered the Islamic insurance market.
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, prime minister from 2003 to 2009, continued the policies
inherited from Mahathir Mohamad. Abdullah persisted with a developmentalist model that
promoted Bumiputera capital, but he showed little interest in developing Malay – or Malaysian
– big businesses. He nurtured SMEs, including cottage industries dealing with halal products,
dominated by poor rural Malays, as well as Islamic-based financial services as he believed firms
in these sectors had export capacity potential if developed well. Since the 2005 census of the
corporate area revealed that SMEs constituted about 99.2 percent of all business establishments,
this new effort to establish these firms was an astute economic – and political – move. SMEs then
employed 5.6 million workers and contributed about 32 percent of real GDP. Eighty-seven
percent of SMEs are in the services sector, 7.2 percent in manufacturing and 6.2 percent in
agriculture. Ninety-nine percent of firms in agriculture are SMEs. Key sub-sectors within services
comprise those related to Islamic financial products, including banking and Islamic insurance.276
Altogether, the state has limit itself on the role of an incubator or manager for Islamic
insurance rather than as a direct participant. The Malaysian state created the necessary
infrastructure to facilitate the emergence of viable national and transnational Islamic financial
systems but did not become involved in creating commercial firms. The key institutions
developed by the state include special offices within the Bank Negara Malaysia; research and
educational institutions; and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), which is an international
standard-setting organization that develops global standards and guiding principles for Islamic
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financial institutions. The state’s effort to act as an incubator rather than as an agent of Islamic
finance is further evident in its insistence that the Islamic sector competes with the conventional
sector.277 Compared to the affirmative policy of NEP of the 1970s, the creation of a dual financial
system has been seen as more inclusive and non-discriminative against non-Malays population.
The dual system model offered the opportunity to maintain order in the conventional system,
generating political support while simultaneously incubating the embryonic Islamic system.
Harmonizing Islamization with economic liberalization
Malaysian government provides more support –particularly in comparison to Indonesia
and Pakistan- in the establishment of the private-based Islamic insurance of Takaful. The next
question would be: If Islamization is a tool for the Mahathir regime to gain public support and
legitimation, why he pursued an Islamic but private-based insurance model rather than using
populist policy. For example, he could rely on expanding social insurance by utilizing Islamic
instrument such as zakat (religious tax). Creating Islamic social insurance seems to be the most
rational option, mainly when there is less disagreement among the scholars of Islam on the
permissibility of social insurance.278 Mahathir could get Muslim support and at the same time,
there was no need to devote more resources from public funding.
There were budgetary deficits highlighted the economic vulnerability in the mid-1980s,
partly due to the large size of the public sector. Therefore, to overcome the crisis and build a
stronger foundation for the economy, it was decided that Malaysia needed more economic
liberalization and deregulation and that the private sector should be the engine of growth.
Liberalization would introduce more competition, attract foreign capital and increase efficiency.
So, how the Mahathir government could gain support from the Malay population for his
economic liberalization agenda? Islamic insurance has a prominent role in this process.
Therefore, Malaysia as s state needed to take command on the Islamic finance agenda.
Mahathir understands the Islamdom is not a monolithic homo Islamicus. In his memoirs,
he writes about Muslims’ different interpretations of Islamic principles and injunctions that lead
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to factions. Therefore, a centralized body for the Islamic finance industry was needed to create a
uniform model for an assemblage of religious and economic practices, which are two domains
that earlier efforts toward secular modernization had presumed separate. This centralized Sharia
body developed concepts and methods of Islamic finance that both represented Islamic values
but also serves the goal for economic liberalization of Malaysia.
The variation in policy responses of the countries stems from difference in the
preferences of regime supporters over the idea of Islamization in general, and particularly
Islamization of insurance. In Malaysia case, the establishment of Islamic insurance was tied up to
a broader privatization project envisioned by Mahathir including privatization of Malaysia’s
health care, social security and Malaysia economy in general. While in previous decades, the
Malaysian Government had prided itself on its achievements in health care and the welfare
model of federal health care services, under the Mahathir administration the public health care
sector was increasingly regarded as a burden, which the government would be unable to carry in
the future. The government's concept of Vision 2020, with the goal of Malaysia reaching
developed country status by the year 2020, has eschewed the welfare state.
Prime Minister Mahathir has asserted the need for "a social system in which society will
come before which the welfare of the people will not revolve around the state or the individual
but around a strong and resilient family system". Several schemes for financing health care have
been articulated by the government. These include the use of compulsory savings, private
insurance, and employer-funded private coverage.279 At the same time, the success of affirmative
action of the New Economic Program since the 1970s in creating a Melayu Baru or the new Malay
elite society encouraged the creation of protection system which both Islamic but also
economically sound. Malaysia’s health care system required a significant growth in the private
health care sector, a high proportion of health care expenditure comes from out-of-pocket, to
sustain high quality and high cost of medical technology.
There had been demographic changes to the UMNO voters. UMNO traditionally gained
support from Malay community and peasants in the villages. However, more Malays migrated to
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cities, worked in a corporate environment, and gained a college degree. This transformation of
the voter characteristics from rural agricultural to more urban Muslim encouraged UMNO to
introduce a program that appealing from them. Most of them were not the poor who need
charity from zakat, but they were more interested in job and business opportunities. The
characteristics of Islamic finance in Malaysia were designed for this particular urban
entrepreneurial group. Furthermore, Islamic insurance is an idiom that capture this
transformation.
Both Mahathir Mohamad top-down state-directed initiatives and bottom-up societal
pressures played a significant role in this process. The three-decade regime managed to create a
coalition between the urban, modern, and middle-class Malay Muslim population and Malay
entrepreneur in building private-based Islamic finance. At the same time, there has been a
continued and continuous pressures from the dakwah movement (Islamic missionary) of
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) or the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia.
Mahathir had been careful enough to limit the role of the traditional religious council (the
older ulama) as merely supporter and far from being the driver of the Islamization. Developing
Islamic instrument through private scheme serves both strengthening the Malaysian Muslim
bourgeoisie or entrepreneur class and facilitate Mahathir’s broad economic developmental
goals, which would further add to UMNO’s popularity and electoral legitimacy but without
jeopardizing the authoritarian and capitalist structure of Malaysia. Islamic insurance
development in Malaysia reflects a continued and continuous dynamic interaction of both
processes: top-down state-directed initiatives and bottom-up societal pressures, especially from
the dakwah movement of ABIM.280
The establishment of Islamic insurance was intended to take the momentum of public
positive response toward the establishment of Bank Islam one year before and to capture the
emerging market of the new urban and modern Malay Muslims as a result of the successful
affirmative action of NEP. The success of Bank Islam had provided a pathway for the
establishment of Takaful. Syarikat Takaful started operations in August 1985 with a paid-up
capital of RM10 million. Bank Islam was its majority shareholder, with others being state religious
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councils and state religious development agencies. In its first year of operations, Syarikat Takaful
attracted 6,000 Takaful participants, with the number rising to 50,000 by the end of May 1987.
In fact, Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop, who was responsible for the implementation of Islamic
banking at Bank Negara Malaysia until the early 1990s, explains,” We agreed from Day 1 that we
would establish, over period of time, an entire ecosystem of Islamic finance consisting of banking
system, a capital market, stock-broking, and Takaful (Islamic insurance).” 281
Before the 1980s, Malaysia had proceeded the presumption of a de facto separation of
religion from the economy. Malaysia’s initial development success stemmed from its position in
the 1970s and 1980s as a global center for high-tech assembly and offshore industrialization.282
With the active encouragement of the developmentalist state, firms from Europe, Japan, and the
United States set up shop in large industrial zones and hired a vast number of workers to provide
the labor for export-oriented growth.
Although economic modernization was primarily a secular project, the state took a special
interest in the economic standing of the Bumiputera. This concern accelerated after the
widespread ethnic riots in 1969. These efforts became particularly pronounced in the state’s New
Economic Policy (NEP), which was initiated in the 1970s. The policies provided ethnic Malays,
who were by state definition Muslim, with privileged access to state benefits such as civil service
positions, state-held trusts, business licenses, government contracts, and preferential access to
higher education in the national university system. Secular economic development saw the rise
in the fortunes of the elites, Melayu Baru (the New Malays).
By the 1980s, the common presumption that economic development was a secular
project underwent a thorough reexamination in Malaysia. Indeed, this secular economic
development helped to improve the economic condition of Bumiputera. Nevertheless, it also
accelerated the rise of Islamism in Malaysia, especially in the universities. Moreover, these
university students especially have increased their involvement with campus dakwah
organizations, which gave rise to the moderate Islamist movement of ABIM.
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There were also some unintended consequences. The rise in the fortunes of the elites,
many of whom were politically connected; and their ostentatious displays of wealth and
conspicuous consumption became a focus of criticisms by Islamists who viewed newly rich
Malays as morally suspect, inattentive to Islam, and “corrupt and greedy.283 There has been
growing dissatisfaction toward the government that was considered as un-Islamic. There were
demands represented by ABIM and PAS that Islam should not be merely instrumental terms but
as a comprehensive system of values that should encompass all spheres of human activity.
When the modernist Mahathir came to power in 1981, Islamism became the most
effective ideological weapon against the UMNO. After decades of removing the threat from the
political left, Islamist has become the primary opponent of the ruling power. Rather than
removing the threat forcefully, the UMNO-led government responded to this Islamic revival by
supporting the social policy of Islamization. UMNO assume Islamic veneer and to incorporate
varying Islamic elements in its program. The cooptation of a charismatic and visionary leader of
ABIM, Anwar Ibrahim, marked the vital point of the Islamization process in Malaysia.
Prior to Mahathir’s accession to the premiership in 1982, UMNO had done little to co-opt
Islam and Islamists into the umbrella of the Barisan Nasional. According to Shamsul, the Barisan
at the time was too busy dealing with internal political squabbles for such efforts to take
precedence. Mahathir’s prescription to meet the challenge of ABIM and PAS was to effectively
redefine the debate between the two parties by embarking on a state-led, UMNO-led program
of Islamization. To give credence to this, nine months later Mahathir spectacularly brought Anwar
into UMNO’s fold and ‘with Anwar’s help, Mahathir was able to quickly formulate new Islamic
policies that were received with wide approval from the country’s ulama or the clergy. Anwar’s
co-option was all the more spectacular since many within PAS had anticipated that Anwar would
become its leader in the future.284
It is clear that Anwar’s co-option signaled the beginning of the institutionalization of
Islamization within the bureaucracy. The first initiative was the introduction of ‘Penerapan Nilainilai Islam’ which was ‘a policy guideline for the incorporation of Islamic ethics in governance’.
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This policy led to the establishment of an Islamic Consultative Body, the Institute for Islamic
Understanding, and the IIUM in 1983, and an Islamic Development Foundation in 1985, as well
as an Islamic insurance company and an Islamic bank (Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad) in 1984.285
Another important development was the introduction of Pusat Islam which in effect was
a ‘government sponsored Dakwah group, intended to compete with other Dakwah movements
and to report on their activities’. Over time Pusat Islam would grow into a fully -fledged
department of government known by the acronym JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Agama Islam
Malaysia – Department of Islamic Advancement of Malaysia). Additionally, to ensure Malays
were educated about UMNO’s ‘progressive’ approach to Islam (as opposed to PAS’s version of
Islam), the government sanctioned policies that saw an increase in Islamic programs over the
radio and television.
Some members of ABIM rose up to become what so called urban ulama. They have a
background in Islamic studies and well-versed in Islamic law, but unlike traditional ulama, they
have influence beyond their particular village or kariah. They are professors in universities, live
in cities, speak in international forum and media, and address contemporary social issues. These
ulama were recruited by the state to build Malaysia Islamic finance. They are the epistemic
community behind Islamic finance. They sit together with bankers, actuaries, and bureaucrats to
formulate regulations on Islamic finance. The emergence of urban ulama is, in part, precipitated
by an alliance between state elites and Sharia bureaucrats in cities, particularly Kuala Lumpur, as
Sharia professionals have been placed on state as well as Islamic Finance Institutions’ payrolls.
Sharia professionals in these institutions and government administration are rewarded with
higher salaries, power, status, and mobility, especially those recruited to federal agencies in
charge of administering Sharia compliance. They are more cosmopolitan than their rural
counterparts actively codifying legal discourses and engaging in Islamic legal theorization.286
Furthermore, these Sharia experts were interested non-only in upgrading their socio-economic
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status but also in maximizing their jurisdictional boundaries.287 At this moment, this group of
urban ulama is known as ‘Islamic business developer’ or ‘entrepreneur’.
Without questioning Mahathir’s own religious convictions his decision to bring in Anwar
was clearly a calculated and strategic decision brought in to deliver the Islamic votes to UMNO’.
However, Mahathir was not only motivated by the desire to blunt the appeal of ABIM and the
influence of the Dakwah educated students. Analyzing his key policy pronouncements, it is clear
that Mahathir hoped to utilize Islam as a vehicle to facilitate his broad economic developmental
goals, which would further add to UMNO’s popularity and electoral legitimacy. Mahathir’s vision
of Islam was one that he believed could be harnessed to UMNO’s original goals of nationalism
and capitalism.
The Islamist party of PAS has been supportive toward the development of Islamic finance
in Malaysia, but they have been very critical in the way Mahathir’s operated it by neglecting poor
people. Although PAS always promote the responsibility of the state to take care of its citizen
including providing free health care, PAS has no principle disagreement on the concept and the
practice of Islamic insurance. PAS even has been developing its own Islamic insurance schemes
for PAS member (Takaful Kifalah dan Takaful Armalah). PAS had objection on the way
government pursued the development of private insurance by reducing its public funding
especially in health care. Mahathir’s Islamization along with privatization and deregulation
program have left behind pools of poverty, urban and rural, while only a small group of elite
Malays have become much better off. According to PAS leader, “PAS shall continue to assess and
address the impact of globalization, in so far as it affects the development of a better Malaysia
and a better world.” Rather than a piecemeal program offered by BN, PAS claim that Islamic State
would solve the problem. Although PAS was known as the defender of the people, its Islamic
State idea has never been expressed clearly, compared to the one proposed by BN and Mahathir.
Moreover, Mahathir has accused PAS of misrepresented Islam by promoting terrorism,
conservatism, fanaticism, backwardness, poverty, and degrading stereotypes.”288 PAS was hardly
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able to compete with BN in winning Malay/Muslim voters, particularly after Mahathir
successfully coopted Anwar Ibrahim into his government.
Furthermore, the state conducts some regulatory reforms to reduce the ambiguity in
Islamic finance. The state reduced uncertainty in Islamic finance by reducing conflicts over
interpretations of Islamic law. Politically, this has been substantial in solidifying support for the
Mahathir’s Islamization project. For instance, The Central Bank of Malaysia Act, passed in 2009,
contained key provisions regarding the status of the National Sharia Advisory Council or NSAC.
These provisions effectively administered compliance with Islamic prescriptions by granting the
NSAC the status of the sole authoritative body on Sharia matters about Islamic banking, Islamic
insurance, and Islamic finance. The act itself granted the NSAC the power to prevail over any
other ruling passed by a Sharia body in Malaysia, and it stipulated that any courts or arbitrators
were required to refer to NSAC rulings in any dispute pertaining to Islamic financial business.
Finally, it mandated that any rulings of the NSAC were binding. This essentially gave the NSAC
supreme authority in the arbitration of matters connected to Islamic finance. Rudnyckyj argues,
“Efforts to rationalize interpretations of Sharia reveal an important aspect of the afterlife of
development: the production of new types of knowledge requires intervention to ensure that
systems operate consistently and predictably. In this instance, the state ensured the efficient
functioning of the Islamic finance infrastructure by mitigating the potential for conflicting
interpretations of religious injunctions.”289
The establishment of the strategic investment fund of the Government of Malaysia,
Khazanah Nasional Berhad, is to help to maintain economic autonomy and strengthen capital
expansion. Khazanah is entrusted to hold and manage the commercial assets of the Government
and to undertake strategic investments on behalf of the nation. It is a novel way to strengthening
Bumiputera capital ownership in a certain way. This company also acts as re-Takaful company.
The world’s largest Islamic re-insurance company are ACR ReTakaful Holdings Ltd, owned by ACR
Capital Holdings, the Dubai Group and Malaysian sovereign wealth fund Khazanah Nasional Bhd,
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with a paid-up capital of $300 million, according to its website.290 Mahathir Mohamad founded
the sovereign wealth fund, Khazanah, in 1994.
Khazanah's portfolio features some of Malaysia's most significant and most strategic
listed entities, such as telecommunications giant Telekom Malaysia and its regional mobile
operator Axiata Group, financial powerhouse CIMB Group Holdings, national power utility
Tenaga Nasional, airports operator Malaysia Airports Holdings and IHH Healthcare. Khazanah is
also the sole shareholder of the country's financially troubled national air carrier, Malaysia
Airlines. In Singapore, Khazanah and Temasek are joint-venture partners in M+S Pte Ltd, which is
involved in the development of four parcels of land in Marina South and two land parcels in
Ophir-Rochor on which Marina One and Duo now stand. It is stated in the website,
Khazanah’s portfolio cuts across various sectors and industries. Our companies comprise
some of the most significant companies in Malaysia, as measured by their strategic
importance to the nation. They include Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) in sectors
such as aviation, financial services, power and telecommunications. We also invest in new
sectors and geographies to support the transformation of the Malaysian economy. Via
these investments, we hope to build new industry linkages and help boost national
growth and development.291
Beyond this purpose, this company had been used as a convenient vehicle for the
government to reward politicians and non-professionals with positions and lucrative
compensation packages.292
Although the government of Malaysia does not involve directly in establishing Islamic
finance companies, the success of Islamic financial institutions is very much dependent on
deposits of government money, rooted in a rent-based model just as NEP-era businesses had

290

Liau Y-Sing, "Malaysian Body Creates New Islamic Reinsurance Model," (18 March 2010), accessed 5 January
2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-islamic-financial-retakaful/malaysian-body-creates-new-islamicreinsurance-model-idUSTRE62H2F420100318.
291
khazanah.com, "Our Investment," accessed 10 February, 2019. http://www.khazanah.com.my/OurInvestments/Sectors#.
292
Leslie Lopez, "Malaysian Sovereign Wealth Fund Khazanah's Directors Resign after Pm Mahathir's Criticism,"
(26 July 2019 2018), accessed 15 March 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/khazanahs-directorsresign-after-mahathirs-criticism.

119
been.293 The government and its subsidiary companies are the primary investors in Malaysia’s
massive Sukuk issuances. Zakat contributions make up a hefty segment of money on hand in
Malaysian Islamic banks. The Employee Provident Fund – Malaysia’s pension system – often
invests its money in Islamic instruments. Think tanks such as INCEIF and ISRA, conferences held
in Kuala Lumpur, and global promotion and marketing are largely funded by Bank Negara and the
state.294
Islamic finance and Islamic insurance serve as meeting point for diverse political interests.
For Mahathir, UMNO and BN, Islamic finance mitigates the real threat posed by Islamism.
Dakwah movement of ABIM and Islamists political party of PAS were pushing demand of having
Islam as a comprehensive system of values within Malaysia polity. To gain support from Malays
population and present the UMNO government as Islamic, Mahathir responded by supporting
the social policy of Islamization. Moreover, Mahathir reshaped this Islamization process by coopting the leaders of ABIM, especially Anwar Ibrahim, and directed the Islamization project. On
economic matters, Mahathir reshaped Islamization agenda by creating Islamic finance in a way
that harmonious with his economic development agenda.
Moreover, Islamic insurance prepared the transformation toward a social system based
on a strong and resilient family system. Mahathir has been keen to exploit the dynamism of
market forces to shake up the bureaucracy and Malay values. On the other hand, the mechanism
that might transform Malay values - market forces - and help make the Bumiputera more
"authentic" capitalists and less dependent on either state assistance or politically strategic
relationships with Chinese businesspeople. Mahathir sought to exploit what he takes to be the
beneficial, transformative effects of market forces without sacrificing government control or
oversight.
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autonomy from globalization was the main reason behind his rhetoric against western capitalism
blueprint.
Islamic insurance received support from a broad political coalition. For the ruling
government of Barisan Nasional and private sectors, Islamic insurance has been one of the tools
to harmonized Islamization and economic liberalization. It was an avenue for the maintenance of
the UMNO's dominant political position, as this is still dependent on its ability to control and
distribute economic resources. Meanwhile, ABIM and PAS support this alternative insurance
because it is imbued by Islamic values and present the ‘more Islamic’ picture of Malaysia.
Moreover, it was also an alternative avenue for Bumiputera capital growth, job entry to the
government, and opportunity for expansion of Sharia jurisdictions. At the same time, there was
no strong opposition against Islamic insurance from non-Malays including the center-left party
of DAP, insurance businesses and corporate figures because Islamic insurance is a private-based
scheme thus it is considered as more efficient in term of public funding. Furthermore, its
establishment did threaten the existing liberal-capitalistic business environment, on the contrary,
Islamic insurance expanded this system and provided benefits and more opportunities for them.
Islamic insurance is a deal between the need for Islamic values, liberalization agenda, and need
for economic autonomy.
Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional coalition depended on (continues to depend on) an alliance
between the Malay masses and a class of Malay entrepreneurs. Favoritism in economic and social
policy ensures support from ordinary Malays; favoritism in corporate and financial policy ties the
new Malay rich to the regime. The strategic use of ethnicity is the key to continual maintenance
of this system of exchange and support across classes, for it demonstrates how regime
institutions embedded each group’s economic interests directly into the system of rule. The new
coalitional alignments between ordinary Malays and the new Malay rich, pressure from the
“fundamentalists” PAS, weak opposition from Chinese Malaysian community, and support from
corporate actors are instrumental for understanding the development of Islamic insurance in
Malaysia.
Adding to that, the success of Islamic insurance in Malaysia post-Asia financial crisis can
also be attributed to the continuing authoritarian system of Malaysia’s polity. Mahathir
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maintained political dominance meaning there had been no changes in the Islamic finance
structure. There was less transaction cost due to political readjustment compared to the
democratization of Indonesia by the end of the 1990s. There had been no serious challenge
toward the regime during that time and its institutions. The Islamization project that initiated
from the center of political power was left untouched.
Corporate Islam and the acceptance of Islamic insurance
Insurance markets in Muslim countries are mainly at nascent or growth stage of
development with a very low insurance density, even in the most developed Muslim nations.
Based on a comprehensive study by Feyen, Lester, Rocha the reasons are the religious
prohibitions, underdeveloped financial systems, weak contract enforcement, consumer
skepticism, corruption, lack of understanding of the benefits and necessity of insurance, limited
technical expertise and low GDP per capita. 296 So, how Islamic insurance has become accepted
in Malaysia society in a relatively short time?
Indeed, the improvement of those variables mentioned by the study above influenced
the development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. Because of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of
May 1969, Malays have become wealthier and taken greater control over Malaysia’s economic
resources. The steady development with government support of Islamic finance since the 1980s
also increased consumer trust toward Islamic Finance institutions. Nonetheless, understanding
the interaction between those variables, particularly the role of religion and Malay’s culture helps
us to have a more profound understanding of this development.
This section discusses the ‘social life of Islamic insurance’ meaning how Islamic insurance
as a commodity has become accepted as a social practice within Malays society. It elaborates the
redefinitions of Islamic economic beliefs and meanings that have shaped the Malay
understanding of entrepreneurship and human agency. Patricia Sloane-White argues that the
development of Islamic finance is not only creating a new class of Malay entrepreneurs but also
transforming Islamic values. She suggests, “Sharia principles at play in Malay-Muslim economic
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life do not merely produce Islamically regulated things, but produce and emplace Islamic norms,
ethics, hierarchies, practices, and gendered identities enacted in corporate life. That is, they
produce Islam.”297
This section consists of two parts. The first part explains how Malay society reset market
values inherent in the Islamic insurance to be in line with their Islamic values and the second part
contains discussion on the emergence of Malay entrepreneurship. This first part focuses on how
Malaysians consume, rework, and accept Islamic insurance, whereas, the evolution of Malays
entrepreneurship plays the most crucial role in it. The second part provides a historical
explanation on how the affirmative policy of NEP and the subsequent Islamization during
Mahathir created a new class of entrepreneurial Malays. This class is not only different from
other groups in term of socio-demographic characteristics but also in mindset. Sloane uses the
term ‘Corporate Islam’ to describe the middle-class urban Malays who are using
entrepreneurship not only as an occupation but also identity. This identity is integral with their
understanding of being a Malay, Muslim and modern. Islam is reconfigured as an ethical and
entrepreneurial religion. This ’altered’ identity provides susceptible ground for novel schemes of
Islamic finance including Islamic insurance to develop and to be accepted.
Islamic insurance as an idiom for self-reliant, piety and care responsibility
Many studies have been conducted to understand the relationship between
entrepreneurship and insurance. The findings show how insurance encourages entrepreneurship
because insurance creates more predictability and manages business risk. The risk-averse
businesspeople will likely to invest in new business ventures as insurance will overcome a
possible loss.
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the public in various ways by different stakeholders. Public perceptions of and demand for
insurance are not static. They are sensitive to changing policy, practice, experience, and flows of
information.299 Golomski argues, “Like biomedicine or finance, insurance tends to travel globally
as a culture-free form of knowledge,” but then he adds, ”Recent ethnographic research shows
how insurance is consumed, reworked or rejected in novel ways.”300 Insurance does not have a
single meaning, logic, or effect but needs to be viewed in practice, in context, and from multiple
vantage points.301 This part of this chapter focuses on how Malaysians consume, rework, and
accept Islamic insurance, whereas, the evolution of Malays entrepreneurship plays the most
important element in it.
The price of premium and services of Islamic insurance are not entirely different from
conventional insurance. Islamic insurance companies and brokers were ethnopreneurial in their
marketing by using language and symbols of ethnic or religious identity. This research founds five
symbols that are presented in the introduction of Islamic insurance in Malaysia:
1.

Islamic insurance as care responsibility toward a family.

2.

Islamic insurance is Islamic.

3.

Islamic insurance embodies cooperation/risk sharing

4.

Islamic insurance is operated by for-profit companies.

5.

Islamic insurance is supported by the government.

In order to understand the social life of Islamic insurance, we examine five aspects of Islamic
insurance in Malaysia. I use secondary sources that documented interviews with people who buy
Islamic insurance, particularly from the qualitative study conducted by Naail Mohammed Kamila
and Norsham Binti Mat Norb.302
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The Family Takaful sector in Malaysia is noted to make up the more substantial portion
of the Islamic insurance operators’ business portfolio, as measured by the size of contributions.
As at the end of the third quarter of 2016, net contributions for Family Takaful business grew by
8.7 percent on a year-on-year basis and accounted for 75.5 percent of market share of Islamic
insurance business in the country. Malaysia is also recognized as the largest Family Takaful
market in the world, with total contributions of around RM 4.8bn registered in 2014. On the other
hand, the growth trend of the General Takaful business for the past five years has moderated to
11.4 per cent average annual growth for 2011-2015, as compared to the growth rate of 17.3 per
cent in the years 2007-2010.303
This recent data show two important things; Islamic insurance is used more as an
investment instead of protection, and individuals/families and not corporations or organizations
are the main consumer of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. Family Takaful is like an endowment
policy. A participant decides on the maturity period, the amount of annual contribution
(provided it is above the minimum amount set by the company), and the frequency of
contributions. The example of Family Takaful is an education fund. Insurance is seen by many
Malaysians as an investment for which a return is expected.
On the other hand, General Takaful protects participants against losses from personal
accidents and loss or destruction of property. The contract specifies the amount of contribution
that the participant must make. Therefore, we will focus on analyzing Family Takaful to
understand the ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance in Malaysia.
How is Islamic insurance presented to individuals or families in Malaysia? Before we
discuss more detail on the preference of Malay on investment type of insurance instead of
protection, we will elaborate how the concept of risk develops in the Islam modernist of the New
Malay. Many studies show religion or belief system has correlation with the low level of insurance
demand. Related to Muslim society of Malaysia, commutative contract of the mainstream
conventional insurance is specifically objectionable by Sharia. This type of contract unduly limits
uncertainty and ambiguity in human lives. Muslims can take steps to minimize the impact of
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events, however, they believe that what happens is predetermined by God’s will. For this reason,
many Muslims see insurance as unnecessary. Furthermore, in their traditional environment in
the villages, family and community is the one who will guarantee in a time of emergency.
The concept of risk is quite modern. The traditional society emphasizes on anticipation of
the actual prevalence of life-threatening dangers which lead to economic insecurity. God or
Nature is the source of this insecurity. Anthony Giddens argues that there has been huge
historical transformation of the nature of risk -and security.304 People in the modern age are
relatively more secure than they were in previous ages. They have longer life expectation and
freedom from serious disease. Nonetheless, the physical security of modern people is balanced
by a new risk: war, nuclear threat, motor accident, environmental degradation, etc. These risks
are not generated by natural causes, but as results of modern social organization or so-called
abstract system305 in Giddens’ term. Furthermore, there is a 'globalization of risk in the sense of
intensity' and extensity such as climate change and nuclear war. This new risk affects everyone
or at least very large numbers of people on the planet. The intensification of worldwide social
relations linking distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events
occurring many thousands of miles away and vice versa.306 Therefore, instead of anticipation,
control of risk is an essential part of modern society.
As Malay migrated to the cities, worked in a corporate environment they have less access
to their traditional community to provide that guarantee. They also face different types of
insecurity: bankruptcy, expensive healthcare and college tuition, etc. welfare state situation, the
state is the one who provide that as during the NEP, Malaysian state provide capital support,
scholarship, and other material resources for the Malay society. State and market become crucial
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actors because the traditional institutions and culture can no longer provide the necessary
protection for modern people.
Patricia Sloane mentions one interesting example of how the understanding of risk
developed among the New Malay. The establishment of Amanah (investment trust for Malays)
by two Malays entrepreneurs is relevant to this case. It can help us to understand how people
perceive Islamic insurance. The founders understand that the abundant NEP-era educational
resources for Malays would not be around forever. Moreover, the government seemed to require
that Malays begin to take an ever-greater group and individual responsibility for their own
development-what they felt was the message behind Vision 2020-they believed that Malay
parents would soon need to put away money to pay for university for their children. Through
Amanah, Malay parents would learn to take responsibility for educational development of their
own children; investing small amounts money in the trust every month for 18 years, parents
would be able to draw out a substantial sum when their children were ready for university.307
The awareness of risk and future uncertainty mark the New Malay identity as a modern
and entrepreneurial society. Investment is a language of modern society, particularly the one
who embrace entrepreneurship as their identity and social status. On the one hand, it is the New
Malay’s way to distant themselves from the lazy and fatalistic traditional Malays. On the other
hand, Islamic insurance is understood not as a way to control uncertainty, but as an idiom of care
responsibility for their family. Furthermore, subscribing to an Islamic insurance policy to protect
themselves and invest on the family future are seen as performing religious duty by the New
Malay generation. Naail Mohammed Kamila and Norsham Binti Mat Norb present an interesting
interview result on how preparing for future risk is understood as part of being a good Muslim:
Takaful and religion are very much close to each other. Why? Because in religion, in Islam
(we’re talking about Islam). So, I refer to Islam, not other religion. In Islam, we have this Maqasid
of Sharia (the objectives of religious law). So, one of the objectives in this Maqasid is to protect
your wealth. In that sense, we’re buying Takaful not only for us but also for our generations. An
example is when you’re buying a Family Takaful product. Maybe you’re protecting yourself for
now so that not burden your family. In case of any emergency, you must be hospitalized, you’re
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well protected. Then, and anything happen to you, also, maybe your family you left behind will
get some compensation. 308
Investment is not perceiving merely as a worldly affair but as a religious duty. Being
mindful of the uncertainty of the future and prepare for that is a way to achieve the objective of
Sharia. Islamic insurance in Malaysia serves as both protection and investment functions. Islamic
insurance in Malaysia has been presented as a modern way to deal with future uncertainty,
particularly in the condition with less government assistance. Buying an insurance policy is also
considered as a noble act that shows a self-reliant attitude. The attitude that inherent in their
entrepreneurial identity. Moreover, Islamic insurance is not presented as a tool for controlling
the future. This would be considered by the Malays as an act of underestimating the power of
God. The Malays reject this type of secularism. Rather, Islamic insurance is presented as an idiom
of care responsibility toward the family.
Investment is considered by the Malay entrepreneur class is an act of piety. For the first
generation of the New Malay during the first decade of the NEP, investment and being frugal are
entrepreneurial ethics that consistent with Islamic values. This view is a rationalist view that has
been promoted by Islam modernists. However, for the Sharia generation who came after them,
the act of investment and business activities, in general, has to be conducted consistent with
Islamic values. It has to be Sharia-compliant.
Sloane argues that Sharia has also emerged as a novel form of corporate culture,
reconfiguring workplace identities and relations in distinctly Islamic ways many see the growing
appeal of the Islamic economy in Malaysia not just as an ethical place to bank and borrow, but
as a place to work. Sloane quotes one young woman who captured this desire well: "We want to
know that the money with which we feed our children was earned morally.”309
The perspectives on Islamic business activity of the early Malay entrepreneurs are parallel
activity to that of Calvinist businesspersons described by Weber, in which work provides rewards
to capitalists in both this world and the next.310 However, the latest Muslim businesspersons in
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Malaysia Islamic economy perceive it differently. For them, Islam has its own terms for
understanding rewards and salvation that do not rely on a Eurocentric model.
From her field study, Sloane found out that it was evident that an increasing amount of
Arabic- and Qur'an-influenced teaching and knowledge was reflected in their experience,
compared to the preceding cohort of Malay entrepreneurs she studied a decade earlier, whose
Arabic and Qur'anic backgrounds were less developed. The men she interviewed, now mostly in
their forties, were raised and educated in an Islamized Malaysia. Now many of them participated
in rigorous study groups that combed Islamic texts for connections between religion and
economic life and worked closely with local religious teachers and Ustaz to understand the rules
for commercial and organizational life contained within the Qur'an and the Hadith.311
Naail Mohammed Kamila and Norsham Binti Mat Norb also notice the importance of
Sharia-compliant in the decision to buy Islamic insurance. Two of their respondents emphasize
the important of Sharia compliance in the daily life of Muslims. Therefore, providing Islamic
scheme for financial protection is an urgent need nowadays. According to them, the compliance
toward Sharia in economic activity is the indicator of a good Muslim. Moreover, Islamic insurance
is not considered simply as a financial product, but it is part of way of life.312
Islamic insurance has been promoted as a scheme that carefully designed by following
the injunction of Sharia in the business transaction. The companies claim that the scheme has
been approved and continuously monitored by Islamic scholars who are expert on the field.
Moreover, they emphasize on where the money is invested. The money must be invested in
lawful businesses according to Islamic teachings. This is an important aspect of Islamic insurance
in a low insurance demand society.
Indeed, many Malaysian Muslims today are firmly placed within the urban middle classes.
Many live and work in and around the capital city of Kuala Lumpur, employed by private-sector
corporations. They have higher income that for many researchers as an important factor for
insurance demand. However, as we see in Malaysia, the demand for Islamic insurance is not
merely drive by the changes in the socio-demographic factors. There are ideologies and norms
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with far-reaching social impact, as more and more Malaysian Muslims seek to calibrate their
politicoreligious orientations to their economic practices, a process Johan Fischer has called
"halalisation".313
Insurance plans may be problematic in places where it has long been customary to gift or
indirectly pay the government and indigenous practitioners for services as an incentive for good
care or to forge personal relationships.314 Islamic insurance facilitates the transition of the Malay
society to become more self-reliant and less dependent on the state and society but maintain
Malay’s traditional value helping each other. In Kamil and Nor, two of their respondents explain
this idea further. In the word of one of the respondents:
The most important thing in Takaful is helping each other, is a mutual corporation or
benefit. Yes. Ta’awun. In that sense, is what our religion, in Islam that we have to help
each other. So, when we invested in Respondent (S1) said Takaful product, we already
made ahead that this payment will go to who participated in that. The pool of fund can
be used to help those people in difficulties. At the same time also, if we are in that
situation, the unfortunate one, so the same thing will happen. The same pool of fund will
be used to protect us, to compensate us. And then to the Tabarru’ fund, if there any
excess to it, it can be shared among the participants. It’s something that other
conventional not doing it…315
The Malay entrepreneurship is unique. Instead of forging individualism for
entrepreneurial success, it emphasizes obligation to others. The others might be understood
narrowly as fellow Malays, or even the nation. They believe that Muslims in Malaysia should all
participate and support Islamic insurance because by doing so, they are strengthening Muslim
position in the country, improving their funds to assist our Muslim brothers and sister as well. 316
Furthermore, behind its increasingly sophisticated financial plan, Islamic insurance
represented what they described as a ‘truly Malay organization’, both spiritually and communally
focused. It was marketed to a network of Malays-who were moved by the idea of caring for
others. In their understanding, Islamic insurance brings double rewards: this-worldy and other-
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worldly-rewards. It could anticipate current and future risk, therefore, protection for the
members, and also the religious reward of helping each other. It is social tools that provided
multiple rewards, instruments of convergence of devotion to others and to Allah, the means to
an exemplary virtuoso identity. Islamic insurance is perceived as representing mutual, network
gotong-royong, compares to the conventional insurance, which is considered exploitative,
untrustworthy, greedy therefore un-Islamic.
The Takaful Act 1984 mentions that company and cooperative can offer Islamic insurance
product. Historically, insurance was initially provided by self-organized mutual societies (guild) in
the nineteenth century and then pushed aside by the rise of corporate insurance companies and
statutory social insurance in the twentieth century. Many Islamic scholars argue that mutual or
cooperative structure is more appropriate for Islamic insurance. Nonetheless, most of the Islamic
insurance products in Malaysia are offered by for-profit companies. How this for-profit motive
does not impede the growth of Islamic insurance in Malaysia?
The general acceptance for for-profit entities cannot be separated with the positive
attitude of Malay society toward entrepreneurship. Islamic insurance develops in the
entrepreneurial environment of Malaysia. Sloane summarizes Malay entrepreneurial ideology as
a whole: “The claim that in development, duty to others must be stated and shown; the belief
that one must not seek greedily the fruits of success but must generously invite others to partake;
the insistence that entailments-be they profits, contacts, or opportunities-must be rightfully
earned through effort, sincerity, and hard work; and, perhaps most crucial of all, the perception
that the entrepreneur is the cornerstone of modernity, possessing the ability to transform
simultaneously both society and the economy into the image of development espoused by the
Malay Muslim doctrine of virtue and the Mahathir government.”317
Compares to Indonesian society, the Malays has a very high trust in private sector. They
do not have an issue with profit-motive seeking as long as it is pursued with the guidance from
the religion. Moreover, they do not have a reservation of having foreign-owned Takaful
companies.318
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A certain degree of institutional trust is necessary for people to pay into an insurance
program, raising the need for sustained attention to this concept. How is institutional trust
established above and beyond trust in the advocates of particular insurance programs? In
Malaysia, the government has a prominent role in developing this trust. The government spend
a lot of money to build the regulatory framework, institutions and educate the public to support
Islamic finance. Although the Malaysian government acts mostly as an incubator and not a direct
participant, public sees the image that Bank Negara Malaysia controlling over the business as
mentioned in the interview above.
Furthermore, government involvement, in this case, has not seen as a negative thing.
Moreover, Islamic insurance develops in environment where there is a tight connection between
Islamic money and Islamic authority. Sloane mentions that these Malay entrepreneurs often
criticized NEP for providing “handouts” to Bumiputera, because Sharia does not allow earnings
from transactions that do not involve work. But they did not question the staggering amounts of
money being channeled by the government and its institutions and by corporations to serve and
promote Islam and the cause of God. Nearly 1 billion ringgits is allocated yearly from Muslim and
non-Muslim taxpayers to JAKIM, and huge sums are funneled into institutions and foundations
that, according to Malaysian tax law, are meant to advantage all Malaysians of all ethnicities and
religions. But that tax money often actually funds explicitly Islamic activities and singularly
Islamist ones, while at the same time government policies restrict the kinds of tax advantages
available to non-Muslims. Criticism of government institutions and policies that provide
resources and benefits to Muslims and deny them to non-Muslims is always rare in Malaysia
because of laws that restrict freedom of speech.319
The emergence of the ‘New Malay’ entrepreneurial class
The face of Malaysia’s capital city, Kuala Lumpur, today is entirely different from the year
1969. The year when ethnic riots happened in Malaysia. The 13 May 1969 (mainly) Malay–
Chinese sectarian violence — one of the darkest episodes in Malaysian history in which hundreds
of people lost their lives. The proximate reason appeared to be the result of ethnopolitical
319

Sloane-White.

132
conflicts in the aftermath of the 1969 general election. The deeper cause, however, was said to
be Malay dissatisfaction with their role in the modern economy, and their perception that the
Chinese had monopolized all economic activities in a nation which, the Malaysian Constitution
stated, rightfully belonged to the indigenous Malays.320 There was a fundamental contradiction
within Malaysian society-the concentration of wealth in the hand of the wealthy Chinese and
monopoly of political power in the hand of Malays. Nowadays, it is common to see a Malay name
after the title of CEO, manager or director of national or multinational companies. These group
of people represents the new entrepreneurial generation of Malays or so-called New Malay.
The New Economic Policy (NEP) was inaugurated in 1971 as a response toward that ethnic
conflict. NEP was affirmative policies and strategies provided by the state with the means to help
the Malays or Bumiputera. This policy replaced the essential laissez-faire economic framework
established in Malaysia upon Independence. Within the 20-year timeframe (ran out 1990) it was
expected that the economic equity vis-à-vis the Chinese would be reached when it could be
demonstrated that Malays had reached 30 percent ownership of and participation in all industrial
and commercial activities. To reach this goal, an enormous transformation and expansion of
economy was set in motion, leaving almost no institutional apparatus untouched. There was a
huge increase in the number of ‘quasi-public bodies and government agencies that were charged
with aiding program for Malays or that acted as surrogate institutions for the transfer of capital
shares and ownership to Malays. Over 20 years, Kuala Lumpur was transformed into a modern
city, built to support the growing policy-led enterprise sector and the public and private interests
of the mushrooming Malays middle class which have been educated to serve them.321
NEP program was designed to increase the percentage of Malays working in the nonagricultural sector, particularly in the managerial level, and increase the wealth of the Malays. 322
The program gained success in reducing poverty among Malays and in creating Bumiputera
middle class. However, some critics suggest that the idea of creating a new and self-sufficient
Bumiputera through affirmative actions, while compelling and impressive (to a certain degree)
at the macro level, did not appear to have materialized at the micro level. This New Malay group
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according to this view is a mere reflection of privileged political access within the patron-client
relationship of Malaysia’s political economy system. Adding to that, the long-term
implementation of racially-targeted policies reinforces stereotypical ethnic identities and hinders
the creation of a more inclusive society.”323
Within three years of the NEP implementation, 98 percent of all those recruited for
government service were Malays, a percentage that far exceeded the 4:1 Malay ratio. During the
period of the Second Malaysia Plan, Malay employment in the commercial and industrial sectors
rose rapidly to parallel the rate in the public service. 324Similarly, Malay admissions to institutions
of higher education also increased dramatically. Malay student numbers at the University of
Malaya, for instance, increased from 49.7 percent to 66.4 percent between 1970 and 1979. The
government also actively participated in funding Malay students for overseas studies.325
The NEP also provided an avenue for Malays to mobilize their capital and increase their
savings. This was achieved through the establishment of agencies such as the Pilgrims Fund Board
or Lembaga Tabung Haji and National Equity Corporation or Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB).
During the Islamization project, the government spends more funding for the establishment of
several institutes to support the development of Islamic finance.
Although the NEP managed only 19.4 percent of Malay ownership of public companies in
1990 against the target of 30 percent, it did create an enlarging Malay middle-class and more
professionals so that by 2004 there were, in fact, more Malay doctors than Chinese doctors. 326
The presence of these Malays in various professional and employment sectors had, in some ways,
helped to restore Malay confidence and the perception that the NEP had helped the Malays to
improve their standard of living and economic position.327 A significant outcome under the NEP
was the creation of government-owned entities that became directly involved in the commercial
activities of the nation.328
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In overall, the new Malays class share similar experiences. Most of them were socialized
for elite roles by civil-service parents. They went to English-style educational system and then
continued to overseas or local universities. More importantly, they were rewarded with
sponsored opportunities for increased legitimacy and power in the modern economic system.329
They also tend to live the same neighborhood of the cities. In the 1970s, there was rapid Malay
urbanization of Kuala Lumpur and its surroundings. Quotas were established to ensure that new
communities reflected blended racial make-up. However, people continue to live in traditionally
racially segregated areas in most of the city.
Many critics on the NEP argue that the affirmative program gained success in poverty
reduction but failed in creating Malay entrepreneurship. Gomez describes Malay
entrepreneurship as mere reflection of a patron-client relationship built among Malay
businesspersons and Malay politician, rent-seeking activities, and political privileges, and
powerful Malaysian state. Nonetheless, many field studies suggest that there has been a radical
change in the mindset of this small New Malay class that gave profound influence in general
Malay population. Entrepreneurship has been embraced by many not only as an actual
occupation but as their new identity, aspiration and social status.
They believed that full equality with the Chinese would be reached when Malays had
become true capitalist owners and producers themselves. Many of them, in addition to holding
down professional jobs in two-career families, had ambitious plans to prove that Malays were as
business-minded as the Chinese, and were engaged in multiple entrepreneurial plans and
projects. Indeed, even many of the Malay men and women in civil-service and other wage-paying
positions, the ‘bureaucratic middle class’, the classic Weberian no-risk category of ‘the middle
class’ in historians’ analyses of western classes, had some form of an entrepreneurial plan in the
process.330
Furthermore, they understand that entrepreneurship is not only a way to achieve wealth
but it also a way to serve God and others. It is often quoted that Prophet Muhammad was a
merchant himself. Business venture requires hard work, intelligent, and perseverance which

329
330

Sloane, Islam, Modernity and Entrepreneurship, page 45.
Ibid.

135
according to them the qualities that every Muslims should have. Furthermore, having your own
business means you are independent and do not rely on other people or government to assist
you. Business creates jobs. Being an entrepreneur means being a good Muslim and helping
people and the nation.
This class possesses modernizing ideas, which is different from the old attitudes of Malay
Muslims in Kampong or villages. The new Malay claimed to be a hard worker, modern and
entrepreneurial compares to the lazy, traditional and dependent Malay in the kampong or the
village. This identification actually was part of contestation between Barisan National and PAS,
particularly during the Islamization process of the 1980s. Islam was a moral standard in this
political contest. Mahathir offered his vision of so-called modernist Islam: ‘using the rhetoric of
rational interpretation of Islam’s teachings, and with his political preoccupations in mind, he
adapted classical modernization theory so that it can accommodate Islamic principles and has
elevated those Islamic teachings which can be argued to encourage entrepreneurialism.’ Islam
for the modernist Islam is a guide to motivate Malay Muslims to thrive for the modern lifestyle,
economic dynamism, and tolerance.
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Meanwhile, PAS was discredited as a group of zealots

who cannot face up modernity.
This New Malay identity is not purely constructed out of Muslim identity. There are
Muslims in Malaysia who are not Malays-such as Indian, Arab, Filipino, Thai, Bangladeshi, and
Indonesian Muslims- are often not perceived to be ‘genuine Muslims’, and therefore are
generally held outside the boundaries of Malay amity and affect. Nevertheless, these
demonstration of social marginality within the Muslim community are relatively insignificant by
contras in relation to Chinese. Chinese area considered as social and economic outsiders
representing a threat.332
Although, Malays admire the hardworking and frugal characteristics of Chinese
businesspeople, they are considered as a lack of social virtue. Chinese is claimed to be greedy,
cheater and self-centered, while Malay is claimed to be more open, hospitable, and generous.
They also rejected what they understand as the characteristics of Western entrepreneurs: the
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unethical and egoistic business ventures. Malays see themselves as virtuoso entrepreneurs:
submissive, other-centered, and altruistic.333 Islamization certainly strengthened the idea that
Malays are modern, but they are different from the Western or Chinese entrepreneurs. This
mentality is what Joel S. Kahn as “self-exoticising discourse” meaning while acknowledging their
status as modern and entrepreneurial, many Malaysian also claim that their entrepreneurship
culture is unique.
Decades of Islamization since the 80s gave birth to what so-called Sharia generation.334
While they have similar socio-demographic indicators like their parents of the first NEP
generations, they have more awareness of Sharia-related issues. They continued the modernist
Islam ideas and practices of the previous generation, but they have stricter observance on Sharia.
They gave more in charity because the Sharia obligation of zakat, save their money in the Islamic
banking, they concern on ensuring their business transactions are Sharia-compliant, and many of
them work in Islamic financial institution. For them, Islam is not only regarded as ethical values
in business but also a ruling and technical instruction in business.
Many of them see the NEP had emphasized on ‘Western-style’ of profit accumulation with
usury and individualism. Now they felt they knew much more about Islam and its Sharia
requirements and could fully embed religious principles and moral practices in their economic
ventures and all realms of their modern lives. They are the corporate Sharia elite. Among them
were Sharia advisors with Islamic pedigrees who set the standards of Islamic finance, authorizing
the Sharia compliance of financial products in the Islamic economy, marketing their expertise and
scholarship globally, and serving as business consultants to equally successful corporate
executives and owners. Connected to each other through business interests and membership in
Islamic study groups and Islamist pressure groups, the men of the corporate sharia elite shared
a vision of a new kind of virtuous capitalism – one that would not only refashion the economy
and people of Malaysia in Sharia-compliant ways but also serve as a model for Muslims
worldwide, and perhaps even remake capitalism for the world.335
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The relationships between the New Malay and ‘traditional Malay’, between Malay with
other the ‘not-genuine’ Muslims, and between Malay with Chinese show the exclusionary power
of Malay entrepreneurship. However, it also as an inclusionary power among the group member
itself. Their relationship with other elite Malay business leaders and politician is not seen as a
traditional feudal or patron-client relationship. They see their relationship as self-and-group
empowering network based on self- reliant, egalitarian, and meritocratic capitalist society.
Furthermore, Malays see themselves as affectively bound, dutiful, real and symbolic kin,
mutually entailed by obligations, and threatened by others. The centrality of entrepreneurship
in this New Malay lives corresponds to the increase in the importance of material wealth in their
social relations. Malay life in relationships with parents, spouses, cohorts and the communal
group is bounded by Islamic duty and financial obligation. For example, the Dakwah activities
have influenced Malays to be more charitable by performing zakat. They are feeling more
responsible financially for supporting their relatives.
The goal of creating Malay entrepreneurs through the NEP might not be achieved as
expected, but certainly, there has been radical transformation on how Malay perceives
entrepreneurship, particularly during the implementation of Islamic finance project.
Entrepreneurship has become the main vector of ethnic, religious, and moral worth and a test of
virtue and modernity among the beneficiaries of NEP or so-called New Malay. The affirmative
policy of NEP created rapid social transformation where Malay received an abundance of wealth
and opportunity. This condition created an ‘altered’ identity of Malayness. They rejected the
stigma of lazy and backward Malays. They claim themselves as modern, entrepreneurial, and
pious Muslims. Entrepreneurship demonstrates the process by which moral obligation to others,
hard works, and Islamic faith have become symbolized together in economic activities, which are
at once ‘modern’ and ‘Malay’ and later on, also ‘Sharia-compliant’.336 The interpretation of Malay
entrepreneurship by stressing on the obligation to others, Islamic values, and self-reliant are
significant on the development of awareness among the New Malay on the concept of risk,
therefore susceptible for the development of Islamic insurance.
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Conclusion: harmonization and Muslim capitalist modernity in Malaysia
The success of the institutionalization of Malaysia’s Islamic insurance industry is primarily
attributed to the gradual and systemic approach driven and backed by the state. Unlike many
Middle Eastern countries, there is no single entrepreneur pioneered the overall Islamic financial
institution in Malaysia.337 Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad himself was the one who ordered
the formation of a task force to explore the viability of an Islamic insurance company in Malaysia
in October 1982.338 However, the state has taken a managerial role that can incubate a new
service economy in which private individuals and institutions (not the state) are the primary
agents of economic growth. The Malaysian state created the necessary infrastructure to facilitate
the emergence of viable national and transnational Islamic financial systems but did not become
involved in creating commercial firms.339
Furthermore, Malaysia’s Islamic insurance and Islamic financial institutions, in general,
have served as a locus where the secular Malaysian government, represented by Barisan Nasional
(BN) under the leadership of Mahathir Mohammad, to create a coalition with the modernist and
urban Malay Muslims, to strengthen the economy of the Malay ethnic group or Bumiputera. Even
after the resignation of Mahathir Mohammad in 2002, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, prime minister
from 2003 to 2009, persisted with a developmentalist model that promoted Bumiputera capital,
but he showed little interest in developing Malay – or Malaysian – big businesses. He advocated
more on policies that nurtured SMEs, including industries dealing with halal products, dominated
by poor rural Malays, as well as supporting many new Islamic insurance companies.340 This
political strategy has enabled BN to preserve and consolidate its continuous dominance against
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the threat from the traditional and fundamentalist Muslim groups represented by Islamist
political party of PAS, and also from the Chinese minority.
The Islamic financial institutions were designed and regulated to enhance Malay
population’s participation in the development process. It is created as an alternative avenue
rather than a replacement for the existing economic system. It contributed to the savings
mobilization and capital accumulation of the Malays in order to improve their standard of living
and bring them up to par with their fellow citizens of Chinese origin. The creation of these
institutions enabled the Malaysia state to make important concessions to the Muslim interests
and Muslim identity of the Malay majority, to defuse the political pressures from the Islamist
political party, and to accommodate its Chinese and Indian minorities and the capitalist structure
of the economy. All of these has been part of a bigger goal for harmonizing Islamization with
economic liberalization.
The Islamization drive has provided Mahathir with a way to position himself as a defender
of Islam and Malay identity, and to embrace the calls for more Islam in public life, to counter
critiques of the ruling government of Barisan Nasional (BN) as ‘secular’ and therefore spiritually
bankrupt. Arguing for ‘secularization’, as classical modernization theorists would have it, would
therefore unhelpful to Mahathir. Thus, he has argued instead of Malaysia to modernize
Islamically, using his favored, pro-capitalist Islamic teachings and creating an Islamic rationale for
the familiar prescription for modernization. Islam, for him, is a moral guide, not politics of Islamic
state, but a set of values and ethics to guide an individual or privately managed action, to
motivate Malay Muslims to act in a way which is conducive to national unity and economic
growth. In pursuing modernization and economic growth, the BN has focused on creating and
cultivating a small Malay entrepreneurial class, which possess modernizing ideas and can lead
Malay Muslims away from their ‘traditional’ attitudes. The BN has had to discredit the Islamist
political party of PAS while ensuring that its own followers also appear sufficiently Islamic. BN’s
attempt in this area have involved mobilizing selected Islamic teachings, such as those which
make allowances for the accumulation of wealth and presenting them as the fundamental of
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Islam. Mahathir has tried to present his government as an Islamic one. Competition between BN
and PAS was the main driver for Mahathir’s Islamization of society and state.341
Islamic finance project has been considered as the most acceptable of Islamization of
Malaysia. Rather than creating tension as happened in the Islamization of Malaysia’s legal
system, Islamic finance is allowing a Muslim elite to operate adroitly within (and profit from)
capitalism, and welcoming Muslim and non-Muslim investors alike. This reality includes the
development of Islamic insurance or Takaful. Malaysia Islamizes its insurance through the
institution of Islamic insurance, which is developed as an alternative and not a substitute for the
still available conventional insurance. Malaysia model of Islamic insurance is Sharia-compliant
but regulated under secular legislation. The development of Malaysia's dual finance system is
tied up with its social and economic policy and that is why it was fully supported by the country's
top leadership in addition to the Central Bank, the Parliament, and the public in general.
The Government of Malaysia is also using Islamic finance in general for its key entry to
globalization. Malaysia was of the first countries to take a systematic planning approach to
develop the Islamic finance system for continuing future progress of its financial industry’s rapid
development. Malaysian government through Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) invites financial
institutions across the world to establish Islamic insurance and Islamic re-insurance operations in
Malaysia to conduct foreign currency business. Altogether, Islamic insurance was a result of the
convergence of diverse interests among political coalitions within Malaysia polity.342
The second reason for the impressive development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia
relates to the social process within Malay society itself. The religion of Islam played a pivotal role
in the state’s development strategies by fostering New Malays with characteristics supportive
toward economic development (such as diligence, accountability, and education). Furthermore,
by promoting a form of Islam fully compatible with its development objectives, the state made it
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possible for “government policies [to] seek to bring Islam in line with capitalism”.343 This mindset
originated long before post-colonial Malaysia.
It was an outcome of a social formation inherited from the British rule in Malaya prior to
independent Malaysia. The British Empire consolidated the apparatus of centralized government
and its capitalist economy, but at the same time, ‘weakened’ or coopted its civil society. The
combination of a centralized government, the coopted religious institutions, and a capitalist
economy leads to a higher trust toward Islamic insurance industry in Malaysia. The ‘weak civil
society contributes to the inability of Malaysian society in establishing institutional frameworks
of economic security outside the market mechanism. Historically, Malaysia has a weak informal
network such as Waqf (religious endowment). The waqf institution has long been neglected and
nearly forgotten by the Islamic community in Malaysia as compared to the other Islamic
institutions). 344
However, at the same time Malays can use their social network for economic ends.
Malays has demonstrated their kampong values-sharing, fairness, equality, and balance- into a
modern and entrepreneurial society of Malays. For Malays, among the Malay middle class,
entrepreneurship has become the main vector of ethnic, religious, and moral worth, and a test
of virtue and modernity among themselves.345 Rudnyckyj terms this assemblage 'market Islam'
and contrast it with what has been labeled 'civil Islam'. He argues that, “market Islam seeks less
to create commensurability between Islam and democracy and is instead designed to merge
Muslim religious practice and capitalist ethics. Market Islam is thus less concerned with state
power and the articulation of politics and religion, and more focused on eliciting the ethical
dispositions conducive to economic liberalism.”346 The truth of that statement can be seen from
the Malaysia’s Islamic insurance development that is increasingly stressing on its market viability
and Sharia-compliant contract rather than the mutual organizational framework of Takaful.
Neslihan Cevik’s work on “Muslimism” in Turkey seems to be relevant to explain the
development of Islamic insurance as part of Islamic revivalism within Malaysian society. In her
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study, she shows how Islamic revivalism in Turkey has manifested itself in Muslims’ engagement
in the markets, political parties, and civic society while still adhering to the Islamic ideals. The
new Islamic form of Turkey encompasses all aspects from economic and political, to cultural
expression along with its theological structure.347
This innovative concept was built on a vibrant empirical research of the post-1980 Turkey.
Cevik uses the terms ‘a guilt-free modernity’ and ‘Islam without apology’ to describe this attitude,
which cannot be reduced either to political adaptation or commodification of Islam. “It emerged
in everyday life spaces in a quest to establish new institutions and lifestyles that allow Muslims
to rework aspects of modernity”.348
This hybridity is located analytically and based on the notion of “Islamic three ds”,
corresponding to major dimensions of the Islamic heritage: din (religion), dunya (this world), and
dawla (the state). She analyzes the 3ds based on the ontology, agency, and action. The purpose
is to differentiate Muslimists from Islamists. For instance, in the level of ontology in the
dimension of din or religion, Islamists perceive Islam as an ideology, while Muslimists understand
it as identity. At the level of the agency of dunya dimension or worldly affairs, Islamists tend
towards communitarianism, while Muslimists are more focused on individuation. At the level of
action of dawla dimension or the public sphere, both approaches are different in terms of how
to create social improvement. Islamists have a state-cantered political action, while Muslimists
use a broad social action. Islamists (just like secularists) claim to be the guardians of ‘traditions’,
while these Muslimists seek to find innovative ways of dealing with the world.349
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CHAPTER IV
INDONESIA

Despite sharing so many similarities, Indonesia and Malaysia are achieving a different
level of Islamic insurance development. Malaysia has become the hub of Islamic finance of
Southeast Asia and the world, while Indonesia still has a vast untapped market. Although both
countries started the Islamization and privatization processes of their economy in the 1980s, the
Indonesian Government gave official support for the establishment of Islamic financial
institutions in Indonesia only after 1990s. Islamic finance, in general, was officially introduced in
1992 and Islamic insurance in 1994 with less government commitment and bottom-up approach.
However, Indonesia Islamic insurance sector recently has been showing a significant growth by
having a contribution of 19% of the total regional market. In 2016, Islamic insurance accounted
for 6.2 percent of the overall Indonesia insurance market with asset more than 42 trillion IDR (3.1
million USD).350
Islamic insurance was introduced officially to Indonesian society through the
establishment of PT Syarikat Takaful Indonesia (Takaful Indonesia) on 24 February 1994. It was
the first Sharia-compliant insurance company in Indonesia. It was endorsed by ICMI (Indonesian
Association of Muslim Intellectuals) and promoted through Islamic informal and formal
organizations. Up until now, Islamic insurance in Indonesia has developed into 20 Family Takaful
companies, which consist of 3 Family Takaful companies and 17 units of Family Takaful, and 25
General Takaful composed of 2 fully-fledged Islamic insurance companies and 23 units, and three
Islamic re-insurance windows.351 The introduction of the new insurance law of 2014 was partly
responsible for this positive development.
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Furthermore, there has been a growth in the form of Islamic micro-insurance for the poor
population and waqf-insurance products in Indonesia. Islamic micro-insurance has been utilized
to help the poor, especially in rural Indonesia. Indonesian poor only need to buy monthly
premium of 5,000 Indonesian Rupiah (50 cents) to receive proper health care against dengue
fever. The waqf-insurance links insurance protection with a social endowment. With monthly
payment, Muslims in Indonesia can contribute to the social cause by investing in property such
as mosque, school, and hospital, and t the same time, receive financial protection for sickness
and death. The development of Islamic micro-insurance and waqf-insurance in Indonesia
represent the bottom-up approach of its communitarian tradition that has provided a strong
foundation for the national economy.
This chapter examines the reason behind the existing gap and differences between
Indonesia and Malaysia (also Pakistan) in Islamic insurance. It starts with a brief introduction of
Indonesia as a multi-cultural religious state, which stresses on the status and role of Islam in the
state building, its plural and dynamic society, and the dualist economic system of Indonesia.
Unlike in Malaysia, Islam does not have special status compares to other five official religions in
Indonesia. All of six official religious groups receive state funding, representation in government,
publicly funded religious institutions and legal protection.
The next section provides detail information on the growth and institutional development
of Islamic insurance in Indonesia. This section also discusses the linkage between Islamic
insurance with other social tools into the broader context of insurance or social protection in
Indonesia. Historically, the state has been heavily involved in providing that protection to
Indonesian citizens, and the private sector has never been the primary provider for economic
security in Indonesia. Recently, Islamic NGOs have become the most important actors in this
matter.
The following two sections explain the factors for Indonesia’s Islamic insurance
development through the lenses of ‘political life’ and ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance. The political
life of Islamic insurance section explores the catalysts, the political landscape of Islamic insurance
in Indonesia, and the political coalitions behind Islamic insurance, particularly during the
repressive government of President Soeharto regime (1966-1998) since the 1980s. Islamic
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insurance and other Islamic finance institutions were initiated in the periphery led by non-state
actors. Many scholars argue that this dynamic has been generating both authentic and Islamic
version of financial institutions, such as Islamic micro-finance and waqf-insurance schemes. The
second part elaborates Indonesia’s social transformation, which is responsible for the
development of the expression of Islam in their ideals for the nation-state of Indonesia and
economic ethics. Indonesian’s communal economic ethics is influential in the development of
Islamic insurance in Indonesia. For many Indonesians, maintaining harmony and social solidarity
are more valuable than personal freedom and achievement. Understanding socio-economic
ethics is vital to make sense of the development of Islamic insurance in Indonesia.
The structure of a religious state
This section provides a brief introduction of Indonesia as a religious ‘imagined
community’, particularly in its relation to the role of Islam in building a religious state, its multiethnic/religious circumstances, and its economic structure. Both legal and societal facts show the
significance of religions in Indonesians’ lives. The Constitution declares Indonesia as a religious
state, protects religious freedom, and supports religious communities. For many Indonesians,
religion is essential, not only in the formal sense of implementation of religiously inspired laws,
but religion is considered essential in creating an ideal society.352
However, Indonesia is also a country rich with paradoxes. The paradoxes are the result of
its long historical and social-cultural processes, particularly colonialism. Like Malaysia, the
colonial rule had shaped the structures of contemporary Indonesian society. The continuous
tension between the secular and the Islamist groups in defining Indonesian politics, economic
inequality within Indonesia’s social stratification, and the existence of dualistic economy in
Indonesia are instances of influences generated from the 126 years of the Dutch colonial rule.
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An imagined community
Indonesia declared its independence from the Dutch colonials in 1945, and after several
years of armed and diplomatic conflict with the Netherlands, Indonesia achieved international
recognition in 1949. Indonesia is the world's largest island country, with more than thirteen
thousand islands, and at 1,9 million square kilometers (735,358 square miles). Indonesia is the
14th largest by land area and the 7th largest in the combined sea and land area. Java, the world's
most populous island, contains about 40 percent (100 million) of the country's population.353
With over 261 million people (2017), Indonesia is the world's fourth-largest nation in the world,
the third-largest democracy, and as well as the most populous Muslim-majority country.
Indonesia is a republic with an elected parliament and president. Since its independence,
Indonesia has experienced many challenges in establishing a democratic government. After
almost a decade of parliamentarian democracy, Soekarno turned it into an authoritarian regime
in the final phase of his reign (1959-1965). Then, Soeharto (1966-1998) ruled an authoritarian
and repressive regime of the New Order for almost 32 years until the regime fell due to a massive
protest in 1998. Since the late 1980s, the Soeharto administration had become heavily
centralized and corrupt. When the financial crisis of 1997 started, the crony-capitalism regime of
Soeharto was not able to cope with it. The monetary crisis had become a political crisis leading
to a democratic transition in Indonesia.
Indonesia is a diverse country. There is no single ethnic, single religion, and single culture
that unite this archipelago of 17,000 islands. However, this diverse archipelago is, in fact, a single
nation-state. For instance, the people of Sumatra have more differences to people of Java
compared to the people of Malaya (Malaysia). Sumatra and Malaya are ethnically Malay,
speaking Bahasa Melayu, and share many histories as a region. There is no exact reason why the
territorial border of Indonesia exists as it is, except because the people themselves believe it to
be so.
The Indonesian archipelago has been an essential region for trade since at least the 7th
century, but before the Dutch came, Indonesia was only a fiction. In 1914, the Dutch centralized
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political control over the whole archipelago after almost a century controlled by a private
company of Dutch East India Company or VOC. The Dutch set up a single government for all the
Indies, formed a new representative assembly, the Volksraad, and introduced new law codes: a
code for foreign Orientals in 1848 and a criminal code for native Indonesians.
This centralization certainly gave a sense of unity in the mind of Dutch administrator, but
not in the mind of native Indonesians. None imagined themselves as belonging to an organic,
unitary community in any meaningful way. Indeed, the Dutch had a vital role in the creation of a
unified Indonesia, but Indonesia exists as a nation mostly because Indonesians themselves want
it.354 The support for this argument is presented in the paragraphs below.
A nation is real for the people who hold it as true, despite the fact that we cannot sense
it physically. Benedict Anderson’s well-known book, Imagined Communities, links the creation of
nations, which he called “imagined communities,” with the advancement of national
languages.355 Bahasa Indonesia, the national language, was a language of trade, which was
spread across the archipelago. It is originated from Malay islands, which is now shared by
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. It is an entirely invented language because we cannot find
any ancient texts, which are written in Indonesian. Moreover, there were no native speakers
before the twentieth century.356 Nowadays, Bahasa Indonesia is more consolidated as lingua
franca thanks to the national education system, the spread of television, and the popularity of
local sinetrons or soap operas.357
The spread of newspapers among the native Indonesians accelerated this sense of unity.
For the first time, these natives spoke, discussed, and shared information as a “one people”.
Moreover, the second youth congress in Batavia (now Jakarta) in October 1928 marked a
milestone in Indonesians’ historical conscience. Youth delegates came from various parts of the
archipelago to discuss a different array of issues concerning their people. In the final day, the
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Congress closed with the reading of the Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda), which all delegates
proclaimed three ideals: one motherland, one nation, and one language. There was no formal
decision from the Congress, but it did promote the idea nationhood. The idea of a united
Indonesia. 358
Also, the social stratification created by the Dutch colonialism partly was partly
responsible for the creation of this shared identity too. In the nineteenth century, the Dutch
consolidated colonial social status system based on racial distinction in the Dutch East Indies
(now Indonesia), and particularly in the island of Java. This system created a notion of
Bumiputera, which was different, as understood in modern Malaysia. The colonial legal system
made an explicit distinction between Europeans, Chinese, and Indonesians. The colonialists put
all natives of the Dutch Indies into one big pool of lower-class called Indies or pribumi regardless
of their ethnicity and religions.
Above them, the Chinese and other ‘foreign orientals’ such as Arab descent formed an
intermediate group consisting mainly of traders and craftsmen, and the one sit on top of the
system was the European colonists. This system formed the roots of later ethnic problems. After
independence, it continues to create tension between the native and the Chinese Indonesian (1.2
percent of the Indonesian population), particularly in relation to wealth distribution. The Chinese
minority population in Indonesia has gained an important position in the business sector with
international business networks. Despite this tension, the identity of Bumiputera or pribumi in
modern Indonesia has never been based on a single ethnic or religious identity.
Indonesia was created based on nationalists’ ideals. It is not a nation based on ethnic,
race, or religion, but a shared idea of Indonesia. Independent Indonesia transcends the great
maritime empires of Indonesia’s past from ethnically dominated networks of trade and distance
outposts of commerce and religion into a single nation-state.359 Indonesia is an obvious case of
fragmented communities trying to achieve an imagined national unity, as its national motto of
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika— “Unity in Diversity”—portrays.
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Islam in a religious society
Islam develops not only in a pluralistic, but also a religious vision of the independent and
modern Indonesia. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world. There are more Muslims
living in Indonesia (215 million) that those who live in the entire Middle East. The growing
influence of Indonesian Muslims has been largely ignored by many orientalist scholars or even
Arab Muslims. They consider Indonesians practice an inferior form of Islam mixed with nonIslamic indigenous cultural elements.360
Indonesia, in fact, is a dynamic Muslim majority country, with incredible diversity.
Different streams of Islam, different ethnic groups, and different religious communities, live side
by side in harmony. Surely, there were several incidents. The tension mostly happened in the
intra-religious relations rather than between religions. The polarization within the Muslim
community itself between the modernist, the traditionalist, and the nominal Muslims is very
influential in Indonesian politics.361 This polarization is shown in the debate on Islamic insurance,
which will be elaborated in the next section of this dissertation.
Furthermore, Indonesia has experienced several serious terrorist attacks from the
extremist Islamic movements and this continuous threat has roots deep in Indonesia’s past.362
However, this country has also an ancient history of religious tolerance that is far more peaceful
than the history of religions in Europe or the Middle East.
The socio-political events in Indonesia are often dominated by religious symbolism of
Islam. However, the elections show that Islam plays a smaller part in determining political
outcomes. According to Ricklefs, one of the prominent experts on Indonesia, from 1955 to the
present, the Muslim political parties have had to adjust to the fact that though Indonesia is
overwhelmingly Muslim, the Muslim parties are a political minority. Moreover, he argues, “Islam
and religion, in general, serve more or less as ‘social glue’ that keeps society together, peaceful
and governable within a society like Indonesia, with weak rule of law, widespread criminality, low
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levels of administrative competence, endemic corruption and a significant presence of extremist,
terrorist groups.”363
Indonesia is not an Islamic state nor a secular state. Sharia is not the law of the land, with
the special exception of the province of Aceh. The Indonesian constitution declared in Chapter XI
“The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God, and the State guarantees all
persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief”. The belief in
the One and Only God is also presented as the first of the five principles of the official
philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state (Pancasila).
The Constitution establishes the founding principle that the state is religious. This
statement means the state has a legitimate role in regulating the religious practice, religious
affairs, and for other religious-related civil matters. Unlike Malaysia, that gives supremacy to
Islam as the religion of the Federation, Indonesia affirms six religions, including Islam. In order of
the size, these are Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. All
these groups receive state funding, representation in government, publicly funded religious
institution, and legal protection. Religious beliefs act as a basis for obtaining legal documents
such as identification cards, school registrations, and birth, marriage, or death certificate.364
In Indonesia, there are religious courts. There is a Ministry of Religions that regulates
religions, not just Islam but others as well. Not only regulating religions, but the state also has
the authority to define them. For instance, there is no official law that prohibits Atheism or
religious sects in Indonesia. However, as many people consider them as defamation against
religion, the government can use the law against blasphemy and defamation to restrict them.
The state actor can decide which religious beliefs are normatively acceptable, which ones are
deviant, and which ones are a threat to social order.365 Atheists can be arrested for defamation.
The same applies to various sects that are considered heretical versions of one of the six
recognized religions. The largest group in this category is Ahmadiya. Ahmadis are not forbidden
to practice their version of Islam, but they are banned from teaching or spreading it.
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Furthermore, majority of Indonesians do not imagine their religion as a private matter.
They considered religion should affect all areas of life, including politics, economics, social
relations, media, culture, family life, and education.366 Nevertheless, many Indonesian Muslims
believe that the substance of Sharia, for example, justice, mercy, and equality, should be
implemented in the national law, and Islamic law as implemented from many centuries ago
should not be the law of modern Indonesia. This view is not unique only among Indonesian
Muslims. Other religious communities in Indonesia share this view also. Adeney-Risakotta states
Contrary to most of the Malaysian population (64% Muslims) who prefers laws of the
country should strictly follow the teaching of the Quran, the majority of Indonesian (91%
Muslims) suggests the laws should follow values and principles of Islam, but not strictly
follow it. According to many Indonesians, creating a community of justice, safety, and
peace is closer to the teachings of the Quran than the purity of Arabic culture. Since
Indonesia’s founding, there have been repeated attempts to make Sharia mandatory for
Muslims. However, most Indonesians has opposed them.367
Islam as a political force has always been considered as a threat by the political authority.
In 1825, the Dutch had already identified kiyayi or village Muslim leaders as their main opponent.
They were influential in leading peasant resistance during the Java wars of 1825-1830.368 Initially,
the Dutch tried to curtail Islamic activities and limit the influence of kiyayi by allying itself with
local aristocracy and customary chiefs. The contrary, this policy increased the resentment of the
Muslim population toward the Dutch. Upon the recommendation of Christiaan Snouck
Hurgronje, the Dutch reexamined this policy by distinguishing between the religious and the
political aspects of Islam, tolerating the former and repressing the latter. Islamic religious
opposition did not shake Dutch rule; however, Islam became more deeply rooted in Indonesian
rural society.369
The policies of the Soeharto government toward Muslim movements in the 1970s were
an echo of those introduced by the Dutch. The Soeharto regime took a strong secular line and
coercive approach toward Muslim movements. Not only Muslim political ambition was checked,
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but also Muslim identities were challenged by nationalist secular ideologies.370 Islam as an
ideology was being disputed against the national philosophical foundation (Pancasila). Islamic
organization and association in Indonesia were not allowed to create by-laws using Islam as their
organization philosophy. Rather, all organizations had to use Pancasila in their by-laws.
At the beginning of 1980s, the regime began to respond to the rising middle-class
commitment to Islam. Soeharto’s policy remained the promotion of personal piety and the
suppression of political activity, but the government made some concessions, for instance, by
building more mosques, schools, reinforcing Muslim courts and banning Christian missionary
activity. In the 1990s, the government started to accommodate Islam and acted less repressive
toward Muslim movements. Soeharto turned from containment to support for Muslim
movements. Soeharto reversed previous policy and created an association for Indonesian Muslim
Intellectuals or ICMI to promote the Islamization of Indonesia.371
Nowadays, there is no significant opposition either from the government or from society
to the deeper Islamization of Indonesia. There is an only difference of opinion about what shape
Islamic life.372 There are some Sharia by-laws, such as the ruling of wearing the headscarf or
‘Muslim Clothing’ during the fasting month of Ramadan, implemented in the country’s more
conservative regions. However, most of these regulations have come from officials of ostensibly
secular parties like the Golkar or the Demokrat and not Islamist parties. According to Shadi
Hamid, the implementation of Sharia is part of a mainstream discourse that cuts across
ideological and party lines in Indonesia. That phenomena suggests that Islamism is not necessarily
about political Islam but is about a broader population that is open to Islam playing a central role
in law and governance.373

370

Ibid.
M. C. Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, C. 1930
to Present (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012).
372
Ibid.
373
Shadi Hamid, What’s Different About Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia?, vol. 2018, World Affairs (The Aspen
Institute, 2016).
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/07/07/whats-different-about-islam-in-malaysia-and-indonesia/
371

153
Indonesia’s dualistic economy
Unlike the British who laid a solid foundation for a capitalist system in Malaysia,
colonialism in Indonesia left out a dualistic system of economy. The dualistic system refers to the
coexistent of capitalist and subsistence economies. The character of state-run cultivation crops
as a system based on coercion was one of the reasons for the absence of social changes in villages
in Java, the island where most of Indonesians live. Despite massive commercialization and
machine-intensive colonial economy, village communities were left socially undisturbed. The
egalitarian and labor-intensive of village economy had prevailed.374 In the present day, the
dualistic feature is shown by the high level of informal economy in Indonesia. In Indonesia, 70%
of the workforce was estimated to be engaged in informal employment, mostly in the agriculture
sector.375 As a comparison, Malaysia’s informal workers consists of only around 9.4 percent of
the total workforce in Malaysia.376
Sir Stamford Raffles introduced a capitalist type of economic development during a brief
period when the British took control of Java in 1811. This system was like the one introduced in
the Peninsular Malaya. However, when the Dutch returned in 1816, they reverted to direct state
control and compulsory cultivation. The Dutch extracted produce, such as coffee and pepper, by
forced deliveries for sale in Europe under ‘the culture system’.377
The culture system was a form of taxation which required by the peasants to devote onefifth of their land to government assigned crops-usually sugar, indigo, coffee, tea, tobacco,
cinnamon, and cotton- and to deliver the produce as a tribute in kind, instead of other rents of
taxes. At the same time, the peasants could grow rice for their subsistent need. Also, they were
required to contribute their labor: to build irrigation canals, roads, and bridges, clear wastelands,
and otherwise build up the economic infrastructure of the island.
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During the 1840s, the culture system was overexploited, and could not produce adequate
revenues. As the population of Java rose from approximately 7 million in 1850 to 28.4 million in
1900, there was no rise in the per capita standard of living. The culture system had made Java as
the vital link in the global capitalist economy, but the peasants in Java were left out within their
subsistence farming economy.378
After the liberal revolution in Holland in 1848, the state control over plantations and
forced labor were abolished in favor of free enterprise and direct taxation. The development of
plantation economy, particularly in the island of Sumatra, owed partly to the contract laborers.
Many of the contract laborers (coolies) came from China and later from Java. Subsequently, the
Chinese played more as an intermediary trader within the colonial economy. They had a vital role
in supplying credit and stimulating the cultivation of export crops such as rattan, rubber, and
copra.379
In Sumatra, the introduction of the capitalist economy led to profound social change.
Sumatra became an important source for agricultural and forest commodities. The monetary
economy was introduced to create a market for textiles, hardware, and other foreign goods. New
towns were established for the new settlers, and Dutch schools were introduced. A network of
village banks called the People’s Credit System was established. As opposed to Java, capitalism
entered the fabric of traditional society to create new classes among the population. 380
Indonesia’s independence had disrupted the continuation of the colonial economy.
Although it was not total, the founding fathers of Indonesia envisioned a transformation from
the colonial economy. For them, independence does mean not only political independence, but
also economic independence, where people are free from exploitation. Their economic ideals
were promulgated in the Constitution Chapter XIV. The economic vision of the Constitution is a
mixed economy of Indonesia combining egalitarian feature of a cooperative system, state control
over major means of production, and private enterprise. Also, the state has a responsibility to
take care of the poor and the needy.

378

Ibid.
Ibid.
380
Ibid.
379

155
Nevertheless, this vision was difficult to achieve during the first decade of independence.
After independence, the Indonesian economy had to recover from the hardships of the Japanese
occupation and the war for independence (1945-1949). During the period 1949-1965, there was
little economic growth, predominantly in the years from 1950 to 1957. In 1958-1965, political
instability and inappropriate economic policy measures made the economy stagnant. Soekarno
aimed at self-sufficiency, import-substitution, and estranged the suppliers of western capital,
even more, when he developed communist sympathies. His efforts to eliminate foreign economic
control were not always supportive of the struggling economy of the new sovereign state.381
The ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) of Soeharto rejected political mobilization and socialist
ideology of Soekarno and established a tightly controlled regime. This strategy successfully put
Indonesia’s economy back on the right track. More flows of foreign investment and foreign aid
programs came into the countries. Under Soeharto, Indonesia transformed itself from a
predominantly agricultural economy to an industrializing economy.382
In the 1980s, Soeharto started to decrease government intervention and initiated the
deregulation of the economy. However, this liberalization did not create a more competitive
business environment in Indonesia. On the contrary, national companies were sold cheaply to
Soeharto families and cronies with the support of a corrupt bureaucracy. Indonesia achieved
remarkable economic growth during this time, but it was not distributed to the people of
Indonesia. Soeharto regime was sustained by bureaucracy, military, and a small number of
conglomerates, which mostly Chinese Indonesian and Soeharto’s family. This crony capitalism
was responsible for the failure of the Soeharto regime in coping with the financial crisis of 1997.
The economy of Indonesia during the post-New Order is less centralized than the
economy during Soeharto regime. Act number 32, the year 2004 serves as a basis for economic
decentralization in Indonesia. The region has more autonomy to manage their economic affair.
However, the nature of Indonesia economy system does not entirely change. Rosser argues that
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Indonesia ‘oligarchic capitalism’ system has been continually shaped by three contradictory
agendas:
(1) the predatory, rent-seeking agenda pursued by the politico-bureaucrats and their
corporate clients; (2) the market-oriented agenda pursued by controllers of mobile capital
(and conglomerates when it works to their favors); and (3) the social justice/redistributive
agenda pursued by peasants, workers, and small business and their allies in the NGO
community. The first two are still dominant in shaping Indonesia economy; however, the
political context of Indonesia as democracy creates more space for the third agenda. In
general, the current Indonesian economy represents a compromise between these three
competing agendas, in particular, the one that favors the interests of the politicobureaucrats and the conglomerates, while accommodating mobile-capital controllers and
incorporating concessions to peasants, workers, and other marginalized elements.383
Political actors of Islamic politics
The considerable diversity within Indonesian society is continually changing the political
landscape surrounding the development of Islamic insurance in Indonesia. The religious, social
and cultural realms are influential in the debate over the role of religion in the country’s nationbuilding and development. Moreover, competition for political power in Indonesia is complex,
fought out at multiple levels of government across a nation, in a context of on-going
democratization and on-going Islamization of the society. This complex process has a deep root
history in the polarization of the Indonesia (Javanese) society which started back in the 1930s.
The intensity of the Islamic modernist movement, particularly after the establishment of
Muhammadiyah organization in 1912, polarized Indonesian society along identity lines between
santri, abangan and priyayi.384
The American sociologist, Clifford Geertz identified three cultural stream or so-called
aliran in Indonesian, namely the santri, abangan, and priyayi.385 The abangan majority were not
irreligious, for they had a rich spiritual life, but it was only partly touched by reformers regarded
as the true Islam. Similarly, the priyayi embraces abangan religious identity but comprises the
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elite cultural identity contras to the abangan masses. The priyayi were used as administrators
during the Dutch colonial era. Gradually they became professional civil servants of modern
Indonesia. For this reason, the priyayi as a class were often regarded as Javanese civil servants.
The santri is a cultural stream of a type of devout Muslim who practice a more orthodox
version of Islam, in contrast to abangan classes. The santri consists of the Modernists and the
Traditionalists kyais. In term of religious understanding, the Modernists are more puritan by
strictly following the injunction of the Quran and early generation of Muslims. Meanwhile, in the
context of Muslim society in Indonesia, Traditionalism refers to a religious strand which
emphasizes on preserving traditionally established local rituals and scholarship. Traditionalist
Muslims refer to themselves as ahlusunnah wal jamaah or aswaja.386
Furthermore, Traditionalism is often contrasted with modernism, which is inspired by
modernity and rationalism. These two groups also differ in many political issues. The Modernist
pioneering a modernization of educational and welfare activities. Modernist played roles in
nationalist political movements and never shy away from active political involvement and
leadership. The Traditionalist started to involve in politics just few years before independence,
and continue to do so, however the combination of their religiosity with politics led to
questioning of their sanctity. The Traditionalist group tends to be more flexible in their political
position, which many suggest pejoratively that the political principle of the Traditionalist is having
‘no-principle’. If the religious interest of Muslims is left untouched, the Traditionalists are willing
to accept any type of political authority. 387
The first santri-abangan polarization erupted with the Madiun uprising 1948 which left
thousands of dead. With this spilling blood the santri-abangan chasm deepened and reinforced
the bitter political contest between the Communist party of PKI and its abangan followers on one
side and santri on the other, represented above all by the santri Traditionalist of NU (at that time
still within Masyumi). The nationalist party of PNI had a more priyayi leadership but also recruited
for abangan.388
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Under Soekarno, the political landscape was strictly represented this polarization. In the
elections of 1955, ‘Islamic’ and ‘secular’ constituencies were easily differentiated. The table
below shows the vote distribution among the ‘big four’ parties, who together got 78.0% of the
valid votes. This result shows the ‘secular’ got 38.7% and the ‘Islamic’ got 39.3%.389
During the time of the New Order of Soeharto, the actors and the institutions had changed
dramatically. However, the political constellation still showed the polarization between those
cultural streams -at least roughly. Also, it had become more difficult to identify ‘Islamic’ and
‘secular constituencies. There was no single organization containing one cultural stream
exclusively. There was more political mixing under the New Order. After taking control of the
situation in 1965, Soeharto launched an operation to destroy PKI and ensured that the influence
of Communism was totally eradicated from Indonesia. Masyumi was already dissolved in 1960
that made Muslim modernist to seek an alternative venue for their aspiration. Although many of
former Masyumi members went for Islamic party of PPP for their political aspiration, most of
Muslim Modernists preferred non-political institutions (NGOs, press, universities) and focused
more dakwah or preaching Islam to the society.
The paragraphs below provide a rough sketch of the Indonesia political landscape about
Islamic insurance development, particularly under the New Order regime of Soeharto. This serves
as a basis for understanding the political landscape behind Islamic insurance development in
Indonesia. However, it is important to note that their positions toward Islamization are also
constantly evolving and there is often overlap between groups. Their gradual acceptance toward
Islamization and Islamic insurance will be discussed thoroughly in the section of Islamic insurance
as political identity immediately after this section.
Soeharto regime rested on the support of these three groups: Golkar, Military, and
Bureaucracy. Golkar or Golongan Karya (Functional Groups) was founded in 1964 and
participated in in the general election for the first time in 1971. Since 1971 Golkar had been the
ruling party in Indonesia until 1999. In the 1971 legislative election, Golkar won 62% of the votes
and an overwhelming majority in the People's Representative Council (DPR).
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Soeharto claimed that Golkar was not a political party. It was portrayed as a nonideological entity without political that hosted diverse groups in society. It promised to focus on
"economic development" and "stability" rather than a specific ideological goal. Golkar also began
identifying itself with the government, encouraging civil servants to vote for it as a sign of loyalty
to the government. The military or the ABRI was one of the strongest factions under Golkar.
Under Soeharto, Members of the Indonesian armed forces played a dominant role in political
affairs. The ABRI Commander led this faction in the parliament.
Besides military and bureaucrat, Golkar was also the house for priyayi, abangan, and nonMuslims who were not the loyalist of Soekarno under PDIP, and santri who denounced political
Islam (Islamism) under PPP. Although they had different religious understanding, they had a
common goal in the eradication of Communism and state control over Islamists. In the early years
of the New Order, Soeharto was supportive toward Islamic piety but very repressive on political
Islam. However, it started to change in the 1990s when more santri were joining the military and
the bureaucrat, particularly Habibie who was recruited by Soeharto to drive the industrialization
of the country. In 1978, he was appointed as Minister of Research and Technology. He continued
to play an important role in "strategic" industries in this post. By 1991, Habibie oversaw ten stateowned industries including aviation, ship- and train-building, steel, arms, communications, and
energy.390
Part of the bureaucracy that will be instrumental in the negotiation and implementation
of Islamic economy in Indonesia is the Central Bank of Indonesia (BI). BI enables the
implementation of Islamic economy within the existing Indonesia economic system.
PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) was a center-left political party. It was led by Megawati
Sukarnoputri, president of Indonesia from 2001 to 2004, and daughter of Sukarno, the first
president of Indonesia. Because of its affiliation with Soekarno, the New Order had been
maintaining close surveillance and control to the Party. PDI-P was by far the most popular political
party coming into the 1999 and the recent 2019 legislative elections.
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This party has an ideal of the realization of an independent, sovereign, united,
democratic, just, prosperous, civilized and religious nation and to fulfill the right and
responsibility of all the people of Indonesia. Therefore, it requires the involvement of all national
forces, both individually and organized in democratic people's organizations and open to all
citizens, regardless of ethnicity, religion, gender, descent and social standing.
Encouraged by the awareness of the responsibility to realize these noble ideals, and to
meet the demands of the development of the existing era, the Indonesian National Party (PNI),
the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), the Catholic Party, the Supporting Association of
Indonesian Independence (IPKI), and Deliberation The Rakyat Banyak (Murba), on March 9, 1970
formed the Development Democracy Group, which was then confirmed by a joint statement by
the five political parties on October 28, 1971. And finally, on January 10, 1973, carried out a
strategic move to fuse themselves into a forum for people's political struggle based on Pancasila
under the name of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). At the close of the PDI II Congress in
Jakarta on January 17, 1981, the five fusion parties emphasized that the realization of fusion was
complete and stated the termination of their respective existence.
Majority of its member was the priyayi of Soekarno supporters under the nationalist party
of PNI and other non-Islamic parties. After the dissolution of the communist party PKI, PDI P has
been the main vehicle for abangan, workers, and labors for their political aspiration. PDI P has
been a stronghold for the supporter of nationalist ideology based on the official Indonesian
national philosophy, Pancasila. PDI P has been positioned as the opponent of Islamism and
opposed many of Sharia-inspired laws and regulations.
PPP was formed in 1973 as a result of the merger between several Islam-based parties,
assuming the role of umbrella party for Muslims. PPP is considered to be a nationalist Islamist
party which conforms to Pancasila doctrine and no longer upholds Sharia as the main goal.
PPP had been the main political vehicle for both santri modernist and santri traditionalist
under the New Order. Soeharto forced a merger of political parties following the 1971 Legislative
Election. The ten political parties were reduced to just two (excluding Golkar) and that the parties
were grouped based on their programs.
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The PPP seemed to have cemented itself a status as the strongest opposition party during
the Soeharto regime. However, it would not last long. In 1984, Nahdlatul Ulama, under its
Chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid withdrew from the PPP and severely weakening it. The PPP was
also forced by the government to replace its ideology of Islam with the national ideology of
Pancasila and to stop using Islamic symbols. As a result, the party replaced its logo showing the
Kabah shrine in Mecca with a star.
Nahdlatul Ulama (literally translated to Ulama's Revival, abbreviated as NU) is a
traditionalist Sunni Islam movement in Indonesia following the Shafii school of jurisprudence. NU
was established on January 31, 1926 in Surabaya as a response to the rise of Wahabism in Saudi
Arabia and Islamic modernism in Indonesia. The NU is the largest independent Islamic
organization in the world with the membership of 40 million in 2003.
NU has been supportive for the implementation of Sharia principles in Indonesia social
and economic development. However, NU is very critical to the strict interpretation of Islam and
the stiffness of political position offered by Santri modernists. For instance, on January 2004, the
Indonesian Council of Ulama (‘MUI’) issued a fatwa restating the Quranic prohibition on riba or
usury and defining that term broadly as any ‘additional charges levied on the postponement of
agreed payments’. In April 2010, Muhammadiyah, one of Indonesia’s largest mass Muslim
organizations, followed MUI’s lead, issuing a similar fatwa. However, Nahdlatul Ulama (‘NU’), the
largest fatwa-issuing organization in Indonesia, and reputedly the largest Islamic organization in
the world, sees the matter as khilāfīya, that is, subject to different opinions or unresolved.
Although many of NU members have become more receptive toward the idea of Islamic
economy, they do not have a strict position in term of supporting or abandoning the conventional
system. Moreover, many of them still suspect that the modern Islamic financial institution is
merely a cosmetic that hinders the profit and political motive of political Islam and does not bring
more benefit to the Ummah (Muslim community) compared to the existing institutions.
The modernist of Muhammadiyah and Dakwah movements whose base was mainly urban
and, in particular, outside Central and East Java-maintained a firmly reformist religious stance
with a firmly principled political stance. The modernist agenda was about Islamization from
below rather than the imposition of Islamic power from above. This new approach was pioneered
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and exemplified by Natsir, a former leader of Islamic party Masyumi, when he created DDII in
1967. 391
The Modernists are often wary with the increase of Christian missionary activities and the
dominance of the Indonesian Christians under the New Order. Therefore, besides confronting
Christian missionary activities in the society, their main strategy is infiltrating military and
bureaucracy under the New Order. The constant tension between the Modernists and nonMuslims is partly responsible for why the Islamic economy has never received enough support
among the non-Muslim in Indonesia.
Another important modernist actor in the late New Order was the Tarbiyah movement.
This movement was inspired by the global revivalism and to inspiration from the Muslim
Brotherhood of Egypt. They were active in campus of public universities. Although they are more
conservative in term of observing Islamic religious duties, they are more politically critical toward
the Soeharto regime. With freedom of organization and association being severely curtailed,
many Indonesian Islamic political activists found inspiration in the Muslim Brotherhood.
Collectively, these activists formed what became known as the Tarbiyah (educational)
movement.
At the close of the Soeharto dictatorship in 1998, the Tarbiyah had become sufficiently
well organized to give rise to Indonesia’s main democratic-era Islamic political party, the PK
(Justice Party), which became the PKS (Prosperous Justice Party). The members are quite diverse
from owners of small or medium businesses, civil servants, to professionals.392 Many of them
become the vital player of the current development of Islamic insurance and Islamic financial
institutions in Indonesia.
Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) plays an important role within the
political system. Under the patronage of B. J. Habibie, ICMI activists infiltrated the central
government. ICMI advocated the domination of Muslims in the ranks of government, civil
services, police and military, industries and commerce. ICMI also advocated the introduction of
Sharia into the Indonesian legal and political system and oversaw the establishment of Islamic
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courts, an Islamic bank and the promotion of Islamic media. Through ICMI, the modernists
established Islamic microfinance (BMT) throughout the country, social relief organization such as
Dompet Dhuafa, and initiated the establishment of Bank Muamalat and Islamic insurance of
Takaful.393
MUI (Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) is a voluntary forum for ulama or Islamic
scholars representing a wide range of Islamic organizations. Although many Indonesians assume
MUI is a government agency of some sort, it is an NGO, not a state agency. MUI is endorsed and
funded by the government as a key source of state policy on Islamic issues since the 1970s. It
enjoys a lucrative state monopoly on halal certification and a revenue stream from the DPS (fatwa
body on Islamic economics) system, as well as a significant annual budgetary grant from the
Department of Religion. MUI was, in the past, a largely compliant agent of the New Order’s
repressive, statist and developmentalist policies on Islam.
At the present day, MUI has been able to reinvent itself since Soeharto’s fall as a
champion of a populist and often ‘hardline’ conservative orthodoxy that sometimes challenges,
but more often leads, government policy. While doing so, it has managed to retain and exploit
the aura of state endorsement it has enjoyed since the 1970s, allowing it to remain part of the
‘Muslim establishment’ of Indonesia — so much so that many Indonesians assume it is a
government agency of some sort. In this way, it has become the most influential public advocate
of conservative interpretations of Sharia in contemporary Indonesia. 394
Besides MUI, the supporters of Sharia-based economy established Islamic Economic
Society (MES). MES is an intellectual forum serves as an epistemic community in order to
disseminate the idea of Sharia-based economy in academia and public at large. At the early days
of Islamic banking in Indonesia, the socialization of Islamic Economic was made by each of Islamic
financial institutions. After the joint evaluation, it is clear that the socialization of the Islamic
economic system can only be successful when done by a structured and continuous manner. 395
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The Islamic financial institutions get together and invite the whole among the required
group to form an organization, with joint efforts, will undertake structured and continuous
socialization to the society. This organization is called the “Islamic Economic Society” is
abbreviated to MES, a reference in the Indonesian language is “Masyarakat Ekonomi Syariah, in
English, is the Islamic Economic Society or in Arabic is Mujtama’ al-Iqtishad Al Islamiy, established
on Monday, 26th March 2001.396
MES’ founders are Individual, Financial Institutions, Educational Institutions, Research
Institutions and Business Entities which are interested in the efforts to grow the Islamic economy.
MES based on Islamic Law, also subject to regulatory legislation that valid in Indonesia, therefore
open to every citizen regardless of their religious belief.397
The Indonesian government sponsored the establishment of social insurance companies
that carry out their activities based on statutory provisions, such as: Perum Jasa Rahardja (now
Persero), Perum Taspen, Perum Asabri and Perum Astek (Social Security). With the birth of the
New Order regime, the private sector was resuscitated as an important part of the Indonesian
insurance industry. And in line with the rapid development in Indonesia, the New Order
government carried out development in all fields including insurance. In an effort to discipline
and improve the quality of the Insurance Industry in Indonesia, the government has issued
various policies in the form of provisions and legislation. Regulations that are important in
disciplining the business this insurance field is the Minister of Finance Decree No. 214 and 215 /
KMK 013/1988 known as the December Package. Shortly after that a special law was issued
regarding insurance business as the first time since the Republic of Indonesia became
independent, namely Law No.2 1992 following the Government Regulation No.73 of
1992/KMK/No.223-226 which regulates very detailed the steps of the insurance business.
Indonesian insurance industry consists of five main sectors: life, non-life, reinsurance, civil
and armed forces, and social insurance. The civil and armed forces and social insurance are
provided by the government. As mentioned before, the constant support of the military and
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bureaucrats was essential for the New Order regime, therefore the regime prioritized the
provision of social insurance for these two groups. Particularly in health care, Indonesian
healthcare has traditionally been fragmented: private insurance schemes for those who could
afford it, basic state provision for the very poorest, and NGOs in specialized areas providing
support in between.398
Small number companies dominate the insurance business in Indonesia. The top 10 life
insurers from a total of 46 companies control more than 60% shares of total assets and
premiums, while the top 10 non-life and reinsurers from a total of 91 companies account for
more than 50%. Furthermore, the top two among the five social and civil and armed forces
insurance companies account for over 80% of total assets and premiums.399
Indonesia's insurance sector has long been open to foreign investment, and while there
are calls to restrict engagement by global players, there is no overlooking the fact that the
industry needs more funds to meet elevated capital requirements. As local companies get in
shape for regional competition in the upcoming ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the industry
is expected to see further consolidation. All of this should open doors for mergers and
acquisitions and for foreign firms to enter the market.
During Soeharto, most of the domestic insurance firms were owned or had patronage
relationship with Soeharto’s family members. For instance, all insurance contracts from
Pertamina, state-owned oil and Gas Company, were subcontracted to a company owned by the
youngest son of Soeharto, Tommy. Then, there was a partnership between Bob Hasan and two
airlines controlled by Suharto's children. One of business group called the Nusamba group
controlled many businesses including insurance.
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A growing niche markets
After its establishment in 1994, Islamic insurance in Indonesia has experienced significant
growth. Association for Indonesian Islamic Insurance operators (AASI) recorded a high increase
in the number of Islamic insurance provider, capital asset, and investment. In 2015, there were
more than 60 companies provided Islamic insurance service across Indonesia, which contributed
to 5.0% of entire gross written of entire Indonesia insurance industry.400 With a sizeable Muslim
population combined with expected good GDP growth, Indonesia has vast potential growth
opportunities for Islamic insurance development.
Indonesians prefer to use the term ‘Sharia insurance’ rather than ‘Islamic insurance’. The
usage of ‘Sharia’ and not ‘Islamic’ is part of the compromise between Muslim activists and
Soeharto regime who considered the term Islamic as more politically subversive within the
Indonesian context.401 However, to avoid any confusion, we keep using the word ‘Islamic
insurance’ in this chapter.
History and development
The development of Islamic insurance only exists in the latter half of 1994. In mid-1993,
ICMI (Indonesian Association of Muslim intellectuals) initiated the establishment of the first
Islamic insurance company in Indonesia. This initiative was followed up by the formation of the
Takaful Indonesia Insurance Team (TEPATI) through a partnership between the Abadi
Foundation, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI), and Tugu Mandiri Life Insurance in July 27th, 1993.
According to Syakir Sula, Islamic insurance is needed to support the establishment of the Islamic
Bank. The establishment of an Indonesian Islamic insurance company in 1994 would protect the
fund managed by Bank Muamalat Indonesia, which was founded three years earlier.402
Through various national seminars and after conducting studies with Takaful Malaysia on
September 1993, finally, TEPATI established PT Syarikat Takaful Indonesia (PT STI) as a Holding
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Company on the 24th February 1994. Then PT STI established two subsidiaries, namely PT
Asuransi Takaful Family Insurance (ATK) and PT Takaful General Insurance (ATU). The birth of
Islamic insurance in Indonesia is mainly the result of the commitment of the Takaful Insurance
Indonesia (TEPATI). Furthermore, it was also the fruit of various elements of initiative, namely
the Association of Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) through the Abdi Bangsa
Foundation, Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk, PT Tugu Mandiri Life Insurance, Ministry of Finance
of the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim entrepreneurs, with technical assistance from
Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Bhd. (STMB).
The two Islamic insurance companies were established based on Malaysia’s Islamic
insurance model. PT Takaful Family (ATK) Insurance inaugurated through Minister of Finance
Decree No. Kep-385 / KMK.017 /1994. It was opened by Mr. Mar'ie Muhammad as the Minister
of Finance at that time on 4 August 1994 with 5 billion IDR initial investment. This company
provides life and other family Takaful services. PT Takaful General Insurance (ATU), established
later 2 June 1995, offers general Takaful services.403
The role of these two Indonesia's Islamic insurance companies in the country's economy
through sharia-based insurance has attracted domestic and foreign investors. In 1997, Syarikat
Takaful Malaysia, Bhd. (STMB) places its capital in the company to become one of the
shareholders. STMB then increased the amount of its capital investment to reach a significant
amount in 2004. The role of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Bhd. (STMB) as an investor continued
through direct capital participation in PT Takaful Family (ATK) in 2009. The Islamic Development
Bank (IDB) also strengthened the company's capital structure in 2004. Domestic investors also
showed a keen interest in participating in developing Takaful Indonesia. In 2000, Permodalan
Nasional Madani Persero (PNM) helped strengthen the company's capital structure. Internally,
PT. General Takaful Insurance standardizes to improve and maintain the consistency of service
quality and company performance through the application of ISO 9001: 2008, which is the latest
international standard for the quality management system.
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The establishment of these two companies has also motivated others to establish a new
Islamic insurance company or open Islamic insurance window or division. Many Islamic insurance
companies were established particularly after the year 2000. Asuransi Syariah Mubarakah (1997),
PT Jaya Proteksi Takaful (2010), and PT Maskapai Asuransi Sonwelis (2015) were set up as new
family Takaful insurance companies. This type of insurance provides life, education fund, and
investment services like Takaful Family in Malaysia. Meanwhile, PT MAA Life Assurance (2000),
PT MAA General Assurance (2000), PT Great Eastern Life Indonesia (2001), PT Asuransi Tri Pakarta
(2002), PT AJB Bumiputera 1912 (2004), and PT Asuransi Jiwa Bringin Life Sejahtera (2003) were
established as window or Sharia-unit. Global insurance companies were also interested in this
new financial service. PT Asuransi Allianz Life Indonesia (2006) and PT Prudential Life Assurance
(2010) are some examples of global companies that open Islamic insurance businesses in
Indonesia. Compared to other countries, Indonesia is well known for having many Islamic
insurance operator in its jurisdiction.
According to the law, there are four methods of establishing an Islamic insurance
company in Indonesia. The first method is by founding a new Islamic insurance company. The
second method is through conversion from a conventional insurance company into an Islamic
insurance company. The third method is by having a new Islamic insurance unit or window. The
fourth method is through the conversion of conventional insurance unit or window into an
Islamic insurance unit of window. Based on the latest OJK database (2018) on the Islamic
insurance company, there are currently 19 units/windows and five full-fledged Life/Family
insurance companies, 25 general Islamic insurance windows, three full-fledged general Islamic
insurance companies, and three reinsurance companies in Indonesia.404
However, not all companies perform well. After operating for more than two decades, PT
Asuransi Syariah Mubarakah was filed bankruptcy in court by Indonesia Financial Service
Authority (OJK). PT Takaful General Insurance (ATU), the pioneer of Indonesia Islamic insurance,
was closed at the beginning of 2017 because of lack of premium growth. However, PT Koperasi
Simpan Pinjam Jasa (Kospin Jasa), one of the biggest credit unions in Indonesia, bought the ATU
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majority share in 2018 and revitalized it. Other companies are being merged to or acquired by
other more prominent companies. Tokio Marine Group, a global insurance company originating
from Japan, made an acquisition of MAA Life Assurance in 2012. PT Jaya Proteksi Takaful changed
its name into PT Asuransi Chubb Syariah after being acquired by the US-based company, Chubb
Corp in 2017. Other company such as PT Asuransi Tri Pakarta, a small company with an asset less
than 200 billion IDR (13 million USD), thrives and becomes one of the best units of Islamic
insurance companies.
The new law No. 40 the year 2014 (UU40 2014) gives incentive for the spin-off of Islamic
insurance windows (i.e., the split of Islamic insurance units from the conventional insurance
companies into a separate standalone entity) within the framework of ten years. This regulation
is expected to spur market activity. However, most of the existing companies have not enough
Islamic insurance business to meet the immediate separation condition. Some companies may
choose to make use of the full 10 years to plan for the spin-off as required by the UU40 2014.
Meanwhile other companies may adopt a strategy of an early spin-off to gain the first-mover
advantage.405
In 2016, Islamic insurance in Indonesia contributed to 6.2 percent of the total insurance
industry in Indonesia. In number, there was 2,168 billion IDR (145.3 million USD) of life & family
Islamic insurance premium and 585 billion IDR (39.2 million USD) of general Islamic insurance
and reinsurance. It was 10.25% growth from the previous year. The increase in asset and
investment were much better. The asset of Islamic insurance grew about 21.69 percent, and the
investment reached 23.64 percent growth. The total asset of Islamic insurance was 28,967 billion
IDR (1.9 billion USD), and the total investment of Islamic insurance was 25,726 billion IDR (1.7
billion USD). The increase in motor vehicle leasing contributed significantly for the premium of
general Islamic insurance. Meanwhile, life insurance had not increased dramatically because of
the economic recession during that year.406
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The top three of life/family Islamic insurance players are Prudential Life Assurance, AIA
Financial, and Asuransi Allianz Life Indonesia, all of which operated via windows. These
companies make up a market share of more than 70% in 2015 for the life/family Islamic insurance
industry in Indonesia in terms of total contributions/premiums. Based on the Financial Services
Authority (OJK) report, a large proportion of the new business by these top three operators are
on unit-linked products. A unit-linked insurance plan is a product offered by insurance companies
that, unlike a pure insurance policy, gives members both insurance and investment under a single
integrated plan. This model has been a significant factor driving the growth in the Indonesian
life/family Islamic insurance sector. 407
The key distribution channel in this market is predominantly agency.408 Companies are
also using the existing banking networks as a more efficient means of distribution. However,
Islamic banking in Indonesia is small compared with conventional banks in terms of assets. Islamic
insurance has been more successful when there is a Bancassurance partnership with
conventional banks. For instance, AIA has a long cooperation with the Bank of Central Asia (BCA)
for both conventional and Islamic insurance segments. For this reason, AIA has increased its
market significantly from 2% in 2010 to 24% in 2014 in terms of total contributions.
The top three players for general Takaful or Islamic insurance sector are Asuransi Astra
Buana, Asuransi Takaful Umum, and Asuransi Adira Dinamika. These companies make up around
50% of the market share for general Islamic insurance in Indonesia. The key lines businesses of
general Islamic insurance in Indonesia are motor, personal accident, health, and property. For
general Islamic insurance in Indonesia, the retail business lines are predominantly sold via agency
force, and the commercial business lines are predominantly sold via brokers.409
The development of Islamic insurance elaborated above is a result of the rise of Muslim
activism since the 1980s. Although the official establishment of Islamic insurance company did
not start before 1994, the idea of Islamic insurance can be traced a few years back before that.
It is more suitable to use the term Islamic economic movement in Indonesia preferably than
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Islamic finance project as commonly known in Malaysia. It is because the initiative came from
the periphery of the power, instead from the state. Muslim intellectuals, universities, religious
organizations, and Islamic NGOs played a more important role than the government in
developing ideals of Islamic economy. Adding to that, the term Islamic economy or economics is
also more common to use in Indonesia compared to term Islamic finance. It is because the idea
of Islamic economics is regarded to encompass broader aspects than mere finance by many
Indonesian intellectuals and activists.
The 1980s was a difficult time for Muslim activists in Indonesia. Any alternative ideas such
as Islamic economy was considered subversive toward the state’s development agenda. For that
reason, it was not possible to implement the concept of Islamic economics into formal
institutions. In the 1990s, Soeharto regime changed its policy toward Muslim group. This decade
was also a crucial period for the implementation of Islamic economics in Indonesia. The Bank
Muamalat Indonesia established in1991 as the first Islamic bank in the country.
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars) and ICMI played a
crucial role in this development. In the 1990s, both organizations were rising as meaningful
representations of Muslim groups in their relationship with the state. Initially, Soeharto approved
the establishment of these organization to appease and gain support from the Muslim
population. Both organizations were also enjoying the patronage of the Soeharto regime. Several
religious decrees of fatwas were issued to support the Soeharto developmental agenda, for
instance, fatwa on contraception for supporting national family planning program and fatwa
justifying state-sponsored sports lottery. 410
In the late 1980s, the situation changed. Rather than an instrument of the state to
influence and control the Muslim population, it was transformed into a canal of aspiration for
Muslim groups to influence government policies.411 In 1989, Amin Aziz, one of the leading
pioneers of Islamic economy movement and also a MUI member, introduced an initiative of
establishing an Islamic bank. MUI then organized a series of workshop to discuss interest and
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banking in Islamic perspective (18- 20 August 1990), which eventually led to the establishment
of Bank Muamalat Indonesia in 1991.412
On October 30th, 1992, the government issued Government Regulation No. 72/1992 on
Profit-sharing Based Bank. The Indonesian Central Bank (BI) supported this development by
issuing the operational guidance for Profit-sharing-based Banks with the BI Circular Letter
No.25/4/BPPP on February 29th, 1993. Furthermore, the BI team sent personnel to Singapore,
London, New York and Iran to learn about the practices of Islamic banking and finance.413 Many
initiatives were launched in this period. Many of these initiatives were conducted as MUI or ICMI
programs. Discussions and experiments by Islamic economy movement activists also resulted in
the establishment of two Islamic insurance companies in 1992 and hundreds of Sharia
microfinance of Baitul Maal wat Tamwil (BMT).
After Soeharto regime collapsed in 1998, Islamic economic institutions have been growing
more rapidly. There has been a stronger attachment between Islamic activists, intellectual and
universities, politicians, and state bureaucrats on the idea of the Islamic economy. Moreover, the
historical role of MUI in the establishment of Islamic financial institutions made its prominence
in the governance of the Islamic economy industry is unquestionable. In 1999, the National Sharia
Council of MUI (DSN-MUI), was born with the MUI Decision No. Kp. 754/MUI/II/1999.
Furthermore, DSN-MUI is accepted as a significant authority in the governance of Islamic banking
and finance, even though DSN-MUI is not a governmental institution. Based on DSN-MUI fatwas,
the Central Bank (BI) issues regulations on Islamic-related finance, which are legally binding.414
From 2000 until 2010, DSN-MUI has already issued 78 fatwas related to the Islamic
economy industry.415 On January 24th, 2004, MUI formally issued a fatwa on the prohibition of
interest, Fatwa MUI No. 1 the year 2004 strongly declared that the current practices of interest
are clearly matched with the definition of usury. As a result, the Islamic economy has become an
integral part of Indonesia economy. Moreover, DSN-MUI has become the primary actor in the
operation of the Islamic economy in Indonesia. There was no public resistance against the
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development of Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia, and more Islamic insurance companies,
and governmental task forces or committees were established to support Islamic finance
development in Indonesia.416
Regulatory framework
Currently, Insurance Law number 40/2014 (UU40 2014) regulates both Islamic insurance
and insurance companies in Indonesia. UU40 2014 covers the aspect of corporate governance,
market conduct, consumer protection, and licensing of insurance industry in Indonesia. Indonesia
does not regulate Islamic insurance separately from conventional insurance. The Indonesian
Financial Service Authority (OJK) collaborates with the religious institution, the Indonesia Council
of Islamic Scholars (DSN-MUI), to enforce the Sharia compliance within the industry. Both
institutions have different tasks. On one hand, the Indonesian Financial Authority (OJK) sets the
minimum capital requirement, the solvency regulation, policyholder protection, and foreign
ownership restrictions to protect the industry. On the other hand, DSN-MUI provides guidance
and evaluates the implementation of Sharia in the insurance contract and practice. The purpose
of the adoption of UU40 2014 is to boost Islamic insurance business expansion, and at the same
time, to ensure the standard of Sharia-compliant of the service.417
Before Law No. 40 of 2014, the growth of Islamic insurance was supported by regulatory
provisions that guarantee certainty sharia insurance law. Legal provisions governing insurance
sharia, among others: First, Law No. 2 of 1992 concerning Business Insurance. Secondly,
Government Regulation No. 73 of 1992 concerning Implementation Insurance Business, as
amended by Regulation Government No. 63 of 1992. Third, Decree of the Minister of Finance
Number: 421 / KMK.06 / 2003 September 30, 2003, concerning Capability Assessment and
Compliance for Directors and Commissioners of Insurance Companies. Fourth, Minister of
Finance Decree Number: 422 / KMK.06 / 2003 September 30, 2003, concerning Managing
Businesses of Insurance Companies and Companies Reinsurance. Fifth, Minister of Finance
Decree Number: 423 / KMK.06 / 2003 dated September 30, 2003 concerning Inspection of an
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Insurance Company. Sixth, Decree of the Minister of Finance Number: 424 / KMK.06 / 2003 dated
30 September 2003 concerning Financial Health of Insurance Companies and Companies
Reinsurance. Seventh, Decree of the Minister of Finance Number: 426 / KMK.06 /2003 dated
September 30, 2003 concerning Business Licensing of Insurance Companies and Reinsurance
Company. 418
Law No. 2 of 1992 and other regulations mentioned above on insurance before UU40
2014 did not correctly regulate Islamic insurance. In the Code of Commerce Law Article 246,
namely: "Insurance is an agreement where someone is responsible tie yourself to an insured by
accepting something premium, to provide compensation to him for a loss, damage or loss of
possible expected benefits he will suffer because of an uncertain event." That definition could
not be used as a legal basis for Islamic Insurance. The definition does not regulate the existence
of insurance based on Sharia principles and does not regulate technical implementation
insurance activities. Therefore, guidelines to run an Islamic insurance business was established
in the Fatwa Council National Sharia Insurance Indonesian Ulama Council (DSN-MUI) No.21 /
DSN-MUI / X / 2001 concerning General Guidelines for Islamic Insurance.419
DSN-MUI is a non-state institution and has no legal force because it is not included in the
laws and regulations in Indonesia. DSN-MUI is different from the National Sharia Advisory Council
(NSAC) of Malaysia. The NSAC, which was established on May 1, 1997, functions as the highest
authority in deciding Sharia matters in Islamic financial institutions bank or nonbank. NSAC is in
the organizational structure of the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM). Member NSAC was
appointed by the board of directors of BNM for a three-year working period and can be re-elected
in the next period.420
There are some legislations to give stronger legal certainty of Islamic insurance in
Indonesia. Those regulations are the Decree Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia No.
426 / KMK.06 / 2003, Ministerial Decree RI Finance No. 424 / KMK.06 / 2003 and Decree of the
Directorate General Financial Institution No. 4499 / LK / 2000 and finally, the Regulation
Government No. 39 of 2008.
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Also, the issuance of Law Number 3 the Year 2006 concerning Amendments to Law
Number 7 of 1989 regarding Religious Courts, which in their provisions give authority to the
Religious Court to handle sharia business disputes. In the event of a commercial dispute between
customers and the company, there are three ways to solve it according to Indonesian law. First,
peaceful settlement among the parties. Second, the parties choose facilities dispute resolution
in the form of arbitrage and alternative dispute resolution. This arrangement is set in Law
Number 30 of 1999 about Arbitrate and Alternative Settlement Disputes or called tahkim. Third,
dispute resolution through court, which in this case is through a religious court. 421
Since the development of the Islamic economic finance industry, it becomes a necessity
to have specific authority to examine, hear, decide and complete the case. On this basis, a Law
No: 3 was issued in 2006 stating that the Religious Courts has authority to examine, try, decide
and resolve cases in the field Sharia Economy. The Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 93 /
PUU / X / 2012 was also added, which states that the Religious Courts have absolute authority in
examining, adjudicating, deciding and resolving cases Islamic economics is pursued through
court, then the Court.422
The new insurance law of 2014 favors full-fledged Islamic insurance entities, instead of
window operations. The purpose is to stimulate growth and competitiveness of the Indonesian
Sharia insurance industry in the longer term. Insurance companies are likely to focus on boosting
their Sharia businesses, and gradually enhancing their capacity and capitalization to achieve the
maturity needed to finally be independent of their conventional units.423 Also, article 1 Number
8 of the Insurance Law UU40 year 2014 regulates the risk management business based on Sharia
Principles in order to help and protect all participants against losses.424
Furthermore, Islamic insurance and Islamic Reinsurance businesses are regulated
differently from conventional insurance and conventional reinsurance businesses. Insurance
business and conventionally managed Reinsurance Businesses apply the concept of risk transfer,
while Islamic insurance and Islamic Reinsurance Businesses are the application of the risk sharing
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concept. Considering the different conceptions underlying the business operation, the Islamic
insurance business and Sharia Reinsurance Business will be encouraged to be held by separate
entities from the conventional entities.425
The article 54, Law No. 40 of 2014 regulates the obligation of Insurance Companies, Sharia
Insurance Companies, reinsurance companies, and sharia-reinsurance companies. One of the
obligations is the requirement of each Sharia Insurance Companies, reinsurance companies, and
sharia reinsurance companies to be members of mediation institutions.426
Furthermore, the article 57-67 of the Insurance Law describes the authority that can be
carried out by the Financial Services Authority so-called OJK. OJK is the primary institution to
regulate and supervise Insurance business activities. The regulation and supervision include
aspects of governance, business behavior and health finance. What is meant by "supervision"
includes analysis of reports, checks and investigations.
There is also ruling for the obligation of every insurance company related to insurance
business association. According to article 68, each Insurance Company to be obliged to become
a member of one of the Insurance Business Associations by the type of business. This
arrangement is intended to enhance the role of associations in regulating its members (selfregulatory). It is also to facilitate better coordination with the Financial Services Authority.427
Compared to Malaysia’s IFSA 2013, UU40 2014 referring to Islamic insurance company
and conventional insurance company in Indonesia was simpler and only discuss on the headlines
for insurance and Islamic insurance. The further explanation of it will be provided in the
Peraturan Otaritas Jasa Keuangan (POJK) or Indonesia Financial Authority. On the contrary, IFSA
2013 totally referred to Islamic insurance covered all the Islamic insurance rules and regulations
and compiled of banking, Islamic insurance and money market. 428
Indonesia regulates Islamic insurance together with conventional insurance. Although the
new regulation gives more detail rulings on Islamic insurance compared to the previous
regulations, the Law does not give detail instruction on Sharia transactions. The Law gives more
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role to DSN-MUI to guide and monitor the implementation. Therefore, the DSN-MUI Fatwa
Institution is considered to be the highest Sharia authority holder in Indonesia. The National
Sharia Council (DSN) is an institution formed by the Ulama Council Indonesia (MUI) which has the
function of carrying out the tasks of the MUI in handling issues related to the activities of sharia
financial institutions. One of the main tasks of the DSN is to study, explore and formulate values
and principles of Sharia (Islamic Law) in the form of fatwas (legal opinion of Islamic scholars) to
be used as guidelines in activities transactions in Islamic financial institutions.429 Through the
Sharia Supervisory Board, supervision of the application of Sharia principles in the system and
management of the Islamic financial institution. However, DSN-MUI is not a governmental
institution, therefore, its fatwas (legal opinions) are not legally binding. The fatwas must be
sustained by the decree from the relevant governmental agency.
Although Indonesia regulates Islamic insurance within the same regulatory framework of
conventional insurance, Indonesia gives more role to the religious or Sharia court. It is the
religious court who has the authority to settle a dispute concerning Islamic insurance in
Indonesia. This is quite different from Malaysia that gives that authority to civil court.430
Islamic insurance companies in Indonesia were developed based on the Malaysian model.
Therefore, we cannot see much differences between the two countries in the way Islamic
insurance company operates. However, Indonesia has a different regulatory framework from
Malaysia. Indonesia acknowledges the existence of Islamic insurance as part of Indonesia
economy and does not intervene on the detail of the Sharia rulings. The Indonesian state limits
itself from being a direct participant and acts purely as a regulatory body, and not even as an
incubator of Islamic insurance like Malaysia.
Special features and challenges
The lack of centralization effort by the Indonesian government creates a shortage of skills
in the Islamic insurance industry, particularly in risk management, actuarial and underwriting
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expertise. The education on Islamic insurance is mostly conducted by study groups in universities,
Islamic NGOs, and the Islamic insurance agencies themselves. The role of insurance agents or
marketers is vital in the implementation of Islamic insurance in society. Agents act as an
intermediary between Islamic insurance companies with the community. Moreover, an Islamic
insurance agent has several roles beside as influential marketers of Islamic insurance products.
The agent has a role in providing access to information, guarding the excellent image of Islamic
insurance companies, and providing solutions and services to prospective customers as well as
insight to the public on Islamic insurance. 431
Islamic insurance in Indonesia has a distribution challenge given the large geographical
spread. This issue is not only resulted in term of lack of resources but also a huge gap on public
awareness of Islamic insurance as a financial tool. Many companies who have Islamic insurance
window dedicate more resources on the conventional product rather than Islamic insurance.432
However, the lack of government support and skilled human resources motivated Islamic
insurance companies to be more innovative in their unit-linked products. Unit-linked products
enable investors to get both insurance and investment under a single integrated plan. Malaysia
has been a pioneer in the Family Takaful plan, whereas members can invest in their children’s
education fund and at the same time, receive insurance protection. Islamic insurance companies
in Indonesia copied and extended this model. Not only education plan, but members can also
invest in social investment such as Waqf (social endowment) or other religious obligation such as
Hajj. Waqf is not private investment, but it is an endowment made by a Muslim to a religious,
educational, or charitable cause. Rather than investment for the college entrance fee, Muslim
can invest in building a mosque, school, or hospital.
In 2017, PT Sun Life Financial Indonesia (“Sun Life”) launched a Waqf feature for an
insurance policy of Sharia life insurance products. This feature will not only allow Sun Life to offer
a solution for better financial planning and protection but also fulfill the needs of clients to serve
religious obligation, particularly in doing a Waqf.433 In order to do so, members can utilize the
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benefit of their insurance and investment. CIMB Malaysia adopted this model in 2018 by
introducing product named Takaful Mulia.
Some Islamic health insurance plan covers not only the costs of medical treatment but
also the costs of alternative medicine, which is any of a range of medical therapies that are not
regarded as orthodox by the medical profession, such as herbalism, homeopathy, acupuncture,
and Islamic prophetic medicine.434 The later refers to the actions and words (hadiths) specifically
of the Prophet Muhammad with regards to sickness, treatment and hygiene, and the genre of
writings undertaken primarily by non-physician scholars to collect and explicate these
traditions.435
Furthermore, Indonesian Islamic insurance companies work together with Islamic NGOs
to deliver their products to the consumer. Norman Nugraha, Chief Agency Officer Shariah Sun
Life says that the company intends to assist Muslims in Indonesia participating in social program.
Therefore, all investment returns of Islamic life insurance at Sun Life is changeable to waqf or
social endowment, such as school, health clinic, or mosque. Moreover, the clients can choose
any authorized waqf institution of which is Sun Life’s partner, such as Indonesian Waqf Board
(Badan Wakaf Indonesia or BWI), Dompet Dhuafa, Rumah Waqf, and registered institution in
Indonesian Waqf Board.436
Accommodating Islamic insurance
Malaysia and Indonesia are experiencing different result related to the development of
Islamic insurance. The birth of Islamic insurance in Indonesia is attributed to the Indonesian
Muslims activism of the late 1970s. The initiative was not coming from the center of the state
power but from peripheral Muslims who demanded alternative economic platform to the failing
state’s economic policy. According to these Muslim activists, Soeharto regime was able to
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maintain a constant economic growth, however, it excluded part of the population from gaining
its benefits. They considered Soeharto’s economic policies had increased inequality of income
distribution between the people and between regions.
Furthermore, economic liberalization under Soeharto had made Indonesia bound to the
power of foreign capital. International institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank had been
dominant forces in determining economic policies under Soeharto. Islamic insurance and other
Islamic financial schemes in Indonesia were born out of criticism toward the economic policies of
the New Order regime.
The absence of direct government involvement and the lack of political support for Islamic
insurance and Islamic financial institutions, in general, are the causes behind this slow
development. Besides the competitive insurance structure of Indonesia, Indonesian State does
not fully support Islamic insurance because it sees and treats it as a ‘political identity’ of a
particular social group within a pluralistic Indonesia that needs to be accommodated and
compensated, rather than a vital tool for national economic development. The deepening of
Islamization within the contemporary Indonesian society makes the state not to ignore or even
reject Islamic financial institutions. At the same time, any attempt to push the state beyond its
current role as a regulator of Islamic insurance will create resistance not only from the nonMuslim population but also from the Muslims of different cultural streams. The following
sections present this argument thoroughly.
The birth of a resistance
The ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) of Soeharto adopted a military method of dealing with
political-economic problems faced by Indonesia. Soeharto rejected political mobilization and
socialist ideology of Soekarno and established a tightly controlled regime that stabilized politics
for economic growth. Contrast to the previous regime, Soeharto encouraged trade and foreign
investment in Indonesia. Moreover, Soeharto since the 1970s boosted the capital intensive of oil
and mining industries, so that the country's income from oil and gas increased from $ 0.6 billion
in 1973 to $ 10.6 billion in 1980, which has a value equal to 80% of Indonesia's exports. Under
Soeharto leadership, Indonesia was able to be self-sufficient (in term of rice production) in the
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1980s and had maintained economic growth 6% -7% per year. Also, Soeharto successfully
reduced the national poverty level from 60% in 1970 to 17.74% in 1996.437
Nevertheless, many critics suggested that the reliance of Soeharto's economic policies in
oil and gas industries and economic liberalization had made Indonesia dependent on the power
of foreign capital. Furthermore, as economic growth had been the priority, economic distribution
had been neglected by the Soeharto regime. For over three decades (1966-1998), Soeharto
implemented a socio-economic strategy based on the development trilogy: high economic
growth, political stability, and equity. The policy goals of growth and stability were met by and
large, but many experts indicate the income inequality increased rapidly under Soeharto, as well
as the share of the labor force engaged in informal sector activities.438
The inequality was exacerbated by the lack of social protection for Indonesians.
Compared to Soekarno, Soeharto had invested significantly in providing nation-wide health
services through primary health centers, known as Puskesmas. However, the centers provided
access to health only at the most basic level. Also, many of them did not have any insurance
protection. The state provided insurance only to civil servants and military personnel, while most
of Indonesian live their live without any formal financial protection arrangement. In his attempts
to restore stability to the nation, Soeharto relied very heavily on the military and the highly
centralized, Javanese civil service. Health insurance for these two groups and their families was
expanded significantly in 1968; it grew into a program eventually named Askes that had 17.5
million members by 2003.439
Combination of political control and economic liberalization at the beginning of
Soeharto’s administration is not unique. It was commonly practiced by leaders in the East and
Southeast Asia regions. Strict leadership style was considered vital to fix the messy economy in
the late 1960s. This choice gave political consequences. All political forces, press, and NGOs
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opposed to the New Order were then given no space. Moreover, the New Order regime was very
repressive to these alternate voices, particularly toward Islamic movements.
The global euphoria of the success of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 resonated well with
Islamic movements in Indonesia. Although it was a Shia revolution, it did not prevent many
Muslim intellectuals and activists in Indonesia to take inspiration from that. Prior to the Iranian
Revolution, there was already an explosion of the usroh movement, which is initiated by Hasan
al-Banna of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, on Indonesian college campuses in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.
The success of the Iranian Revolution provided a psychological boost for Muslim activists
particularly in mosques around campuses. Muslim women activists in Indonesia especially college
students, were struck and awakened by the women of Iran who dressed traditional garment but
managed to repel the domination and influence of the superpower United States from their
country. The Iranian Revolution has become a powerful inspiration for the affirmation of selfesteem, confidence and a new identity for the dakwah (missionary) activists. It started from the
image of Iranian women in their hijab then spread through the campus mosque network in
Indonesia and extend its influence on all walks of life.440
However, Soeharto continued his policy that dates back since the beginning of the 1970s
to allow religious expression of Islam but not political Islam. In reality, the line between individual
piety and political expression often blur. Wearing hijab is an individual choice, but in public space,
it can be seen as an expression of a political identity. Soeharto regime did not allow public school
students to wear hijab (headscarf) in school and any official photo identification. Soeharto’s
government further his political control over civil organizations by declaring in 1984 that
henceforth only Pancasila and not Islam or any other religion or ideology, could serve as the
ideological basis for mass organizations in Indonesia.
These socio-political circumstances forced the aspiration for Islamization including ideas
of Islamic economy to be confined within campuses walls. Intellectuals and students studied the
work of modern Muslim intellectuals including the work by prominent Shia cleric Muhammad
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Baqir Sadr: Our Economy (Arabic: "Iqtisaduna"). Written between 1960 and 1961, and published
in 1982, Our Economy still forms much of the basis for modern Islamic banking. In his book, alSadr shows that Islam has answers to problems of the modern world by presenting an Islamic
alternative to both capitalism and socialism.441 He rejects socialism and capitalism by arguing
both private and public property originate from God, and that the rights and obligations of both
private individuals and rulers are therefore dictated by Islam.
Not only from Iranian intellectuals, but Indonesia Muslims have also been developing
ideas of Islamic economy other international economist such as who writes a series of books
titled Islamic economic doctrine. In the book, the insurance model from an Islamic point of view
is thoroughly explored. He argued that the practice of commercial insurance is not permitted by
Islam. Also, he also contends that life insurance that makes the soul as an object of insurance is
not in accordance with Islamic law. Aside from conventional insurance based on insurance
practices in Europe, it also contains elements that are prohibited by Sharia.442 Other book
Insurance in Islam by M. Nejatullah ash-Shiddiqie explains the risks, the nature of insurance and
the bad things related to insurance. In addition, insurance in the capitalist, socialist and Islamic
systems is discussed and argued for the supremacy of Islamic insurance.443 From these works,
Indonesian Muslim intellectuals developed insurance plans adjusted for Indonesians.
The pioneers of the Islamic economic movement, among others A.M Saefuddin, Dawam
Raharjo, Adi Sasono and Amin Aziz, came from intellectual background of Pusat Pengembangan
Agribisnis (Centre of Agribusiness development), Bogor Agricultural Institute.444 This center was
established in 1982 as an intellectual forum focusing on a wide array of economic issues,
including the idea of Islamic economy. Besides organizing conferences, several experiments on
Islamic financial institutions were implemented. In 1984, Bandung Institute of Technology
students found a Sharia microfinance called Baitut-Tamwil Teknosa. 445
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In his book titled Nilai-Nilai Ekonomi Islam or the Principles of Islamic Economics
published in 1984, AM Saefuddin mentions specifically Islamic insurance together with Zakat,
Islamic Banking, and Waqf (social endowment) as instruments to implement the principles of
Islamic economics.446 According to Saefuddin, there are three fundamental principles of Islamic
economics: the optimum benefits of property ownership, moderation, and justice. Islam teaches
that property should be utilized to bring benefits not only to individuals but also public at large.
There is no concept of absolute ownership in Islam. Private and public property ownerships are
acknowledged only when it is utilized to achieve that goal and remove any exploitation from one
toward the others.
Moreover, Islam also teaches Muslims to live in moderation, parsimony and avoid
extravagance. Lastly, the principle of justice means that economy should bring benefit to all
people and not particular individuals or groups within the society. Justice can be achieved both
through a market and a non-market mechanism. Zakat and other forms of charity are used when
individuals or groups cannot access economic benefit through market mechanism.
Although Islam does not oppose the market mechanism and private sector, Islam
regulates how business is conducted. The prohibition of usury is to ensure that there is no
exploitation resulted from any business transaction. For this reason, Saefuddin advocates the
establishment of Islamic Bank and Islamic insurance in Indonesia. Saefuddin argues that
conventional banking and insurance ensure profit only to one party and leave another party with
a higher risk of the business. Islamic insurance or Sharia insurance is based on mutual help so
that people can share the burden and risk when one of them is facing economic difficulties. In
sum, AM Saefuddin emphasizes the importance of economic activities to be grounded in religious
values. The economy is not only a pursuit of profit, but it is also an activity toward ethical life.
However, the 1980s was a difficult time for Muslim activists in Indonesia. Despite this
development, the impact and scale of the Islamic economy project were still very minimal. The
banking regulation (1967 Law on Banking) did not give any room for the establishment of any
noninterest banking institution. The state was not supportive towards the idea of Islamic
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economy, which was considered subversive toward state’s development agenda. For that reason,
it was not possible to implement the approaches of Islamic economics into a formal institution.447
In the 1990s, Soeharto regime changed its policy toward Muslim group. This change was
also an important period for the implementation of Islamic economics in Indonesia. The Bank
Muamalat Indonesia established in1991 as the first Islamic bank in the country, and later, PT
Syarikat Takaful Indonesia (PT STI) was established in 1994 as the first Islamic insurance company
in Indonesia. The following paragraphs elaborate on the process of how these Islamic economics
activists negotiate with the state and try to find space within the existing system.
State as the regulator of Islamic insurance
Ever since taking office in 1967, President Soeharto committed to undertake the
revitalization of Indonesia’s economy. Beyond his rhetoric of creating a just-and-equitablyprosperous society in a material and spiritual sense based on Pancasila, Soeharto adopted the
Western capitalist development model. the New Order recruited neo-classic economists mostly
graduating from American universities, especially the University of California, Berkeley.448
Minister of Finance, J.B. Sumarlin who was in office in 1988 until 1993, did not object the
establishment of Islamic banks, because according to him, it did not contradict the Indonesian
Constitution. The government started to accommodate the idea of Islamic economy. Choiruzzad
documents this transformation in the government’s stand in more detail.
Several organizations established Islamic banks in the form of baitul mal (financing house)
had been set up such as the Co-operative for Professional Services (Kooperasi Jasa
Keahlian) Teknosa Bandung in Bandung on 4 July 1984 and Koperasi Ridho Gusti in
Jakarta. The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), especially with its Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) greatly contributed to further development of Islamic banks in
Indonesia. On June 1990, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas, inaugurated the Jakarta
OIC Economic Consultative Forum, to promote economic relations between Indonesian
and other members of the OIC. On 19 March 1991 Minister of Home Affairs Rudini and
Minister On 19 March 1991 Minister of Home Affairs Rudini and Minister of Religious
Affairs Munawir Sjadzali signed a joint decree on the development of the Islamic
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Almsgiving Management Body (Badan Amil Zakat, Infaq, dan Shadaqah, BAZIS) which is a
non-governmental organization, but worked under the government’s supervision. 449
Moreover, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) was given task preparing the
establishment of an Islamic bank without interest, the Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI). Soeharto
promised an interest free loan from his Foundation of the Pancasila Muslim Action (Yayasan Amal
Bhakti Muslim Pancasila) of the IRP 3 milliards. In addition, several Muslim big entrepreneurs,
including Fadel Muhammad, Aburizal Bakrie, and Fahmi Idris, were interested in the creation of
Islamic banks. The government’s support for the BMI suggests that Soeharto regime recognized
the need to acknowledge the Muslim community in a more practical manner and to bring them
into national, economic development.450
Soeharto personally donated 50 million rupiah and 3 billion rupiah from the Foundation
Amal Bakti Amal Pancasila which he led. In addition, there are 9 largest shareholders of the Bank
Islam, all of which are individuals or offshore foundations, Bob Hasan (figure corporate) worth 25
billion rupiah, GLC 4.5 billion, Krakatau Steel 3.5 billion, Hutomo Mandala Putra 3,3 billion,
Pensiun Nusantara Foundation 3 billion, Pertamina 2 billion, Aburizal Bakrie 2 billion, Ibrahim
Rasyid 2 billion and YDBKS 2 billion.451
If in Malaysia, the largest accumulation of capital and bank owners is government
institutions and state Islamic departments, in Indonesia Islamic bank ownership originated from
private sector, social organizations and individuals known closely with Soeharto. This situation
explains several things. First, Soeharto's approach uses those close to it as a stock owner the
largest bank signals that Soeharto has more to act as individual rather than as a President. This
means, though has the power to issue policies and regulations based on the constitution existing,
but Soeharto does not use the state allocation for injection bank capital. Secondly, as it further
emphasizes individual decisions, Soeharto wants to say that formally, the state is not involved in
the Islamization process which is quite vibrant. In addition to the question that Soeharto needs
to take care of not feeling Islam and avoid criticism of the existence of the bank, it can be seen
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as Soeharto's consistent stance on Pancasila's ideology confirms Indonesia not as an Islamic and
not a secular state.452 In the late 1980s, President Soeharto started to question the loyalty of top
military leaders. Following the increasing distrust toward military, Suharto went closer to Muslim
groups.
However, the predatory environment of widespread corruption within Soeharto regime
gave dilemma for the proponents of Islamic economics. On the one hand, they need support from
the state, but on the other hand, they need to ensure that Islamic financial institutions were built
independently and be consistent with the moral goals of Islamic economics.453
Based on several experimentations and surveys, the Central Bank (BI) came into a view
that rather than a threat to the conventional system, Islamic finance could play a supportive role
to strengthen the existing national economic system. BI requested the participation of many
Islamic economy activists in the process of developing the regulatory environment for Islamic
banking in Indonesia. 454
BI expected that this non-interest-based banking would be able to reach out a certain part
of the population who see interest as usury and thus forbidden by the religion. More choices of
financial services mean wider mobilization of public fund. 455 Islamic economics, according to BI,
is not to replace the existing banking system, but instead to strengthen it.
Seeing BI’s positive response, some Islamic economy activists were becoming more and
more moderate. Some started to think the possibility of the ʻcoexistenceʼ of Islamic economic
within the existing system. On the other hand, many of BI officials were also becoming more
supportive towards Islamic economy movement.456
However, despite the convergence of interests, there was also continuing tensions, in
which the state and Islamic economy movement negotiate the role of the state in the Islamic
banking and finance. Choiruzzad describes this negotiation process, which led to a compromise
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on the role of BI as representative of the state and DSN-MUI as the representative of the
community withing the architecture of Indonesia’s Islamic economy.
During the legislation process of the 2008 Islamic Bank Law, BI wanted to establish Islamic
banking committee (KPS) within the BI structure with significant power to regulate the
Islamic banking industry. In the KPS, BI promised to fairly accommodate representatives
from the business, Islamic religious scholars, and Islamic economists. This idea was not
completely accepted by business actors due to their worries that BI will have stronger
control to the industry and thus limiting its growth. MUI was also not really fond of the
idea because it worried that the KPS will take over their role (for example: to issue fatwa
regarding Islamic banking practices). Finally, the KPS was established under BI structure,
but with an unclear role, more like an advisory board, and not as powerful as it was
designed. The power to issue fatwa stayed in DSN-MUI (Dewan Syariah Nasional Majelis
Ulama Indonesia, Indonesia Islamic Scholars Councilʼs National Council of Sharia).
However, because MUI is not a state body, it has no legal power. Thus, as before, the
fatwa only serves as an accepted agreement among the actors and only become a legal
rule after BI issued a BI regulation (Peraturan Bank Indonesia) based on that fatwa.457
Later, BI transferred the authority of managing financial services to the Financial Services
Authority of Indonesia (OJK). At the end of 2011, as an effort to reform the financial sector, the
government and the House of Representatives (DPR) agreed to establish OJK. Then, on November
22, 2012, Law No. 21 concerning OJK was ratified. This so-called independent institution will
function from December 31, 2012, which replaces the functions, duties and regulatory
authorities that have been carried out by the Ministry of Finance through the Capital Market and
Financial Institution Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK). Then at the end of 2013, the turn of
functions, duties and authority for banking regulation and supervision by Bank Indonesia (BI)
would also be transferred to OJK.
A political accommodation in a multi-cultural society
The moderation and stabilization effects provided by Indonesian state through its
financial authorities has created a new challenge for the supporter of Islamic banking and
insurance in Indonesia. Now, the Islamic financial services have been accepted as a private-based
insurance service within the existing national economy. It enables diverse players to be involved
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including the multinational insurance companies. Although the insurance law no 40/2014 gives
permission for cooperatives to establish Islamic insurance, most of Islamic insurance providers
are insurance companies. ICMI, MES, MUI, insurance companies, and Indonesian financial
authorities are becoming the vital actors for Islamic insurance development and their dominance
has raised criticism, including from the pioneer of Islamic economics themselves. The Muslim
Brotherhood-inspired of political party of PKS clearly states in its platform that Islamic economy
should be an integral part of Indonesia economic development. Indonesian state should take
active role to expand market share and gradually transfer its dependence on international donors
toward self-sufficient and international Sharia-based financing.
Furthermore, Islamic banking and insurance as accommodating capitalism later become
ideological barrier for many center-left politics (Muslim and non-Muslims) to support the
establishment of these institutions. According to Dawam Rahardjo, as stated in the book Islamic
Economic Architecture (2015), Islamic economics is currently still considered too focused on the
discourse on finance and banking with sharia trademarks.458 The presence of Islamic finance or
Islamic banks is indeed a symbol of Islamic economic revival. In the 21st century, perceptions of
the rise of the Islamic economy are arguably rising significantly. This was triggered by great
interest and curiosity in Western countries.
However, there is a dilemma in the development of the Islamic finance industry. Among
these are capital requirements, because most sources of capital come from foreign or nonMuslim capital. In addition, Islamic banks and insurance also tend to adopt conventional banking
and insurance techniques and loosen the basic principles of Sharia law. This is done because in
order to be competitive, Islamic financial institutions must glance at large projects that are high
in risk.
For this reason, the Islamic economic system should ideally be developed with
institutional economic epistemology. With epistemology, the concept of an Islamic economy that
is operational is no longer limited to the financial sector. The Quran illustrates that the usury
institution must be replaced with the zakat and tijarah institutions. While the Hadith or prophetic
tradition also regulates the existence of waqf institutions that are directly related to the real
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economic sector. According to Dawam, zakat and waqf are actually instruments to solve poverty
problems. Unfortunately, the practice of Islamic economics is still limited to the financial sector,
so the essence of Islamic economics as an institutional economy has still not been achieved.459
Other argue that Islamic economy should not be determined by a certain label. An
important principle of a sound economic system is a system that does not contrary to moral
values and does not impair the humanitarian value such as the existence of exploitation and
injustice. It is a system that encourage competition in doing good deeds or fastabiqul khairat.
According to this view, Islamic economy can be named anything as long as it is consistent with
the moral values of the economy.
The modernist organization of Muhammadiyah has been slowly embraced this privatebased Islamic insurance. Before the establishment of the first Islamic insurance in Indonesia, on
April 27, 1992, the Muhammadiyah sought cooperation with a conventional insurance company,
PT Asuransi Jiwasraya. The cooperation was aimed to realize the program of economic
development for Muslims, particularly the members of Muhammadiyah.460
The Muhammadiyah considers conventional insurance is haram, however it can be
accepted when it gives more benefit to individual and society.461 Therefore, according to
Muhammadiyah social insurance provided by the state, such as Taspen, Askes, and insurance for
social and religious reasons, such as insurance for hajj and education are not a violation against
Islamic law.
Historically, the Muhammadiyah prefers to manage the organization fund by itself.
However, due to lack of expertise and resources in managing insurance business, recently the
Muhammadiyah has made several agreements to work together with Islamic insurance company.
For instance, Muhammadiyah of West Java (DPW Jabar) signed a memorandum of understanding
(MoU) with Recapital Life Insurance (Relife) in the Islamic insurance participation program for
Muhammadiyah residents.
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Like the Muhammadiyah, the Muslim Traditionalists NU, which today claimed to have
some 35 million members, had already carried out local economic activities since its
establishment. The NU already discussed the permissibility of bank interest in the first forum in
1927. The campaign of Islamic economics starting from early 1980s brought this topic to be a
public issue. In 1982, forum in Bandar Lampung once again brought the issue of bank interest
and even touched upon the issue of Islamic bank. Again, there was no single agreement. As in
1927, there were three different views on the issue of interest: the view that interest is usury
and thus it is prohibited (haram), the view that interest is not usury and thus it is allowed (halal),
and the view that it is in doubt (shubhat) because of the existence of different views.462 However,
there were also differences within the first camp. Within the first camp, which argued that
interest is prohibited, there were differences between those who argued that interest is
prohibited at all situation and those who argued that despite its haram status, interest is allowed
due to the emergency until a bank which operates according to Islamic existed. Despite these
differences, the idea of Islamic banking was generally considered positive among NU circles in
1980s.
Abdurrahman Wahid, the grandson of the organization’s founder and the leader of this
new generation of NU was very critical on the Islamic economics project, particularly when it is
supported by the state. After he took the leadership of NU in 1984, his enmity toward modernist
groups had put the organization against the establishment of Islamic banking and insurance.
Wahid strongly criticized ICMI’s initiative on the establishment of Indonesia’s first Islamic
bank. He said ICMI as willing to sacrifice the security of depositors’ fund just to comply with “an
outdated tenet of Islamic scriptures.” He then described Islamic financial institutions as a’moral
burden for Muslims”, arguing that “it is hard to imagine a financial vehicle more vulnerable to
abuse”. Wahid saw the initiative, backed by ICMI, was part of the agenda of Political Islam. When
Bank Muamalat Indonesia was finally established in 1991, he commented that it was “another
victory for those who want to see Islam as a political alternative.” 463
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The NU mostly suspicious with the motive of the Muslim Modernists, and not with the
idea of prohibition of interest itself. Instead of supporting the Islamic economy project, the NU
opened a People’s Credit Bank (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat, BPR) in 1990 by cooperating with the
Summa Bank, a bank owned by a Catholic family, to establish some 2,000 BPRs. The Summa Bank
would provide staff, financial share and training. It was hoped that the NU could contribute to
economic growth especially in rural areas. Abdurrahman Wahid explained that there was nothing
prohibited in the economic field to cooperate with people from other religions if they are capable
and honest.464
PDI-P shared the view of Abdurrahman Wahid of seeing Islamic finance and insurance as
a mean for political Islam. However, as more Muslims and elite santri joined PDI-P, this party has
become more responsive and less strict toward the aspiration of the Muslim population. 50% of
PDI-P constituent are Muslim, and they are mostly the middle and poor of the Muslim population.
According to PDI-P, Indonesia should develop its economic system according to Indonesian
characteristic based on cooperation. PDI-P does not voice open opposition against the Islamic
economy; however, it still sees the Islamic economy as a foreign product and gives benefit only
to a small group of the society. PDI-P is very critical not on the religious aspect of the Islamic
economy but how the idea is implemented according to the Constitution and other regulations.
PDI-P promotes a middle ground between Islam and pluralistic Indonesia.465
Furthermore, as the santri Modernists and Traditionalists are debating the legitimation of
Islamic banking and insurance within Indonesia’s economy, PDI-P which mostly represents the
abangan cultural stream and non-Muslim were advocating for a universal social security system
for all Indonesian. Suharto’s downfall and the subsequent elections led to the euphoric embrace
of the concept of citizens’ rights on the part of Indonesians who had heard about nothing other
than their responsibilities for more than three decades.
In 1999, in the first truly democratic elections in nearly 45 years, Indonesians favored the
PDI-P party led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, which had campaigned on a platform of increased
equity. The following year, the new parliament amended the 1945 constitution to include the
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“right to receive medical services”. Two years later, a further constitutional amendment specified
that the state was responsible for ensuring health service provision, as well as for developing a
social security system for all citizens. The next clause, reminiscent of the declaration of
independence, stated that the details would be worked out later. PDI-P leader Megawati, then
Vice-President, set about working out the details. An unwieldy working group of over 60 people
drafted a social security law that, in its first version, envisaged the fusion of all four state-owned
insurance firms into a single entity, which would operate as a single payer, not-for-profit trust
fund. Minutes of meetings and interview accounts show that this was hotly contested, not least
by the existing insurance firms and those who benefited from the profits they generated.
Besides being reluctant to lose their cash cows, directors of state firms were reportedly
concerned that the restructuring would open their books to public scrutiny. Employers were
afraid that the plan would raise costs, partly because they could no longer opt out of the staterun scheme. They argued that the mandatory schemes violated human rights. Private sector
employees and some labor unions also opposed the draft bill, because under the new structure,
workers would have to contribute to premiums formerly covered entirely by employers. What’s
more, they worried that premiums paid by workers and employers would be used to subsidize
services for the poor and unwaged, leading to a cut in benefits for those in work. Advisors
favoring private sector interests, including from the United States, objected to the fact that the
state would have a virtual monopoly on provision of social insurance. 466
The bill was reportedly revised 56 times before a draft was submitted to parliament in
January 2004. In 2014, Indonesia embarked on an exciting and ambitious strategy to move
towards universal health coverage through Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN), the country's
single-payer national health insurance scheme. The Government of Indonesia spends significant
resources to cover membership costs for the poor and near poor under JKN administered by BPJS,
which stands for Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (Social Insurance Administration
Organization).
In conclusion, the development of Islamic insurance in Indonesia was influenced by the
global Islamic revivalism of the 1980s, political repression by Soeharto regime, and economic
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deprivation experienced by many Indonesians. Compared to Malaysia’s experience, Indonesian
Muslims have been emphasizing not only the un-Islamic practice of the conventional insurance
in term of violation of Sharia ruling but also how this un-Islamic practice led to socio-economic
problems of foreign domination, political disenfranchisement and economic deprivation of the
Muslims. From the perspective of Soeharto economic policies, the idea of Islamic insurance and
Islamic finance in general came from the ‘wrong side’ of Indonesia political spectrum. It came as
a criticism toward the ruling regime of Soeharto, and only the change in the political attitude of
Soeharto toward Islam and the political environment in the 1990s had made the idea of Islamic
finance eventually took off.
At the height of harsh authoritarian rule of the Soeharto era, Islamic political activism was
often the focus of the most intense of state repression. Because the Indonesian Communist Party
had been destroyed in the 1960s, only Islamic organizations possessed the potential to mobilize
substantial grassroots support. Thus, they were considered a threat to the centralized and rigid
authoritarianism of Soeharto’s New Order regime. However, as Soeharto experimenting
totalitarianism by controlling Islamic affairs, the Islamist had become closer to Soeharto and
endorse Islamization, including Islamic insurance from inside the system. Moreover, alongside
the rapid expansion of the economic liberalization under Soeharto, the society witnessed the
emergence of Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) involved in the penetration of Islamic
economic concept and practices in the public sphere.
However, this unique quality of the movement had never reached significant progress
until complemented by the unexpected reorganization of the environmental setting of the
political economy of the nation in the 1990s. Soeharto became more accommodative toward
Islamic movement, particularly on the idea of Islamic or Sharia economics. As a result, Islamic
financial institutions had started to gain legitimacy and support to co-exist with the conventional
institutions and practices. These institutions take a role in capital and resource distribution,
particularly in the poor rural and urban areas.467
This political accommodation continues after the New Order regime of Soeharto
collapsed in 1998. The government issued more regulations to support the development of
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Islamic financial institutions. Islamic insurance has become a legitimate scheme to fill the gap left
out by the government’s social insurance and conventional insurance schemes.
The introduction of Islamic banking and insurance within the public domain of the
national economy has created another problem. Choiruzzad identifies continuing tensions could,
in which the state and Islamic economy movement negotiate the role of the state in the Islamic
banking and finance.468
Indonesian state has taken the role as regulator of Islamic banking and insurance. The
state limits itself from any direct involvement in funding or even acts as incubator like Malaysia.
The slow development of Islamic insurance in Indonesia can be attributed to this choice. Also,
Indonesia has not been a good regulator either. Many experts argue that the rampant condition
of corruption during the New Order and the post-Soeharto era has dampened the development
of Indonesia’s economy in general.
Furthermore, the democratization of Indonesia’s socio-politico and socio-economic arena
in the post-Soeharto era has imposed a change to the environmental setting of the Islamic
economy. Instead of creating a regime-supportive setting like Sudan, Kuwait, and Malaysia,
democratization in Indonesia generates a free contested market with extended and marketbased development likewise the case of Jordan and Turkey.469 Now, Islamic insurance companies
must compete not only with conventional insurance companies whose service has become more
available, but also with the provincial and state-funded social insurance schemes. There is less
incentive for Indonesian Muslims to choose private-based Islamic insurance over other schemes.
As a result, with the largest Muslim population in the world, the development of Islamic insurance
in Indonesia seems to be running in the place.470
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The absence of direct government involvement and the lack of political support for Islamic
insurance and Islamic financial institutions, in general, are the causes behind this slow
development. Indonesian State does not fully support Islamic insurance like Malaysia because it
sees and treats it as a ‘political identity’ of a particular social group within a pluralistic Indonesia
that needs to be accommodated and compensated, rather than a vital tool for national economic
development.
The deepening of Islamization within the contemporary Indonesian society makes the
state not to ignore or even reject Islamic financial institutions. At the same time, any attempt to
push the state beyond its current role as a regulator of Islamic insurance will create resistance
not only from the non-Muslim population, but also from the Muslims of different cultural
streams.
Islamic banking and insurance have been accepted by the political communities in
Indonesia. Islam has penetrated the dominant nationalist, secular and Pancasila based political
parties and has made them stronger in their contest against Islamic parties, which are no longer
the lone channel for Islamic aspirations. Tanuwidjaja argues that the fact that almost all parties
have accommodated religious aspirations and shied away from criticizing controversial religious
issues shows the strength of religious influence in the contemporary Indonesian politics.471
However, it does not mean that there is a single agenda of ‘Islamic economy’ agreed
across the board. For the modernists, the current practice of Islamic economy finance is primarily
a vehicle through which to call attention to a unique Muslim identity. The pioneers of Islamic
economy in Indonesia appeared to identify strongly with the idea that Islamic finance offers more
equitable means of distributing wealth than conventional finance. While for many, ‘Islamic
economy’ should not be interpreted exclusively with a particular label. Moreover, they have
criticized continuously the current implementation of Islamic banking and insurance which
according to them, Islamic banking and insurance only provide an improvement to the
exploitative system of capitalism, instead of altering it. 472

471

Sunny Tanuwidjaja, "Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the Evidence of Islam’s
Political Decline," Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 32, no. 1 (2010).
472
See Islamic finance as identity in Karen Hunt-Ahmed, Contemporary Islamic Finance: Innovations, Applications,
and Best Practices ( John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013).

197
Civil Islam and the critical attitude towards Islamic insurance
This section discusses the ‘social life of Islamic insurance’ meaning how Islamic insurance
as a commodity is accommodated as a social practice within Indonesian society. It elaborates the
redefinitions of Islamic economic beliefs and meanings that have shaped Indonesian
understanding of entrepreneurship and human agency. The NEP and economic development in
Malaysia created a new Malay entrepreneur class that is very receptive toward the private-based
institution of Islamic economy. Moreover, the processes produce and emplace Islamic norms,
ethics, hierarchies, practices, and gendered identities enacted in corporate life.473 There have
been different processes happened in Indonesia that lead to a different trajectory of Islamic
insurance development in Indonesia.
The amalgamation of rich precedents of a communal economy, economic exclusion and
foreign domination, and state repression by the New Order regime generate Islamic reform
movement that emphasizes civil institutions and the communal economic ethics. Rather than
creating vibrant Muslim entrepreneurs but with conservative mindset like in Malaysia, the Civil
Islam of Indonesia, as Robert Hefner define it, repudiated the goal of the Islamic state, mobilized
religiously ecumenical support, promoted women's rights, championed democratic ideals, and
advocate an indigenous and egalitarian economy. As a result, the current practice of privatebased Islamic insurance does not receive wide support among Indonesian Muslims.474
This section consists of two parts. The first part provides empirical finding on how Islamic
insurance is presented by companies, agents, and religious organizations and how people
respond to it. The second part contains discussion on the emergence of Civil Islam identity under
the New Order regime and explains how this identity strengthens and reshapes the existing
communal economic ethics within Indonesian society. The ethics determine how Indonesians,
particularly the Muslims, perceive risk, economic insecurity, and how Islamic insurance can or
cannot be the tool for solving those challenges.
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Islamic insurance Vis a Vis ‘serve without self-interest’
The following section elaborates in detail how Islamic insurance is presented within
Indonesian society and how they respond to it. Islamic insurance transcends Muslim
understanding of risk and provides the non-usurious way to respond to it. However, as
Indonesian Muslims become more pious and accept the prohibition of ‘interest’ practiced by the
conventional insurance companies, they still have an objection with the ‘self-interest’ motive of
Islamic insurance companies. It is hard to accept by majority Indonesian Muslims that a mutual
help of bearing each other burden is managed through a private scheme. I argue that this is the
main ‘social factor’ of the slow development of Islamic insurance in Indonesia.
As Indonesians become wealthier due to economic modernization and more pious due to
the deepen Islamization process within Indonesian society, the traditional ideals of surrender,
acceptance, and gratitude toward tragedies are indeed being evaluated. The idea of making
financial preparation for an unforeseen event such as illness, natural disasters, loss of job, and
an increase in tuition fee is not strange anymore. However, the way to respond it does not
necessarily through the implementation of Islamic insurance. Adeney-Risakotta states that
Indonesian have resources for facing risk in four different kinds of knowledge: mimetic, mythic,
ethical, and theoretic. Islamic insurance represents the ethical and theoretic knowledge that
provide introspection and moral responsibility, and rational understanding of risk.475 However,
this ethical and theoretic knowledge is still considered insufficient for many Indonesians. With
this consideration, Islamic insurance in Indonesia is presented to the public with an emphasis on
two aspects: religious validation and social features.
Many scholars indicate the Javanese ideals such as surrender to God will (pasrah),
acceptance (nrimo), and gratitude are the reasons behind the lack of an insurance system within
Indonesian society.476 Islamic insurance is offered with a new theological narrative that
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transcends people understanding of disaster, financial loss, and tragedy in general together with
a practical solution to it.
The religious understanding of tragedies is a test from God, and it happens due to
traditional disharmony in the society. Tragedies is something that we cannot control. It is in God’s
hand. The Modernist view transcend this by saying that there is a cause and effect for everything.
Moreover, even if we cannot totally control what happens in the future, we can prepare for it.
Indonesia as the land of seventeen thousand islands and volcanoes is well acquainted with
tragedy. Through insurance tragedy is translated as a risk that can be mitigated and
compensated. Islamic insurance goes further to convince Indonesian Muslims by stating that the
Muslim can be risk-aware, more prepared but still God-minded. Islamic insurance ensures that
risk is managed according to the laws revealed by God himself.
The discussion of lawful and unlawful is often to be too complicated for any lay Muslim
to understand. Therefore, the way Islamic insurance is presented by the agent is that Islamic
insurance is Islamic because the service necessitates the existence of Sharia board within the
company. This Sharia board are a group of trustworthy Islamic scholars who monitor and ensure
the service is following Islamic law.
Although Malaysia has a similar practice, the emphasis on religious scholars or institution
rather than state support makes Islamic insurance in Indonesia is unique. The absence of trust
towards the private company and direct support from the state make Islamic insurance
companies rely on the religious institution or Muslim religious leaders. Riaz Hassan and Taghi
Azadarmaki argue that in a differentiated social formation society in which religion and state
occupy different space like Indonesia, people’s trust toward religious institution tends to be
higher than in un-differentiated social formation society.477 The trust of Kyai or Islamic clerics in
Indonesia is much higher compared to other Muslim countries.
Although this strategy has contributed to the growth of Islamic insurance in Indonesia
recently, it is still considerably low. One reason is, as discussed previously, the increase in piety
among Muslims in Indonesia does not necessarily mean support for a single expression of Islam.
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Majority Muslims in Indonesia put the moral principles or Islam, such as justice and solidarity
above a specific injunction found in the religious texts. The other reason is the impersonality of
Islamic insurance as a formal institution. Islamic insurance claims to be a scheme that enables
mutual help among the Muslims, unlike the for-profit conventional insurance. However, people
tend to be willing to help and be charitable when they know the face of the person they want to
help. This condition is particularly important for the constant repeated interaction and not oneoff charity act.
Although many Muslim societies become more modern, they still withhold their
communitarian way of socio-economic interaction. For instance, people in many Arab countries
developed an informal model of interest-free financial arrangement. This arrangement between
a homogenous group of people based on the principle of Mutual Qard Hasan (counter no interest
loan), is well known as Jamey'ah (literally, Society). Each member pays an equal particular
amount of money each month and the collected sum of money from the group is given each
month to one of them.478 In Kenya, almost 72 percent of the population participating in Saving
and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs) and have mobilized over Ksh.150 billion (USD 2.14
billion) in savings i.e. more than 30 percent of the National Domestic savings.479 This type of
informal arrangement is very popular especially with an estimated 72 percent of people living in
Muslim-majority countries do not use formal financial services.480
In Indonesia, it is manifested in the tradition of Arisan or known as 'julu julu' or 'jula jula'
in Sumatra. It is a form of informal rotating savings and credit association. Generally, this form of
no-interest microfinance takes place during a social gathering at a fixed interval at each
member’s home. This practice is still sustained nowadays representing a financial alternative to
bank loans or other formal channels.481
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Beyond finance, the peasants in these traditional villages help others mutually in various
activities from spontaneous help for mourning neighbors, collective maintenance of ancestral
grave, agricultural activities, religious ceremonies, to building public facilities. Usually, they work
together voluntarily since the beginning to the end of the activity without expecting material
rewards for their work. This mutual aid is conducted based on different kind of reasons. Some
societies implement this practice based on the principle of reciprocity. One will help someone
else as long as he hopes he will get similar help from that person. Especially for major agricultural
tasks in rice agriculture such as hoeing, plowing, planting, and harvesting, people will help others
in order to get enough labor support when they need it.
These people also set up a rice barn collectively as a common food supply system. In riceplanting season, members of the group can use the rice or other staple foods (sagu, cassava,
corn) for their need and repay it with equal amount when they harvest. Furthermore, this
collective rice barn has two main functions; firstly, as emergency reserve during a famine and
secondly as economic stability when there is oversupply and price of food goes down. Even for
subsistence community such as Baduy, they do not sell their rice in the market but keep it in the
rice barn called Leuit to provide community’s daily need. Nevertheless, this mutual assistance in
subsistence communities important not only in term of the economy (commodity stability) but
also as part cultural identity.482
In this modern time, Indonesians try to implement this traditional way of mutual help in
other matters too. Arisan for buying a car is one of the instances. Many of Indonesians are not
wealthy enough to buy a car in cash. At the same time, they do not want to involve in a credit
scheme because of the prohibition of usury. Therefore, they set up an informal saving group to
help its member buying a car. This illustration shows that although Islamic insurance companies
are successful in gaining trust from the public related to Sharia-compliant issues, Islamic
insurance in Indonesia has not been successful in presenting the value of cooperation or risk
sharing. In addition, one research in Medan, Sumatera island of Indonesia shows profit sharing
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variable influences negatively and insignificantly on the local people’s interest in Islamic
insurance.483
The other strategy to boost public acceptance toward Islamic insurance, many Islamic
insurance companies link their product with investment for social features. PT Sun Life Financial
Indonesia promotes the waqf insurance benefits feature to attract customers. The feature that
has been launched since August 2017. This service combines the concept of waqf (social
endowment) and Islamic insurance that enables Muslims, in particular, to save continuously and
at the same time assure their ability to establish an endowment. Customers who participate in
such a plan will contribute to it regularly and, at the end of the policy, will bequest all benefit
from it to appointed beneficiaries as a waqf endowment. The company works with Islamic NGOs
to act as the trustee who allocates the funds collected to orphanages, religious schools, mosques,
and other appointed beneficiaries. Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Berhad introduced a similar product
in 2002. However, after 7 years of operation, the plan was canceled on 9 February 2009.484
The other social feature is micro Islamic insurance or known as microtakaful. Microtakaful
is usually delivered by an Islamic insurance company in collaboration with domestic NGOs, which
support Islamic microfinance institutions who offer microcredits and savings products. The NGO
acts as an intermediary between the insurance company and the microfinance institutions which
sell the credit-life microtakaful product together with their loans.
Takmin Working Group is a group of initiators who commit developing Islamic microinsurance in Indonesia. Its members consist of experts in Islamic insurance, micro finance and
accounting. Takmin Working Group (TWG) at first worked with PT. Syarikat Takaful Indonesia in
developing and marketing the products. This approach, in the world's Microinsurance practice is
known as the institutional approach or "Partner Agent Model". The Islamic micro-insurance
serves the low-income clients and is utilized to help needy children or orphans to school, to cure
the sick, to celebrate a family wedding, and to settle funeral of the death, etc.
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A robust civic tradition with distrust towards capitalism
This section discusses how the political repression and economic exclusion by the New
Order regime toward Indonesian Muslims unwittingly generated popular Islam with a robust civic
tradition, but a weak political and entrepreneurial institution. Although the recent
democratization and economic liberalization have opened political space and increased people’s
welfare, there is still a high level of distrust towards state and market. This condition provides a
path dependence that influences the development of Islamic insurance, which is presented as
non-usurious but private-based insurance.
The development of the private sector in Indonesia, in general, came in fits and starts.
The reason was that there was a long-standing distrust of private capital in Indonesia, particularly
among the Muslim community.485 Muslim population was considered as an important part of the
country economic development and mobilizing them for achieving development goals through
religious idioms had been vital for its success. President Soeharto, in his speeches, repeatedly
regarded Islam and development as being inextricably interwoven. Soeharto argued these values
should become the driving force and spirit of national development. Religion and development
must equally support each other.486
Furthermore, Soeharto emphasized the critical role of the Islamic clerics (ulama) in
revitalizing Islamic values as a positive spiritual and social force in national development.
Soeharto urged the Islamic leaders to encourage the Muslim community to participate in the
development and insisted that development is a religious duty. For this very reason, the
government established the Council for Islamic Clerics (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in 1975,
in order to become a mediator between the government and the Muslim community as large.487
However, Soeharto’s appeal to the Muslim population was an empty gesture. Not
because, the lack of support from the Muslims, but because the priority of the New Order regime
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was creating conglomeration within Indonesia economy and not helping the small and medium
enterprises. Soeharto’s rhetoric is merely a way to legitimize his economic agenda.488
In the late 1980s, discontent rose about the perceived widening gap between the
privileged rich and the large group of poor people, specifically between the visibly wealthy ethnic
Chinese business tycoons and the pribumi majority. The leading conglomerates, many of them
ethnic Chinese tycoons had overgrown during the New Order. Their rapid growth was possible
because of the patronage of the dominant political elite, particularly President Soeharto. Under
this patronage, the conglomerates enjoyed preferential treatment, including substantial
subsidized credits from the state banks, protection, and monopoly positions, and assured
government procurement.489
Furthermore, the New Order government began to be criticized for not involving the
native entrepreneurs (pribumi) in the development process and for allowing the special privilege
to the Chinese minority. Muslim entrepreneurs were encouraged to study economics and
business in the West so that they could compete with the Chinese in business. Criticism was
leveled against the Government’s marginalization of small-scale and middle-scale businesses in
which many Muslims were involved. Soeharto’s economic policies relied on the rapid growth of
large private conglomerates which emerged and thrived under the patronage of Soeharto’s ‘New
Order’ regime. The too much emphasis on economic growth, rather than justice and dependence
upon foreign aid rather than economic independence also became the target of critics. The
criticisms came mostly from non-governmental organizations (NGO) with the support from
international NGOs. Unlike in Malaysia under Mahathir Mohammad, the socio-political
circumstances of the New Order had circumcised the development of Muslim entrepreneur class
in Indonesia.
However, the absence of market economies among Indonesian Muslims and political
democracy under the New Order did not obliterate the creation of civil institutions and public
civility in Indonesia. On the contrary, the combination of economic exclusion and political
repression forced Indonesian Muslims to occupy the civil society space, by focusing on
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proselytizing Islam to the society, establishing educational facilities, and setting up diverse NGOs
and cooperatives which ironically mostly, if not all, owned by members of the economically weak
groups.490
This emphasis on civil society rather than market or statist route is not new for Indonesian
Muslims. Muslim Indonesia has historical precedence of creating public civility through the extrastate Muslim associations in late colonial Indonesia. Comparative research on politics and
democratization in the 1980s and 1990s show that there are other ingredients besides market
forces and democratic state that can make democracy work. Those two ingredients are ‘social
capital’ and ‘civil society’. Social capital consists of accumulative cultural endowments that
facilitate the performance of specific social task. The common usage of civil society refers to the
clubs, religious organizations, business groups, labor unions, human rights groups, and other
associations located between the household and the state and organized on the basis of
voluntarism and mutuality. According to Hefner, the practice of pesantren or traditional Islamic
boarding school has civil precedence that provides a path of dependence for Indonesian Muslim
society.491
Pesantren was a result of the destruction of imperial Islam and the loss of native rulers’
authority during Colonialism. By doing that, the Dutch unwittingly reinvigorated popular Islam.
The Dutch control of the state-led Muslim leaders in Indonesia to develop a cautious and critical
attitude toward government and force them to rely on their own resources to build their
institutions. Their situation contrasts with the experience of Muslims in much of the Middle East
or even nearby Malaya (Malaysia). In Malaya, particularly in the native states subject to an
indirect rule (where sultans retained a significant measure of authority), the British encouraged
cooperation between state authorities and Muslim leaders. In Indonesia, little collaboration
existed between colonial rulers and Muslims. In modern Indonesia, Pesantren has provided the
leadership, organizational precedence for the birth of Civil Islam in Indonesia.
Pesantren also has a strong affinity with Sufism. In his study on the role of the Sufi
organization, Salvatore argues that
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Sufi brotherhoods were at the forefront of a proto-globalization based on hemispherewide networking between metropolitan regions, rural provinces, and nomadic
formations. Furthermore, cities became nodes within wider circulations, rather than, as
in European and Weberian models, centers of corporate powers. The emerging patterns
of civility were open-ended, balancing inner cultivation, communicative skills, and
outward etiquette.492
Altogether, Hefner argues that Indonesia, in part due to deep pluralist traditions that
predate colonial intervention and in part due to the role of civic associations in its recent
democratic transformation, is a paradigmatic example of an 'emergent tradition' of civil Islam.
According to Hefner, civil Islam is characterized by 'denying the wisdom of a monolithic "Islamic"
state and instead affirming democracy, voluntarism, and a balance of countervailing powers in a
state and society. According to Hefner, civil Islam of Indonesia confirms the commensurability of
contemporary Islam and civil democratic traditions.493 However, the case of Indonesia also shows
the civil Islam of Indonesia has distrust towards the norms of modern capitalism.
A study compares several countries to understand what people really think about
capitalism. The surveys conducted in early September 2015 by asking ten questions of population
in ten nations Britain, the United States of America and Germany (from the developed world)
and Brazil, India, Indonesia and Thailand from the faster growing, emerging world.494
The results show a high level of distrust towards capitalism among Indonesians. Only 3%
of the respondents see the commensurability of business and the well-being of society. Almost
half of the Indonesian respondents vie negatively toward the business practice of the
company.495 On the other hand, there is a high percentage of Indonesians who put the strong
community and family life as important to well-being as a strong economy. In addition, while
more people in all seven nations believe that the free enterprise system is better at lifting people
out of poverty than government, in Indonesia only 8% confirms this belief.496
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These surveys provide us with the social circumstances in which Islamic insurance has
been introduced and developed in Indonesia. The initial development of Islamic insurance and
Islamic economy in Indonesia came from this path. It did not come from a new middle class who
began to embrace liberalism’s privatization, or introduced by conservative Islam’s bully state
from above, but come as a critical voice against the market excess and political repression. Islamic
insurance was a cultural expression of the identity of Indonesian Muslims. However, as the state
had started to regulate it in the 1990s and market had become dominant in the process and
uprooted from the civil society, Islamic insurance has lost its appeal for many Indonesian
Muslims.
Also, the emphasis of Islamic insurance in the Sharia-compliant and not on the overall
benefit of the products has only convinced the small number of Indonesian populations. As
mentioned previously, with 91% of its population identify as Muslims, only 22% of the overall
population (including the non-Muslims) perceive the laws in the country should strictly following
the teaching of the Quran. In comparison, with 64% Muslim, there is 52% of the Malaysia
population who has that view. The survey does not especially address Islamic insurance, and
many of the proponents of Islamic insurance does not support the implementation of Sharia as
a national law.497 However, their argument is different from Civil Islam, which the supporters of
Islamic economy mostly see religion as an individual matter. However, this survey still says
something how the practice of Sharia-based institutions and products in society.
However, it does not mean that Islamic insurance is rejected by all Indonesian population.
Rudnyckyj identifies a similar group as the New Malay entrepreneurs of Malaysia within many
corporate settings.498 Movements for spiritual reform active in state-owned enterprises, private
corporations, and government bureaucracies in contemporary Indonesia represent a different
phenomenon that Rudnyckyj describes as Market Islam. These groups are not necessarily
interested in achieving broad social transformation through party politics or direct advocacy.
They are not concerned with questions of human rights, social justice, or political liberalism:
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those who represent Islam as holding the key to economic success are, in general, not outspoken
advocates for democracy.
Further, market Islam involves designing a form of Muslim practice commensurate with
the goals of eliminating corruption, promoting privatization, and enhancing productivity in an
increasingly global market. These groups are dominance within Malaysian society, but in
Indonesia, they are a relatively small number. Market Islam is the group that is most likely to
support the implementation of Islamic insurance in Indonesia.
Pepinsky further elaborates the characters of so-called Market Islam in Indonesia who is
more likely to support Islamic financial institutions. He examines the socioeconomic origins of
consumer demand for Islamic where expressed piety is on the rise. He discovers that piety is far
less important as a factor in shaping individuals’ use of Islamic financial products than commonly
believed. The results show that the most pious Indonesian Muslims are just as likely to report
using banking products as their less pious counterparts. However, Indonesian Muslims who have
a high level of income and strong ties with other Muslim countries tend to use Islamic financial
product. In other words, modernization and globalization play decisive roles in shaping individual
use of Islamic financial products. Pepinsky argues:
Islamic finance is a uniquely powerful symbol of identity politics in the Muslim world
precisely because it is so nearly indistinguishable from conventional finance. The choice
of Islamic financial products—at least in plural banking systems such as those found in
Indonesia—is, therefore, a window into the ways in which social and economic changes
are filtered through religion.499
Conclusion: distributional politics and critical Muslims in Indonesia
The first Islamic insurance of Indonesia was founded in 1994, or ten years after the
establishment of Islamic insurance of Malaysia. This fact has been causing another delay for
expansion and consolidation of Islamic insurance in Indonesia. This delay was not without reason:
at a time when the Soeharto regime was consolidating the liberal economy through a centralistic
approach, such an idea integrating an experiment into a national plan was not a popular path in
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developmental planning. Moreover, a negative stigma to the initiative that carries Islamic agenda
as a result of unpopular political Islam in the past is worsening any attempt to bring this case
legitimate. Hence, when it first came into the ground as a micro-level experiment, it is out of the
initiative of a small group of Islamic economic enthusiast influenced by the global spread that
was aware with the limited opportunity available for pushing for a bigger agenda of a meso-level
institution. Therefore, this early stage development was uniquely bottom-up pushed within a
possible opportunity and rather an unconducive environment of the early New Order regime.
The changing environment of the New Order in the 1990s and afterward has provided a
favorable circumstance for Islamic interest to advance their politics as in social and cultural
affairs, but it must be emphasized that this does not mean the advance of a single, coherent
ideology called ‘Islam’. In Malaysia, the cooptation of ABIM by Mahathir Mohamad created a
supportive condition for the Islamic modernist agenda including the development of privatebased Islamic insurance. The state-led Islamization in Malaysia ensured that the development of
Islamic insurance is compatible with the economic liberalization agenda and the ethnic politics
of Malaysia. On the contrary, in Indonesia this agenda is only supported by the Modernist group
of Indonesian Muslims.
The practice of Islamic insurance and Islamic economy was not agreed by all Indonesian
Muslims. Although there has been less opposition since its establishment in the 1990s, the
majority of Muslims in Indonesia see it as just one among many alternatives of the
implementation of the doctrine of the Islamic economy. The modernists mostly promoted it as
an expression of revivalism of Islamic identity, which encompasses not only in ritual but also in
all aspects of human lives. However, the traditionalists reject the strict interpretation and stiff
political position of the Modernists. The Traditionalists can be very strict on ritual rulings of the
religion, but they are often to be more flexible in their socio-political position. In the issue of
Islamic economy, the Traditionalists tend to emphasize on public benefit and avoid any radical
confrontation with state authority compared to the strict adherence on particular interpretation
on Islamic economic doctrine of the Modernists. Therefore, the Traditionalists are more
susceptible to the state-sponsored social insurance of JKN-BPJS than private-based of Islamic
insurance of Takaful. The JKN-BPJS is considered by the Traditionalists to be more consistent with
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Islamic and Indonesian socio-economic values than the practice of contemporary Islamic
insurance. The forum bahtsul masail pre-33th NU Congress held by PBNU at the Krapyak
Yogyakarta boarding school on March 28, 2015, agreed to support the national health insurance
program (JKN) which was handled by BPJS Kesehatan. They concluded that the JKN concept
handled by BPJS Kesehatan was not problematic according to Islamic sharia. The forum which
was attended by Muslim clerics from various regions in Indonesia determined that the BPJS was
in accordance with Islamic law. They looked at the contract used by BPJS Kesehatan as ta'awun
contract. When asked the question whether it contained usury, they answered that the BPJS
contract did not contain usury.500
Furthermore, the emphasis on social benefit has been the primary goal of Islamic
economy for many activist-minded of the pioneer of Islamic economy in Indonesia. As the
political environment changed in the 1990s, more actors became more involved in the
development of Islamic insurance. Conventional economists, bankers, actuaries and also
lawmakers have become the primary actors of the recent development of Islamic insurance.
Many pioneers feel that the idea of Islamic economy has been ‘hijacked’ by private sectors who
emphasis more on finance. According to the pioneers such as Dawam Raharjo, moral concerns
such as addressing poverty, inequality, and economic injustice, must be the main parameter of
the success of any Islamic financial institutions. At this moment, he argues that many of these
institutions merely focus on the increase in business indicators.501
Therefore, many Muslims in Indonesia are reluctant to support the Islamic economy and
buy Islamic insurance premium. For many Indonesian Muslims Islamic model should be an
alternative for capitalism and foreign domination and inculcated the spirit of self-help, solidarity,
and cooperation. Recently, some Islamic insurance companies have been developing insurancelinked products, which combine financial protection with socio-religious investment. Other
companies work with Islamic NGOs to deliver micro-takaful or micro Islamic insurance to the
poor. However, it is very early to evaluate their impact on overall Islamic insurance development.
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The abangan or the nominal Muslims and the Non-Muslims see the current practice of
Islamic insurance is quite exclusive. PDIP had been the strong opposition of Sharia-inspired
regulations in the post-Soeharto era. Islamic finance had been seen as a symbol for Sharia
encroachment to the multi-cultural and multi-religious Indonesia. As the Islamization of
Indonesia become deeper recently and many santri, both Traditionalist and Modernist, have
joined and become the constituents of PDIP there is less opposition from this party toward
Islamic economy. PDIP has never opposed the idea of Islamic economy because it has become an
acceptable practice in the society, but PDIP has been very critical in the implementation
procedure of Islamic economy, particularly in the direct involvement of the state. According to
PDIP, the Indonesian state should be neutral on this issue. The ideal Indonesian state should act
only as a regulator of the Islamic economy, and not an incubator or supporter like the Islamist
State of Malaysia. Moreover, any implementation of Sharia-based regulation must be in
accordance with the national laws.
The lack of support of the state differentiates Indonesia’s Islamic insurance with
Malaysia’s. The success of any Islamization agenda owes much to the involvement of the state.
However, the problem for Indonesia lies in the ambiguity of the role of religion within a secular
state. Especially Islam historically was considered to be a threat for the national and secular
identity of Indonesia. Therefore, mobilizing support for Islamic finance or Islamic insurance had
never been in the mind of the Indonesian government. Indonesia government allow the
development of Islamic insurance to co-opt Muslims political aspiration but never fully support
it in order to become the dominant part of the Indonesia economy.
Furthermore, the current government of Indonesia has been focusing more on building
universal insurance coverage for its people. In order to do that, Indonesia needs to create a
bigger risk pool. Indonesian citizen is under obligation to subscribe to the JKN, the national social
security system. The wealthier population can add with private insurance if they need more
coverage in their plan. In the context of contemporary Indonesia, private insurance is no
substitute for the social insurance, but it is a complementary. Without this obligation, it can have
detrimental effects on the risk pool. The government does not forbid Islamic insurance, but it
does not encourage it either.
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In sum, there is no full support from all political spectrums over Islamic insurance
development in Indonesia. There are favorable circumstances for Islamic interest to advance
their politics as in social and cultural affairs. However, it does not mean the advance of a single,
coherent ideology called ‘Islam’, including ‘Islamic economy’. There is only accommodation for
the current practice of Islamic insurance within a wide variety of interpretations of Islamic
doctrine and practices of social protection. In particular, the current manifestation of Islamic
insurance has not enough support from the Muslim traditionalists.
Accordingly, the central question at the heart of the debate over Islamic finance in
multicultural Indonesia, given that Islamic finance is nearly indistinguishable from conventional
banking, is not one over the substance of the financial services provided by Islamic institutions
rather. The question is about the extent to which the growth of an Islamic financial system in
Indonesia is either costly or beneficial to Indonesians, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In other
words, the debate over Islamic finance is neither theological nor technical, it is distributional and
political. The question is on how the Indonesian state should accommodate the demands of its
citizens for financial products deemed to comply with Islamic principles.
In addition, Indonesia has failed to develop a fully-fledged regulatory state. Unlike
Malaysia, the capacity of the Indonesian state to supervise and regulate the economy in
accordance with market principle remains weak with a widespread corruption practice. This
condition gives impact not only the development of Islamic insurance, but also the overall
economic development.502
The social reason for the slow development of private-based Islamic insurance is the longstanding distrust of private capital in Indonesia. The amalgamation of rich precedents of the
communal economy, economic exclusion, and foreign domination, and state repression by the
New Order regime generate Islamic reform movement that emphasizes civil institutions and
communal economic ethics. Rather than creating vibrant Muslim entrepreneurs but with
conservative mindset like in Malaysia, the Civil Islam of Indonesia, as Robert Hefner define it,
repudiated the goal of the Islamic state, mobilized religiously ecumenical support, promoted
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women's rights, championed democratic ideals, and advocate an indigenous and egalitarian
economy.
The initial development of Islamic insurance and Islamic economy in Indonesia came from
this path. It did not come from a new middle class who began to embrace liberalism’s
privatization or introduced by conservative Islam’s bully state from above but come as a critical
voice against the market excess and political repression. Islamic insurance was a cultural
expression of the identity of Indonesian Muslims. However, as the state had started to regulate
it in the 1990s and market had become dominant in the process and uprooted from the civil
society, Islamic insurance has lost its appeal for many Indonesian Muslims.
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CHAPTER V
PAKISTAN

Pakistan is an ideological country. This country got independence from the British
intending to provide a homeland for Muslims where they could live according to their religion.
However, the goal had never been fulfilled as no government after independence paid serious
attention to the Islamization of Pakistan. Although the constitution states Islam as the state
religion, Pakistan retained the most law that inherited from the British and maintained the
secularist traditions within the government. The concerted program of Islamization only started
to take shape in 1977 when the left-wing government of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was ousted in a coup d'état led by a former Army general, Ziaul-Haq. He then became the sixth President of Pakistan with two cornerstones economic policy,
including liberalization and Islamization of the economy.
The new government of Zia-ul-Haq showed some interest and announced many steps for
Islamization. Establishment of the system of Zakat and Islamization of the banking system are
important steps that need to be mentioned. A mandatory religiously derived tax called Zakat was
enforced in 1980, which applied to saving accounts and other investment and to agricultural
produce. In January 1980, the Pakistani government opened approximately 7,000 interest-free
counters at all the nationalized commercial banks. Pakistan becomes the first country in the
world with the highest number of Islamic banking.503 Nevertheless, not enough attention was
given to the insurance sector during that time.
In 1992, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) of Pakistan on its own initiative reviewed the
insurance laws and proposed some changes. The council prepared a report "Islamization of
Insurance" for the government in 1992, but the government did not consider implementing it
practically. After a decade, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), through
notification S.R.O 877(I)/2012 dated July 16, 2012, issued Islamic insurance regulation of Takaful
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rules, 2012, allowing conventional insurers to operate Islamic insurance windows alongside their
existing conventional insurance business, and conduct Islamic insurance business. There were
five Islamic insurance companies operated in 2015 with gross premium of US$ 64.34 million and
an asset volume of US$ 114.38 million. The Islamic insurance industry comprised just about 2%
of the insurance sector in Pakistan as at December 2015.504 This number was still quite small
compared to Malaysia and Indonesia within the same year.
This chapter examines the reason behind this existing gap between Pakistan and the two
other countries: Indonesia and Malaysia in their Islamic insurance development. Moreover, it
explains the reason why Pakistan delayed the development of Islamic insurance until 2012. In the
early phase of its Islamization, Pakistan had preferred to focus on the implementation of Zakat in
order to provide economic security for most of its poor population. This chapter begins with a
brief section on the structure of Pakistan as an Islamic state. It elaborates its multinational
characteristics, the status of Islam as the popular identity of the Pakistanis, the persistence of the
kinship-based economic systems in the country, and the political actors related to Islamic
insurance. This section focuses on the challenges that Pakistan has had in achieving a coherent
national identity and becoming a stable nation.
The next section provides detail information on the growth and institutional development
of Islamic insurance within the existing structure of the insurance sector in Pakistan. This section
also discusses the linkage between Islamic insurance regulatory frameworks within the broader
context of insurance or social protection in Pakistan. The state of Pakistan had always been
idealized and positioned as the primary provider of the protection within the idea of the Islamic
welfare state, and not merely as an incubator of Islamic insurance as Malaysia does, or as a
regulator as Indonesia does.
The last two sections explain the factors for Pakistan’s slow development of Islamic
insurance through the lenses of ‘political life’ and ‘social life’ of Islamic insurance. The political
life of Islamic insurance section explores the catalysts, the dynamics, and the political coalitions
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behind the institutionalization of Islamic insurance, particularly during Zia’s state-sponsored
Islamization (1977-1988), and his continuous legacy in the aftermath. The central puzzle to be
addressed is why, as an Islamic state, Pakistan has been slow or even failing in creating Islamic
reform for its insurance sector. Next, the social life of Islamic insurance section explores the
process of how Islamic insurance was introduced by the Islamist modernizers within a highly
conservative social-cultural environment of Pakistani society. Similarly, it asks the question of
how Islamic insurance has not been receiving proper acceptance by a society where Islam is
deeply ingrained in its norms, values, and identity.
The structure of a ‘weak’ Islamic state
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan had been created in the name of Islam. Muhammad Iqbal
(1876–1938), a poet and philosopher who is called the ‘Spiritual Father of Pakistan’ pioneered
the idea for a separate land for the Muslim of India in his famous 1930 Allahabad Address. Iqbal
described Islam as a “social nizam” (social order) and argued that the religion of Islam was the
best suited of all religions for the organization of life, as it applied to every aspect of the life of
the individual and society.505 Furthermore, although few argued that Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the
founding father had preferred a more secular type of Pakistan, it is commonly believed that the
Muslim League leadership including Jinnah and the ulama (Islamic clergy) had articulated their
vision of Pakistan in terms of an Islamic state as Iqbal previously described.
The Constitution was adopted on 23 March 1956, and from then on, Pakistan is known as
the world’s first Islamic republic. However, the role of Islam in the Republic was not clearly
defined. In 1973, the new constitution was promulgated, in which Islam is stated as the state
religion. The 1973 Constitution provides the framework that no law would be passed against the
teaching of Quran and the Sunnah (Prophetic tradition). However, Islam was never enough to
make Pakistan into a unified nation; Pakistanis are divided not only by different variations of
Islam but also by a host of other ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and social difference.
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A multinational country
Pakistan is the world’s sixth-most populous country in the world and has the largest
Muslim population after Indonesia.506 Like Indonesia and Malaysia, Pakistan is also a culturally
diverse country. In term of geographical area, it is the 36th-largest country, spanning 881,889
square kilometers (340,499 square miles). Pakistan has a 1,046-kilometre (650-mile) coastline
along the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman in the south and is bordered by India to the east,
Afghanistan to the west, Iran to the southwest, and China in the far northeast.507
Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic. Executive power is headed by the prime
minister, who works coherently along with the bicameral parliament and the judicature.
President is the head of the state. Like the presidential election system in the US, president is
elected by the Electoral College for a five-year term. The president was the most important
authority in the country until 2010. The 18th amendment, passed in 2010, stripped the
presidency of its major powers.508 Before the amendment, the president had the ability to
remove the prime minister and dissolve the Parliament. The amendment turned Pakistan from a
semi-presidential to a parliamentary republic.
The name Pakistan means Land of (the) Spiritually Pure in both Urdu and Persian
languages. In 1933 Choudhary Rahmat Ali, a Pakistan Movement activist, proposed ‘Pakstan’ as
the name of the country in his paper Now or Never; Are We to Live or Perish Forever? This paper
is also known as the "Pakistan Declaration". The name of Pakistan is an acronym that stands for
the "thirty million Muslim brethren who lived in PAKSTAN—by which we mean the Five Northern
units of India: Punjab, Afghan Province, Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan". The letter i was added
to ease pronunciation and forms the linguistically correct and meaningful name. 509
Another prominent leader for Pakistan movement was the poet-philosopher,
Muhammad Iqbal. Iqbal who was born on Nov 9, 1877, encouraged the creation of a “state in
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north-western India for Muslims” in his 1930 India Muslim League presidential address at
Allahabad, British India. As a leading philosophical and literary voice during the time of Indian
independence and the eventual partition of the country, Iqbal was an essential political and social
leader in the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Although he died in 1938, which is long before
the establishment of independence Pakistan, he gave vision to the people particularly to
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Quaid-i-Azam (the Great Leader) and Baba-i-Qaum (Father of the Nation)
of Pakistan, through his poetic collections.510
Following Iqbal’s vision, Jinnah tried to build a strong state relying on three principles of
‘one nation, one culture, and one language’. He also believed that Pakistan could somehow be
turned into not only an ideal Islamic state but also an ideal egalitarian socialist state. Jinnah
aspired the very solid traditions of social justice in Islamic thought could somehow be made to
flourish in an independent Pakistani state.511 However, many scholars argue that these visions
neglected the social and geographical base of Pakistan. In reality, Pakistan has never been able
to reach a consensual conception of the nation since its independence. The ideological
foundation for Pakistani state nationalism led to the partition of India has failed to act as a
unifying concept for the multinational country of Pakistan. 512
The land of Pakistan was part of British India. As a state, Pakistan was born out of India’s
partition in 1947. The initial rationale for separating Pakistan from India was the presumed need
to provide a homeland for the minority Muslims in an overwhelmingly Hindu India. It was a result
of the two-nation theory stating that Muslims and Hindus are two separate nations by every
definition; therefore, Muslims should be able to have their separate homeland in the Muslim
majority areas of India, in which Islam can be practiced as the dominant religion.
In 1946, the Labor government in Britain decided to end the British rule of the Indian
Subcontinent. The loss of international support on continuing India colonialization, numerous
local protests, and financial burden of World War II forced the British to take this decision. The
Indian National Congress demanded a single state, while the Muslim League, which made up
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most of the Pakistani elite after 1947, expressed the idea of a separate Pakistan as an alternative.
The British proposed a compromise in the form of a decentralized state with much power given
to local governments. However, this proposal was rejected by both of the parties and resulted in
several riots in South Asia.
Eventually, the Parliament of the United Kingdom agreed to divide British India into the
two new independent dominions; the Dominion of India (later to become the Republic of India)
and the Dominion of Pakistan (later to become the Islamic Republic of Pakistan).513 Fifteen
million people were displaced due to religious violence accompanied the partition across the
subcontinent. On 14 August 1947, the new Dominion of Pakistan became independent, and
Muhammad Ali Jinnah was sworn in as its first governor-general in Karachi.514The tragic
experience of partition became the basis of a strong India-centric threat perception in Pakistan.
At the time of its independence in 1956, Pakistan had two separate geographical entities.
The eastern part is only one-sixth the size of the western part of Pakistan yet holding eight million
more people. The western part of the country possessed 80 percent of the cultivable land and
had the country’s capital and only port in Karachi. Meanwhile, East Pakistan had far less
infrastructure and was much weaker economically.
Both parts of Pakistan were mainly Muslim. However, there were differences in religious
practice. The Muslims in the western part of Pakistan has a long history of communal strife, which
influences the relationship between different religious communities in the area. On the contrary,
religious interaction with Hindus had become routine for Bengalis in the east. According to
Weightman, those cultural differences were some of the centrifugal forces that would ultimately
result in its political demise leading to the transformation of East Pakistan into Bangladesh in
1971.515
The split indeed created an Islamic trend within the country, but it did not necessarily
create a cohesive nation of Pakistan. It is mainly due to the lack of linguistic cohesion among
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Pakistanis. About two-thirds of the population speaks Punjabi. Punjab is the most economically
productive province and contains the modern nation’s capital, Islamabad. Sindhi language is
spoken by about 12 percent, mostly in Pakistan’s second industrial province of Sind. Urdu is
spoken by only 8 percent, yet it was proclaimed the national language. Urdu is also the language
of the state education system, of the national newspapers, and the film industry. It was the
language of Muslims in the heartland of the old Mughal Empire, centered on cities of Delhi, Agra,
Lucknow, Bhopal, and Hyderabad, rooted in what is now India.516 Along with English, Urdu is the
language of the elite and government.
The acknowledgment of Urdu as the official language of the country does not correspond
with the social practice by majority Pakistanis. Urdu-speakers are concentrated in cities,
especially the old capital of Karachi. Those are the Mohajirs, people who migrated from India
after partition in 1947. Several other languages are spoken, with the most enormous diversity in
mountainous regions. Pashto and Baluchi belong to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European
language family. Sindhi, Urdu, and Punjabi belong to the Indic branch. Brahui is a Dravidian
language of about 2.2 million people with the vast majority found in Baluchistan. There is also
Balti, which is a Sino-Tibetan language used by people living in Gilgit-Baltistan region of
Pakistan.517
Nonetheless, Pakistan has a geographical unity that in some respects thousand years old,
being the valley of the River Indus, which drains southward into the Arabian Sea plus neighboring
mountains, deserts, and swamps. This Indus plain was the ancient site of one of the oldest
civilizations of Mohenjo-Daro. After the coming of Islam, people in this geographical entity had
been professed the religion Islam for hundreds of years and have often been ruled by the same
Muslim dynasties.518 However, the geographical characteristics of having high altitudes and
desserts have also limited the accessibility and people interaction, which foster cultural
differentiation, communalism, and regionalism within the country.
Pakistan is politically divided into four highly differentiated and unequal parts: Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab, Sind, and Baluchistan. Waziristan is not a province but is part
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of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).519 NWFP is capped by a dramatic knot where
the Karakoram, Pamir, and the Hindu Kush have buckled together. Peshawar is the biggest city
and industrial center of this region. Most people living in this area are Pathan and speak Pashto.
Waziristan is also a mountainous region, but it is bordering with Afghanistan. The majority of
followed the customary law of Pashtunwali, and only small number of them following the State
law. Badal-revenging blood feuds to protect Zan (family), Zar (wealth), and Zameen (land) are
central pillars of this code.520
The Punjab region long had been the breadbasket of the subcontinent. Moreover, Punjab,
on average, produced more than half of the GNP of Pakistan. Punjabi has continuously also
dominated the armed forces. Sind region is located in the Indus delta, which make it very fertile
for agriculture. Second to Punjab in size and wealth, Sind has excellent agricultural potential and
in 1947 was in the process of being colonized by immigrants from Punjab. However, much of the
rural Sind remains controlled by zamindari. Initially, zamindari collected taxes for the Moghuls
and later the Raj. Zamindar were or became large landowners, especially in Sind and Punjab, and
they continue to control both land and peasant farmers under the feudal system. Politically,
Zamindari families are often voted in as members of Pakistan’s Parliament because they are
relatively wealthy and come from prominent families. Baluchistan has twice the size of Punjab,
but it is rugged and arid. Baluchistan possesses the smallest population and is the most
impoverished province.521
This diversity has created various localized ethnic identities and loyalties, arguing for
cultural recognition in a more inclusive national narrative, struggling for political autonomy, or
more significant share of the economic development. For instance, Sindhi nationalism evolves in
a rural setting of Sind under the leadership of prominent large landowner families, Baloch
nationalism flourishes in a tribal milieu requesting the more significant share of the profits from
mining and other industries, and the Mohajir movement in an urban context of Karachi.522 Those
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localized loyalties are counter-reactions toward the increasing dominance of the Punjabi in
Pakistan’s bureaucracy, military, and industries.
Modern multinational Pakistan has been governed by following the legacy the British in
ruling British India. Instead of direct control through a powerful centralized government, the
British relied on local chieftains, landowners, or provincial leaders to manage the population.
Similarly, the ‘weak’ federal government of Pakistan has always depended on the very same old
elites and families in governing the country. The framework of a federal parliamentary republic
and meritocracy are supposed to overcome political problems generated from those diversities.
However, those modern institutions have not been able to transform Pakistani society.
Islam as the state and the popular identities
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, also known as the 1973 Constitution,
incorporates many injunctions from the Sharia. The 1973 Constitution is considered to be one of
the most Sharia-dense constitutions in the modern world. Besides stating that Islam is the state
religion, the 1973 Constitution uses language, norms, principles, prohibitions, and guarantees
derived from Islamic law. 523
Pakistan was the first country in the modern world to adopt the adjective "Islamic" to
modify its republican status under its otherwise secular constitution in 1956. However, Islam has
only become state religion after 1973, when a new constitution, more democratic and less
secular, was adopted. The Constitution of 1973 is Pakistan’s most important document as it gives
foundation of the current government. Article 227 of the Constitution holds that all existing laws
"shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and
Sunnah […] and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions." 524 Still, the very
legal structure in Pakistan is common English law, which inherited from the former British ruler.
With time, Pakistan introduces legal changes to accommodate new developments.
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Pakistan’s legal system contains State law, Sharia law and Customary laws. State law and
Sharia law are both formal, written codes. Meanwhile, customary laws are informal and
unwritten, but immensely strong, because they reflect the cultures of the people.525 In so-called
Tribal Areas of the Northwest Frontier Province, the government in Pakistan relies on the local
authority to maintain order. Instead of Pakistani state law, a body of local elders and notables
or the leading males of families so-called the Jirga implement Pashtunwali, the ethnic code of
the Pathans. The Pashtunwali provides a general guideline for resolving disputes once they arise.
The traditional codes of Pakistan do not provide detail rules for every contingency. The normative
content of customary laws is very fluid; therefore, it is best thought as a code of honor rather
than a legal code. Instead of trying to abolish crime altogether, maintaining collective honor and
prestige, restoring peace, and retribution are the primary purpose of this ethnic code. Also, this
code influences how they conduct their economy. 526
Beside the Pathans, every traditional Pakistani community has its version of customary
laws. The only significant population in Pakistan which has completely shed allegiance to
traditional codes are the Mohajirs (the migrants) of Karachi.527 The Mohajirs of multi-ethnic
origins migrated from various regions of India to Pakistan after the separation.
The Sharia is often considered to be more progressive than Pashtunwali. For instance,
Sharia guarantees a share of inheritance to girls, while Pashtunwali gives it only to boys;
furthermore, Sharia law guarantees rights to wives in the case of divorce. However, the Sharia
that was promoted by the Taliban, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, does not necessarily mean
the Islamic law as understood and implemented in many other Muslim societies. The Sharia that
is being advocated is the tribal interpretation of Sharia by the Taliban.528 Despite its
progressiveness, the implementation of Sharia is complicated in Pakistan, because the different
Islamist groups in Pakistan cannot have consensus which form of the Sharia is valid.
According to Ian Talbot, one of the leading historians of South Asia, the separation of East
Pakistan into an independent country of Bangladesh in 1971 contributed to the trend toward ‘a
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more Islamic’ Pakistan in three ways. Firstly, it cut stroke the numerical strength of the nonMuslim minority. Secondly, it strengthened anti-Hindu and anti-Indian sentiment by seeing that
the East Bengali secession was a conspiracy, and lastly, it demolished the secular Pakistani
nationalist ideology, which had huge supports among the Bengalis. The secession of East Pakistan
into a new country of Bangladesh reinforced Islam as an ideological cement for the state of
Pakistan.529
After the secession, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under Bhutto (1973-1977)
advocated a program compounded of agricultural and industrial reform and the promulgation of
new constitution 1973, which defined Pakistan as an Islamic socialist republic. The president and
prime minister were to be Muslims, and laws were to conform to Islam as determined by the
council of Ulama (Islamic clergy). As Pakistan became increasingly dependent on oil-rich Arab
states for loans, commerce, and employment of labor, Bhutto made further concessions to
Islamic morality, such as prohibiting alcohol and gambling.530 Furthermore, the regime of Zia-ulHaq of the late seventies intensified this Islamization process by utilizing Islam as a tool for
nation-building bypassing other traditional loyalties.
Islam is deeply ingrained in the identity of Pakistani people. Even the PPP, which is
generally regarded as ‘secular’ party, has been using religious symbols to gain support from the
population. The PPP recruited many of its politicians from the prominent families, specifically
families of hereditary saints. However, Islam of Pakistani masses contains various traditions.
Pakistan contains all the key facets contemporary Islam: Sufism; traditionalist scholars; the
modern clergy and their madrasah and Islamic colleges; Islamic parties and their political
activists; and Islamic modernism.531 Therefore, there is always a strong reaction when certain
groups or the state itself tries to impose one monolithic version of Islam imitating, for instance,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, or Iran.532On the other hand, the Pakistani state is too weak to achieve this
even if it wanted too-as Zia-ul-Haq’s failed Islamization demonstrated.
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The majority of Muslim in Pakistan is Sunnis, and most of them are traditionalists known
as Barelvis. The name comes after the madrasah founded in 1880 in the town of Bareilly-also in
Uttar Pradesh, India. They have a traditional religious attitude, which are inspired by Sufism. This
popular Islam includes a belief in the intercession of saints with God, the validity of miracles by
the saints, worship at the shrines of saints (though not strictly speaking worship of the saints),
and local traditions attached to the saints.533 The practices of Barelvi may similar to the practice
of the older Muslim societies; however, the traditionalist orientations had begun to take a
recognizable shape only in the late nineteenth century as a response to modernism.534
Unlike the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia, the Barelvis have never created a significant and
enduring political party of their own. They played a leading part in all the broader Muslim mass
movements in India and Pakistan, and then formed part of the MMA Islamist alliance which
governed the NWFP and Balochistan from 2002 to 2008. However, their political influence is very
limited.
Based on their theological understanding, all the Sunni Islamist groups, from the relatively
moderate and democratic Jamaat-e-Islami to the Taliban and other extremists, are drawn from
one of two traditions: the Deobandi and the Ahl-e-Hadith.535 The Deobandi, named after a
famous madrasah founded in Deoband (now in Uttar Pradesh, India) in 1866, is a representation
of one of the oldest Islamic modernisms. Both Pakistan’s main Islamist parties today, the Jamaate-Islami (JI) nationally and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islama (JUI) in the Pathan areas, are drawn from
the Deobandi tradition.536 Another tradition is so-called Ahl-e-Hadith. It is a branch of the
international Salafi tradition, heavily influenced by Wahabism. The Ahl-e-Hadith are more
extreme than the Deobandis, and less concerned with questions of modern social justice and
development.537
The most central from all Islamist ideas is the idea that sovereignty belongs to God alone.
The implication is that all legal and political authority derives from God and His injunctions, as
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mentioned in the Sharia. According to the Sunni Islamists, one could not be a Muslim without
accepting this idea, nor could a state become Islamic without recognizing it.538
Beside this majority Sunnis, Pakistan also hosts so-called Muslim minorities. There are
two ‘Muslim minorities’ in Pakistan: the Ahmadis and the Shias. Seven million or 2.2% of
Pakistanis are Ahmadi. The Ahmadiyya follows the Sharia injunctions in their rituals and shares
many ideas with the Islam modernists, except the Ahmadis believe that their leader, Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad, was also a prophet after Muhammad. Because of this belief, Ahmadiyya was
declared as a non-Muslim minority of Pakistan in 1974.539
The Shias of Pakistan are the world’s second-largest Shia community after that of Iran.
The Shia comprises only 10-15 percent of Pakistan’s population (20-30 million). Although there
are many incidents where Sunni extremists targeted the Shia group with hate propaganda and
terrorism, Shias have always been fully integrated into all sections of political, professional, and
social life without suffering any discrimination. In mainstream politics, the Shia-Sunni divide has
never been an issue in Pakistan. Two prime ministers from Bhutto family, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and
his daughter, Benazir Bhutto, were also Shia. Moreover, Shia clergy has been at the forefront of
communal activism in Pakistan since 1949, but the general Shia people participated in such
organizations, as they had in pre-partition India.540
Islamist radicalism in Pakistan is influenced by a combination of ideology and conditions
induced by the governing elites. Similar to what happened during the partition of 1947, Muslim
masses can occasionally be stirred up to furious panic by the cry of “Islam in danger’.541 The
governing elite and the military of Pakistan also often create conditions that foster Islamic
radicalism. For instance, many of religiopolitical related violent incidents happened after
Pakistan’s realignment in the US-led War on Terror in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.542
All in all, traditional and popular forms of Islam do play a key role in holding Pakistan
together. However, their role is not on the modern sense of transforming the sociopolitical
conditions as the forces of Islamist reform (whether moderate or extremist) would wish. Islam
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as a single homogenous ideology, is not present in the mind of the majority of Muslim
Pakistanis.543 Islam indeed provide elements in the nation-building process of a multinational
Pakistan. The religion also has a significant role in transforming the moral of the society, like the
case of Malaysia’s corporate sector mentioned before where Islam is utilized to inculcate
discipline and work ethics among the workers. Some Pakistani statesmen have tried to promote
religion in public life as a way of trying to improve working ethics of public officials.544 However,
Islam in Pakistan has failed to create loyalties and ethics, which transcend those of loyalty to kin.
This kinship loyalties and ethics are quite robust that influence in not only politics but also the
economy of Pakistan.
‘Patronage to kinship’ economy
In term of economy, around a quarter of Pakistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its
export earnings are derived from the agricultural sector, which is controlled by a few thousand
feudal families. With this concentration of economic power, the feudal families also have
considerable political power upon the country. In addition to agriculture, remittance is an
important part of Pakistan’s economy. Around 7 million Pakistani Diasporas contributed
significantly to national economic stability. In 2015-2016, they transferred money to their
families amounted US$19.9 billion of remittance or equaled to 7.11 % of Pakistan’s GDP.545 Ian
Talbot argues that remittance was one of the contributing factors for Zia-ul-Haq longevity in
power, rather than his hegemonic Islamic discourse.546
Modern industries are rare, and they are only available within the metropolitan areas of
Karachi and Lahore. Most of the urban population remains semi-employed or informally
employed. Pakistan was ahead of South Korea in economic development in the early 1960s, but
now, it is dreadfully far behind. Nonetheless, with the continuous conflict in the neighboring
country, Afghanistan, the constant threat of violence and terrorism, and the prevalent corruption
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within a weak government, Pakistan is not a fail state. In fact, Pakistan is quite functional as a
state and even can be considered as one of the most resilient countries in the world.
Pakistan's average economic growth rate in the first five decades (1947–1997) has been
higher than the growth rate of the world economy during the same period. Also, Pakistan’s
manufactured exports in the 1960s were higher than those of Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines
or Indonesia. However, because of the lack of investment in education, training, skills, and health
of the labor force, Pakistan is now behind those countries.547
The country is one of the largest producers of natural commodities. Pakistan's most
important industry is textiles, and this industry has an overwhelming impact on the economy of
the country. The textile sector in Pakistan represents about 57% percent of the country's
exports.548 This industry is the second-largest employment sector in Pakistan, with approximately
40% labor force in the industry. Pakistan also develops other industries, such as mining, oil and
gas extraction, and automotive.
Although the agriculture sector still plays an important role, and the manufacturing starts
to grow, the current economy of Pakistan is shifting toward services. The services sector share in
GDP stands around 44.18 percent on average.549 The share of the services sector in total
employment has been increasing over time. In 2009, 2.76 million people were employed in this
sector. However, the financial sector, which includes insurance, real estate, and business service
has still a small share in employment generation, which employed only around 820,000 people.550
The Pakistani economy is also sustained by the remittance transferred by its diaspora. In
2015-16, there was US$19.9 billion remittances came from 7 million Pakistani diasporas. The
primary source countries of remittances to Pakistan are the United States and the Gulf states.
Since the late 1980s, Pakistan has pursued a program of market-oriented economic
adjustment, reform, and development with the support of the International Monetary Fund
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(IMF) and bilateral donors. this program has aimed at enhancing macroeconomic stability,
promoting the private sector and export-led industrial development, and reversing past neglect
of critical social sectors such as health, education, and population planning. Unfortunately, the
implementation of this program has mostly lagged expectations. The main reason was the
liberalization program was absorbed by the Islamization of the economy.551
Pakistan has everything needed to be successful economically. Although there are plenty
of cheap labor, a large domestic market, and access to regional markets, foreign investors have
been reluctant to invest their money in Pakistan. Its widespread corruption, lack of skilled labor,
law and order problems, and outdated infrastructure are some of the reasons behind that.
Another major problem is Pakistan's massive external debt and its continued dependence on
financial aid. Debt and foreign grants provide approximately 25 percent of government revenue,
and debt service obligations total nearly 50 percent of government expenditure.552
Underlying most of the economic problems faced by Pakistan is the persistence of its
‘patronage to kinship’ system. Patronage has long been the bedrock of politics in Pakistan, where
votes are dictated by immediate concerns about legal protection and government handouts. 553
It explains the mass support for populist ideas and programs such as ‘Islamic welfare state’
introduced by Pakistan leaderships, including the current Prime Minister, Imran Khan.
Pakistan is low in natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, there is no ‘traditional’
source of wealth for elites to control and monopolize, Lieven explained. In this environment, the
only way to extract wealth is through control over the state. To achieve control over the state,
communal leaders rely on “patronage to kinship” – an underlying dynamic of the Pakistani system
where wealth and power are distributed along the kinship line. This deep kinship, Lieven noted,
is a vital aspect of Pakistani society. Beside to gain wealth, kinship is used to maintain degrees of
stability through power structures.554 This character provides the basis for the whole explanation
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of the stagnation of Islamic insurance in Pakistan, which will be elaborated further in the
upcoming sections.
However, this endemic patronage does not necessarily make the economy of Pakistan a
failure. On contrary, the strong kinship was one of the reasons for its resiliency. The economy
proved to be resilient in the face of multiple adverse events concentrated into a four-year (1998–
2002) period: the Asian financial crisis, economic sanctions, the global recession of 2001–2002, a
severe drought, and refugee crisis in the post-9/11 military action in neighboring Afghanistan.
Political actors of Islamic politics
The following paragraphs provide a brief map of the actors of Islamic politics in Pakistan,
particularly on their positions regarding the institutionalization of Islamic insurance. As
mentioned before, patronage and kinship form the essential elements of the Pakistani political
system. In Pakistan, political factions, which support individual politicians or alliances of
politicians are significant, but they are temporary. Politicians use factions to seek patronage
because they need the foundation of strong kinship networks, which are the most important
aspect of Pakistani politics.555
Although there have been power shifts within the society, the landowners are still the
dominant power in Pakistan’s politics. A few thousand feudal families control Pakistan’s
agricultural sector. Only two percent of households have landholdings larger than 20 hectares,
accounting for 30 percent of total land holdings.556 Although successive military and civilian
governments have tried with to redress the land imbalance, the concentration of economic
power in Pakistan still rests on these families. As a result, feudal lords continue to wield more
power than civil authorities do in many rural areas. This concentration of economic power
strengthens these individuals’ influence within the patronage and kinship patterns of the
Pakistani political system.
However, great individual landowners no longer dominate the southern part of Punjab
and the NWFP. Several land reform program, the subdivision through inheritance of formerly
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great estates, and social mobility due to economic change are responsible for this
transformation. The key rural politician in these areas is a relatively small landowner (with
perhaps 100 acres or so), deeply embedded in the dominant local landowning clan, with influence
over the police and administration.557Such Landowners are very often local urban politicians too
because they own urban property. Nowadays, most of the wealth does not come from the land
anymore, but the land is essential links to the people and their votes.558
Landownership and the power of kinship are inevitably reflected in the political system of
Pakistan. Just as in much of the rest of South Asia, a majority of Pakistan’s political parties are
dynastic. For many years and particularly after the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, only two
parties dominating the Pakistani politics: the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). the PPP is led by Bhutto-Zardari family and has a strong
supporter in the Sindhi countryside, while PML-N, which was founded by Zia-ul-Haq, has a very
powerful Punjabi character and has been led by Sharif family almost for the last three decades.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came from a family of large Shia landowners who could afford to send
him for schooling in the US and the UK. He was very talented speaker. His oratory could
manipulate public emotion as the best of Shia preachers could, and his call for social justice
resonated with Shia values. His party’s flag conveniently displayed the colors of Shiism: black,
red, and green. Although he never openly flaunted his Shia background, he commanded the
loyalty of Pakistan’s Shia multitudes.559
The Northern Punjab and the NWFP have less dynastic characters as they have always
had a more egalitarian and meritocratic, as with the Pathans and the Jats. In these groups, it is
often more accurate to talk of ‘big men’, risen through personal wealth and character, rather
than hereditary leadership. Very often, the decisive moment in family’s rise was when they
became sufficiently locally powerful to get into a political party as a candidate, and on that basis
to get a government job- after that, they can make their fortunes by corruption.
Recently, there has also been a sharp rise in the popularity of centrist parties such that
the Muttahida Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The MQM is Pakistan’s
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only genuinely modern mass political party, which gains support from mostly the middle-class
from the ethnic background of the Mohajir population of Karachi. PTI is also a centrist political
party in Pakistan founded in 1996 by former international cricket captain Imran Khan. In 2018,
PTI or Pakistan Movement for Justice ended the two-party dominance of the PPP and the PML-N
by becoming the largest party in the National Assembly as a result of the 2018 general election.
As the 19th Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan is leading Pakistan as a populist, religiously
devout, anti-corruption reformist, and envisioning building an “Islamic welfare state”. The recent
victory of PTI of Imran Khan seems to bring change to Pakistan’s political system. However, it is
still too early to draw this conclusion. The patterns of political kinship and traditions concerned
are very old and very deeply rooted in Pakistani society.560
In sum, we may see a conflict of different ideologies, the tension between civil society
and military, and fierce confrontation between the Islamists and secular parties within Pakistani
politics, however, kinship consideration usually outweighs these differences. Defense of the
honor and the interests of the kinship group is often considered to be more important than
loyalty to a party, to a state, or to any code of professional ethics, not only for ordinary Pakistanis,
but also for most politicians and officials. In Pakistan, waves of public sentiments including Islamic
revivalism in many forms can topple regimes and bring new ones to power; but they do not
change the basic structure of politics.561
Both Pakistan’s main Islamist parties today, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) nationally and the
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islama (JUI) in the Pathan areas, are drawn from the modernist tradition of
Deobandi. According to Lieven, the ideological stance of Deobandi can be described as both
fundamentalist and reformist. Their aspiration to the pure teaching of the Quran and the Prophet
makes them as a fundamentalist group. By its own description, Jamaat-e-Islami is “an ideological
party” that stands for “complete Islam” and whose mission, according to Article 4 of the party’s
constitution, is the “establishment of Divine Order or the Islamic way of life in its entirety, in
individual and collective life, and whether it pertains to prayers or fasting, Haj or Zakat, socioeconomic or political issues of life.” This statement also advocates radical reforms of society.
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They are also puritan (in the old Anglo-American sense), in their concern for strict public morality
and their dislikes of both ostentatious wealth and the worship of saints and shrines. Their ideas
of reform are quite modern, which concerned with questions of modern social justice and
development. Majority of their supporter come from middle-class lay intellectuals concentrated
in urban centers.562
In 1977, these Islamic parties formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) with other
political parties to run a political campaign against the left-oriented PPP in the 1977 general
elections. This coalition was a populist and consolidated right-wing political alliance, consisting
of nine political parties of the country. However, the alliance performed poorly in 1977 general
elections. By 1978, the alliance met its end when parties have diverged in each of its agenda. The
left-wing parties later would form the MRD alliance under PPP to oppose President Zia-ul-Haq in
the 1980s and the right-wing forming the IDA alliance under PML.
The Islamic parties have been consistently participating in the general elections. In the
1990s, the Islamic political parties united on a single platform in 1993 as "Islamic Front" against
Benazir Bhutto of PPP and in 2002, they formed another political alliance of the Muttahida
Majlis–e–Amal (MMA; "United Council of Action"). Despite its vast mass, populism, and support,
the MMA alliance only retained 63 seats while the PPP retained 94 seats and the President
Musharraf's PML (Q) securing 124 seats during the general elections held in 2002. In overall, the
Islamic influence in the politics has been very limited in the public.563
Islam was never enough to make Pakistan into a unified nation. On the contrary, the
hostility toward India often provides a better unifying force for its people. This security concern
has determined the content and contours of Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policy. As a result,
this dominance of security policy also paved the way for the superior position of the military
within state establishments and society. The Pakistan Armed Forces, the sixth largest in the world
in terms of active military personnel and the largest among Muslim countries, have played an
influential role in mainstream politics throughout Pakistan's political history.
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The Army is also the only institution that has succeeded to some extent in resisting
‘feudal’ characters of the Pakistani political system in the name of state loyalty and professional
meritocracy. However, “It succeeds in part only through turning itself into a kind of giant clan,
serving its members’ collective interests at the expense of the state and society, and underpinned
to some extent by ancient local kinship groups among the north-western Punjabis and Pathans,”
argues Anatol Lieven.564 The Pakistani military considers itself as a big family or large kinship
group, which maintain its power through extracting patronage from the state and distributing it
to its members.
There are longstanding Western fears that the social change in the country will ‘Islamize’
the Army, which increase their support Islamist revolutions or that there might be a mutiny by
Islamist junior officers against the high command. These dangers do exist, but in Lieven’s, a
Pakistani expert, view, most probably only a direct ground attack on Pakistan by the US could
bring them to fruition.565
The military officer’s ideology was first and foremost Pakistani nationalist. The military
tied to Pakistan, not the universal Muslim Ummah of the radical Islamist’s dream; tied not only
by sentiment and ideology but also by the reality of what supports the army. In the 1980s General
Zia did undertake measures to make the army more Islamic. Many officers who wanted
promotion adopted an Islamic trait in the hope furthering their chances of promotion. However,
this did not lead to blocking the career of secular generals from promotion such as General
Karamat and Musharraf. In the 1990s, and especially under Musharraf, most of Zia’s measures
were rolled back.566
Pakistan has a complex legal framework, a corrupt police institution, and court system,
but a progressive group of lawyers.567 The Federal Sharia Court (FSC) of Pakistan is the most
important institution regarding Islamization in Pakistan. The Federal Sharia Court was established
in 1980 during the Zia-ul-Haq regime. It is in the federal capital, Islamabad. The FSC is a
prestigious court that has the power to examine and determine whether the laws of the country
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comply with Islamic Sharia law. The declaration of Pakistan as the Islamic Republic in 1953 was
also the result of the struggle of these Islamic parties.
It consists of eight Muslim judges appointed by the President of Pakistan after consulting
the Chief Justice of this Court, from amongst the serving or retired judges of the Supreme Court
or a High Court or from amongst persons possessing the qualifications of judges of a High Court.
Justice Najmul Hassan Sheikh is the current Chief Justice of the court in 2017. Of the eight judges,
three are required to be Islamic clergy who are well versed in Islamic law. The judges hold office
for three years, which may eventually be extended by the President. Related to Islamization
program, this court represents the stricter voices of Islamic clergy against the pragmatic approach
of the government, the State Bank of Pakistan, or the industry.
The Insurance industry in Pakistan is regulated under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000. The
Government of Pakistan established the Department of Insurance in April 1948 within the
Ministry of Commerce. The purpose of this arrangement is to take care of affairs related to the
insurance under economic and industrial policies. The insurance industry in Pakistan is relatively
small compared to India, or even Bangladesh. However, the Pakistani insurance market has
undergone significant structural changes in the last few years, particularly, through mergers of
companies. According to Insurance Ordinance 2000, an insurance company must meet the
increased statutory requirement of minimum paid-up capital. Some companies who were unable
to raise this capital have been asked to close their operations. The ordinance increases the
efficiency and competitiveness of insurance industry in Pakistan.
Furthermore, the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), Insurance
Division, issues directives on financial security and transparency, code of good governance and
sound market practice to boost the industry. The year 2015 showed improvement in Pakistan’s
overall economic indicators, including containment of current account deficit. However, many
argues that this improvement was due to the continuing decline in international oil prices and an
uplift in remittances from abroad, and not because the structural adjustment at home.
The successful issue of Sukuk Bond in the international market also helped the investment
in Pakistan. Many countries have started to see Pakistan as a potential country for investment.
For instance, China and Pakistan made agreements in 2016 to establish the China Pakistan
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Economic Corridor (CPEC) between the two countries. As a result, many foreign companies start
to open the insurance business in Pakistan. In overall, the Pakistan insurance market is relatively
liberalized, with 100% foreign ownership and control of insurance companies permitted.
However, in overall the insurance industry has little influence in the regulation of insurance in
Pakistan.
Stalling growth and development
Pakistan has been the leader in advocating Islamic finance since its inception. After
participating in the establishment of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) at the first
Organization of Islamic Conference (now called the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) in 1973,
the Government of Pakistan initiated a national program to establish an interest-free economy
in the eighties. However, this program failed, primarily due to the continuous legal dispute
concerning the meaning of ‘true’ Islamic economy, the shortage of well-trained human resources,
and its reliance on the inefficient public institutions.
From the early 2000s onward, Pakistan changed its policy of systemic change of economy.
Pakistan has promoted Islamic finance and started a parallel financial system to that of the
conventional finance industry. This policy tried to replicate the success story of the Malaysian
Islamic economy. By September 2016, 22 Islamic banks consisting of six full-fledged Islamic banks
and 17 conventional banks with Islamic banking divisions, five Islamic insurance companies, and
80 Islamic mutual funds are operating in Pakistan. Islamic financial services companies are
managing an asset volume of about US$25 (PKR 2,492) billion including 57 Sukuk (Shariacompliant bond) issues with a volume of US$6.3 billion out of which Sukuk of US$1 billion
matured by September 2013. 568
In Pakistan, Islamic insurance just started very recently, and at present, only five Islamic
insurance companies operate. However, the growth during the period 2009-15 is positive. In
addition, assets of the Islamic insurance sector increased by 600% in seven years from PKR2.7
billion in 2008 to PKR16.3 billion in 2015. Currently, these five Islamic insurance companies are
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the backbone of Islamic insurance of Pakistan: Dawood Family Takaful Limited, Pak Qatar Family
Takaful, Pak Qatar General Takaful, Pak-Kuwait Takaful Company Limited & Takaful Pakistan
Limited. Several Islamic insurance models are being implemented by these companies. These
include Mudarabah based model, which has been adopted by Dawood Family Takaful Limited &
Pak Qatar Family Takaful & Wakalah Based Model, which has been adopted by Pak-Kuwait
Takaful Company Limited.
The reform on the legal framework of Islamic insurance in Pakistan has contributed
significantly to its development. As part of the reform, Islamic insurance rules were introduced
in 2005. Based on these new rules, Securities & Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and the
Central Sharia Advisory Board are working in close collaboration to aid Islamic insurance
companies to provide Islamic insurance services as per Islamic Sharia.
History and development
In 1978 the new president of Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq, announced the Pakistani government
would enforce Nizam-i-Mustafa, or the Islamic system. The Pakistani government intended to
complete the Islamization process of the country, which had been ignored by the previous
regimes. The Islamic system of the economy under Zia-ul-Haq was established through the
implementation of Zakat and replacement of interest-based finance to profit and loss sharing
system. Pakistan was not alone in conducting this initiative. This decade was a period of the global
resurgence of Islamic finance when Muslim countries like Pakistan, Sudan and Malaysia and some
Arab countries mobilized their efforts to transform their financial systems on Islamic lines.
The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) Pakistan was given a task to consider the best strategy
to achieve the objective of Islamization. To take help in its task, the CII set up a panel of 15 highly
qualified economists, bankers, and financial experts. The panel submitted an interim report,
which recommended the immediate removal of interest from the financial institutions whose
transaction was relatively less complicated and from where interest could be removed with ease.
This recommendation was followed by its final report, which contained detailed

238
recommendations for eliminating interest from all domestic transactions. The reports were
submitted to the government on November 1978 and June 1979, respectively.569
Besides drawing some strategies, the Council also examined the laws governing the
insurance business in the country. The Council analyzed eleven such laws and expressed its
opinion about them in a brief report to the government, which was in March 1984. The Council
further decided to constitute a working group to analyze the existing system and frame a new
system of surety and assurance following the Islamic teachings. At this time, the Council brought
together economists, the heads of the government insurance company and other insurance
experts as part of their working group.
The 1984 report of the Council stated the insurance contracts contain prohibited
elements including uncertainty in transaction, gambling, and usury.570 As discussed previously in
the matter of prohibition of insurance, the Council also objected the existing insurance contract
due to the element of uncertainty of transaction present in the differences between the premium
paid and the service received. The Council also considered insurance as gambling in its extreme
form. The Council considered those elements come within the definition of unlawful acquisition
of others’ property. Therefore, the report stated, "insurance in all its forms, except postal
insurance in Pakistan, is wrong, wicked, unlawful, prohibited and unenforceable".571
According to the same report, cooperative insurance with the following characteristics
would be lawful: (i) when an insured is paid a certain sum at the happening of an incidence, the
sum paid is considered tabaru or donation from all the insured. In such cases, the presence of
gharar or uncertainty in a transaction is accepted, (ii) as cooperative insurance is not meant to
receive profit so gambling and usury will not be present in it, and (iii) the insured are eligible for
receiving qard al-hasan (benevolent assistance) from the insurance fund.572 In overall, the
acceptance of the cooperative model is due to the social element in the nature of cooperative
itself. Cooperative insurance is considered to be closer to the ideal model of Islamic insurance.
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Moreover, the Council recommended that the Islamic insurance business shall be
conducted by an autonomous, non-profit, state organization. This perspective was like the view
of many Muslim scholars in Indonesia, arguing that insurance should be a non-profit endeavor.
The insurance fund shall be established as a permanent fund, with the status of a waqf
(endowment), and not as a business investment. Installments paid by the participants towards
short-term general insurance will be added to the Islamic insurance fund. Installments paid for
long-term insurance plans will be divided into profit-sharing investment and insurance
contributions.573
As some of the members of the Council, especially the clergy were strict of the view that
the insurance business should be based on mutual help and without any intention of making
profit. Therefore, the Council did not find any of the experiences of Islamic insurance companies
of that time suitable to be adopted for Pakistan. Majority of Islamic insurance services at that
time were provided by the for-profit company from Malaysia and the Gulf countries. The Council
was of the view that any insurance arrangement, which was not of the mutual type, will not be
acceptable in Islam. Most of the members of the working group agreed that insurance should not
be a money-making source for the organizers and should provide cover against those risks only
which should be covered in public interest, i.e. insurance should cater to the requirements of the
public and not to the requirements of the privileged class. Nevertheless, this effort was
discontinued without any concrete policy on Islamic insurance.574 Besides, the government of
Zia-ul-Haq decided to focus on establishing an Islamic welfare system of Zakat and agricultural
tax of Ushr. The Pakistan new welfare system was introduced on June 20, 1980, through the
promulgation of the Zakat and Ushr ordinance of 1980.
In 1990, a new council came into existence which decided to form another group to
complete this task. The working group comprised of six members of the council and four
representatives of major insurance corporations. Also, there were around twenty Islamic scholars
and insurance experts advising the group on the nature and function of the present system. Their
expertise was crucial for the Council to develop an alternative system. The group prepared a
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report in 1992 and submitted for consideration by the government. In this report, the group
reviewed the history of insurance and its present forms. It also investigated the status of
insurance from Sharia point of view and found the same conclusion that in its present form,
insurance involves the elements of usury, speculation, and gambling.575
Like the conclusion of the prior report, the Council report of 1992 had also discarded
existing Islamic insurance practices of that time which were considered Islamic alternatives to
insurance. The Council reviewed the functioning of Islamic insurance companies, working in
different Muslim countries, for developing a practical model for Islamic Insurance and suggested
an alternative system based on the concept of Mudarabah and Waqf. The Council studied STMSB
(Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Sendirian Berhad), IAIC (Islamic Arab Insurance Company) and IICS
(Islamic Insurance Company Sudan). The Council rejected the IAIC model because, in its view, all
conditions of occidental insurance are retained under Islamic nomenclature. The IICS model was
also rejected because of the distribution of surplus from the Islamic insurance. According to the
Council if the premium is considered debt then all principal amount must be returned, and if it is
considered an investment then profits of some participants cannot be diverted in favor of others.
As a result, the Council has recommended its model of Islamic insurance which is claimed to be
"in complete agreement with Islamic teachings".576
The main difference of the report of 1992 compared to 1984 is the Council in its 1992
recommendations showed flexibility regarding private insurance provided the Sharia
compatibility of its operations is guaranteed. In the early nineties, there was a huge
disappointment toward the performance of state enterprises, including in the Islamdom. Staterun enterprises were considered to be inefficient. This fact is apparent from the collapse of the
socialist system and the rise of privatization in most countries, including Pakistan. Many
proponents of Islamic economy shifted from supporting nationalization to economic
liberalization.577
The Council opened an opportunity for the private sector to be involved in the
Islamization of insurance in Pakistan. The Council recommended that the public sector runs the
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business of Islamic insurance, so the government may take the responsibility of running this
service according to Islamic law as suggested by the Council. If the above requirements can be
guaranteed, the Islamic insurance business can also be run by private and semi-government
corporations.578
The government of Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan Muslim League (PMN-L) had shown its
interest towards Islamization of the insurance business in the country and formed a commission
to develop a scheme for this purpose. Moreover, in 1993, the government put in place the Sharia
Enforcement Act. However, the Islamization Commission’s interim report was never presented
to Parliament, and plans were never implemented. Like previous effort, despite all elaborations
and sophisticated recommendations, there was no practical step has been yet taken for the
Islamization of insurance.579
Nawaz Sharif won again in the 1997 election and defeated the Pakistan People’s Party
(PPP) led by incumbent Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Sharif was sworn in as Prime Minister on
17 February. Following this victory, Sharif reconstituted Islamization Commission in 1997,
drawing largely on the Report of the Self-Reliance Committee, of which Professor Khurshid
Ahmad was the chairman. He was the person summoned back by President Zia in the early
Islamization program in 1984 with the task of overlooking the Islamization of Pakistan’s economy.
He was a Pakistani economist based in the University of Leicester who specializes in research,
education, and publication, working to advance Islamic economics and Islam in general. He was
summoned back from the United Kingdom, and he assumed the position of deputy chairman of
the Planning Commission. Professor Khurshid went on to become chairman of the Standing
Committee on Finance, Economic Affairs, and Planning during his first tenure in the Pakistani
Senate from 1985 to 1997.580
On December 23, 1999, the Sharia Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court strengthened
the Islamization effort by upholding the 1992 judgment and directed the government to
eliminate all forms of interest-based banking by June 30, 2001. The historical verdict consisted of
three detailed judgments by Justice Khalilur Rehman, Justice Wajihuddin and Justice Mohammad
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Taqi Usmani. After that things began to change slightly and somehow the Central Bank started
to be more supportive toward Islamization of economy and move in that direction and that is
how, according to Professor Khurshid, “From 2002 onwards, Islamic banks or banks which would
have totally self-contained Islamic units came into existence.” He added, “Now, [progress] is very
slow, but the direction is correct. Pakistan had two parallel streams, about 90 percent in interestbased and about 10 percent Islamic-based.”581
The Islamization of insurance efforts gained momentum after the promulgation of
insurance ordinance 2000 followed by Takaful Rules 2005 issued by the ministry of commerce
(MOC) to regulate the Islamic insurance business in Pakistan. Since then, international players
are taking keen interest to initiate Islamic insurance business in Pakistan.582
Furthermore, the Islamic insurance business in Pakistan entered a new era in the year
2012. Based on Takaful Rules 2012 issued by SECP, conventional insurance companies can open
Islamic insurance window. The Takaful Rules 2012 was a step for promoting the industry rapidly
at the national level, and the masses would have an opportunity to fulfill their insurance needs
under Sharia.583
Many players have become more involved in the development of Islamic insurance in
Pakistan. Based on data provided by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), there were 51 insurance
companies (7 life insurance, 39 general insurance, and 5 Islamic insurance), with an asset volume
of PKR876 billion (US$9 billion approximately), by the end of December 2015.584 Assets of the
insurance sector have shown a stable growth, with a median of 15%, over the 2009-15 period.
The size of the insurance sector is about 3% of GDP (9/271), showing a huge potential yet to be
capitalized.
Despite its open and ‘liberalized’ insurance market, structure of the insurance industry in
Pakistan had been highly skewed towards state-owned insurance companies. State Life Insurance
Corporation (SLIC) and National Insurance Company Limited (NICL) constituted 74% of the total
insurance market, particularly before 2005. Currently, there are five life insurance companies
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and 50 general insurance companies in the country. Most of the companies are private, local,
and foreign insurers.
The asset volume of 5 Islamic insurance companies was worth of PKR16 billion (99.5
million USD) by the end of December 2015. The Islamic insurance business has gained
momentum in Pakistan after 2005 since the promulgation of Takaful Rules 2005 by SECP. PakKuwait Investment Company (PKIC), a joint venture between Pakistan and Kuwait, started its
efforts in 2002 to introduce Islamic insurance in the country. Its major shareholders include
Takaful National of Malaysia (25%), PKIC (30%), Meezan Bank (10%) and others (35%). In 2007, a
second Islamic insurance company, Takaful Pakistan Limited, started its operations in the
country. In August 2007, Pak-Qatar Takaful Group obtained two separate licenses from SECP to
start operations in family as well as in general Islamic insurance business in the country. The size
of Islamic insurance stream was just about 2% of the insurance sector in Pakistan as of December
2012.585
As Malaysia and Indonesia, Islamic insurance products in Pakistan are broadly categorized
as family and general Islamic insurance business. In addition, seeing the lower purchasing power
as reflected in low GDP per capita and vast population of the rural areas of Pakistan, there is vast
scope for micro-Islamic insurance schemes.
Hanif’s study presents the growth of assets under Islamic insurance in Pakistan during the
period 2009-2015 showing an increasing trend. It shows that the assets of Islamic insurance
doubled in three years [2009-11] and were six times more in 2015 than those in 2008. It is
important to note that during the seven years period (2009-2015), conventional industry assets
increased to three times only, and the GDP growth rate in the country remained below 5%.586
This trend shows a significant increase in assets under Islamic insurance than conventional
insurance, clear evidence of market interest and potential for growth in Islamic insurance in
Pakistan.
To conclude, there is an excellent potential for Islamic insurance companies in Pakistan.
New rules and policies have been promulgated to develop this industry. The growth and
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expansion over the seven years of 2009-15 are very healthy; however, profitability during this
period is extremely low. Pakistan’s share of global Islamic insurance for the year 2015 was
projected to be US$75 million, which is about 1% of the total global Islamic insurance premium.
This proportion still quite small as compared to other countries (e.g., Malaysia, Indonesia, USA,
and the UK).587
Regulatory framework
Unlike Malaysia, there is no separate regulation for Islamic insurance in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s regulatory framework is also different from Indonesia because there are additional
regulations for Islamic insurance in Pakistan, whereas in Indonesia, both conventional and Islamic
insurance follow the same regulations. Islamic insurance companies in Pakistan must follow both
specific regulations on Islamic insurance and general insurance regulation, such as the Insurance
Ordinance 2000 and Insurance Rules 2002. These rules regulate all insurance business in the
country, including Islamic insurance business. The Takaful Rules 2005 and later the Takaful rules
2012 were however made to provide for the additional requirements of Islamic insurance in
Pakistan.588
In detail, the Islamic insurance business in Pakistan is regulated by several different
regulatory regimes from the rules related to establishing a company in general to the law
specifically on Islamic insurance. Islamic insurance companies have to follow legal requirements
such as the Companies Ordinance 1984 (SECP-2002); Companies (Issue of Capital) Rules 1996
(SECP-1996); The Insurance Ordinance 2000 (SECP-2011); The Insurance Rules2002 (SECP-2002);
The Takaful Rules 2005 (SECP-2005); The Insurance Companies (Sound and Prudent
Management) Regulations 2012 (SECP-2012); and Takaful Rules 2012 (SECP-2012). The Takaful
Rules cover all aspects of Islamic insurance operations from the nature of operating models to
Sharia compliance, qualifications for all persons involved in the business, capital, and corporate
governance issues.589
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In Pakistan, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SECP) is the general overseer for
both Islamic insurance and conventional insurance operators of the country. As a comparison,
the oversight functions for the Islamic insurance industry in Malaysia are performed by the
Malaysian Central Bank (Bank Negara Malaysia) and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB).
Also, to ensure the exercise of self-regulation within the Islamic insurance industry, the Malaysian
Takaful Association (MTA), which is organized by the operators itself, sets a common standard
for all Islamic insurance operators to regulate on and control matters concerning the pre-contract
examination of agents, agency registration systems, code of ethics, and compliance on Islamic
insurance tariffs. In Indonesia, Law number 40, the year 2014 states that the conventional and
Islamic insurance businesses are regulated and supervised by the Financial Service Authority (the
OJK). However, the specific guidelines for Islamic insurance are provided by an autonomous
Fatwa of Nasional Sharia board of DSN-MUI. DSN-MUI is a non-state institution that issued fatwas
related to Islamic transaction, including Islamic insurance in Indonesia.590
The Companies’ Ordinance 1984 governs the corporate sector in Pakistan.591 To start an
Islamic insurance business, a company must register under Companies’ Ordinance 1984.
According to this ordinance, a foreign Islamic insurance company with 100% ownership can
operate in Pakistan by meeting the minimum capital requirement of US$4 million, 50% of which
must come from abroad. The minimum capital to conduct life insurance business is PKR500
million, and for general Islamic insurance, it is PKR 300 million, irrespective whether the intended
business falls under conventional or Islamic insurance sectors, respectively. Upon incorporation,
the company is required to get itself registered under the Insurance Ordinance (2000) with the
insurance division of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). Section 6 of the
Ordinance (2000) provides detail criteria for all registered insurer, which ensures transparency,
managerial skills, and justice among the stakeholders.592
Also, Islamic insurance company needs to comply with the Takaful Companies’ Rules (of
2005 and 2012). These rules allow an Islamic insurance company to provide both for conventional
insurance and Islamic insurance. However, the company cannot provide a different product (life
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and general). Life insurance must be provided only life insurance Company, which does not
provide general insurance product (section 4(2) Takaful Rules).593
The Rules allow for both stand-alone and window Islamic insurance operations (Section 3
of the Takaful Rules) even though a window operator is required to display this status below the
company name in its place of business and all other relevant correspondences (section 11).
Notwithstanding, a conventional insurer may transform itself into an Islamic insurance operator
upon application to the Commission and meeting certain requirements set out by the
Commission (Section 7(1). In Pakistan and Indonesia, conventional insurance companies can
open Islamic insurance window, which is not allowed in Malaysia. In Malaysia, Islamic insurance
products can only be delivered by Islamic insurance companies.594
Also, the principal operational model of Islamic insurance is Wakala (for risk
management) and Mudaraba (for investment); however, Wakala is also allowed for investment
management.595 Investments must be made according to the Islamic finance principles under the
supervision of the Sharia board. the Pakistani framework, though not having specific sections
with limitations, in its definition section (section 2 of the Takaful Rules 2012), necessitates the
operators to choose between these two models only. Malaysia’s framework is more flexible in
term of Islamic insurance model compared to Pakistan’s model. Malaysia Islamic insurance
operators may choose from any of the operating models available worldwide provided the
operational model has been approved by its Sharia Committee and Board of Directors, but by
virtue of section 8.2 of the Malaysian Guidelines for Islamic Insurance Operation, the approval of
the Central Bank must be sought where the Islamic insurance operator wishes to use a model
which is to be introduced in Malaysia for the first time. The Fatwa from DSN-MUI No:
21/DSNMUI/X/2001 gives a guideline for Islamic insurance companies in Indonesia to use the
profit-sharing model of Mudaraba.596
Establishment of Sharia board and Sharia compliance audit is necessary. Except for a
detailed criterion for liquidation and distribution of surplus in PTF, in the case of ceasing
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operations, a comprehensive accounting and regulatory framework are being laid down by SECP
to regulate Islamic insurance business in Pakistan.597 The SECP as regulator, has the power to
appoint its own Sharia Advisory Board which shall formulate policies and guidelines for Sharia
compliance and resolve differences in Sharia rulings relating to treatment of operational issues
that may arise amongst Takaful operators Legislation has also included a reference to the
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) accounting
standards. Additionally, a reference to Sharia-compliant filters for investments is cited.598
An Islamic insurance operator is only required to appoint one Sharia advisor, a Sharia
compliance auditor, and a Sharia compliance officer. Like in Malaysia and Indonesia, the Sharia
committee shall consist of members all of whom must have knowledge in Islamic jurisprudence
and/or Islamic commercial law. However, Pakistan has more paper qualification for the
committee member. The Sharia advisor needs to have several certifications and degree that show
the advisor’s knowledge of Islamic finance and Takaful, enough command of the English language
and knowledge of Pakistani laws. Moreover, any Sharia advisor needs to have at least four years’
experience in giving Sharia rulings.599 Furthermore, in order to cover further risk, the rules 2012
also mentions about the establishment of reinsurance company for Islamic insurance companies.
As there is no local Islamic Reinsurance Company in Pakistan, The SECP has authorized the
Pakistan Reinsurance Company Limited (PRCL), a conventional insurance company, to conduct
window Islamic reinsurance operations.
There is a considerable difference between Pakistan and the other two countries in
conflict resolution mechanism. The Pakistan framework gives authority to the SCEP to sets up a
Dispute Resolution Committee via the Small Disputes Resolution Committee Rules 2015. The
Committee sits in the major cities of Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore and such other places as may be
designated by the Commission and has the power to arbitrate disputes arising from individual
life, domestic and motor insurance policy provided the claim does not exceed one million rupees.
Also, operators providing micro-Takaful are required to establish an internal dispute resolution
mechanism to handle consumer complaints (section 8(4)) of the Securities and Exchange
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Commission (Microinsurance Rules) 2013. In Malaysia, the Civil Court under the commercial
division of the court, referred to as the Muamalat Bench, has been dedicated to solving matters
in Islamic financial conflicts. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the Religious Court has the authority in
resolving conflict related to Islamic financial services based on Law number 3-year 2006.600
Special features and challenges
In comparison with other countries, there are some unique features and challenges of
developing Islamic insurance in Pakistan. Throughout its history over the last four decades,
Pakistan has been stressing on developing an ‘ideal’ and ‘perfect’ alternative of a model from the
Islamic perspective. It has emphasized more on its legal compliance of Islamic law rather than its
practicality and economic substance of Islamic economic transaction. The elaborative processes
within the Council of Islamic Ideology and public debates on what it means to be an Islamic
system had been the primary concern of developing Islamic model of Islamic insurance. One of
the indicators of this tendency is its reliance on a good Sharia education and certification rather
than finance education in developing its human resources.
Moreover, Islamization intended to have a systemic change within the Pakistani economy.
A sectoral reform approach had been accused of “dualism and half-heartedness”. This intention
of having systemic change had been stumbling block for Pakistan to imitate Malaysian model in
the first place. Creating Islamic alternatives within a ‘non-Islamic’ system was considered by many
proponents of Islamic system against the mandate of the Constitution.
Another significant debate in the development of Islamic insurance in Pakistan was the
issue on who is the provider of Islamic insurance. Many Islamic scholars argued that the state
was the provider of this service based on their interpretation of Islamic law. Being non-profit,
mutual, and public had been continuously articulated by the scholars as to the features of Islamic
insurance model of Pakistan. Only recently, the scholars have started to accept the involvement
of the private sector. They start to mobilize the Pakistani masses in a bottom-up approach
towards the Islamic system. Professor Khurshid describes it as the two parallel movements of
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top-down from the state level and bottom-up involving and inculcating the private sector,
especially the agricultural sector and the cottage industries in Pakistan.601
Nevertheless, the current regulatory framework of Islamic insurance in Pakistan relies
heavily on the role of the state to provide the guideline, supervise, and resolve conflict. The SECP,
which was established in 1999, is the primary regulator and market enabler in the development
of Islamic insurance in Pakistan. This centralized feature helps to avoid disagreements in the
implementation of Islamic insurance as experienced in the previous decades. However, it also
has given an overwhelming burden for this institution. Many critics argue that the SECP has
performed well in providing regulations but lack of human resources capability in its overall
governance of Islamic finance in Pakistan.602
Moreover, private-based Islamic insurance is still considered as an auxiliary of the Islamic
welfare system, which has always been promoted by the politicians during each general election.
Zakat and Ushr are still the main tools for the government to give economic assistance to the
poor population. In addition, in 2015, Pakistan has launched the Prime Minister's National Health
Insurance Program (PMNHIP), which aims to provide health insurance to low-income families in
23 provinces. Through the scheme, they will be given health cards covering them for up to
Rs50,000 (US$477) of treatment in public or private hospitals, including emergencies, maternity
care, post-hospital treatment and even transportation costs.603 The Islamic welfare system is still
the dominant political program as this program provide a short-term political outcome compared
to overhauling the entire social security framework into a more efficient system. This feature will
be elaborated further in the upcoming section when discussing ‘political life’ of Islamic insurance
in Pakistan.
In overall market assessment, Islamic insurance business in Pakistan still has a low market
share, although growing at a faster pace. The past financial performance appears to be weak,
though with significant potential depicted by healthy growth. After the enactment of The Takaful
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Rules 2005 and later the Takaful rules 2012, and the establishment of SECP in 1999, Pakistan has
a reasonably good regulatory framework in place. Also, the market sentiments are still mixed
about Islamic insurance in Pakistan, as many still hardly see the difference between conventional
insurance and Islamic insurance.604 Pakistan’s Islamic finance industry in general and Islamic
insurance sector in particular needs to educate the public through different venues and platforms
about the differences in conventional and Islamic financial industry.
Islamic insurance in a divisive nation
Zia-ul-Haq thought Islam could be a unifying force for the multinational country of
Pakistan. However, this state-sponsored Islamization opened sectarian fissures within a far from
monolithic Pakistani Islam. Islam was, however, less effective in providing a cohesive national
force than Zia anticipated. According to Ian Talbot, one of the prominent historians in Pakistan
history, the most significant tension of all was between the state legalistic imposition of Islam
and the humanist tradition of Sufism.605 Although we can dispute the notions of legal Islam vis a
vis humanist tradition provided by Talbot, we can agree that ‘Islam’ is a contested concept in
Pakistan. Each Islamist group in Pakistan consciously promote their understanding of Islam as
valid Islam.
At the same time, there was no incentive for the government to promote private-based
Islamic insurance as the underlying assumption for the state behind the Islamization was having
the redistributive policies that can give an immediate impact of growing state’s capacity, and by
implication, deepen its penetration of society. Islamization in Pakistan’s politics can be described
as continuous tension between the expansion of state power and social resistance to it.
This section examines coalitional politics behind Pakistan’s slow development in Islamic
insurance. The main problem for developing Islamic insurance in Pakistan was even though
Pakistan is officially an Islamic state; there has been no consensus on how to put Islam into
practical programs. The country has been experiencing continuous legal battles over
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interpretation and bureaucratic neglect by post-Zia administrations who had continued to
emasculate Islamization project. Moreover, the obsession of political actors in Pakistan,
particularly the Islamic parties, toward the idea of ‘Islamic State’ as an unnegotiable package of
Islamization necessitates all reforms start from and by the state (étatisme). As a result, all
discussions regarding Islamizing insurance sector in Pakistan had always been translated in the
term of the Islamic welfare state. In comparison, the Islamists of Malaysia and Indonesia have
been moving from state-centric reform toward the market and civil society channels due to their
respective political environments.
Contention over operationalizing Islam
Muslims agree that the Quran condemns usury, but do not all agree over what the
meaning of the term is.606 Most Pakistanis agree that usury is any interest on the debt; others
believe Quran refers to unethical loans that unfairly enrich the lender and not interest charged
under state-regulated banking practices. The economists, bankers, politicians, and bureaucrats
who would be responsible to administer the conventional economic system are the ones who
usually hold the second view mentioned before.
Meanwhile, Jamat-e-Islami and other Islamist group, with financial support from Saudi
Arabia, have advocated the elimination of any interest on the debt and organized numerous
symposia to elaborate and develop concepts and practices of the interest-free economy.
According to Khurshid Ahmad, the Pakistani intellectual and proponent of this movement, the
concept of Islamic economics, including Islamic insurance, is an essential part of the very concept
of Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1949,
and the Constitution of Pakistan contains essential elements of the vision of Islamic economics.607
It means there is a mandate to establish an Islamic system of economy. Moreover, the aspiration
of establishing Nizam-i-Mustafa or Islamic system in Pakistan has always been present in every
politicians’ rhetoric across the ideological spectrum and throughout Pakistan modern political
history. However, the Islamization reforms have had only a minor impact on political, legal, social,
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and economic institutions of the state and Islamic insurance was left far behind. The main reason
was the continuous contention over what constitutes Islamization itself.
Muhammad Iqbal and Ali Jinnah provided the imagination of an independent Muslim
state and the need to revive Islam as a complete system of life, however it was Sayyid Abul A’la
Maududi (1903-1979) and Jamaat-e-Islami (established in 1941) who articulated how Islamic
revivalism could be brought about in political, social, cultural, and economic arenas. He
attempted to make the religion more operational to mobilize the masses. On the Indian
subcontinent, Maududi has been hailed as the person who established the economics of Islam as
a separate branch of knowledge.608
Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, was a journalist and activist who was
sympathetic to Indian nationalism initially, but then began to blame nationalism for dividing
Muslims. After partition, Maududi chose to come to Pakistan and brought a faction of the Jamaate-Islami to Pakistan, and along with other prominent Islamic clergy tried to establish a political
role in the new state of Pakistan. Jamaat-e-Islami made the achievement of an Islamic
Constitution in the land of Pakistan its central goal.609
Jamaat-e-Islami is ‘an ideological party’ whose mission, according to Article 4 of the
party’s constitution, is the: “establishment of Divine Order or the Islamic way of life in its entirety,
in individual and collective life, and whether it pertains to prayers or fasting, Haj or Zakat,
socioeconomic or political issues of life.”610 For Jamaat-e-Islami, being Muslim means both
performing the religious rituals and improving the social life.
One of the prominent experts on Jamaat-e-Islami, Humeira Iqtidar, describes this party as
a Leninist cadre-based party; Maududi’s focus on ideology, ideological training, and structured
organizational management with the modernist aspirations of removing the backward traditions,
which are considered to be influenced by local customs and feudalism. From its ideological roots,
Jamaat-e-Islami moved into a more political phase when Maududi decided that the party would
participate in Pakistan’s 1958 national elections. However, the party did not gain much political

608

Alim.
HUMEIRA IQTIDAR, “Secularism Beyond the State: The ‘State’ and the ‘Market’ in Islamist Imagination *,”
Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 3 (2011): 535–64, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X11000217.
610
Ibid.
609

253
success until 1977 with the arrival of General Zia-ul-Haq in a military coup that overthrew Prime
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. With Zia as their patron, Jamaat-e-Islami together with other
Islamists group started introducing their concept of Islamization through state’s apparatus.
Islamic economics, including the idea of Islamic insurance, grew naturally from the Islamic
revival and political Islam such as the Jamaat-e-Islami whose adherents considered Islam to be a
complete system of life in all its aspects, rather than a spiritual formula and believed that it
logically followed that Islam must have an economic system, unique from and superior to nonIslamic economic systems. According to them, through the Islamic economic system, the gap
between the rich and the poor will be reduced and prosperity enhanced by such means as the
discouraging of the hoarding of wealth, taxing wealth (through Zakat) but not trade, exposing
lenders to risk through profit sharing and venture capital. Islamic system does not allow
speculation and other activities that bring benefits to certain individuals and bring damage to the
society.611
Compared to the Islamic economics version of the Iranian revolution, Jamaat-e-Islami was
more relax regarding private ownership. Jamaat-e-Islami were opposing the state’s land reform
policy and did not support nationalization program. They did not call for public ownership of land
and large industrial enterprise. However, they advocated on large public sector and public
subsidy policies (utilities, public transport, health care, energy resources such as oil, and unused
farmland).612
The main achievement of the clergy and the Islamic parties in Islamizing Pakistan’s
economy was the establishment of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Federal Sharia
Court (FSC) of Pakistan. The Council of Islamic Ideology was established for the purpose of
advising the government about bringing its laws and provisions into conformity with the
injunctions of Islam. CII made numerous recommendations that interest should be eliminated in
Pakistan as it is forbidden by Sharia.
In 1977, CII was entrusted by the next president of Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq, with the task of
preparing a blueprint for making the economy interest-free. President Zia directed the Council
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with specific goal of eradicating interest from the economy. As a result, the issue of interest or
usury gained central issue in country’s policy arena.
As mentioned in the previous section, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) appointed a
panel of economists and bankers in November 1977 to assist the Council in the delicate task of
finding ways and means to eliminate interest from the financial institutions and re-model
(Islamize) Pakistan’s economy. CII submitted several reports and made several recommendations
to transform the socio-political and economic system into a system conforming to the tenets of
the Sharia. Those included the reports and recommendations on Islamic insurance as discussed
earlier.
The Federal Sharia Court (FSC) was established in 1980 also during the Zia-ul-Haq regime.
The FSC office is in the federal capital, Islamabad. It is a prestigious court which has the power to
examine and determine whether the laws of the country comply with Islamic Sharia law. Beside
these two institutions, the declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic Republic in 1953 was also the
result of the struggle of these Islamic parties.
The Islamic parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami have not become the force in politics it had
hoped to be and only achieved a minor result in the elections. It is partly because there was no
massive support from most of the Muslim population. A majority of Sunni Pakistanis are the
Barelvis or traditionalists, which have traditional religious attitudes and resistance toward the
modernist agenda offered by the Deobandis group such as Jamaat-e-Islami. Also, Maududi’s
insistence on a cadre-based system and his desire to control the organization meant that while
his writings influenced many and found avid readers across North India, the Jamaat-e-Islami
remained a small, relatively tight-knit group for many decades after its inception. Indeed, the
Jamaat-e-Islami can be considered as the best example of Leninist party in terms of its
organizational structure and modus operandi.613 Nevertheless, Islamic parties have continued to
have an influence in Pakistani politics due to the patronage received under Zia-ul-Haq. The
Islamization Program of Zia-ul-Haq, Islamization amendments in Pakistan’s Constitution, and the
Islamization of the economy are the results of these Islamic parties’ efforts.
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On the other spectrum, Islamization was not defined as an establishment of an Islamic
state. The aspiration for Islamization was expressed in the leftist idiom of ‘Islamic Socialism’ and
not in term of Sharia implementation in Pakistan. From 1970 to 1977 West Pakistan was under
the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). PPP advocated a program
compounded of agricultural and industrial reform and the promulgation of a new constitution
which defined Pakistan as an Islamic socialist republic. The president and prime minister were to
be Muslims, and laws were to conform with Islam as determined by the Council of the Islamic
clergy.614
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with PPP had laid a foundation to use Islam in addressing the nation’s
unbalanced economic development. PPP’s Foundation Documents, authored by J.A. Rahim and
Mubashir Hasan, stated the intention to merge Islam with socialist ideas and liberal democratic
values. They claimed that this attempt, of so-called ‘Islamic Socialism’ would serve the interests
of the masses, not the capitalists, it was said, had pillaged the country and left people more
destitute that during the period of colonialism.615
Moreover, Bhutto attempted to transcend Islam in Pakistan from merely personal piety
into a pragmatic religion. For instance, Bhutto interpreted Jihad as synonymous with the idea of
Islamic Socialism. Jihad was interpreted as applying to everyday human struggle the dedication
of abolishing artificial distinctions and making righteousness the criterion of honor among men
and establishing a democratic and egalitarian social order.616 Bhutto adapted socialist
expressions of the charismatic Mao Zedong by saying that the party’s purpose was social change
based on Islamic teachings, not a socialist revolution.
Furthermore, Bhutto used this idea to threaten or reduce the power of his political
adversaries, particularly in the metropolitan centers. Thus, Bhutto did not hesitate to nationalize
the economy and conduct land reform. Since 1976, Bhutto extended his earlier nationalization
program when he ordered the government to take control of all cotton-ginning, paddy-husking,
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and flour milling. Bhutto’s actions were pleasing to many farmers in the rural areas but generated
resentment in the broader public.617
Bhutto argued that his Islamic Socialism was not communism. Islamic Socialism
acknowledged the right to private property but always be subordinate to the interests of the
community. His socialist regime, it was said, would never threaten Islamic tradition, and it was
often repeated that no law would be enacted that was repugnant to Islam.618
Although he was not religious himself, Bhutto showed his support to Islamic causes by
the promulgation of 1973 Constitution. Considering the previous experience, the Constitution of
the 1973 was more Islamic in character than the previous ones. Under Bhutto leadership, PPP
framed a Constitution that true to the aspirations of people and principles of Islam. The
Constitution of 1973 recognized Islam as the religion of the country and enjoined upon the State
to serve the cause of Islam and to bring all existing laws in conformity with Islam. The Islamic
Advisory Council (later, was re-designated as Council of Islamic Ideology) was set up to
recommend ways and means to bring existing laws of the country in conformity with the Islamic
principles. The Constitution explicitly requires the state to take necessary steps for the
prosecution of social justice, and eradication of social evils, such as prostitution, gambling and
taking of harmful drugs, and pornography.
Despite his effort to soften his socialist programs with Islamic idioms, the clergy and the
religious political parties like Jamaat-e-Islami and JUP were continue opposing his idea of Islamic
Socialism. They argued that Bhutto had the intention to implement his ideas in the same pattern
as practiced in China. Bhutto’s ideas were also considered to be secular based on Western
worldview. At that time, the religious parties had only 18 members in National Assembly, but this
tiny group had a stronger voice in the Assembly and support among the population concerning
Islamic issues. Many people were convinced that Bhutto economic program as merely an Islamcoated socialism, instead of a genuine Islamization of Pakistan economy.
Despite little success in the general elections, Islamic parties have continued to influence
Pakistani politics. This continuous effort obtained enormous support by Zia-ul-Haq who thought
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that Islam could be a unifying force for the divisive nation of Pakistan. After the removal of Bhutto
government in 1977, General Zia became the patron of Islamization in Pakistan and for the first
time in the country’s history, opened the bureaucracy, the military, and various state institutions
to Islamic parties.
Islamic reforms accelerated during the beginning of the Zia regime. However, this statesponsored Islamization opened further sectarian fissures within a far from monolithic Pakistani
Islam.619 Islamization, which means putting Islamic ideas into practical programs, including in
economy, received challenges from many fronts.
It was different compared to the Islamization of Iran during the 1979 Revolution. In Iran,
the Islamist force agreed to develop a new form of the Sharia that is modern and more adapted
to the contemporary world. Meanwhile, there was no consensus like that in Pakistan. The
different Islamist groups in Pakistan cannot agree on which form of the Sharia they wanted to
implement. There were different structure and process that happened in those two countries.
While Iran has a unitary and centralized form of Shia Islam that has been established by an empire
for hundreds of years. Pakistan has a diverse form of Sunni Islam and tension between Sunni and
Shia Islam.620 This continuous contention over operationalizing Islam has led the actions of
executive authority to postpone several times the project of the complex Islamization of the
banking and insurance sectors, and the economy as a whole.
A ‘providing state’ in an Islamic patrimonial system
Beside the contention mentioned above, there was little incentive for the Pakistani state
to support the development of private-based Islamic insurance within a ‘patronage to kinship’
economy of the country. The underlying assumption behind the Islamization project since the
1980s was in an Islamic setting, state will be responsible for fulfilling the needs of every citizen
with enough protection against any worries. “Islamization” of redistribution or the creation of an
Islamic patrimonial within a concept of Islamic welfare system has been the state’s essential tool
in an Islamized national politics. This project brought advantage both to the state and Islamic
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groups. Therefore, the redistributive policies such as the implementation of Zakat and Ushr, and
not private-based Islamic insurance, were the backbone of Zia’s Islamization project of Pakistan.
Zia Ul-Haq regime inherited weak economic indicators from Z.A. Bhutto in term of
growing debt servicing and declining GDP growth. However, Zia managed to avert those
indicators due to generous western aid to the tune of $ 3.2 billion from the US after Soviet
interference in Afghanistan in 1979 and increasing volume of remittances from $ 0.5 in 1978 to
$ 3.2 billion in early 1980s.621 It helped greatly to stimulate growth increase in GDP to 6.6% from
5% during Bhutto period. Under the jargon of Islamization, Zia regime also brought shift form
socialist economy of nationalization to capitalist economy. Zia regime gave a major role to private
sector in the process of growth.622
The government employed and adopted many recommendations by professionals,
engineers, and economists to meet the goals of economic reforms. The new policy relied upon
building private-sector and enterprises to achieve economic goals. Under a new policy, the
private-sector investment grew from ~33% in 1980 to ~44% in 1989.623 However, Zia’s economic
development was still dominated by étatisme, a policy which started since 1958 emphasizing on
the state’s dominant role in directing industrialization through licensing practices and subsidies.
Several industries were privatized but not banks and insurance that were kept under
government-ownership management. At the time of independence in 1947, 84 insurance
companies were operative in Pakistan, but the insurance industry was nationalized in 1972, and
merged into State Life of Pakistan and only in the 1990s, the financial reforms allowed private
and foreign companies to establish their business in the insurance sector.624
The reason for not changing the status quo of insurance was the political importance of
redistributive policies for both Zia and Jamaat-e-Islami. Although, Zia’s new economic policy
focused on liberalization of the economy, it fell under the Islamization program, which aimed for
the creation of an Islamic welfare system. The new Islamic ordinances, particularly on the
religious taxes which were promulgated since 1979, absorbed the liberalization of the economy
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under a new economic system. According to Nasr, these redistributive policies was essential for
the close alliance between the military-led by General Zia and the Islamic parties.625
Moreover, Nasr argues that the core issue of Pakistani politics has always been the
expansion of the (weak) state power and social resistance to it. In “weak state,” autonomy of
state institutions cannot be preserved, and as a result, industrial policy making and relations
between public and private sectors become directly reducible to pursuit of private interest.626
Redistributive policy is a way for the state to gain power and legitimacy among the people.
In addition, in pre-capitalist society such as Pakistan, redistribution and gift giving are
essential in buying political loyalty. As the state of Pakistan has been fundamentally weak since
its inception, in order to contend with powerful ‘feudal’ alliance and other political actors, the
state needs to rely on redistributive policies in order to increase its capacity and influences.
Therefore, redistributive policies either in the form of land reform, or Zakat during Islamization
of Zia-ul-Haq were very significant in strengthening state capacity against those diverse social
forces.627
In Pakistan, land reform has been the primary vehicle for redistributive policies. Since its
independence, the Pakistani state had become dependent on the landed elite and their networks
of authority to maintain order in rural areas; so much that they had been integrated into state
organization. The state was, therefore, hard-pressed to push through meaningful land reforms.
Ayub Khan (1959-69) and Z. A. Bhutto (1971-77) introduced only modest land reforms—after the
two land reforms of 1959 and 1972 still 30 percent of Pakistan’s farmlands were owned by 0.5
percent of the landowners.628
Zia ul-Haq, backed by Islamist parties, opposed land reform programs of previous
regimes. Zia needed to find another mean of redistributive policy, which consistent with the ideas
and interests of his supporters. As a new military regime, Zia was under pressure from the
powerful anti-Bhutto alliance (landowners and the Islamist parties) to undo Bhutto’s socialist
policies, including land reforms and nationalization. To compensate for this shortcoming, the
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state has sought to promote equity through other channels, including taking over religious lands
and endowments, and the collection of religious taxes and distribution of the proceeds. By the
end of the 1980s, the distribution of religious taxes approximated the level of all government
subsidies, which shows how central Islamization measures have become to the state’s
redistribution policies.629
During the first years of his rule (1977-84), Zia co-opted Islamic forces to balance the
power of the landed elite. Zia showed strong pro-Islamic stance by reintroducing traditional
Islamic punishments, prohibiting gambling and alcohol consumption, and creating a new judicial
review system. Moreover, Zia sought to introduce a number of distributive programs as part of
his Islamization package. These were designed both to aid the poor, and to consolidate the state’s
control over Islamic institutions—a continuation of the policy first introduced by Ayub Khan in
1959. This control would extend the state’s presence to the private sphere.
Zia introduced the system of Zakat, which is the Islamic requirement that Muslims share
their wealth with the less fortunate members of the community. Pursuant to his zakat ordinance,
monies derived by the government were to be divided into three parts: a local account, provincial
account, and a central account. Such funds were earmarked for community use and were
intended to spark development schemes from the village upwards. A hierarchy of control boards
was created to administer zakat collections, and Zia also appointed an Administrator-General to
oversee the entire program making him directly answerable to the President.
This mandatory religious tax was enforced in 1980, which applied to saving accounts and
other investment at the rate of 2.5% per annum. In addition, there was mandatory 10% tax called
Ushr that applied on the farm harvests and imported products. Ushr laid the foundation for an
Islamic welfare state, and that funds generated by ushr would be used to expand Pakistani
industry, construct pukka roads, and build modern state-of-the-art hospitals. Also, the monies
collected through the Islamization program would help social services for all Muslims, Sunnis and
Shia alike.630
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However, there was a strong reaction came from the country’s Shia community, which
claimed that zakat tax was a Sunni Muslim contrivance and that they had their own collection
practices. The Shia argued that their religious observances had been undermined by the
ordinance, and that it exposed the community to the manipulative capabilities of the majority
Sunnis. At the height of the controversy, a Shia group had stormed the Federal Secretariat in
Islamabad and had held it hostage for three days when the government refused to answer their
complaints. Following that episode, and not wanting to further excite religious passions, Zia
exempted the Shia from the otherwise obligatory rule.631
During Zia’s Islamization, the state coalesces with social force (the Islamists) using Islam
as the symbol. For Zia, Islamization of economy was not meant to implement Islamic rulings in
economic transaction including insurance, but it was primarily as a disguise of a new
redistributive policies. This strategy strengthened the state against the strong kinship networks
of the feudal class, and at the same time, presented Zia’s government as an Islamic government.
As a military officer without feudal kinship support, Zia tried to find support from the Islamic
clergy and general public with his Islamic redistributive policies of Zakat and Ushr.
In addition, the state’s takeover of the collection and distribution of religious taxes was
aimed at improving social welfare, but also to help the government’s budget deficits. In fact, since
1988 Zakat and Ushr funds have been officially integrated into the government revenue accounts.
In sum, Zia used Islamization more as a strategy to strengthen the state power rather than simply
an honest aspiration or reviving Islamic laws in Pakistan economy as the clergy and Islamic parties
suggested.
At the same time, the Islamist parties of Jamaat-e-Islami was continuously holding the
idea of ‘the Islamic state’ in their political imagination. It was the imagination of the ability of
particular institutions associated with the state in managing and directing individual behavior.632
Any kind of Islamic reform had to be conducted through the instrument of the state. It is the state
and no other institutions, including market, can tackle this task. It is a type of statism, which is
the belief that the state should control either economic or social policy, or both, to some degree.
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Therefore, controlling the state was the primary objective of any Islamic reforms promulgated at
that time.
Zia’s Islamization of economy program was translated in as creating welfare system where
state will be responsible to fulfill the needs of every citizens with an enough protection against
any economic difficulties. For many Islamic intellectuals and activists, it was absolutely unjustified
not to term the Islamic state as a welfare state. The economic implication of this comprehensive
welfare concept is that the Islamic state is responsible for eradicating poverty and creating
conditions for full employment and a high rate of growth and also arranging social security and
foster equitable distribution of income and wealth.
The debate within the Council of Islamic Ideology on Islamization of insurance had shown
the insistence of the clergy for having the state as the primary provider of economic protection.
The Council recommended that the Islamic insurance business shall be conducted by an
autonomous, non-profit, state organization. Moreover, they were strictly of the view that the
insurance business should be based on mutual help and without any intention of making profit,
therefore the Council did not find any of the experiences of Islamic insurance companies of that
time suitable to be adopted for Pakistan. The Council was of the view that any insurance
arrangement, which was not of the mutual type, will not be acceptable in Islam. Only in the
Council’s recommendations of year 1992 showed its flexibility regarding private insurance. The
Council recommended that the business of Islamic insurance be run by the public sector, so the
government may take the responsibility of running this requirements and details according to
Islamic law as suggested by the Council. If the above requirements can be guaranteed, Islamic
insurance business can also be run by private and semi-government corporations
Besides, the primacy of the idea of Islamic welfare state gave political benefit to the
Islamist parties. “Islamization” of redistribution has by itself Islamized national politics to the
advantage of Islamic groups. Throughout the 1950s the Jammat-e-Islami helped galvanize
support for the landed elite against land reform by underscoring the sanctity of private property.
The alliance was able to undo the government’s plans. Adversely, the problem of rural poverty
and the socioeconomic position of the landed elite too elicited a response from Islamic groups.
When Zia took power, Islamic parties rallied behind him to introduce new distribution policies.
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Zia included Islamic parties in the drafting of Zakat and Ushr ordinances and gave them access to
various state resources. Religious leaders then became one of primary actors in promoting rural
development projects and rural development. As a result, the redistributive policies were used
to increase popular support toward the Islamic groups and gave these groups more access to the
state’s policies. However, the reliance on the idea of Islamic welfare state had stalled the
development of private sector in Pakistan, thus there were no Islamic insurance companies prior
to the year 2004.
The Zakat and Ushr laws may have helped the state’s revenues and to a modest extent
contributed to its provision of social welfare, but only after exacting a steep political cost in terms
of entrenching Islamization in state policy and national politics, fanning the flames of sectarian
conflict, and expanding state capacity.633 Eventually the increase in the capacity of the state
through Islamization would also bring about tensions in the relations between the state and its
Islamic allies. The Islamic parties were increasingly unhappy with the increase in the state’s
control of Islamic institutions.
It is important to note that Islamization has been a manifestation of deep-seated struggles
between the weak and developing Pakistan state and powerful social forces. As such,
Islamization’s impact on Pakistan’s economy must be gauged in terms of the extent to which it
has facilitated the state’s penetration of the society and control of the economy.634 In
comparison, Mahathir of Malaysia encouraged Islamic insurance in a way that consistent with
Malaysia’s economic liberalization agenda. Supporting Islamic insurance was a political way of
demonstrating that Mahathir and UMNO remain connected with their constituents’ Islamic
roots, and at the same time, building a working Islamic insurance-backed economy, especially
one without heavy state subsidies, would reinforce the transformation toward a modern and
entrepreneurial Malay society. On the contrary, in Pakistan the underlying assumption behind
Islamization was having the redistributive policies that can give an immediate impact of growing
state’s capacity. “Islamization” of redistribution—creation of an Islamic patrimonial and/or
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welfare system—has by itself Islamized national politics to the advantage of both Zia regime and
Islamic groups.
In summary, the Pakistani state’s emphasis on state redistribution by using Islamic
institutions reflects its desire to gain public acquiescence to its domination in the same fashion
as it has been extended to the landed elite and their kinship network. Domination in pre-capitalist
society largely occurred in various forms. It can be in acts of generosity and distribution of
resources were reciprocated by loyalty. As the state sought to replace traditional elite, the state
was compelled to contemplate a similar normative order, but one in which state institutions
would extend generosity and receive loyalty. According to Nasr, as the state of Pakistan
implements redistributive policies of religious taxes, and not empowering market through state
support of private-based institutions, its capacity grows. By implication, its penetration of
Pakistani society deepens.635
From failed co-optation to negligence
There were series of attempt to co-opt Islamization ideas and Islamic forces throughout
Pakistan history, but all failed. General Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf tried modernizing the
country by implementing secular nationalist model like Turkish republic. General Zia-ul-Haq
made effort to co-opt Islamization demand and unite Pakistan through enforced adherence to a
stricter and more puritanical form of Islam mixed with Pakistani nationalism. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
founder of the Pakistani People’s Party and civilian ruler of Pakistan in 1970s, for his part tried to
rally the Pakistani masses behind him with a program of anti-elitist economic populism of ‘Islamic
socialism’, also mixed with Pakistani nationalism. 636
To stay in power Z.A. Bhutto was compelled to devise a new strategy. He actively
championed Islamization in the hope of co-opting a part of the opposition. Bhutto made further
concessions to Islamic morality, such as prohibiting alcohol and gambling. In addition, he initiated
the establishment of the Council of Islamic Ideology under the supervision of Mufti Mahmud. The
task of this Council was to oversee the implementation of government-sponsored Islamization.
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Indeed, the ‘secular’ government of Bhutto was the one who started the Islamization process in
Pakistan. This concession for Islamization was also influenced by the fact of Pakistan became
increasingly dependent to oil rich Arab states for loans, commerce, and employment of labor.
However, the Islamic parties did not fully support this initiative due to their rejection of the heavy
influence of socialism in the practice of Islamization. The PPP eventually was defeated in July
1977 by demonstrations and the intervention of the army.
The new military regime, led by General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) and influenced by the
Jamaat-e-Islami, again attempted to base its authority on a strong pro-Islamic stance. The
government reintroduced traditional Islamic punishments, prohibited gambling and alcohol
consumption, and created a new judicial review system. More importantly, the government of
Zia-ul-Haq pushed further Islamic economy ideas into practice. Zia introduced the redistributive
system of Zakat and Islamization of banking system to be implemented in Pakistan.
Zia’s Islamization established approximately 7,000 interest-free counters at all the
nationalized commercial banks in January 1980, making Pakistan the first country in the Muslim
world with the largest number of Islamic banking.637 However, although the attempt at the
Islamization of the economy was initially started under the umbrella of the constitution, the
constitutional authorities were never persuaded to take the implications of these efforts
seriously, except in the implementation of religious taxes of Zakat and Ushr.
In 1979, Zia’s government declared that the enforcement of an interest-free Islamic
economic system would be completed within a three-year time frame. However, this very same
government on June 25th, 1980, limited the jurisdiction of Federal Sharia Court for a period of
three years from entertaining any petition to consider fiscal issues including bank interest. With
the exception of establishing the Council of Islamic Ideology, the Zia government did not contrive
firm provisions and effective strategic policies for facilitating the Islamization process of the
economy.638
One of the reasons for the lack of support from Zia’s government toward the Islamization
promoted by the clergy and Islamic parties was due to the miniscule results by Islamic parties in
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the 1985 national elections. In this election, Jamaat-e-Islami won only 10 of the 68 seats it
contested in the National Assembly and 13 of the 102 for various provincial assemblies. With
Jamaat-e-Islami proving to be less of a force than expected on the national stage, Zia’s support
for the party and its Islamization agenda waned.
Benazir, the daughter or late Zulfiqar Bhutto from the left-wing party of PPP, campaigned
strenuously against Zia’s Islamization both before and after Zia’s death in 1988. Benazir criticized
the “anti-female” bias in the Zia’s Islamization program, and this theme became a major issue of
the PPP campaign in 1988. This campaign strategy was successful in bringing Benazir to the
power.
Subsequent to the election, however, the issue of Islamic reform has faded from centerstage. Although, her ‘anti-Zia’s Islamization’ campaign contributed to her victory, Benazir’s
government had done little to hinder the operation of the Islamization as implemented by Zia.
Her administration has not dismantled the Federal Sharia Court nor the Sharia Appellate Bench
of the Supreme Court.
Benazir’s administration was constrained from dismantling Zia’s Islamic reforms due to
its narrow electoral mandate. She had been well-advised to moderate her opposition to
Islamization as directly challenging the reform would entail considerable political costs to her
administration. Her administration continued to incrementally emasculate through bureaucratic
neglect the already anemic program that she inherited from her predecessor.639
Nawaz Sharif became the 12th Prime Minister of Pakistan on 1 November 1990,
succeeding Bhutto. The subsequent government manifested a similar attitude except for its
establishment of the Commission for Islamization of the Economy (CIE) in June 1991 to promote
Islamic Banking. Furthermore, the ruling government of Nawaz Sharif challenged the 1991 FSC
judgment on riba in the Supreme Court. The government contended that bank interest is not riba
and that it was utterly impossible to run the economy without interest in present day
circumstances. 640
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Islamization, which means putting Islamic ideas into practical programs including in
economy, received challenges from many fronts. Between Muslim groups, there has been
unrelenting debate on what exactly Islam says on the matters: Zakat, Ushr, Islamic insurance, etc.
Furthermore, there has been series of legal battles over the interpretation of Islamic laws. This
continuous contention over operationalizing Islam has led the actions of executive authority to
postpone several times the project of the complex Islamization of the banking and insurance
sectors, and the economy as a whole.
The divisive political environment of Pakistan made the issue of Islamization of the
Pakistani economy becoming a very salient policy issue, where a large number of actors feels that
the issue affects them, and that the political system is a way to address the issue. Moreover,
rather than debating regulation on accounting practices, setting utility rates, and premium rates,
the issue is always associated with ideology and political interests. Unlike in Indonesia and
Malaysia with their State or Central Bank, there was no institution that strong enough to solve
the differences. In Pakistan, the realization of the Islamic economic model was entrusted to the
Council of Islamic Ideology, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, and the Federal Sharia Court, while the
State Bank appeared on a roadside of this process and was content with technical functions. This
represents the dominance of the ulama (Islamic clergy) and Islamist political parties in the
Islamization agenda in Pakistan.
Furthermore, a critical study on the performance of Securities and Exchange Commission
(SECP) who is responsible to regulate the insurance industry in Pakistan founds that there is
evidence of partial degree of institutionalized corruption which led to the questioning the
credibility and competence of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan as their
rightful regulator. This shows the high level of distrust toward state institution due to the
relationship-based culture that motivates corrupt behavior.641
The main problem for the developing Islamic insurance in Pakistan was despite the fact
that Pakistan is officially an Islamic state, there has been no consensus on how to put Islam into
practical programs. Both Z. A. Bhutto and Zia regimes tried to co-opt the pressure of Islamization
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from the Islamic groups but failed. Pakistani state was too weak to achieve this even if it wanted
too-as Zia-ul-Haq’s failed Islamization demonstrated. Moreover, the obsession of political actors
in Pakistan, particularly the Islamic parties, toward the idea of ‘Islamic state’ as an unnegotiable
package of Islamization necessitates all reforms start from and by the state (étatisme). As a result,
all discussions regarding Islamizing insurance sector in Pakistan had been always translated in
term of Islamic welfare state as history of Council of Islamic ideology has documented. In
comparison, the Islamists of Malaysia and Indonesia have been moving from state-centric reform
toward market and civil society channels due to their respective political environments.
Beyond the textual argument and ideologies, it was also battling overpower and interests.
The post-Zia administrations continued to incrementally emasculate Islamization project as they
could not abort it due to its high political cost. Simultaneously, there was no political incentive
for government to promote Islamic insurance as it has little political benefit for them.
Consequently, Pakistan has been experiencing continuous legal battles over interpretation and
bureaucratic neglect of Islamization project until the present. Consequently, the Islamic
insurance Industry in Pakistan suffers from absence of standardization that affects their business
especially companies with cross-border selling.
Tribal Islam and conservative attitude toward Islamic insurance
This section addresses the issue of why Pakistani society resists Islamic reform or even
the best-designed and best-intentioned attempt at reform and positive development such as the
establishment of Islamic insurance. There had been constant radical top-down efforts to
transform the country. After Jinnah, various leaders came up with their novel ideas of reforming
Islam. Ayub Khan introduced ‘modern’ Islam, whereas Zulfikar Bhutto came up with his version
of a ‘socialist’ Islam. The ‘fundamentalist’ version Islam became dominant under Zia military
regime. Benazir Bhutto came and put down the radical tone of Islamization and introduced the
‘compromising’ Islam. Lastly, Nawaz Sharif wanted to boost the private sector under the
‘capitalist’ version of Islam. These leaders tried to improve Pakistan’ social and economic
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conditions but they could not stay long enough to continue the reform because there was no
political support outside their respective feudal and kinship networks.642
Like Indonesia, Pakistan has levels of socioeconomic problems which would seem to be a
fertile ground for a mass reformist movement in the name of Islam. Also, it has inherited from
India before 1947 on of the leading intellectual traditions of Islamist modernism and reformism.
However, the ‘reformed types’ of Islam failed to transform Pakistani society. It is mainly because
the Muslims of Pakistan, like other societies in the Indian subcontinent, have tended to remain
socially and religiously conservative. Moreover, due to the strength of kinship loyalty, Pakistani
society has little incentive to modify their social institutions and religious practices, including
embracing an Islamic but novel and private-based insurance mechanism.
This section begins by elaborating the idea of insurance within Pakistani society, and then
explore the social stagnation for the reluctance in accepting the modern scheme of Shariacompliant insurance. The concepts of risk and risk sharing are tied to the values or culture in local
worlds.643 Pakistani society tends to be resistance to any effort of changing their traditional risk
management. This part of this chapter focuses on how Pakistani consume, rework, and hesitate
to accept Islamic insurance, whereas, the religious conservativeness and kinship bonds play the
most critical part in it.
Islamic insurance and the multiple risk managements
About 97% of Pakistanis are Muslims. They also live in a country that claimed to be an
Islamic state. Our assumption is Islamic insurance would be embraced by Pakistani society who
are seeking for alternative scheme of conventional insurance. On the contrary, Islamic insurance
industry in Pakistan took so much time to take off and there were not enough investment vehicles
for Islamic insurance companies to invest in. Islamic insurance has been existing for several
decades, yet it hasn’t grown as quickly as other Islamic financial services. The answer is Pakistanis
rely upon channels of social charity, state assistance, and kinship network for their economic
protection, and disregard modern scheme of any private based insurance.
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Insurance is a relatively small sector in Pakistan. Insurance is considered as a ‘luxury’ good
and hence is considered for purchase only by those who are wealthy. However, many of these
rich families prefer not to use insurance and rather prefer to invest in property and family
business as a form of insurance and life cycle risk management. But for some who chose to buy
insurance, they tend to choose Islamic insurance over conventional insurance with various
reasons. Abdul Wahab’s study shows out of 80 respondents 22 are of the view that they have
selected the Islamic insurance model because it is Islamic, 16 are of the view that they are using
it because of religious reasons while 30 respondents when asked said that, it is because they are
personally satisfied with the Islamic insurance on the other hand, 15 are of the view that, they
have chosen Islamic insurance because others (family and friends) ask them to choose it.644
Private health insurance in Pakistan is underdeveloped. Only about 7% of health financing
is through mandatory and voluntary prepaid health insurance. Private for-profit and not-forprofit health insurance schemes are funded through contributions and mainly based in large
cities. Large private employers are increasingly buying private group health insurance for their
employees. Still, in Pakistan, the health system is dominated by private financing, in the form of
out-of-pocket payments, (at 55% of total funding in 2012). This number of private financing was
extremely high in global terms (where the average was 21%). It was also well above the 20% limit
suggested by the 2010 World Health Report.645
The low level of insurance is due to the small effective market size. In the developing
Muslim countries like Pakistan, only public sector employees are forced to save in the form of
their pension and social security contributions. Pakistan’s Public sector employment is tiny
compared to the total Pakistan’s workforce. As a result, the market size for insurance and related
products are restricted to this group. Moreover, like Indonesia, majority of workers in Pakistan
work in informal sectors that are lack of insurance protection.
For majority Pakistani, the state’s welfare framework has been their primary scheme for
receiving assistance. Therefore, the welfare system is entirely to be the buzzword in daily political
debate in Pakistan, mainly due to the prevalent poverty in the rural and urban areas. The
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Economic Survey 2018 revealed Pakistan’s percentage of people living below the poverty line in
2015-16 is 24.3 percent of the overall population. This number is a radical improvement of the
previous decade of 2005-2006 where 50.4 percent of the people are deficient.646 The rhetoric of
‘Islamic welfare state’ partly contributed to the victory of PTI party, which brought Imran Khan
to the prime minister seat. Imran Khan’s rhetoric on the Islamic Welfare State has gained
multiple supports, particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami supporters, and people the urban literate
population. These urban literates may not agree in the Jamaat-e-Islami kind of Islam, but they
are interested in how Islam is being or is going to be promoted to protect the disadvantaged in
the community.
Imran Khan’s welfare program is a continuation of different types of distributive policies
that had been conducted since Pakistani independence. As discussed in the previous section, the
distributive policies are embedded in Pakistan as a ‘weak’ state. Before Imran Khan’s program,
there have been land reform, Zakat or religious taxes, and the latest, Bhutto Income Support
Program (BISP). BISP is funded through the federal budget in 2008 to provide unconditional cash
grants to the most impoverished families in the country.
Regarding the religion of Islam itself, the majority of Pakistani Muslims are traditionalists.
For Muslim traditionalist, Islam is an individual religious commitment. Their leaders present Islam
in devotional rather than collective term, unlike the modernist of Deobandis (including the
Jamaat-e-Islami). The modernist group advocates more than a program for an individual spiritual
improvement. For Jamaat-e-Islami and their like-minded groups, Islam offers a systemic
transformation of the society based on the formal ruling of the Sharia.647 Islamic economics,
including the idea of Islamic insurance, grew naturally from the Islamic revival and political Islam
such as the Jamaat-e-Islami whose adherents considered Islam to be a complete system of life in
all its aspects. Islam must have an economic system, unique from and superior to non-Islamic
economic systems. The modernist Muslims are the ones who are more receptive toward the idea
of Islamic insurance, even though, they initially advocated more on public-funded rather than
private-based schemes.
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More conservative Salafi have shown less interest in socioeconomic issues, arguing that
the Prophet of Islam and his companions did not study `laws` of economics, look for patterns,
strive for understanding of what happens in commerce, production, consumption, therefore it is
not necessary for contemporary Muslims to put efforts on those matters. Not only conventional
insurance, this group not even entertain with the whole idea of Islamic insurance itself.
Moreover, they reject the religious argument of Islamic insurance and contend that transaction
is unlawful.
The majority of Pakistani Muslims are traditional who reluctance toward Islamic insurance
not because of its legal argument, but because the whole idea of Islamic insurance is too modern.
For them, the fundamental concept of Islam is on personal and ethical, not the communalpolitical aspect of Islam. This traditional understanding of the religion is expressed in the social
practices of charity. Islam in Pakistan is having effective role in that softening the misery of
Pakistan’s poor through charity. One of the prominent charity organizations is The Citizens’
Foundation, with more than 600 schools and 85,000 pupils. The Citizens’ Foundation is a nonreligious organization but a majority if its founding members from the business community are
practicing Muslims from different strains of Islam.648
Charities with a religious character also tend to be more favored and more trusted by the
population. Pakistan’s most famous private charitable institution by far, the Edhi Foundation,
which is non-religious; however, it is led by a very religious individual, Abdus Sattar Edhi. This
charity is vital for a country like Pakistan, where public expenditure for social welfare including
health sector were only 5% of government expenditure. Moreover, the charity organization
usually plays important role where the level of trust toward state institutions is extremely low.
Pakistan has one of the lowest levels of tax collection outside Africa, which shows the public’s
low level of trust toward the state. However, charitable donation in Pakistan, at almost 5 percent
of GDP, is one of the highest rates in the world.
Another religious institution that is central for helping the disadvantaged groups in
Pakistan is the madrassah or religious school. For instance, the Red Mosque in Islamabad, which
was sieged by the police force under the order of Musharraf in 2007, could afford to feed up to
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6,000 students. The funding mostly comes from local individual donations and Zakat from abroad.
Many people in the oil-rich Gulf States Muslims send zakat abroad - an estimated £50m a year
from Saudi Arabia.
The poor Pakistani families prefer to send their children to madrassah even compared to
free public school. It is because madrassah is taking care all the needs of their children, not only
for their academic need but also for their daily needs. Madrassah removes the financial burden
for many poor parents. Report says over 35,000 madrassahs are currently operating in Pakistan,
which is very huge for a country like Pakistan. According to a report issued in Karachi, there were
only fewer than 300 madrassahs during country’s independence in 1947.
These religious institutions are the genuine voluntary sector of Pakistan. While there are
some other ‘secular’ NGOs with linkage to the International aid organization, but many of them
are lack of skills and below the standard required by those international organizations.649
Nonetheless, many foreign aids are controlled by state apparatus or semi-governmental
institutions, and NGOs are under state surveillance because of political suspicion.
The other risk management available and used by many Pakistanis is the remittance
through an official money transfer or black-market services of hawala. Hawala is black market
money transfers that can transfer money any amount, to anywhere, in almost no time. Quick,
cheap, and paperless, the age-old hawala money transfer is thriving in Pakistan. Millions of
emigrants use it to remit their wages to families back home.
This remittance system relates to the strong kinship of Pakistani society. One study
examines the relationship between remittance and family member sickness and shows that the
level of remittance increases when there is a family member who gets sick. At the same time, the
study found no money transfer among the village members. It shows that the risk-sharing
happens between individual within kinship networks and not among individual in a similar
location. This habit is quite different from the communitarian model happen in many Indonesian
villages where geographical proximity and modern association replace many of kinship ties. This
issue will be elaborated further in the next section.
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As mentioned before, Islamic insurance was presented to the public as the ‘Islamic’
alternative of conventional insurance. Several studies show that many customers in Pakistan
choose Islamic insurance because of a religious reason. Ninety percent of the customers come
because the service complies with their religious beliefs.650 However, this appeals only for the
well-off individuals in the urban center, which is quite small. Moreover, the survey of 150 life
insurance customers conducted by Akhter revealed that majority of the respondents is unaware
of Islamic insurance concept.651 Some of the upper-income group tends to disregard Islamic
insurance partly due to their lack of awareness concerning the Islamic aspect of Islamic insurance.
Many hardly found differences between Islamic insurance and conventional insurance.
Moreover, the commitment toward Islamic economics among the Muslim modernists
does not necessarily lead to actual participation. As comparison, a separate dataset based on
interviews conducted in the Middle East and North Africa alone shows as much as 45 percent of
the respondents would choose an Islamic product over an otherwise identical conventional
alternative. Moreover, these respondents will still choose Islamic products even if it required
paying an additional charge equivalent to 5 percent of the loan amount. However, only 2 percent
report current use of Islamic finance. There is considerable gap between expressed preferences
and actual behavior.652
There are some initiatives to promote Islamic microinsurance to the poor population of
Pakistan. This service provides life, health, crop and livestock protection, and small-scale
businesses, especially for the rural community. However, the population is more interested in
participating in the programs conducted by the State and NGOs, and not Islamic insurance
companies. Despite the promotion of Islamic insurance from its religious aspect, the general
population of Pakistan tend to use more traditional ways, non-market approaches, of risk
management. In overall, the economic activities within Pakistani society are more influenced by
tribal ethics of hospitality, honor, and mutual help among kin rather than modern and rational
profit seeking motive economy.653
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How could this happen? The following section elaborates why there is no transformation
within Pakistani Muslim society, which resulted in their reluctance in using Islamic insurance. The
religious conservatism and the strong kinship bond are influential in the way they manage
economic risks.
The stagnation of social reform
Stating Islamic insurance as the Sharia-compliant service does not necessarily change the
beliefs and behavior of most of the Pakistan population, which are deeply conservative. Most
ordinary Pakistani aspire of the implementation of Sharia, but it is because of the conditions of
lack of justice, security, and welfare within the society. People use ‘Sharia’ as a sort of code for a
better, simpler, more equal, more honest, more protective, and more accessible form of the
economic system and not so much about the content of the law dealing with the economy. 654
On the other hand, the Islamist political parties have never achieved sufficient political control in
the parliament and could not successfully organize a massive movement for Islamic reform. All
in all, the Islamic reform in Pakistan is more concern about putting more religious ruling rather
than on the actual implementation of it.
This phenomenon of Islamization of economy is not an isolated phenomenon but is
closely connected not only to the internal socioeconomic conditions of the semi-feudal Pakistani
society. Historically, the scheme of 'Islamization' of the economy was introduced by a Martial
Law regime of Zia-ul-Haq in an arbitrary and undemocratic way. It was a political instrument
devised by the ruling elites to maintain the status quo, block land other radical social change.
However, the conservative forms of Islam play a more critical role in the lives of Pakistanis than
the modernist ideas of Islamic reform. Islam in Pakistan is more presented in term of devotional
and ethical, rather than in term of political and collective identities.655
Furthermore, there is strong tribal nature presented by Pakistani society. To be more
exact, the loyalties and social life of the Pakistani people revolves around the sub-ethnic
categories of the family and kin or so-called baradari. The family is the basis of social organization,
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providing its members with both identity and protection. Rarely does an individual live apart from
relatives; even male urban migrants usually live with relatives or friends of kin. Children live with
their parents until marriage, and sons often stay with their parents after marriage, forming a joint
family.656 This kinship relationship defines to whom their children will be married to, to what
political party they will vote in the next election, and to whom they will ask for job and help.
According to Lieven, kinship relations play a central role in wealth creation and
distribution for a country with low natural resources, such as Pakistan. In Pakistan, there is no
‘traditional’ source of wealth for elites to control and monopolize, Lieven further explained. The
primary way for aspiring leaders to extract wealth is through a control over state. To achieve this
end, communal leaders rely on “patronage to kinship” - a basic dynamic of the Pakistani system.
This deep kinship, Lieven noted, is an extremely important aspect of society, used to maintain
degrees of stability through power structures.657
However, patronage in Pakistan should not therefore be the preserve of the elites, and as
simply top-down relationship. A mixture of the importance of kinship loyalty and the need for
politicians to win votes, and -on occasions-to mobilized armed supporters. Quite poor people can
thus form part of ‘human resource networks’ and mobilize some degree of help or protection
from their superior. Even the very poorest in the village often benefit from the deg tradition
whereby local landowners and big men distribute free food to the entire village to celebrate some
happy event, to boost local prestige through public generosity.658
People gain access to patronage by using their position within kinship network to mobilize
support for a politician who then repays them in various ways when in office, or by using kinship
links to some policemen or official to obtain favor for relatives or allies. In certain circumstances,
this can benefit the whole village through the provision of electricity, roads or water. The effects
on the resources, and on the state’s ability to do things are just the same, but more the results
are ploughed back into the society, rather than making their ways straight to bank accounts in
the West. This is an important difference between Pakistan and Nigeria, argues Lieven.659.

656

Peter Blood, ed. Pakistan: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994.
Lieven.
658
Ibid.
659
Ibid.
657

277
Facing with these multiple problems and weak government, the Pakistani population turn
to their kin and biradari to support their economy. In theory, members of a biradari are coresidents of a single village. In some areas, however, land fragmentation and generations of outmigration have led to the dispersal of many members of the biradari among various villages,
regions, and cities. Patrilineal kin continue to maintain ties with their natal village and enjoy the
legal right of first refusal in any biradari land sale.660
Members of a biradari celebrate the major life events together. Patrilineal kin are
expected to contribute food and to help with guests in the ceremonies accompanying birth,
marriage, death, and major religious holidays. The biradari has traditionally served as a combined
mutual aid society and welfare agency, arranging loans to members, assisting in finding
employment, and contributing to the dowries of poorer families.661
Kinship is central to the weakness of the Pakistani state, but also to its stability, above all
because of its relationship with class. Because the Pakistani political elites, especially in the
countryside, rely for their strength not just on wealth but their leadership of clans of kinship
networks, kinship plays a vital part in maintaining the dominance of the ‘feudal elites and many
of the urban bosses.
By helping to enforce on the elites a certain degree of responsibility for their followers,
and circulating patronage downwards, kinship also plays a role in softening-to a limited extentclass domination. Kinship is therefore partially responsible for Pakistan’s surprisingly low rating
of social inequality according to the Gini Co-efficient. In both these ways, kinship is a critical antirevolutionary force, whether the revolution is of a socialist or Islamist variety.
On the other hand, urbanization and economic development have given ordinary people
in much of northern and central Punjab more significant opportunities to exploit the system for
their advantage. The power of the big landowners and tribal chiefs has been much reduced and
has shifted to lower and much more numerous strata of rival landowners and local bosses. This
situation gives people more chance to extract benefits by switching between them. Urbanization
has also reduced the role of kinship, though not as greatly as standard models predict.
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Lieven argues that a combination of the weakness of the state and the power of kinship
is one critical reason why urbanization has had much smaller impact on political patterns and
structure that one might otherwise expect. For in the cities, albeit not as much as in the
countryside, you also need protection from the police, the courts and political linked urban
gangs.” Moreover, rather than new urban population emerging, what we have seen so far is vast
numbers of peasants going to live in the cities while remaining peasants culturally. They remain
deeply attached to their kinship groups. They still need their kinship groups to help them for
many of the same reasons they needed them in the countryside. Underlying all of this is the fact
that so much of the urban population remains semi-employed, rather than moving into modern
sectors of the economy-because these usually do not exist.662
Conclusion: contention and conservative society in Pakistan
The underlying assumption behind the Islamization project since the 1980s was in an
Islamic setting, the state will be responsible for fulfilling the needs of every citizen with enough
protection against any worries. Also, the mandatory systemic change had been the main theme
of Islamization of Pakistan. Consequently, there has been continuous tension between the
theocratic element of the state represented by Sharia Court and the ruling regimes- after Zia-ulHaq until the present days. The Sharia Court judgment decreed that the whole economic system
must be based on interest-free instruments. Meanwhile, various regimes after Zia-ul-Haq have
stalled full application of this order. Multiple ways of delaying implementation and modifying the
injunctions have been found. Legal battles over interpretation have been fought and subtle ways
found to avoid a clash over the order to convert to an “Islamic economy.”
As a social product, Islamic insurance has been promoted as an Islamic alternative to
conventional insurance, which considered to be suitable for Islamic society such as Pakistan.
There has been a growing awareness among the educated and urban professionals. However, it
continuously receives low support within the general Pakistani society. Most people still rely on
traditional methods for risk mitigation and financial protection. Moreover, the state, feudal lords,
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and tribal and religious communities still hold prominence role in providing that protection. Like
Indonesian society, Pakistanis have a low trust in the private sector concerning providing
insurance. There is a general agreement, particularly among the Ulama (clergy) in Pakistan that
the insurance business should be based on mutual help and without any intention of making a
profit. Any insurance arrangement, which was not of the mutual type, will not be acceptable in
Islam. Therefore, the adoption of private-based Islamic insurance model has not received wide
support among the people of Pakistan.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research is to understand the development gap of Islamic insurance
between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. The central question is, why have Islamic insurance
systems developed well in some countries, but not in others. Malaysia has shown a significant
growth rate in Islamic insurance demand and outpacing conventional insurance, while Indonesia
and Pakistan are still standing far behind Malaysia. Previous studies as already highlighted in the
introduction and literature review chapters cannot fully explain the reason why the government
and its people supporting or rejecting Islamic insurance as an accepted policy and normative
practice within the country. This dissertation is the first such comparative study of the political
and societal determinants for the development of Islamic insurance in three Muslim majority
countries in Asia.
This dissertation draws on secondary works in several other disciplines in order to answer
the research question. Not just political science and history, but this dissertation also utilizes
insights from anthropology, economics, sociology, and religious studies. The design of this study
mostly follows a qualitative research methodology, specifically case study and combines a range
of primarily qualitative approaches. It analyzes political parties and coalition platforms,
organizations’ charters, and press releases to trace contemporary and prior political norms,
priorities, and strategies. Ethnographic and historical studies, documents, and secondary sources
help to understand the social and cultural circumstances. Quantitative resources, such as survey
data and statistics are used when possible. The paragraphs below provide a summary of the
findings in more detail, set recommendations for future research, and a reflection on the overall
dissertation process.
The elite, the niche, and the neglected
Islamic insurance is part of the whole package of Islamization, which dated back to the
1980s. The global events of the oil boom and the Iranian revolution, and the rise of revivalist
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movements within the Muslim societies created a ‘double pressures’ of Islamization demand to
the states, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. After several decades of the Islamization
process, these three countries have achieved different results in their Islamic insurance
development. Upon critical review of the preliminary data, it was discovered that Islamic
insurance system in all three countries produced different results not only quantitatively, but also
qualitatively.
Malaysia has shown a significant growth rate in Islamic insurance demand and outpacing
conventional insurance, while other countries, including Indonesia and Pakistan are still standing
far behind Malaysia. In 2015, Malaysia continued to be the largest Islamic insurance market in
South East Asia, with a 62% market share and the largest Family Takaful market globally.
Indonesia Islamic insurance sector recently has been showing significant growth by having a
contribution of 19% of the total regional market. While Pakistan is falling behind with Islamic
insurance comprised just about 2% of the insurance sector in Pakistan as at December 2015, this
number was still quite small compared to Malaysia and Indonesia within the same year.
Regarding the regulatory frameworks, all three countries have enacted specific laws for
the regulation of Islamic insurance though Malaysia has a fully enacted Islamic Financial Services
Act while Indonesia and Pakistan have guidelines passed by their respective insurance regulatory
body. Malaysia only permits stand-alone (fully-fledged) Islamic insurance operators, while
Indonesia and Pakistan are currently still allowing for Islamic insurance window operations.
All three countries insist on the existence of a Sharia supervisory board for an Islamic
insurance operator to ensure Sharia compliance. Malaysia develops a sophisticated network of
government agencies, businesses practitioners, and religious institutions to create a national
platform and standard. Indonesia state provides the necessary legal framework for Islamic
insurance to operate in its jurisdiction. However, it gives autonomy to the non-state religious
institution of DSN-MUI to give detail guidelines. In Pakistan, the state very much dominates the
regulatory process, and there is less participation from the business community and the public
at large.
Regarding dispute resolution mechanism to cater to Islamic insurance-related disputes,
in Malaysia, there is in a place known as the Muamalat Bench in the High Court to entertain such
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disputes and a Financial Mediation Bureau that provides arbitration services for disputes arising
from Islamic financial matters including those from Islamic insurance. In Indonesia, the religious
court has authority in solving any dispute related to Islamic insurance and other Islamic financial
related transactions. In Pakistan, though a similar court has not been created the Small Disputes
Resolution Committee sits in significant cities and entertains Islamic insurance-related disputes.
Despite the differences in detail numbers, statistic growth, and features mentioned
thoroughly in the previous chapters, there is one primary qualitative difference need to be
highlighted. Islamic insurance in Malaysia, developed as a systematic national program, has
achieved maturity and elite status at the global level. In Indonesia, the service is continually
growing but within a limited scope. It is more precise to describe Islamic insurance in Indonesia
as a growing niche market. Pakistan’s Islamic insurance came later and had slower growth
compared to the two countries mentioned earlier.
This dissertation founds that the coalitional politics behind the decision of political actors
to embrace and regulate Islamic insurance as a state’s policy and the economic ethics of the
societies behind their acceptance (or rejection) of Islamic insurance in their daily lives influence
the development gap of Islamic insurance between the three countries.
Firstly, both Malaysia and Pakistan chose to co-opt the Islamization agenda. However,
they achieved different results. The successful co-optation in Malaysia owed to the ability of
Malaysian leaders to harmonize Islamization with economic liberalization, which led to nationalwide support on the agenda. Pakistan failed because Islamization was used as an ideological tool
by the state to expand state power against social resistances within Pakistani society. As a result,
legal battles over interpretation have been fought and subtle ways found to avoid a clash over
the order to convert Pakistani economy to an “Islamic economy”. Indonesia took accommodation
policy as the state had to respond to the growing influence of the Muslim middle class, but at the
same time, it was constricted by the pluralistic nature of Indonesian polity. In sum, the country’s
fundamental political institutions construct these complex bargains made between various
groups within each country.
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Figure 6-1: The Political Life of Islamic Insurance
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Mahathir’s Islamization has led to state active participation to ensure uninterrupted
public support toward the regime and its liberal economic programs. The Islamization was also
intended to transform the Malay population’s socio-economic condition, but without disrupting
the very capitalist structure of the Malaysian economy. From a political perspective, encouraging
Islamic insurance has the advantage of demonstrating that Mahathir and UMNO remain
connected with his constituents’ Islamic roots. In addition, encouraging investment in Islamic
reinsurance has strong potential to reassure underwriters, possibly spurring new investment and
creating economic opportunities among Malays where Mahathir and UMNO draw the majority
of their support. Building a working Islamic insurance-backed economy, especially one without
massive state subsidies, would reinforce the transformation toward a modern and
entrepreneurial Malay society. Besides the state, the significant actors behind all of these
concerted efforts are a group of scholars with impeccable Islamic and technical expertise and
pedigrees. They are generally Sharia trained in the Middle East (most often the renowned AlAzhar University in Cairo) and PhDs in Islamic finance from universities in the West (often
Loughborough or Edinburgh), who proudly call themselves “Islamic business developers” and
“entrepreneurs.”
In Indonesia, Soeharto’s Islamization represented the limited role of the state in
accommodating the Islamization demand of a group of Muslim modernists in Indonesia, within
the context of its multicultural society. The initiative started as a micro-level experiment by a
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small group of Islamic economic enthusiast in Indonesian universities influenced by the global
spread of critical ideas toward the practices of a secular and capitalist economic development at
that time. It was a bottom-up initiative then later accommodated by the Indonesian state during
the last phase of the New Order regime.663 The changing environment of the New Order in the
1990s and afterward has provided a favorable circumstance for Islamic interest to advance their
politics as in social and cultural affairs, but it must be emphasized that this does not mean the
advance of a single, coherent ideology called ‘Islam’. In Indonesia, Islamic insurance is regulated
to accommodate the small number of the urban, middle class, and the modernist group of
Indonesian Muslims.
Theoretically, the Islamic state of Pakistan should provide the best ground for Islamic
insurance to develop. However, the underlying assumption behind the Islamization project since
the 1980s was in an Islamic setting, the state would be responsible for fulfilling the needs of every
citizen with enough protection against any worries. This assumption has made the Islamists
focused more on the creation of an Islamic welfare state, instead of developing private-based
Islamic insurance. Also, the mandatory systemic change had been the main theme of Islamization
of Pakistan. Consequently, there has been continuous tension between the theocratic element
of the state represented by Sharia Court and the ruling regimes- after to Zia-ul-Haq until the
present days. Legal battles over interpretation have been fought and subtle ways found to avoid
a clash over the order to convert to an “Islamic economy.”
Moreover, redistribution policies play a significant role in a weak and patrimonial state
like Pakistan. As the state implements redistributive policies, its capacity grows, and by
implication, its penetration of society deepens.664 In overall, the Islamic economy program in
Pakistan, including Islamic insurance, would receive enough state support only when it enhances
the political goals of the ruling regime.
Secondly, at the social level, the economic ethics of the societies are the reasons behind
their acceptance (or rejection) of Islamic insurance in their daily lives. The new Malay class has
reshaped ‘Islam’ as a new entrepreneurial and corporate ethics, which is supportive of the
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development of Islamic insurance in Malaysia. Meanwhile, the robust civic tradition in Indonesia
has developed a critical attitude toward the private-based scheme of Islamic insurance. Lastly,
Pakistan religious conservatism, counter-intuitively, mostly ignore the modern scheme of Islamic
insurance.

Figure 4-2: The Social Life of Islamic Insurance
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The Malays has re-articulated their kampong values-sharing, fairness, equality, and
balance- into a modern and entrepreneurial society of Malays. Entrepreneurship has become the
primary vector of ethnic, religious, and moral worth, and a test of virtue and modernity among
the new Malay middle class.665 This type of society of market Islam seeks less to create
commensurability between Islam and democracy. It is instead designed to merge Muslim
religious practice and capitalist ethics.666 In Malaysia, Islamic insurance has been widely accepted
as it represents the idiom for piety, self-reliant, and care responsibility within the family.
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Although, this attitude seems similar to the Calvinist ethics, Muslim scholars in Malaysia argue
that Islamic insurance is unique. In general, the revival of Islamic principles in Malaysian Muslims
economic life produces new Islamic norms, identities, ethics, and practices that manifested itself
in Muslims’ engagement in the markets while still maintaining their Islamic ritual devotions and
conservative attitude.
In Indonesia, the emphasis on social benefit has been the primary goal of Islamic economy
for many activist-minded of the pioneer of Islamic economy. For many Indonesians, the moral
concerns such as addressing poverty, inequality, and economic injustice, must be the main
parameter of the success of any Islamic financial institutions, including Islamic insurance. Those
social justice values, and not merely legal requirements and profitability of insurance are the
priority in defining their economy.
At this moment, many Indonesian Muslims are reluctant to support and subscribe to
Islamic insurance premium because the model has not clearly distinguished itself as an
alternative for capitalism and foreign economic domination. According to many Indonesian
Muslims, Islamic insurance should inculcate the spirit of self-help, solidarity, and cooperation
rather than mere economic benefits. Therefore, some Islamic insurance companies in Indonesia
have been developing insurance-linked products, which combine financial protection with socioreligious investment to attract Muslim consumers. Others set up a collaboration with Islamic
NGOs to deliver micro Islamic insurance to the poor population of Indonesia.
As a social product, Islamic insurance has been promoted as an Islamic alternative to
conventional insurance, which considered being suitable for Islamic society such as Pakistan.
There has been a growing awareness among educated and urban professionals. However, it
continuously receives low support within the general Pakistani society. Most people still rely on
traditional methods for risk mitigation and financial protection. Moreover, the state, feudal lords,
and tribal and religious communities still hold prominence role in providing that protection.
Similar to Indonesian society, Pakistanis have low trust in the private sector giving financial
protection. There is a general agreement, particularly among the Ulama (clergy) in Pakistan that
the insurance business should be based on mutual help and without any intention of making a
profit. Any insurance arrangement, which was not of the mutual type, will not be acceptable in
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Islam. Therefore, the adoption of private-based Islamic insurance model has not received
extensive support among the people of Pakistan.
Moving forward
Ira Lapidus once said that the economically defined social classes were relatively less
significant. He stated:
…(historically) the role of indigenous elites, institutions, and cultures in determining the
pattern of development must be emphasized because of some important differences
between Muslim and European societies. In the 19th and 20th centuries, European
societies were to a considerable extent organized in terms of economically derived social
classes. In many European countries, bourgeois elites were the principal forces behind
economic development, state organization, and world conquest. Industrial working
classes were a principal force in production. In Muslim societies, economically defined
social classes were relatively less significant. In these societies, the economy was
embedded in and regulated by tribal, communal, associational, and state political
structures. State elites -and tribal and religious notables- used political power to control
land and trading resources and to extract the surplus product of peasants and other
producers.”667
Our case studies confirm this statement. The economically defined social classes were not
the dominant actor in the Islamization of insurance in Indonesia, Pakistan, and even in liberal
Malaysia. The high degree of modernization through its latest neoliberal economic development
does not necessarily remove the communal pattern and state political structure of Malaysia.
Some scholars to describe the process introduce the term ‘ethnicized neoliberalism’. The
government and ethnic collectives continue to strategically use these liberal economic
development models for the social and political positioning of these ethnic groups in
contemporary Malaysia.668
Nonetheless, are there any market systems in the world that are free from any of this
distinctive cultural pattern, anyway? In order to exist, the market needs to have certain customs
and rules, which then bring identities, norms, associations based on tribal ties, ethnicity, religion,
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or gender in the process. Islamic insurance is not merely a process of calculating the risks and
compensating damage, but it is also a cultural process where people construct the meaning of
their faith, fate, and good faith within their social interaction.
Furthermore, this dissertation provides rich, thick description and analysis of the
phenomena of Islamic insurance in three countries. Therefore, it cannot generalize the result for
broader population. Its reliance on secondary sources has created another challenge. Malaysia
has huge resources on Islamic insurance compared to Indonesia and Pakistan. Therefore, more
field works are needed, particularly in the case of Pakistan, to expand this research further.
Potentially, future studies can assess other countries using the similar approach. This
dissertation links the Islamic insurance development of the three countries to the quality of the
prior colonial institutions. As Timur Kuran suggests, there is a need to have more research on
Muslim majority countries who escaped colonization, such as Iran and Turkey. 669 Studying their
Islamic insurance institutions might bring more insight into the performance of Islamic economic
institutions in general. In addition, it may be interesting to deepen our understanding of the
nature of religion and risk by making a comparison with other late modernizers with strong
religious-based communities such as China, India, and Latin America. This dissertation should
inform the scholars of religious studies that the social, economic and political processes can be
as important as the religious doctrines in informing the individual decision of participating in any
risk management mechanism.
Similarly, this dissertation should convince Islamic economists and Islamic business
practitioners that Islamic insurance is a complex phenomenon that requires wide ranging
intellectual input beyond the confines of business and economics.670 They should seek for greater
inter-disciplinary ties and impact for the socio-historical study of Islamic insurance. The
development of Islamic insurance in a country does not only depend on the economic
improvement or other macro-economic factors, but also on the dynamic of socio-political
environment of the country.
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For practical recommendation, the supporters of Islamic economic movement might like
to design insurance frameworks based on the local political and social circumstances in the light
of findings of this study. For some countries, the faith-based non-profit health care ministry in
the US may serve as a better model than the current private-based Islamic insurance.
Strengthening regulation and empowering the non-profit organizations for a country with strong
civic tradition such as Indonesia can be an alternative route for developing an Islamic but also an
indigenous mechanism to protect the population against economic insecurity. This strategy may
be more successful too for a country such as Pakistan that has strong tradition of charity.
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Evidence from Malaysia." International Review of Business Research Papers 5 (2009): 193211.
Redzuan, H., "Analysis of the Demand for Life Insurance and Family Takaful " Australian Academy
of
Business
and
Social
Sciences
Conference,
2014,
https://www.aabss.org.au/system/files/published/AABSS2014_290.pdf. .

304
Regan, Matt. "Imagining Indonesia: A Requiem for Benedict Anderson." (31 January 2016).
Accessed
23
May
2018.
https://publicpolicyindonesia.wordpress.com/2016/01/31/imagining-indonesia-arequiem-for-benedict-anderson/.
“1992 'Report on Islamic Insurance'.” Council of Islamic Ideology. Islamabad: Council of Islamic
Ideology, Pakistan,1992
“Resolutions and Recommendations of the Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy 1985-2000.” The
Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy. Accessed August 8, 2018.
https://uaelaws.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/resolutions-and-recommendations-ofthe-council-of-the-islamic-fiqh-academy.pdf
Ricklefs, M. C. "Islamizing Indonesia: Religion and Politics in Singapore's Giant Neighbour." Public
Lecture (2004). https://ari.nus.edu.sg/Assets/repository/files/events/ARIPublicLecture23Sep2004-MCRicklefs.pdf.
Ricklefs, M. C. Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious
History, C. 1930 to Present. Singapore: NUS Press, 2012.
Rieck, Andreas. The Shias of Pakistan: An Assertive and Beleaguered Minority. Oxford University
Press, 2015.
Rosser, Andrew James. "Indonesia: Oligarchic Capitalism." In Oxford Handbook on Asian Business
System, edited by Michael A. Witt and Gordon Redding: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Rudnyckyj, Daromir. "Islamic Finance and the Afterlives of Development in Malaysia." PoLAR:
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 37, no. 1 (2014 2014): 69-88.
Ruggie, John Gerard. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in
the Postwar Economic Order." International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 379-415.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300018993.
Saefuddin, A.M. Studi Nilai-Nilai Sistem Ekonomi Islam. Jakarta: Media Da'wah, 1984.
as-Sadr, Baqr. Our Economics. WOFIS, 1994.
Salman, Syed. "Contemporary Marketing Issues in Takaful." International Journal of Economic
Perspectives 8, no. 4 (2014): 13-18.
Santiago, Jose. "What Do People Really Think About Capitalism?" (11 November 2015). Accessed
2 November 2018. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/what-do-people-reallythink-about-capitalism/.

305
Sawada, Y. "Disasters, Household Decisions, and Insurance Mechanisms: A Review of Evidence
and a Case Study from a Developing Country in Asia." Asian Economic Policy Review 12
(2017): 18-40.
Schmith, Scott. Islamic Banking Experiencing Rapid Growth. International Trade Administration,
2005.
Sherif, M. and N. A. Shaairi. "Determinants of Demand on Family Takaful in Malaysia." Journal of
Islamic Accounting and Business Research 4, no. 1 (2013): 26-50.
Sherif, M., & N. A. Shaairi. “Determinants of demand on family Takaful in Malaysia.” Journal of
Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 4(1), (2013):26-50.
ash-Shiddiqie, M. Nejatullah. Asuransi Di Dalam Islam. Translated by Ta'lim Musafir. Bandung:
Penerbit Pustaka, 1987.
Shome, Anthony and Syahira Hamidon. "The Contradiction of Entrepreneurship through
Affirmative Action: The Case of Malaysia." The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 27,
no. 1 (2009): 38-66.
Siddiqi, Farhan Hanif. The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic
Movements. Routledge, 2012.
Simon, Jonathan. "The Emergence of a Risk Society-Insurance, Law, and the State." Socialist
Review, no. 95 (1987): 60-89.
Sinanović, Ermin. "Islamic Revival as Development: Discourses on Islam, Modernity, and
Democracy since the 1950s." Politics, Religion & Ideology 13, no. 1 (2012): 3-24.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2012.659500.
Sloane, Patricia. Islam, Modernity and Entrepreneurship among the Malays. Palgrave Macmillan
UK, 1999.
Sloane-White, Patricia. "Islamic Finance and Muslim Capitalist Modernity in Malaysia." The
Caravan,
1715
(27
September
2017).
Accessed
18
April
2018.
https://www.hoover.org/research/islamic-finance-and-muslim-capitalist-modernitymalaysia
Sloane-White, Patricia. Corporate Islam [E-Book] Sharia and the Modern Workplace. 2017.
Smyth, Mark. "Islamic Finance in an Almost Postcrisis and Postrevolutionary World: As in Politics,
All Islamic Finance Is Local." In Contemporary Islamic Finance: Innovations, Applications,
and Best Practices, edited by Karen Hunt-Ahmed. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2013.

306
Sojung, C. Park, Lemaire Jean, and Chua Choong Tze. "Is the Design of Bonus-Malus Systems
Influenced by Insurance Maturity or National Culture? — Evidence from Asia." The
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice 35, no. S1 (2010): S7.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/gpp.2010.37.
Souiden, Nizar and Yosr Jabeur. "The Impact of Islamic Beliefs on Consumers’ Attitudes and
Purchase Intentions of Life Insurance." 33, no. 4 (2015): 423-41.
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1108/IJBM-01-2014-0016.
Staff, Verdict. "Indonesia Hits the "Sweet Spot" for Life Insurance Growth." (2016). Accessed 28
April 2019. https://www.verdict.co.uk/life-insurance-international/features/indonesiahits-the-sweet-spot-for-life-insurance-growth-5036980/.
Stasavage, D. and K. Scheve. "Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance." Quaterly Journal of
Political Science 1 (2006): 255-86.
Strange, Susan. The Retreat of the State the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. New York:
New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Suharso, Yudi. "UU No 40 Perasuransian Diharapkan Angkat Industri Asuransi Syariah." Last
modified
27
May
2015.
Accessed
7
February
2019.
http://keuangansyariah.mysharing.co/cat/keuangan-syariah/.
“Sun Life Financial Indonesia Launches Waqf Feature for Shariah Insurance Product." Sun Life.
Last
modified
August,
2017.
Accessed
27
June,
2019.
https://www.sunlife.co.id/ID/About+us/Newsroom/Press+releases/2017/Sun+Life+Fina
ncial+Indonesia+Launches+Waqf+Feature+for+Shariah+Insurance+Product?vgnLocale=e
n_CA.
Swartz, Nico P. and Pieter Coetzer. "Takaful: An Islamic Insurance Instrument." Journal of
Development and Agricultural Economics 2, no. 10 (2010): 333-39.
Tajuddin, Azlan. Malaysia in the World Economy (1824-2011) : Capitalism, Ethnic Divisions, and
"Managed" Democracy. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012.
“Takaful Insurance Booms in Malaysia." Life Insurance International. Accessed 10 January 2018.
Talbot, Ian. Pakistan, a Modern History. Expanded and updated ed. New York, NY : Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005.
Tanuwidjaja, Sunny. "Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the
Evidence of Islam’s Political Decline." Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of
International and Strategic Affairs 32, no. 1 (2010): 29-49.

307
Teo, John. "1 Care: Show Us the Mathematics." The Malaysian Insider (19 February 2012).
Accessed 18 April 2018. https://blog.limkitsiang.com/2012/02/19/1-care-show-us-themathematics/.
“Textile Division." Textile Industry Division Government of Pakistan. Last modified Accessed April
24, 2019. http://www.textile.gov.pk/.
Thaha, Idris. Islam Dan Pdi Perjuangan: Akomodasi Aspirasi Politik Umat. Gramedia, 2018.
Thanasegaran, Haemala and Mohammed Shaiban. "Harmonisation of Takaful (Islamic Insurance)
Regulation- a Realistic Goal or Improbable Ideal?" Singapore Journal of Legal Studies
(2014): 328-54.
Thanasegaran, Haemala. "Growth of Islamic Insurance (Takaful) in Malaysia: A Model for the
Region?" Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2008): 143-64.
Thee Kian Wie. Indonesia's Economy since Independence. Singapore: ISEAS-Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2012.
Tocqueville. Democracy in America. edited by Harvey Mansfield and trans. Delba Winthrop, ed.,.
Chicago: University Chicago Press, 2000.
Tolefat, Abdulrahman Khalil and Mehmet Asutay. Takaful Investment Portfolios : A Study of the
Composition of Takaful Funds in the Gcc and Malaysia. New York: New York: John Wiley
& Sons, Incorporated, 2013.
Touwen, Jeroen. Extremes in the Archipelago: Trade and Economic Development in the Outer
Islands of Indonesia, 1900-1942. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001.
Treerattanapun, Aranee. "The Impact of Culture on Non-Life Insurance Consumption." Wharton
Research Scholars 78 (2011).
Tripp, Charles. Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Tuominen, Mary. "The Hidden Organization of Labor: Gender, Race/Ethnicity and Childcare Work
in the Formal and Informal Economy." Sociological Perspectives 37, no. 2 (1994): 229-45.
Utami, Srikandi. "What Does the Future Hold for the Takaful Industry in Indonesia " (2014).
Venardos, Angelo M. Islamic Banking and Finance in South-East Asia: Its Development & Future,
3rd Ed. Asia Pacific Business Series; V. 6. Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific,
2012.
Wahab, Abdul Rahim Abdul, "Takaful Developments in Pakistan & Challenges Globally." Amana
Takaful Conference, Sri Lanka, 22 November 2011, 2011.

308
Waldman, Steven. "Is the Health Insurance Industry Immoral?" the Wall Street Journal. August 5,
2009.
Accessed
13
October
2018,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124950683016308929.
Wan Norhayate Wan, Daod, Arifin Noor Mizan, Zainol Fakhrul Anwar, Salleh Fauzilah, and
Noekman Erwin. A Comparative Analysis on Takaful Acts between Malaysia and
Indonesia. 1st Aceh Global Conference (AGC 2018): Atlantis Press, 2019.
Warde, Ibrahim Islamic Finance in the Global Economy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2000.
Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Vol. 1. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1924.
Weightman, Barbara A. Dragons and Tigers: A Geography of South, East, and Southeast Asia.
Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2002.
Weiss, Meredith L. Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society Amd Coalitions for Political Change in
Malaysia. Stanford University Press, 2005.
Weni, Hawariyuni and Salleh Marhanum Che Mohd. "Modeling the Demand for Family and
General Takaful in Malaysia (a Comparative Study): Ardl Approach to Cointegration."
Tazkia Islamic Finance and Business Review 7, no. 1 (2012).
“Who

We Are." Islamic Development
https://www.isdb.org/who-we-are.

Bank.

Accessed

18

February,

2018.

World

Atlas. "Ethnic Groups of Malaysia." Accessed 16 January
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ethnic-groups-of-malaysia.html.

2018.

The World Factbook.“South Asia: Pakistan.” Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Last
updated
July
30,
2019.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/pk.html
“The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity.” Pew Research Center. Last updated 9 August 2012.
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2012/08/the-worldsmuslims-full-report.pdf
“World

Overview."
World
Insurance
Factbook.
Accessed
7
June
https://pdfslide.net/documents/2015-international-insurance-factbook-iii.html

2018.

“World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision”. Worldometers. 2017.
“World Takaful Report 2016.” Middle East Global Advisors. Accessed 28 April 2018.
http://www.takafulprimer.com/main/downloads/ms_5860.pdf

309
“World Takaful Report 2016: Connecting the Dots, Forging the Future.” Middle East Global
Advisor & Finance Forward. Accessed 19 May 2018.
http://www.takafulprimer.com/main/downloads/ms_5860.pdf
Yaacob, Hisham. Waqf History and Legislation in Malaysia: A Contemporary Perspective. Vol. 3,
2013.
Yasmeen Niaz Mohiuddin. Islamization and Liberalization of the Economy under the Military
Government of General Muhammad Zia-Ul-Haq: 1977-1988. Pakistan: A Global Studies
Handbook. Washington DC: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2007.
Yazid, A. S., J. Arifin, M. R. Hussin, and W. N. Wan Daud. "Determinants of Family Takaful (Islamic
Life Insurance) Demand: A Conceptual Framework for a Malaysian Study." International
Journal of Business and Management 7, no. 6 (2012): 155-27.
Y-Sing, Liau. "Malaysian Body Creates New Islamic Reinsurance Model." (18 March 2010).
Accessed 5 January 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-islamic-financialretakaful/malaysian-body-creates-new-islamic-reinsurance-modelidUSTRE62H2F420100318.
Yusof, Dato' Mohd Fadzli, "Shariah Overview of Takaful." The International Takaful Summit,
London, 30 June, 2009, https://issuu.com/takafulprimer/docs/1015-fadzli.
Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. Islam in Pakistan: A History. Princeton University Press, 2018.
Zerriaa, Mouna and Hedi Noubbigh. "Determinants of Life Insurance Demand in the Mena
Region." Geneva Papers on Risk & Insurance 41, no. 3 (2016): 491-511.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/gpp.2016.1.
Ziring, Lawrence and Shahid Javed Burki. Pakistan. April 12, 2019 ed.: Encyclopædia Britannica,
inc., 2019.
Zoli, Corri and Emily Schneider. "How Islamic Is Pakistan’s Constitution?" Foreign Policy, May 15,
2014.

310

VITA

Muhammad S. Rahman is a Fulbright Scholar Program at Graduate Program for
International Studies (GPIS) of Old Dominion University (ODU), Norfolk, Virginia. His study
interest focuses on the theme of how religious communities respond to globalization. He is also
Lecturer on (study) leave at International Relations Study Program at President University of
Indonesia.
He earned my BA in Political Science from Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia in 2005
with a BA thesis on a neo-Gramscian analysis of the Zapatista movement in Mexico. He received
my MA in International Relations from the University of Groningen, the Netherlands supported
by the StuNed program in 2010. His MA thesis examines the role of China as a responsible
stakeholder in the International Financial System.
In addition, he has been actively involved in Muslim Students Association of ODU where
he served as its President from 2014 to 2016. He utilized systemic thinking and social innovation
to address the problems, especially in building social justice and inclusion as an effort to challenge
the current discourse of Islamophobia.

